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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses pension reform strategies since the 1990s across the OECD using a new 
approach. The thesis utilises existing data available in Pensions at a Glance and ISSA 
Country Profiles to construct a new dataset which allows us to explore pension reforms both 
comparatively and historically among OECD countries. Using fuzzy-set ideal type analysis 
(FSITA), this thesis constructs a new categorisation that captures trends towards the 
socialisation and individualisation of social risks for pension reforms across the OECD from 
the 1990s to the mid-2010s.  
 
Based on contextual and empirical analysis, this thesis reveals the following findings. First, 
the fuzzy-set analysis reveals that individualisation reforms were the most dominant trend 
for the last 25 years. However, this was not the whole story. Both the socialisation of social 
risks and stability was observed. Secondly, deterministic path-dependence was not observed 
in pension reforms as reform strategies converged regardless of regimes or pension 
typologies. Lastly, the relationship between old-age poverty and pension reforms are 
identified. Building up on Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) findings, the study indicates that 
the poverty levels of older people could be one of the influential factors that shape pension 
reforms within the prevailing pressure of fiscal austerity.     
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Chapter 1 : Introduction  
 
Contemporary welfare states are facing a considerable challenge in balancing sustainability 
and adequacy in welfare support. The current period is clearly distinct from previous eras of 
welfare, commonly known as ‘the golden age’ and ‘retrenchment’ of welfare states. From 
the end of the Second World War to the 1960s, most welfare states experienced dramatic 
expansion and developed social insurance programmes. National variations existed, but the 
period was generally characterised by encompassing welfare support against social risks. 
However, such a high commitment to social risks was replaced by the discourse of austerity 
in the 1970s and 1980s. With new social risks and political pressure, most welfare states 
emphasised the responsibility of individuals in managing social risks. Benefit cuts, 
tightening eligibility criteria, and a residual approach were a common practice of this time. 
These eras of ‘the golden age’ and ‘retrenchment’ were succeeded by attempts to prevent 
poverty and unemployment through the expansion of social investment measures since the 
1990s.  
 
As the social investment approach has swiftly spread, considerable policy shifts can be seen 
in many welfare states. These welfare reforms go beyond the single dichotomy of expansion 
or retrenchment. They are often comprised of multiple policies that have different – even 
contradictory at times – aims and effects in securing economic participation and high-paid 
jobs. Package deals, combined reforms, and political exchange and social pacts are important 
terms that explain the pattern of welfare reforms of the time (Häusermann, 2012: 116). In 
other words, welfare retrenchment and restructuring have been co-present in various policy 
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areas. In pension reforms, for example, retrenchment measures such as benefit cuts, raising 
the pension age and changes in indexation have been introduced, but other types of reforms 
such as restructuring pension systems also have been widely witnessed (Clasen, 2005: 93-
94). Such complexity can be also detected through poverty data from the Luxembourg 
Income Study, LIS. From 1990 to 2010, those countries showing high poverty rates in the 
total population also show high poverty rates among older people, and vice versa. However, 
some interesting cases can also be observed. For instance, Greece has significantly decreased 
poverty among older people since 2000, despite the moderate change in poverty rates in the 
overall population. Hungary, Norway, and Poland demonstrate poverty alleviation in the 
older population whilst poverty rates increased in the overall population. Conversely, some 
countries like Switzerland show increasing poverty in older people despite of the overall 
decrease in poverty in the total population. From this data, we can expect a variation in 
government interventions in pensions. In fact, a wide range of poverty-reduction effects is 
observed in social security transfers across OECD countries, ranging from 99% to 13% in 
2010. This implies that pensions play a very different role in different welfare states. 
 
These changing dynamics of welfare states thus demand a new approach and new concepts 
in analysing the complexity of welfare state development. As Kvist (2007: 200) argues, 
changes in welfare states since the mid-1990s cannot be captured by a unilinear, one-
dimensional conception. Therefore, the prevailing terms of ‘welfare state expansion’ and 
‘welfare state retrenchment’ are not sufficient to capture this complexity. A focus solely on 
these concepts could result in a narrow and restrictive approach (Clasen, 2005: 94) which  
might demonstrate the ‘big picture’ of welfare reform but not the underlying dynamics of 
change. In this regard, this thesis utilises two alternative concepts in analysing pension 
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reforms in recent decades: the socialisation and the individualisation of risks. Both concepts 
are interwoven with the economic principles of Keynesianism and neo-liberalism (Beck, 
2002; Esping-Andersen, 1994; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Pierson, 2006; Taylor-Gooby, 2009) 
and highlight respectively ties with T.H. Marshall’s work on social rights and libertarian 
approaches that emphasise individualism. Taking into consideration that among the main 
functions of welfare states is the ‘management of social risks’, and that social policy 
represents the public management of social risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 36), these 
concepts might be useful in capturing the dynamics of welfare state reform.  
 
Applying this analytical framework, this thesis is devoted to analysing the trend of pension 
reforms since the 1990s. There are several reasons for this choice. First, the period of time 
is an interesting era for comparative study as the socialisation and individualisation of risks 
co-existed in many policy areas. The available literature on welfare state reform since the 
1990s tends to focus on the trend of the individualisation of risks to indicate and capture the 
changes from the previous phase of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1982). In doing so, the 
socialisation of risks has received much less attention among contemporary researchers. 
Social investment is widely discussed, but it is often represented by activation policies that 
foster labour market participation. This thesis shows that the trend of the socialisation of 
risks in current welfare states is far more extensive than this contemporary approach 
acknowledges, and has relevance to a broader range of policy areas, including pensions. In 
this sense, this thesis fills a gap in the existing literature.  
 
In addition, the dynamics of pension systems since the 1990s are not fully explored in much 
of the comparative welfare states literature. With increasing budgetary stress, pensions have 
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become a critical issue in most welfare states. Many of them adapted retrenchment measures 
transferring responsibility from the state to individuals from the 1970s, and this trend of 
individualisation has continued to this day. On the other hand, the growing needs of old-age 
protection have been gradually observed in many countries. Emerging new social risks and 
the concerns over poverty among the older population have formed the ground for 
socialisation reforms, despite continued fiscal austerity. In this circumstance, the social 
investment perspective since the 1990s recognises pension systems as a part of ‘flexicurity’ 
(Hinrichs & Jessoula, 2012: 4-5). This means that pensions function as a final safety net for 
those who are not fully active under the social investment perspective. In this respect, 
pensions are a traditional passive income protection, but also serve to facilitate social 
investment. Therefore, a view that considers pensions just as the opposite concept of social 
investment is too simplistic (Hemerijck, 2013; Kvist, 2014). Social investment is no 
substitute for social protection, but they do complement each other (Hemerijck, 2013: 137). 
Nevertheless, much of the existing literature (Kuitto, 2016; Lister, 2004; Nikolai, 2012) on 
the social investment perspective does not seem to reflect these multi-dimensional aspects 
of pensions. In this vein, this thesis argues that it is necessary to pay attention to the 
complicated dynamics of pensions. For these reasons, this thesis explores pension reform 
since the 1990s. The scope of analysis is OECD countries, maximising the coverage of 
comparison. The analysis is based on data from 1990 to 2015 in order to include the most 
current data.   
 
In this regard, this thesis aims at answering the following research questions.   
▪ What are the trends in pension reforms among OECD countries since the 1990s? 
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▪ How can we categorise the variety of pension reform strategies adopted across the OECD 
since the 1990s?  
▪ How do pension reform strategies compare with existing welfare and pension typologies?  
▪ How can we explain reform pathways found across OECD countries?   
 
Data and methodology  
 
Very few data sources provide detailed comparative and historical information about pension 
systems. The OECD published the series Pensions at a Glance which provides a categorised 
summary of pension reforms since the early 1990s. Also, ISSA Country profiles provides 
comprehensive information on social security systems around the world. Despite the various benefits, 
employing these datasets for comparative research is challenging, as the data is spread over multiple 
volumes and criteria are not identical. Therefore, this thesis generates new criteria mainly based on 
Pensions at a Glance, and then carefully reshapes the data into a single comparative form. The ISSA 
Country profiles are applied as a complementary resource; cross-checking with Pensions at a Glance 
minimises the risk of missing information and errors in classification. This thesis then reclassifies all 
the data according to the unified category for pension reforms. In doing so, seven categories of 
subtypes of reforms are identified: coverage, adequacy, financial and fiscal sustainability, economic 
efficiency, administrative efficiency, diversification and security of investment.  
 
As a methodology, this thesis employs fuzzy-set ideal type analysis (FSITA). FSITA is a 
relatively recently developed methodology based on fuzzy-set theory. Fuzzy-set social 
science was first introduced by Zadeh (1965) and its horizons were broadened by Ragin 
(2000). It uses set-theoretic language to understand diverse and intertwined attributes of the 
social phenomenon. The fuzzy-set approach is ‘fuzzy’ in terms of its capacity to express 
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subtle differences in the subject. In contrast to crisp-set, it permits ‘shades of grey’ 
(fuzziness) beyond a simple dichotomy (Hudson & Kühner, 2009: 36; Ragin, 2000: 154). 
When considering that the real world is far from black and white, fuzzy-set theory can reflect 
the reality that we try to capture. FSITA became popular in comparative studies for the 
following numerous benefits (Hudson & Kühner, 2009; 2013; Kvist, 1999; 2007; Lee, 2011; 
2013; Vis, 2007).    
 
First, fuzzy-set analysis functions as a bridge between variable- and case-oriented studies. It 
sees cases within a holistic perspective in the manner of the case-oriented approach, without 
forsaking objectivity in diversity like the variable-oriented approach. In fuzzy-set analysis, 
researchers are able to reflect their substantive case knowledge in analysing data. The 
process of setting fuzzy-sets that generate ideal types, calibration, and interpretation is 
closely tied with theory. This is a significant advantage for this thesis. As addressed above, 
the main analysis of this thesis begins with generating comparative reform data based on 
substantive case knowledge. In addition, the fuzzy-set method is apt for comparative study 
with a limited set of cases. As Ragin (2000: 25) pointed out, a quantitative study requires 
more than 50 cases to identify generic patterns across observations. In a qualitative study, 
however, the number of cases is limited to one or two cases due to its in-depth focus. The 
fuzzy-set approach can overcome problems of measurement validity and precision, situating 
it as a reliable alternative for analysis that explores 10 to 30 cases (Kvist, 2007: 199; Ragin, 
2000: 23-25). Considering the subject of this thesis is 34 OECD countries, fuzzy-set analysis 
is the most appropriate method to analyse them. Furthermore, FSITA takes a configurational 
approach in recognition of social phenomena that consist of multiple conceptually rooted 
attributes. Researchers group cases into a relatively small number of configurations of 
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attributes and recognise each of them as different ‘kinds’ of cases. In doing so, it is possible 
to understand types of cases as different configurations of attributes (Ragin, 2000: 66). This 
attribute of FSITA allows us to accurately grasp complicated dynamics in pension reforms. 
This thesis argues that the dynamics of current welfare states are more complex than in 
previous eras, and consequently are difficult to understand with a single-dimensional 
approach. In this regard, this thesis suggests two dimensions of welfare dynamics in welfare 
states: the socialisation and individualisation of risks. By employing FSITA, we can 
recognise them as configurations that consist within pension reforms. The biggest advantage 
of FSITA is that it enables us to reflect the multi-dimensional attributes of pension reforms 
within the analysis. In this regard, this thesis generates typologies for pension reforms using 
FSITA, to answer the research questions.   
 
Thesis structure 
This thesis is structured as follows. It consists of two parts: a contextual part and an empirical 
analysis part. The first part is comprised of three chapters. It aims at providing contextual 
information on pension reforms across OECD countries based on a literature review and data 
analysis. Chapter Two (Changing welfare states) analyses the general trend of welfare state 
development. It begins with concern about the prevailing terms, ‘welfare expansion’ and 
‘welfare retrenchment’. Neither of these terms fully captures the complexity of changing 
welfare states as they employ a single-dimensional approach. As an alternative, this thesis 
suggests two concepts: the socialisation of risks and the individualisation of risks. These are 
two distinct flows observed in the development of welfare states in managing social risks. 
This thesis finds that the trend of socialising risks rose from the concept of citizenship and 
formed the bedrock of post-war welfare states. However, new social risks and pressures have 
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emerged since the 1970s. Neo-liberalism, combined with individualism and the 
individualisation of risks, became the dominant trend of the time. The next significant 
transition is witnessed in the 1990s with the introduction of the social investment perspective. 
The trend of individualisation has continued, but at the same time, the socialisation of risks 
is re-emphasised. The chapter concludes by arguing that this final phase requires more 
attention, as relatively little literature has explored the co-present nature of these different 
trends. Pensions are an interesting topic to analyse in particular, because of their significance 
in welfare states.    
 
Chapter Three (Welfare states and pension institutions in comparison) aims at summarising 
our existing knowledge on systematic comparisons of welfare states and pension systems. 
This thesis focuses on typologies for their economy of explanation. The chapter begins with 
exploring welfare regimes. Among others, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) work is considered as 
a modern classic. This chapter devotes space to examining his typology and relevant issues 
that surround it, including alternative regimes such as the Mediterranean, Antipodean, and 
East Asian models. In addition to this, this chapter will also explore contemporary debates 
in comparative welfare research such as the discussion on the social investment approach. 
The chapter then moves on to existing pension typologies, delineating the benefits and 
downsides of each. As these typologies function as a ‘snapshot’, this thesis explores the 
mechanisms of pension reforms in order to understand pensions within the passing of time. 
Earlier studies on the outcome of pension changes are also addressed. Finally, based on the 
understandings developed in this chapter, the chapter argues that it is necessary to generate 
a new typology to analyse pension reforms. Considering the research questions, the typology 
for this thesis needs to contain dimensions that acknowledge the socialisation and 
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individualisation of risks in order to accurately capture welfare dynamics. Also, the typology 
should be able to reflect specific institutional changes in pension systems, covering as many 
OECD countries as possible.  
 
Chapter Four (Poverty in older people and the welfare states) is the final contextual chapter 
of the thesis, computing poverty levels of welfare states since the 1990s. It aims at providing 
a ‘big picture’ of the role of pension systems in managing old-age risks. This chapter 
compares the economic situation of older people and the entire population using various 
poverty indicators. First, the process of measuring poverty and selecting indicators is 
addressed. What to measure, which level to set, and how to measure are important issues in 
accurately computing poverty levels. Secondly, the poverty trends of OECD countries since 
the 1990s are computed based on LIS microdata. Relative poverty rates, the poverty gap, 
and the squared poverty gap are provided. Then, this chapter demonstrates the relative 
poverty rates based on a decomposed income: factor income, income after social security 
transfers, and disposable income. It demonstrates a wide range of poverty-reduction effects 
in social security transfers across OECD countries. This implies that each OECD country 
employs income security systems very differently. Income security plays a vital role to 
combat poverty among the older population in some countries, whilst being reduced to only 
an ‘assistant’ role in others. Lastly, the old-age poverty level is compared to welfare regimes 
and pension typologies. This provides us with insights into the role of income security 
systems in relation to welfare regimes and pension institutions.   
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The second part of this thesis covers the empirical analysis of pension reform strategies. It 
also consists of three chapters. Chapter Five (Capturing pension reform strategies) 
demonstrates the process for generating the dataset for the principle analysis of this thesis. 
Employing existing data is not easy for this study, as it is necessary for the data to provide 
highly detailed information on institutional changes in pension systems. Considering the 
long period of time and the number of countries, only a few data sources are appropriate for 
this study. In this regard, the thesis extracts single criteria using the Pensions at a glance 
dataset from the OECD, and then carefully reshapes the existing data into a single 
comparative form. The ISSA Country profiles dataset is applied as a complementary resource. 
By doing so, this thesis generates a comparative dataset of pension reforms between 1990 
and 2015 that covers 34 OECD countries. The chapter then goes on to provide a descriptive 
analysis of the data. First, an overview of all the measures of pension reform for the last 25 
years is provided. The period is then divided into halves: 1990-2003 and 2004-2015. The 
overview of subtypes for coverage, adequacy and security of investment follows.  
 
Chapter Six (Categorising pension reform strategies: using fuzzy-set analysis) provides the 
main analysis of this thesis. Using the data from Chapter Five, this thesis generates 
typologies of pension reforms in order to analyse the trend of pension reforms. To begin, the 
research method, fuzzy-set ideal type analysis, is delineated. Then, the main analysis on 
pension reform is divided into two sections. The first section analyses the socialisation and 
individualisation of old-age risks in pension reforms. On the basis of the two dimensions 
from Chapter Two, two fuzzy-sets are identified. This gives us a total of four ideal types of 
pension reforms. The second section is an analysis of the three dimensions of socialisation. 
Compared to the literature on the trend of individualisation, only a few researchers have paid 
20 
 
attention to the socialisation of old-age risks in pension reforms. To fill this gap in knowledge, 
this thesis sheds light on the trend of the socialisation of old-age risks. Three elements – 
coverage, adequacy and security of investment – are employed as three dimensions and 
render a total of eight ideal types.  
 
Chapter Seven (Analysing pension reform strategies) introduces the findings from the results 
of the fuzzy-set ideal type analysis. Four findings are delineated: First, the result confirms 
that pension reforms from the 1990s onward are diverse configurations of the socialisation 
and the individualisation of risks. As argued in the first part of this thesis, four theoretical 
configurations of pension reforms are empirically observed. The results confirm some key 
findings in earlier literatures; for example, it empirically supports the claim that 
individualisation reform was the most dominant trend for the last 25 years. Socialisation 
reform was the least dominant trend but can still be considered noteworthy when considering 
the prevailing pressure for fiscal austerity across countries. Secondly, the results do not 
match with Esping-Andersen’s (2004) welfare regimes, Finch et al.’s (2017) social 
investment typology, or  Bonoli & Shinkawa’s (2005) pension typology. Rather, reform 
strategies converged regardless of welfare models or pension typologies. This suggests that 
path-dependency was not observed. Also, the direction of pension reform was not consistent 
in most of the countries over the 25 years. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
there was convergence in welfare models or pension institutions. As this thesis measures the 
input of pension reforms, a county’s regime shift or a pension system’s institutional change 
are not confirmed in this thesis. Thirdly, this thesis finds a relationship between old-age 
poverty and pension reforms. Countries with higher poverty rates in the older population in 
the early 1990s were more likely to socialise old-age risks in the following 25 years. Building 
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on Bonoli & Shinkawa’s (2005) findings, this thesis suggests the poverty levels of older 
people as one of factors that explain pension reform in addition to population ageing and 
pension institutions. Lastly, the configuration of the three elements of socialisation – 
coverage, adequacy and security of investment – did not match with welfare regimes, 
pension typologies, or old-age poverty rates. Instead, in each country, the pension reform 
strategy reflects a pragmatic mix of reform strategies designed to address the specific old-
age poverty risks that have developed in their system.  
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Part 1: Contextual analysis of pension reform strategies 
 
Prior to an empirical analysis on the trends in pensions across the OECD, the first section of 
this thesis is devoted to delineating contextual information relevant to pension reform. It 
spans the history of welfare states, welfare regimes, pension typologies and poverty for the 
last 25 years. As Esping-Andersen (1990: 80) highlighted in his regime theory, specific areas 
of social policy and welfare states are not separated, but tightly linked with each other. This 
means that pension systems do not exist in insolation but have developed under the influence 
of welfare regimes. Thus, pension reforms should be understood within the socio-economic 
context of welfare states. By taking a broader context, this thesis promotes a comprehensive 
analysis of the existing data on pension reforms in OECD countries. It allows us to accurately 
capture the trend of pension reforms and interpret the results, which are presented in Part 
Two of the thesis.   
 
Part one is comprised of three chapters. Chapter Two begins with examining changing 
welfare states. It aims at exploring new concepts that effectively reflect the welfare dynamics 
of contemporary welfare states. As the management of social risks is one of the main 
functions of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 36), Chapter Two begins with an 
examination of the concept of social risks. Based on Esping-Andersen’s (1999) framework, 
the definition of social risks, the various types of social risks, particular risk groups, and the 
responsible subjects for managing social risks are delineated. Chapter Two then offers a brief 
history of post-war welfare states. Following Hemerijck (2013) and Garland (2016), this 
thesis classifies the post-war period into three eras: from the end of the Second World War 
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to the 1960s (first phase), the 1970s and the 1980s (second phase), and the 1990s onward 
(third phase). Whilst no single welfare state’s development perfectly matches with this 
periodisation (Hemerijck, 2013: 118) it functions as an analytical framework for the 
following chapters. By closely examining these periods with an emphasis on social risks, the 
thesis highlights two concepts that reflect how social risks are managed; the socialisation 
and the individualisation of risks. Using these concepts, we reveal that the third phase is an 
interesting time for a comparative study, as the socialisation and the individualisation of 
risks co-exist in many policy areas. In this vein, Chapter Two highlights the importance of a 
multi-dimensional approach to analysing pension reforms from the 1990s onward.  
 
Chapter Three is another contextual chapter that explores systematic comparisons of welfare 
states and pension systems. It pays attention to typologies as they are able to reflect the multi-
dimensional characteristics of subjects, providing an economy of explanation at the same 
time. Based on literature reviews, we first explore Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare 
regimes. As addressed above, this helps us to understand pension reform within a broader 
context. Chapter Three then moves on to pension typologies. It critically examines these 
typologies for the analysis of pension systems, beginning with the classical dichotomy of 
Beveridgean and Bismarckian pension systems that emphasise funding and coverage levels, 
before reviewing later works that developed from this dichotomy. This chapter also allocates 
space for the underlying mechanisms of pension reforms. This complements our 
understanding of pension reforms, as the earlier typologies focused on capturing institutional 
designs of pension as a ‘snap shot’. In doing so, we reach the conclusion that existing 
typologies do not sufficiently fit the aims of this thesis, which attempt to capture the more 
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refined details of reform within a more complex social reality of pension systems. These 
reflections lead us into generating new pension typologies in Part Two.         
 
The final chapter of Part One is devoted to exploring poverty across the OECD. Firstly, it 
aims at providing contextual information about the economic situation of older people. 
Taking into consideration that among the main functions of welfare states is the alleviation 
of poverty, this is a necessary step before undertaking empirical analysis. Furthermore, 
pensions are the bedrock of post-war welfare states. Very few countries can afford to neglect 
the need for old-age security through pensions. In this sense, exploring poverty levels among 
older people for the last 25 years over OECD countries provides us with an insight into the 
pension system in each country. Instead of referring to the poverty figures released by 
international organisations, we compute poverty levels of OECD members using the LIS 
microdata. LIS microdata allows us to get a more tailored picture for this thesis as we 
demonstrate relative poverty rates based on multiple indicators. Poverty rates are then 
computed using decomposed incomes. This makes it possible to compare poverty rates 
before and after social security transfers. It reveals that each OECD member employs an 
income security system very differently in terms of reducing poverty in the older generation. 
Lastly, by comparing poverty levels with welfare regimes and pension typologies from the 
previous chapter, Chapter Four demonstrates a more nuanced understanding of the role of 
pension systems across countries.       
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Chapter 2 : Changing Welfare States  
 
‘Changing welfare states’ have attracted extensive research in comparative studies for over 
half of a century. Since the dramatic expansion of welfare states after the Second World War, 
impressive numbers of researchers have analysed their economic contexts, social 
configurations and institutions that explain the welfare expansion. The focus of research has 
shifted since then, as welfare states have faced completely different contexts of change. 
Following massive socio-economic changes since the 1970s, many mature welfare states 
seemed to turn away from welfare expansion to welfare austerity (Clasen & Siegel, 2007: 3-
4). In this period of time, the retrenchment of welfare states was one of the most popular 
topics in welfare literatures (OECD, 1981; 1985). The situation changed again in the 1990s, 
when a social investment perspective was introduced and gradually developed as an 
alternative approach against old and new social risks in many welfare states. The starting 
point of this new phase is far from self-evident, but several researchers see the 1990s as the 
beginning of new era (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Garland, 2016; Hemerijck, 2013; Jenson, 
2012; Lister, 2004). One of the distinguishing features of this phase is the complexity of 
welfare dynamics. It is welfare reform that goes beyond simple expansion or retrenchment. 
Policy makers increasingly attempt to satisfy both issues at the same time. They reorganise 
welfare programmes to reduce the financial burden, while strengthening social protection 
against old and new social risks, through multi-dimensional reform packages (Bonoli & 
Natali, 2012: 12). Political exchange and social pacts are a common practice to pursue 
reforms (Häusermann, 2012: 116). These changing dynamics of welfare states require a new 
approach to their analysis; a multi-dimensional approach. We need to examine “the 
combined reforms” (Häusermann, 2012: 116) as changes in welfare states since the 1990s 
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cannot be captured by a unilinear, one-dimensional conception (Kvist, 2007: 200). In this 
vein, the prevailing terms of ‘welfare state expansion’ and ‘welfare state retrenchment’ 
might not be good enough here. These approaches aimed to capture the dominant trajectory 
of welfare state development by highlighting expansion and retrenchment – with few studies 
highlighting that the trajectory comprises elements of both. Shifting attention from welfare 
states to a specific policy area verifies this complexity further. In pension systems, for 
example, neither of the terms is able to accurately reflect the recent changes, as pension 
reforms for the last twenty-five years include both aspects of retrenchment and expansion at 
the same time. The rising pension age and benefit cuts can be seen as retrenchment, but many 
countries extended pension credits for certain groups of people and protection for those on 
low-incomes at the same time. But then the question becomes whether the concepts of 
‘expansion’ and ‘retrenchment’ can accurately capture the changes taking place in welfare 
states. As these indicators are of a narrow and restrictive nature (Clasen, 2005: 94), they 
might demonstrate the big picture of the status of changed welfare states, but not the 
underlying dynamics.   
 
This thesis consequently pays attention to alternative concepts: the socialisation and the 
individualisation of risks. They are two distinct trends observed in the development of welfare states 
in managing social risks. The socialisation of risks ties with T.H. Marshall’s (1992) social rights of 
citizenship and the individualisation of risks is embedded in the individualism formed in modern 
society. They are also interwoven with the economic thoughts of the time, such as Keynesianism and 
neo-liberalism (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1994; 1999; Pierson, 2006; 
Taylor-Gooby, 2009). This chapter will trace the two trends in welfare reforms with an emphasis on 
social risks. It is common to divide the post-war period into two: the golden age of welfare states 
(from the post-war period to the 1960s) and the period of fiscal austerity and retrenchment (from the 
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1970s to now). This chapter, however, will follow an alternative periodisation suggested by 
Hemerijck (2013) and Garland (2016) to highlight the trends of socialisation and individualisation. 
They suggest three distinctive periods of welfare states. The first is from the end of the Second World 
War to the 1960s, the period when socialisation is established as the core of post-war welfare states. 
The second phase is from the 1970s to the 1980s, when the trend of individualisation emerged. The 
third phase is from the 1990s to now, characterised by the spread of individualisation and re-emerging 
socialisation. As Hemerijck (2013) noted, no single country’s experiences completely match with 
the periodisation. This is particularly true among the latecomers, such as East Asian countries, as 
they have different timeline of development (Kim et al., 2010). Nevertheless, their overall trajectories 
are not completely divorced from those of other welfare states. In this regard, the periodisation 
functions as a frame that demonstrates the overview of development, providing an insight for the 
following research design.  
 
2.1 Social risks and welfare states 
The main function of welfare states is the ‘management of social risks’, and in the same 
context, social policy is public management of social risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 36). 
The management of social risks is intrinsically tied up with the way welfare states distribute 
resources; to whom, by what means, for what aims, etc. (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 32-33). 
Therefore, it might be appropriate to take a close look at social risks before examining the 
three phases of welfare states. 
 
Social risks are the universal risks that most people face during the life course, such old age, 
sickness, disability, unemployment. They are individuals’ risks but become ‘social’ when 
welfare states recognise them as warranting public consideration. The underlying idea here 
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is that these risks are generally beyond the control of individuals, and have collective impacts 
on society (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 37). It legitimates government intervention into the 
realm of individuals for the greater good. In order to fully understand the concept of social 
risk, three things need to be addressed: its flexibility, the multiple actors within its 
management, and its sociological regularity.    
 
First, the recognised territory of social risk is not a fixed concept; it changes across time. 
The need for protection against social risks also varies depending on the period of time. For 
example, in the 19th century Europe consisted mainly of rural societies. Sickness and 
disability were risks similar to industrial societies, but old-age and unemployment were not 
dominant risks of the time. The social risks throughout the 20th century have also been 
changed. Major social risks in the golden age were the interruption of income caused by 
retirement, unemployment, sickness, or disability. New social risks, however, have emerged 
with rapid changes in labour markets, family structures, and increased longevity (Taylor-
Gooby, 2004b: 2-3). Another factor which influences the concept of social risks is the 
capacity of the society to deal with them. For example, due to the lack of infrastructure, most 
risks were not considered as social risks until the 19th century. Instead of the state, families 
pooled resources across generations to deal with risk (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 37). 
According to Wilensky (1974, as cited in Esping-Andersen, 1999: 33), the modern welfare 
state would not have existed if not for the development of public administration, statistical 
bookkeeping, and taxation. 
 
Secondly, the management of social risks involves multiple actors. Esping-Andersen (1999) 
explains three sources that manage risk in welfare states: the state, markets, and family. 
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Social risks are “internalised in the family, allocated to the market, or absorbed by the 
welfare state” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 40). They have different principles of risk 
management: the state allocates resources by the principle of authoritative redistribution; the 
markets distribute resources by monetary transactions; the family manages social risks based 
on reciprocity (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 35-36).The different expectations from the welfare 
triad led to different responses against social risks. For example, in some countries market-
driven social protection is predominant whilst the state takes a residual approach. In other 
countries, the state provides comprehensive protection against social risk, constraining the 
role of markets. Also, the role of family could be emphasised as a primary welfare provider 
in some countries whilst social policies play an active role for de-familisation in others. In 
short, countries show various responses to social risks, even if the risks are similar. One 
might find dominant constellations of collective responses against social risks; welfare 
regimes. The various welfare regimes and their attributes will be addressed in detail in 
Chapter Three. 
 
Lastly and most importantly, social risks must be understood within their social and 
economic contexts because of sociological regularity in social risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 
40). The chances of facing social risks are not completely random. Social risks are highly 
stratified in their nature (Cantillon, 2011: 445); certain groups of individuals and certain 
points of the life course are more vulnerable to risk than others. As risk is not equally 
distributed among all citizens and throughout the life course, the management of those risks 
requires different logics and reasoning depending on their features. As a consequence, we 
can see the welfare triad plays different roles for different social risks. It is particularly clear 
when the role of the state is considered. For example, people may not welcome government 
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intervention based on general taxation when the social risks are not everyone’s problem. In 
such situations, the different levels of solidarity of society would delineate the territory for 
each welfare triad to deal with the social risks.  
 
In consideration of these factors, Esping-Andersen (1999) classified social risks into three 
different types: class risks, life-course risks, and intergenerational risks. First, class risks 
are social risks unevenly distributed across social strata. This reflects the fact that social risks 
are likely to occur in particular groups of citizens. Traditional high-risk strata may include 
labourers of hazardous work (e.g. mining), unskilled people, and lone-parent households. 
They are more at risk than others in terms of occupational injury, unemployment, in-work 
poverty, and social exclusion. For these high-risk strata, it is the state that plays a significant 
role. Markets are reluctant to provide protection to them because of the high risk and low 
returns, and families often do not have the capacity to provide protection as other family 
members often share a similar risk profile. Second, life-course risks are unequally distributed 
social risks across the life course. For example, it is a well-known fact that children and the 
elderly are particularly exposed to poverty. The risks are due to the mismatch of age-specific 
needs and earnings. In general, families with young children and the elderly have costly 
needs but earn less than other working generations. It is the family that traditionally provides 
protection towards those two life-course risks based on the intergenerational contract: the 
young care for the elderly in exchange for a transfer of wealth. Markets are able to manage 
social risks for the elderly but not for children. This is because most market provisions are 
fitted to the ‘prime age’ working generation, as they have surplus resources that enables 
them to join long-term contracts for private pensions or life insurance. The state also has 
covered life-course risks through traditional welfare programmes such as old-age pensions 
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and family benefits. As with other social risks, the risk groups of the life-course risks changes 
across time. It has been spread over the life-course with emerging new social risks. Lastly, 
intergenerational risks refer to the inherited social risks across generations. Social origin has 
a considerable impact on educational achievement and consequently occupational 
attainment. It indicates that some risks are primarily reproduced within families, and 
reinforced by markets, with poverty inherited from generation to generation. As family and 
markets are involved in producing the intergenerational risks, only the state is able to break 
the chain of risk transmission. Esping-Andersen (1999) pointed out that the role of the state 
to deal with this problem is more than social protection and income security based on the 
principle of equality. They are suited for class risks and life-course risks, but more explicit 
commitment to egalitarianism is required for intergenerational risks: e.g. equal opportunity 
policies. It can be interpreted as ‘equity’ achieved by universal and compulsory education. 
Or, if we take it as a broader concept, it would include new affirmative action programmes 
targeted to socially disadvantaged groups (e.g. ‘Sure Start’ in the UK) or public services to 
improve structural reproduction of inequalities (Esping-Andersen, 1999, pp. 40-43). 
 
The three types of social risks classified by Esping-Andersen can be a useful framework for 
the analysis of welfare states. They have some drawbacks as many typologies do; they may 
not be mutually exclusive – e.g. lone-parent households can be classified in all three – and 
the definitions remain ambiguous about ‘uneven distribution’ and the ‘inheritance’ of social 
risks. It is meaningful, however, in terms of two things. For one, it shows the fact that social 
risks have various combinations of actors. At a glance, some might think social risks always 
involve all of the welfare triad. As we have seen above, it may not be true in dealing with 
class risks and intergenerational risks. Markets and the family may take some roles, but it is 
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the government which plays a dominant role to diminish those problems. In addition, the 
classification allows us to trace changes of dominant social risks in the time and the changes 
in managing actors. For example, the life-course risks for the elderly received attention at 
the early stages of the welfare state developments. Old-age pensions were introduced in 
many European countries before the First World War. Intergenerational risks, on the 
contrary, have been noticed more recently and social policies such as activation programmes 
have been adopted since 1990s. When considering those advantages, the decomposed notion 
of ‘social risks’ would be useful to highlight different features over time. In this context, this 
chapter will bring out the concept of three social risks to compare the dynamics of 
socialisation and individualisation during the three phases. The summary of the three types 
of social risks is in Table 2.1 below.  
 
Table 2.1: Three types of social risks 
Type Definition Risk group Management 
Class risks Unevenly distributed social 
risks across social strata 
High-risk strata    
e.g. hazardous workers, 
unskilled, lone parents, etc.  
State 
Life-course risks Unequally distributed social 
risks across the life course 
Children, the elderly, etc.   State     
Markets (only 
for the 
elderly) 
Family 
Intergenerational risks Inherited social risks across 
generations  
Children of less privileged 
families 
 e.g. children of low-income 
families 
State  
 
Source: Author based on Esping-Andersen (1999: 40-43).  
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2.2 Socialisation as the core of the post-war welfare state: The end of the 
Second World War to the 1960s 
The highly encompassing welfare states were developed after the end of the Second World 
War in the developed capitalistic world. The prosperous welfare states were maintained for 
more than 20 years. Social insurance systems had already been introduced at an earlier stage 
throughout the developed capitalist world; health care, old-age pensions, compensation 
schemes for industrial accident, unemployment benefits, and family allowances had existed 
since before the post-war welfare state. The countries’ commitment to the social risks, 
however, considerably varied in terms of social spending and funding criteria (Pierson, 2006: 
110-112). Meanwhile, the general expansion in welfare provision occurred during the 
‘golden age’ after the Second World War. Social insurance programmes were rapidly 
expanded to cover most of the population. For instance, only a half of the labour force in 
Western Europe was covered by accident, sickness, invalidity and old-age insurance, and 
merely a fifth of the labour force for unemployment insurance in the early 1930s. Coverage 
was significantly expanded by 1975; more than 90% of the labour force were covered for 
old-age, invalidity, and sickness insurance; 80% for accident insurance and 60% for 
unemployment insurance (Pierson, 2006: 131). Social services and subsidies for children, 
education and housing were also widely introduced. One point to note is the fact that social 
care was not the primary consideration of the time. As the family structure based on 
traditional gender roles provided most care services for children and the elderly, social care 
services remained a peripheral part of welfare expansion in most countries (Taylor-Gooby, 
2004b: 3). The generosity and quality somewhat varied depending on the country, but it was 
a dominant trend in Europe to provide generous benefits. As a consequence, public 
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expenditure soared; it increased from 9.3% of GDP to 14.6% of GDP in major advanced 
countries in Europe between 1950 and 1970 (Flora, 1985: 19). 
 
Multiple factors contributed to the expansion of the welfare states. Economically, Fordism 
became prevalent in the manufacturing systems. With the industrialised and standardised 
manufacturing process, mass production became available. It was then combined with 
Keynesian economic thought – capital investment to stimulate economic activity at levels 
securing full employment – and achieved unprecedented economic growth and price 
stabilisation, resulting in  large and stable manufacturing sectors over the decades. The high 
economic growth and low level of unemployment were one of the key factors which enabled 
continuous government intervention in welfare programmes. As governments satisfied the 
opposing interests of capital and labour at the same time, a substantive commitment to 
welfare expansion was accepted by the societies (Pierson, 2006: 133). Also, politically, the 
working class and middle class were influential in their mobilisation. Wartime full 
employment enabled trade unions to effectively carry through society’s welfare needs 
(Pierson, 2006: 132). Furthermore, the traditional family structure functioned as a 
reproductive sector by clearly divided gender roles; male breadwinners earned a family wage 
and housewives took care of dependent elderly relatives and children (Taylor-Gooby, 2004b: 
1-2).  
 
All of those economic, political and cultural backgrounds were a driving force behind the 
expansion of welfare states, but the most significant factor is arguably the expansion of 
citizenship. T.H. Marshall introduced the concept of citizenship through his famous essay 
“Citizenship and Social Class” in 1950. He divided citizenship into three parts: civil, political 
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and social rights. In fact, citizenship has been at the core of welfare states since their 
formation in the pre-war period. Pierson (2006: 112-113), in his explanation of the birth of 
the welfare state, argues that political rights of citizenship affected the introduction of social 
insurance in the pre-war welfare states. According to him, there is a correlation between the 
dates for the extension of suffrage and for the first social insurance in the developed countries. 
Countries that had achieved universal male suffrage earlier also had an earlier introduction 
of social insurance (Germany, France, Denmark, and New Zealand). New Zealand, which 
extended the suffrage to women in the very early stages of the movement, also adopted 
family allowance much earlier than any others. It is also observed that those which achieved 
suffrage in the early 20th century abolished the rules for disenfranchising benefit recipients 
during this period (UK, Norway, and Sweden). This implies that the development of political 
rights played a significant role in the formation of welfare states. 
 
When it comes to the development of the post-war welfare states, it is the social rights that 
played a pivotal role. Marshall described social rights as “the whole range, from the right to 
a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social 
heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the 
society” (Marshall, 1992: 8). Historically, the concept of social rights was gradually 
developed. The early poverty studies of Booth and Rowntree and policies of the Royal 
Commission in the 19th century led to a change in approach towards both people in poverty 
and the solution to it. The Beveridge Report in 1942, the blueprint for post-war social 
security, was widely supported by citizens for the comprehensive state-run system of 
compulsory insurance (Baldock, 2012: 28-35). Social rights became the core idea of post-
war welfare states. Marshall’s social rights include two aspects: socialising individuals’ risks 
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and institutionalising state welfare. First, socialising individuals’ risks refers to externalising 
one’s responsibility to protect one’s self against social risks. Until the emergence of modern 
welfare states, individuals were solely responsible for social risks and state intervention was 
limited to residual and voluntary approaches. This was the social norm of the 19th century. 
Marshall’s social rights, however, externalised those individuals’ responsibility to the state 
by affirming citizen’s rights to economic welfare and security. It is only a “modicum” of 
economic welfare and security “according to the standards prevailing in the society”, which 
is far from a clear definition as Mishra (1977: 25-26) pointed out, but few can disagree that 
socialising individuals’ risks is a defining feature of the era. It is in line with Esping-
Andersen’s writing that social protection introduced in the golden age was “firmly anchored 
in the explicit normative commitment of granting industrial and social rights” (Esping-
Andersen, 1994: 712). He highlighted this aspect of social rights in relation to markets and 
the family through the concept of de-commodification and de-familisation. As social rights 
enable citizens to maintain a socially acceptable standard of living independent of pure 
market forces, it entails a de-commodification of individuals (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 3, 21). 
Also, as government intervention takes away social risks from the family, it strengthens de-
familisation (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 45-46). In other words, social rights provided a firm 
ground for social protection in post-war welfare states by recognising the state’s 
responsibility of socialising individuals’ risks. Secondly, institutionalising state welfare 
refers to the granting of rights based on the status of citizens. Social rights are provided not 
through performance; they are inviolable status rights. State intervention before the war took 
a residual approach which mostly concentrated on the ‘deserving poor’. The benefits were 
carefully designed to deter able-bodied persons (e.g. the principle of less eligibility).  
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Considering these facts, the ‘institutionalising’ of state welfare is a significant change which 
brought about the development of social protection. According to Marshall, it provided the 
new solidarity that modern societies require. It is “a direct sense of community membership 
based on loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law” (Marshall, 
1950 as cited in Mishra, 1977: 22). It is distinct from the traditional solidarity which is based 
on ascribed status (Mishra, 1977: 21-22). Social rights in citizenship delineated post-war 
welfare states, but it is a less stable concept compared to civil and political rights. As 
addressed above, the notion of social rights include unclear aspects. As “social rights do not 
tell us what their content at any time in a particular society would be” (Mishra, 1977: 26), it 
is inevitable that the scope and standards are affected by social changes. Also, social rights 
are concerned with the distribution of the social product, and there have been conflicts over 
distribution. Different understandings of social rights in the changing circumstances led to 
the transformation of welfare states in the late 20th and early 21st century.  
 
After taking everything above into consideration, this thesis defines the socialisation of risks 
as institutionalised government intervention which socialises individuals’ risks. In other 
words, it refers to the state actively absorbing social risks from individuals. It eventually 
results in de-commodification and de-familisation as those risks would have been 
internalised in the family or allocated to the market without state action. As addressed earlier, 
welfare provision was significantly expanded in the golden age. The period was marked by 
new and varied forms of government intervention (Pierson, 2006: 130). It is a distinctive 
trend of socialisation in this period of time; the general expansion in social insurance and 
services. If we look at the trend of socialisation with the frame of social risks (Table 2.1), it 
provides us with a more detailed view. First, the socialisation of the golden age was 
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concentrated on the life-course risks. The old-age pension was a major social insurance 
programme in most welfare states, and the coverage was fully expanded to cover the labour 
force during the period. Also, child benefits and universally systematised public education 
systems were introduced. Socialising risks for those two groups has been the typical 
government intervention in welfare states since then. The working family with care needs, 
however, was not the main concern of the time, as the post-war welfare states assumed male 
bread-winner families (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 41-42). Second, welfare states generally 
socialised class risks regardless of risk strata. The development of encompassing social 
insurance certainly alleviated class risks in general. It might be true that the high-risk strata 
benefited more from the expansion of the invalidity, sickness, and unemployment insurance 
than the low-risk strata, but they were not particularly targeted in the programmes. Lastly, 
the intergenerational risks received less attention in this era. The realisation of the 
consequences of unequal origins came after the period (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 43).  
 
2.3 New pressures and new social risks 
The favourable atmosphere for welfare states gradually changed. The developed countries 
in the world have faced internal and external challenges since the 1970s. First, there has been 
a shift of emphasis from manufacturing to service industries since the 1970s. The Fordism 
which sustained the golden age was not held any more for several reasons; its technical 
rigidity impeded efficiency as the production scale grew and the market began to require 
unique and customised products instead of mass production (Kim, 1996: 121-123). As a 
result, the massive employment in the service sector gradually replaced the manufacturing 
sector. This post-industrial transition is the natural consequence of successful economic 
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development (Pierson, 2001: 86), but the problem is the fact that service industries generally 
have limited productivity growth compared to manufacturing industries. Baumol (1967) 
highlighted that this is especially true for the labour-intensive service industries such as 
education, childcare, and health care (as cited in Pierson, 2001: 84). It eventually caused the 
slowdown in economic growth resulting in the stagnant growth of wages, and led to a 
decrease in welfare state revenues (Pierson, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2004b). Another problem 
of de-industrialisation is unemployment, particularly for low-skilled workers. Labour 
markets have become polarised; massive manufacturing jobs moved to developing countries 
and only high value-added industries and service sectors remained. As a result, jobs for semi-
skilled and low-skilled workers have become scarce. They are often jobless or employed in 
precarious positions in a service sector (Garland, 2016: 118-121). 
 
Secondly, demographic changes took place in most advanced countries. Low fertility rates 
and longevity resulted in ageing. In the OECD, the old dependency ratio (the age-population 
ratio of over 65 and 20) rose from 15.6% in 1960 to 19.5% in 1980 and continuously 
increased to 21.8% in 2010 (OECD.StatExtracts). This means the modern welfare societies 
have to shoulder double burdens: decreasing revenues and increasing welfare costs. The 
decreasing working population inevitably brings up shrinkage in tax revenue and 
contributions for welfare states. At the same time, the increasing elderly population creates 
fiscal pressure on the core programmes of modern welfare states (Pierson, 2001: 93-94; 2011: 
7-9; Taylor-Gooby, 2004b: 2-3). For example, increasing life expectancy results in the 
longer receipt of pension benefits, which produce an additional increase in pension spending. 
In the UK, life expectancy was 48 years for men and 48 years for women whilst the pension 
age was 70 when the first public pension was implemented in 1907. When considering that 
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current life expectancies are 75 and 80 years in the UK, the rising concern of sustainability 
of public pension might be inevitable (Garland, 2016: 122).  
 
Thirdly, family structure has changed. Dual earners in a household have become more 
common as women’s labour participation rates rose. It is largely due to women’s better 
access to education, but is also attributed to an economic reason; double earners are favoured 
to maintain a satisfactory family income as fewer men’s wages can support a family (Taylor-
Gooby, 2004b: 3). On the other hand, fragmented households are increasing. Single-parent 
households are increasing because of high divorce rates and out-of-wedlock births, and 
single households consisting of one elderly or an adult are also increasing. Welfare states 
have to face a new challenge as these new trends generate a mismatch between existing 
welfare programmes and reality (Pierson, 2001; 2011). Now welfare states need to 
externalise care services previously provided by the family and recalibrate traditional 
benefits based on the breadwinner model. In addition, welfare states need to provide further 
protection for fragmented households as they tend to be vulnerable to poverty.         
 
Finally, globalisation is a major culprit in the suppression of welfare states. Globalisation 
has spread over the welfare states as technology has developed. Super-computers, electronic 
communications, advanced transportation and containerisation are all driving forces. In 
addition, a phenomena of the 1970s onwards, saw governments agree upon various regional 
trade agreements and economic integration. This introduced open markets to international 
trade with lower tariffs, deregulations, and free movement of goods, capital, and labour. In 
this circumstance, nation states now have much less capacity to intervene in a market. For 
the EU, for example, governments’ capacity is limited to revenue rising, as the SGP requires 
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European member states to stay within the limits on government deficit (3% of GDP) and 
debt (60% of GDP). Furthermore, as high corporate tax rates and social expenditure might 
be ‘punished’ by international markets, nation states have difficulties in securing budgets to 
meet increased needs (Garland, 2016: 117-118). On the other hand, globalisation caused 
employment instability. Since the 1980s, corporate mergers and bankruptcy of international 
firms have led to massive layoffs, unstable incomes, and income inequality (Hirst, 1999; 
Song & Hong, 2006; Taylor-Gooby, 2004b). Meanwhile, some argue that globalisation is 
not a major reason for welfare austerity; governments blame globalisation for the difficulty 
in handling new emerging risks under budgetary stress (Pierson, 2001: 81). However, it is 
hardly deniable that globalisation has affected welfare states in terms of employment 
instability. Mishra (1999) also pointed out that globalisation causes unemployment through 
flexibilisation, downward pressure on wages, and deteriorating working conditions, 
eventually making welfare states spend more to meet those needs.  
 
Much of the literature has focused on these new challenges in welfare states (Giuliano Bonoli, 
2006; Pierson, 2011; Taylor-Gooby, 2004b). These new challenges have been named ‘new 
social risks’, which refer to social risks that individuals commonly face in their life course 
due to the socio-economic transition from an industrial society to a post-industrial society. 
Lacking adequate skills and knowledge in the labour sector, reconciling work and family 
life, and insufficient social provision are typical examples of emerging new social risks. 
Esping-Andersen’s framework (Table 2.1) would be useful to highlight the further features 
of new social risks. First, when it comes to class risks, unskilled people and lone parents are 
newly added to the high-risk strata in the post-industrial society. They have been in the risky 
group since the post-war welfare states, but it drew less attention from society as they were 
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not profound problems. The number of lone parents was fewer due to the conservative 
attitude  towards divorce and out-of-wedlock birth, and low-skilled workers still had a good 
chance to find steady, unionised job in the huge manufacturing industry (Garland, 2016). In 
current welfare states, however, both groups are much more vulnerable to social risks. The 
poverty rates in single parent households are particularly high because of the low household 
income and the lack of support for raising children. There is also a significant income gap 
between low-skilled and high-skilled individuals (especially in countries where market-
driven forces are strong), and those lacking skills tend to be employed in the labour-intensive 
service sector with low wages, or fall into long-term unemployment. Secondly, the life-
course risks have been spread over the entire lifetime. As addressed in the first section, 
children and the elderly are traditional risk groups as those periods of the life course have 
costly needs but fewer resources. In the post-industrial society, the risk is no longer limited 
to them as many prime-age workers have financial problems. Due to long-term 
unemployment, frequent in-and-out movement of the labour market, and the work-poor 
problem, an increasing number of the working generation is unlikely to have a stable income. 
It means the traditional generational contract might not properly function; those of working 
age might not be able to finance children and youth or the retired (Kvist, 2014: 135-137). It 
is directly linked to the third issue, the intergenerational risks. As social origin affects 
children’s educational and occupational attainment, if their parents’ poor economic status 
has set in, it might impede social mobility and inherit poverty over generations. The 
persistency of poverty in high-risk families is a new type of social risk observed in post-
industrial welfare states. These new social risks have gradually emerged since the 1970s and 
have persistently impacted on welfare states up to the present day. Welfare states’ responses 
to social risks have varied over time. Welfare states in the second phase were more inclined 
to rely on markets by reducing government intervention, whilst welfare states in the third 
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phase tried to adapt themselves to new social risks (Garland, 2016: 116). In the following 
two sections, we will take a look at the different responses to new social risks in the second 
and third phase of welfare states.    
 
2.4 Emerging individualisation: 1970s – 1980s 
Under the pressure of austerity, Keynesianism, the economic consensus of the golden age, 
showed its limited power to solve economic problems. The neoclassical approach, inspired 
by Hayek, took its place. Neo-liberals’ main idea was favouring price stability, budgetary 
discipline, flexible labour markets, and retrenchment of welfare commitments. Neo-liberals 
believed government intervention produced ineffectiveness and inefficiency. They expected 
that competition in the free market would benefit all in two ways. It would improve economic 
efficiency in general, and more importantly, it would inspire people to bring out the best in 
them by stressing self-reliance, discipline, and individual responsibility. Therefore, 
government intervention should be minimised to facilitate the free market. Public services 
should run on the basis of business principles, resulting in them being contracted-out. For 
social security, means-testing for minimum support was implemented so as not to disturb 
work incentives (Hemerijck, 2013: 119, 126-128).  
 
Neo-liberalism is certainly the dominant political ideology that delineates this period of time, 
but it might be unwise to clearly delineate the extent of its general impact on welfare states. 
According to Taylor-Gooby, most European countries showed the move towards greater 
liberalism in market institutions and left behind the Keynesian welfare state. The increase in 
the proportion of private services in the welfare mix was witnessed everywhere (Taylor-
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Gooby, 2004a: 7-8). Taylor-Gooby concluded that EU policy-making accepted market 
freedom as essential for economic success, leaving room for possible government 
intervention for a social agenda in the future (2004a: 15). Esping-Andersen, however, argued 
that the neo-liberal idea did not succeed in dominating countries across the world. It was ‘far 
too radical’ even to the European right, and only limited countries embraced the idea: the 
UK, New Zealand, and the US (2002: 4). It is also in line with the continuous increase in 
spending on social protection in OECD countries by the 2000s. Hemerijck (2013: 133) 
argues that the neo-liberal attack on welfare states remained incomplete due to this fact. For 
the most frequently discussed issue, the resilience and retrenchment of welfare states, 
researchers also do not seem to reach an agreement. For example, Pierson (2011: 13-18) 
concludes that welfare programmes have been strikingly stable in the era of austerity based 
on the data of Scruggs (2007) and Korpi and Palme (2003), who contend that there was a 
significant rollback of welfare states. In short, “[a] judgement of what constitutes “major 
retrenchment” is in the eye of the beholder” (Pierson, 2011: 18). The difficulty surrounding 
its conceptualisation and the lack of empirical data make it far from a simple process. 
 
Another major trend evidenced in this period of time is individualisation. This is the social-
cultural process which is promoted by neo-liberalism (Dawson, 2012; Howard, 2007; 
Lazzarato, 2009). Neo-liberalism forms the most dominant discourse of individualisation, 
with it being the field of action of neo-liberalism (Dawson, 2012: 311-312). The trend of 
individualisation drew attention from scholars of various disciplines (Bauman, 2000; 2007; 
Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1994). They attempt to theorise changes in social 
structure, family dynamics, fertility decisions, the politics of welfare states, and of course, 
the economy framed by neo-liberalism as addressed above. Based on the literature of 
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Bauman (2000; 2007) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002), Dawson (2012: 306) defines 
individualisation as “the way in which identity is transformed from a ‘given’ into a ‘task’ 
and that individuals are encouraged to take responsibility for this task”. Individualisation is 
the spirit of the era. It should be seen as “designating a trend” of modern society (Beck & 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 5). According to Garland (2016: 124-125), multiple factors 
contributed to this trend. It rose from the decades of peace and prosperity after the war as a 
counter reaction to the collectivist ethos. It was propelled by consumer capitalism and the 
neo-liberal economic school of thought. In addition to these influences, increased social 
differentiation weakened solidarity in societies; fragmented social classes, ethnic and 
religious diversity, and declining trade unions and political parties struck the welfare 
commitments of the golden age, which was premised on homogeneous needs. Garland (2016) 
argues that the trend of individualisation also stemmed from the development of welfare 
states. The encompassing welfare states in the golden age contributed to individuals’ 
autonomy and choices through de-familisation and de-commodification. It is paradoxical, 
he says, that welfare states themselves are a powerful vehicle for the spread of individualism 
which contributed to the retreat of welfare redistribution. 
 
The trend of neo-liberalism and individualisation led to the change in dealing with social 
risks: individualising social risks. This can be defined as “the shift towards an 
individualisation of responsibility for welfare outcomes” (Taylor-Gooby, 2009: 3). Social 
risks were in the realm of misfortune in the golden age, forming a ground for the government 
intervention. With the spread of individualisation, they have been transferred to the realm of 
self-responsibility. Considering socialisation of risks in the previous era, it is “a return to 
rugged individualism” of social protection seen before the creation of the post-war welfare 
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states (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 4). The individualism of modern society allows us more 
freedom than before; freedom from previously existing social forms such as class and social 
status, gender roles, family and neighbourhood. This freedom is, in fact, a ‘precarious 
freedom’ as Beck pointed out. “Your own life – your own failure” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002: 24). As individuals are now free from the restrictions of the previous arrangements, 
all the responsibility to survive in modern society is being imposed on individuals’ shoulders. 
As Beck & Beck-Gernsheim put it:  
“In the most public and the most private ways we are helplessly becoming high-wire 
dancers in the circus tent. And many of us fall. Not only in the West, but in the 
countries that have abruptly opened their doors to Western ways of life … The 
decisive feature of these modern regulations or guidelines is that, far more than 
earlier, individuals must, in part, supply them for themselves, import them into their 
biographies through their own actions” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 2). 
This process also results in stratification in the management of risks. Dawson (2000) 
explains the point of inequality in it using Bauman’s literature. Risks are universally 
individualised to everyone, but there is only a limited group of people that have the resources 
to handle the risks effectively. As a result, some people are more likely to experience 
insecurity than others (Dawson, 2012: 307).  
    
On the basis of self-responsibility, the most common type of welfare reforms in this period 
was simple cutbacks (Garland, 2016: 107-109). These took the form of reductions in benefits, 
the limiting of coverage, and tightening conditions. Targeting and residual approaches were 
widely applied. When it comes to class risks, individualism had a significant impact on the 
high-risk strata. This is because the cuts mostly targeted social assistance programmes rather 
47 
 
than pensions or healthcare, due to political acceptability. In order to reduce welfare 
dependency and to stress an individual’s responsibility, social assistance programmes 
tightened eligibility conditions. They required single parents and the long-term unemployed 
to prove that they were actively seeking a paid job, attending job training, or receiving 
education. As a result, the high-risk strata became more vulnerable to extreme poverty and 
were forced to rely on private networks. Regarding the life-course risks, public pensions for 
the elderly was the biggest concern of this era due to the large expenditure. Based on neo-
liberal thought, marketisation has been widely introduced in the public pension arena. To 
this end, contracting-out, the provision of tax incentives to join private pensions, and the 
reduction of the portion of public pension in the multi-tier system were introduced. In 
addition, various strategies for cutbacks – tightening the link between earnings and benefits, 
raising the pension age, introducing disadvantages for early-retirement, etc. – were widely 
applied to pension systems. 
 
This distinctive flow of individualisation has resulted in the weakening of social rights. The 
shift towards individualisation through reforms succeeded in containing the level of welfare 
spending in exchange for the erosion of “the base of public support for inclusive state 
provision” (Taylor-Gooby, 2009: 3). Various benefits became a conditional right provided 
on the basis of an individual’s appropriate conduct, rather than universally shared social 
rights (Lazzarato, 2009: 129). Ferge (1997) also argues that social rights are not considered 
real rights in this period of time. This especially affected poorer and less powerful groups 
resulting in the welfare cut in benefits. Meanwhile, civil and political rights in citizenship 
are emphasised instead, as they are “inexpensive” to pursue in a society. For example, 
minorities of the time – such as women, homosexuals, and the disabled – gained visibility 
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and a voice for civil and political rights in the period (Ferge, 1997: 26-28). In short, the social 
rights for the vulnerable seem to be damaged under the strong individualising trend, with the 
acknowledgement of civil and political rights gaining prominence. In addition, 
individualisation has made mobilisation for political movements increasingly difficult 
compared to the past (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 47-52). As more social risks are 
considered as individuals’ responsibility, poverty is seen as a personal failure rather than a 
class experience. Consequently, it creates the images of two separated worlds – “us the 
taxpayers and them on benefits” – people pay less attention to inequality in a society 
(Sinfield, 2013: 220). The welfare consensus for Beveridge’s ‘good society’ started to 
dissolve from the mid-1970s onwards. The collective responsibility for social risks and the 
enforced solidarity of the golden age was explicitly rejected in the individualised society 
(Ferge, 1997: 21-22). 
 
Lastly, it might be appropriate to clarify the terminology to avoid confusion. This thesis has 
employed the ‘individualisation of risks’ as a term that refers to the shift towards an 
individualisation of responsibility for welfare outcomes. Many welfare literatures (Clarke, 
2005; Ferge, 1997; Frericks, 2010; Frericks et al., 2007; Sinfield, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2009) 
have considered this trend, but they often used different terms which we dealt with in a 
similar context earlier. The most common term is the individualisation of responsibility. 
Taylor-Gooby (2009: 2-13) used this term to refer to the transition of welfare states under 
new social risks. Welfare states took the new approach to welfare which is “the shift towards 
an individualisation of responsibility for welfare outcomes” (Taylor-Gooby, 2009: 3). He 
sees individualisation as an outcome of the new social risks. As governments take a less 
commanding role, individualisation of responsibility begins to play a more significant role. 
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In a similar sense, Ferge (1997) employed ‘individualised responsibility’ for social 
reproduction, which is distinct from the collective responsibility of the welfare states in the 
20th century. Sinfield (2013) addressed ‘individualisation of unemployment’ to describe the 
changing perspectives that transfers the risk of unemployment to individuals rather than 
society. Kelly (2001) also explained the youth-at-risk in the risk society using Beck’s (2002) 
and Foucault’s theories. Individualisation here refers to how the discourse of youth-at-risk 
seek to individualise the risks to the self. Other related terms are also found in the literature. 
Clarke (2005) used the term ‘responsibilisation’ to explain the process of New Labour’s 
policy1. He used the term to emphasise citizens’ responsibility to produce the conditions of 
their own independence in the neo-liberal discourse. According to him, the trend of 
‘responsibilisation’ functions as “a smokescreen which the state is systematically divesting 
its responsibility” (Clarke, 2005: 453). In other words, it is the individualisation of 
responsibility, transferring state responsibility for social risks to individuals. On the other 
hand, Frericks (2007; 2010), who has analysed pension reform, used the term of 
‘individualisation’ as self-responsibility in pension systems. The principle of neo-liberalism 
provides more individual choice for one’s own future developments. It affected pension 
reforms through stronger individualisation of obligations and entitlements in public schemes. 
For example, derived rights, such as widow’s pensions, are being cut or removed. DB 
pension has changed to DC, which links benefits much more strictly to one’s contribution 
record. Benefits are calculated based on one’s lifetime income rather than a few ‘best’ years. 
There are numerous examples of the individualisation of responsibility especially in the area 
of pensions, and they will be addressed in more detail in later chapters.  
                                                          
1 Clarke (2005)’s research analysed New Labour’s policy which is mainly focused on the third phase (1990s and onward). 
This paper introduced it here rather than in the next section, however, as the concept of ‘responsibilisation’ in Clarke’s 
research is very close to ‘individualisation of responsibility’ which is embedded in neo-liberalism since 1970s.        
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2.5 The spread of individualisation and re-emerging socialisation: the 
1990s – now 
A new paradigm for welfare states has been observed since the 1990s. However, the third 
phase of reconfiguration in welfare states has a less clear starting point. The first and second 
phases of periodisation are associated with critical junctures. The Great Depression of the 
1930s and the Second World War led to the new welfare consensus for ‘good society’ and 
created the golden age, the first phase of reconfiguration. Keynesianism was the ground 
theory for the encompassing welfare states, advocating substantive government 
interventions. The Great Stagflation of the 1970s is often considered the major cause that 
triggered the second phase of reconfiguration. The deep economic crisis raised questions 
around the effectiveness of a big government, and ‘do-it-yourself welfare’ based on neo-
liberalism and individualism gained power. The government took a role of management of 
welfare pluralism, rather than management of social change using social policy (Ferge, 1997: 
30). On the contrary to these two phases, the third phase is far from clear. It is associated 
with neither one unified body of economic thought nor an economic crisis (Hemerijck, 2013: 
119). It is, however, a phase that is clearly distinct from the previous era. The 1980s were, 
according to Esping-Andersen, the period when “libertarians and neo-liberals spearheaded 
the call for a recast model”, whilst the 1990s were “the arrival of a second ground formula 
for the post-industrial Good society” (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 17). Jenson (2012: 27-32) 
also states that welfare states since the mid-1990s should not be described as ‘frozen’ or 
under a period of ‘permanent austerity’. Instead she argues that we are witnessing a new type 
of government intervention, and with a particular character of social investment. This is also 
in line with Hemerijck (2013) and Garland (2016)’s periodisation. They subdivided the post-
golden age into two: the period since the oil shocks in the 1970s and the period since the 
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1990s. The social investment perspective is the most prevailing explanation for the third 
phase. 
 
The social investment perspective emerged as an alternative way for welfare states to adapt 
to the changing needs of contemporary society. The neo-liberal paradigm in the previous 
phase tried to contain social expenditure by limiting government intervention. However, the 
market, which is expected to bring out the best in people, shows its limited capacity in facing 
new social risks without government intervention. It means the traditional social insurance 
mechanisms do not provide adequate protection for the present day. The system is still there, 
but the conditions for being recipients have become difficult to achieve because the system 
was not fit-for-purpose in modern society. In addition, the traditional programmes are less 
capable to deal with new demands, such as gender equality and the issue of reconciling work 
and family (Hemerijck, 2013: 135-136). In these circumstances, the social investment 
perspective was initiated by the UK in the 1990s and succeeded in catching the mood of the 
times (Esping-Andersen, 2002: 17). It swiftly spread across various countries. For example 
within the EU, two of the most important agreements that highlighted the need for a social 
investment approach were the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 and the Social Investment Package 
in 2013. International organisations also published reports such as the “Social Protection 
Strategy: From Safety Net to Springboard” (World Bank, 2001) and “Extending 
Opportunities: How Active Social Policy Can Benefit Us All” (OECD, 2005). According to 
Garland (2016: 128), social investment is now accepted as the official aim of welfare regimes 
everywhere. It is worth noting, however, that social investment has spread in different ways 
and at different paces. Depending on the welfare regime, the timing of the transition to post-
industrial society and the level of economic performance, there are substantial national 
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variations. When it comes to the timing, Nordic countries adopted active labour market 
policies at an early stage (e.g. Sweden in the 1950s) whilst conservative countries such as 
Germany have stuck to the traditional breadwinner-oriented polices until recently. Compared 
to them, liberal countries including the UK have more actively embraced the social 
investment perspective with an emphasis on workfare programmes (Garland, 2016: 130-
131). In East Asia, Korea, Japan and China have also introduced various activation policies 
since the 2000s (Kim et al., 2010). When considering the fact that they are ‘latecomers’ to 
welfare states and that the new social risks are relatively recent phenomena, their adoption 
of a social investment perspective implies its great influence over a wide range of countries. 
National variation is also observed in the preference of key dimensions of social investment. 
Welfare states share the principle idea of the social investment approach but when applying 
it to their policy arenas they usually concentrate on some dimensions more than others. For 
example, Nordic countries tend to emphasise human capital through constant learning. 
Liberal countries, however, focus more on orientation to the future through early education. 
Conservative countries attempt to enrich the entire community through an investment in 
individuals (Jenson, 2012: 29-32). Their social expenditure profiles also reflect these 
national variations (Nikolai, 2012: 97-105).  
 
The main idea of the social investment perspective is future-focused discourse which 
provides a pragmatic response to new social risks (Lister, 2004: 157-158). It focuses on the 
redistribution of opportunity for social inclusion rather than income distribution for equality. 
It therefore emphasises an investment in human and social capital rather than passive income 
transfers. Social policy primarily plays an instrumental role to equip citizens to respond to 
social risks. It includes: continuing education; training and retraining; skills development; 
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work experience programmes; job search assistance; job creation schemes; the provision of 
public sector employment; and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (Garland, 2016: 128). The 
social investment paradigm aims at integrating social and economic policy, but the latter 
holds a dominant position (Lister, 2004: 158). Social investment is, roughly speaking, an 
attempt to reconcile Keynesianism and neo-liberalism. It combines elements from each 
paradigm. One might think this kind of social investment thinking contradicts the idea of 
traditional social protection, but that would be a simplistic view. Certainly, their policy goals 
are different; the primary goal of social investment is labour market activation whilst social 
protection aims at providing protection outside of the labour market. In addition, the social 
investment perspective emphasises the shift from ‘passive’ social protection to ‘proactive’ 
investment in human capital (Lister, 2004: 157-158). However, a closer look at their 
relationship reveals that the social investment perspective complements rather than replaces 
traditional social protection. This is because they are interrelated through the labour market.  
 
Pension systems provide a good example. One might think pensions are particularly far from 
social investment as they mainly cater to retirees who are less likely to be active in the labour 
market. Nevertheless, pensions have a high element of social investment as well as other 
social protection programmes (Kvist, 2014: 141) in two respects. First, a social investment 
strategy can contribute to securing old-age protection through pensions. In most countries, 
pension entitlement and benefit levels are decided by an individual’s contribution record 
which is linked to their career profiles. A social investment approach can make an impact in 
this regard, as if more people are active in the labour market, the larger their contribution 
record is. This eventually leads to a higher level of pension benefit when they reach pension 
age. In social investment approach, all interventions in the life course are important, 
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including those in later life. For example, ‘active ageing’ is a catch phrase for social 
investment strategies that aim at activating older people. It refers to policies that delay 
retirement from the labour market and maintain an independent and healthy living (Kvist, 
2014: 141). At a societal level, it contributes not only to general productivity but also the 
sustainability of pension systems, as it allows for the collection of more contributions whilst 
saving pension expenditure. At an individual level, it can increase the contribution records 
of individuals resulting in better old-age protection. It should be noted, however, that this 
kind of strategy – e.g. raising the pension age – does not necessarily mean the socialisation 
of old-age risks. On the contrary, it can be seen as the individualisation of risks in that it 
transfers the responsibility of protection to individuals. This thesis returns to this issue below.  
 
Secondly, a social investment approach is linked to pensions through the concept of 
flexicurity. According to the EU’s definition, flexicurity is an integrated strategy for 
enhancing, at the same time, flexibility and security in the labour market. Hinrichs and 
Jessoula (2012) argue that it has become a pivotal issue in public discourse in the EU 
countries with the rise of the social investment perspective. In general, flexicurity entails 
three factors. First, labour market flexibility is increased with decreased job protection and 
more atypical jobs. Second, high(er) levels of income security for the unemployed is 
arranged to compensate for the flexibility in the labour market. Lastly, activation policies 
promote employment and re-employment (Hinrichs & Jessoula, 2012: 4-5). In the social 
investment perspective, flexicurity gains legitimacy for several reasons. For one, welfare 
states need to provide a safety-net in case activation policies fail. Increasing flexibility in the 
labour market inevitably creates precarious and insecure positions. Activation policies are 
introduced to minimise those risks, but it might not work for some people. Welfare states 
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thus should prepare another measure for them (OECD, 2005: 7). In addition, flexicurity 
might contribute to further labour market flexibility. As it makes more flexible arrangements 
in employment feasible, it facilitates more atypical jobs, thereby more job creation (Garland, 
2016: 128). In this circumstance, social protection facilitates active transitions in and out of 
work as people are more likely to take risks to equip themselves with new skills, which is 
favourable for a changing society (Kvist, 2014: 141). Moreover, social protection might 
function as the necessary condition for the effectiveness of social investment policies. For 
example, according to this thinking, the state needs to provide social protection to the long-
term unemployed, because their poverty would negatively affect their children’s 
development (Hemerijck, 2013: 137). Also, in the same context, strengthening old-age 
protection through pension reforms can be required. We will come back to this point in the 
below. In this respect, it is too simplistic to see social protection as the opposite concept of 
social investment. They are complementing rather than substituting each other. This 
relationship has been emphasised by many researchers (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Estevez-
Abe et al., 2001; Hemerijck, 2013; Kuitto, 2016), saying “social investment is no substitute 
for social protection2” (Hemerijck, 2013: 137). It is also in line with OECD’s stance on social 
investment; the proactive orientation of social policy does not imply neglecting traditional 
social protection, and existing commitments to pension benefits will be honoured (OECD, 
2005: 1).  
 
                                                          
2 Hemerijck (2013) uses ‘social protection’ for traditional social insurance and ‘social promotion’ for new types of 
protections under social investment. In his writing, the term ‘social promotion’ refers to various social policies including 
family, labour market, education, employment policies. However, they are, in fact, social protection in terms of the state 
protection against social risks. To avoid any confusion, this paper used ‘social protection’ elsewhere as a term for all kinds 
of state protection.       
56 
 
The welfare dynamics of this period involve aspects of both the socialisation and the 
individualisation of risks. Their attributes, however, might not be identical to those of the 
first and second phases. When it comes to the individualising risks, the trend in the third 
phase is in the continuum of the second phase. In general, it adopts the ways of neo-
liberalism seen in the previous phase. Activation policies since the 1990s embraced the spirit 
of Do-It-Yourself in order to liberate the citizen from the state. Empowerment policies 
allowed citizens individualised choice. Individuals’ responsibility towards their own 
condition are emphasised. More importantly, protections against market failures have been 
removed or reduced in order to make labour more flexible. Benefit systems have been 
redesigned to enhance work incentives. In short, individualisation has continuously spread 
from the 1990s onwards to make citizens into ‘market ready’ workers (Clarke, 2005: 448-
453). In social protection, less government intervention has been encouraged for cost 
containment and increasing consumer choice over market products (Frericks, 2010: 720). In 
pensions, as addressed above, continued employment during older years of primed age has 
been promoted. Various strategies such as raising the pension age, disadvantaging early 
retirement, and increasing contribution years for full pensions have been widely introduced. 
This is in line with the general trend of individualising risks. They are, however, different 
from the neo-liberal approach in the 1970s and 1980s in two respects (Hemerijck, 2013: 140-
141). First, the trend of individualisation since the 1990s does not “theoretically rule out the 
kind of social risks and market failures” (Hemerijck, 2013: 141) and allows government 
intervention to alleviate them. Second, whilst neo-liberalism only focuses on the public cost 
side of welfare states, individualisation under the social investment perspective does not 
agree with the trade-offs between economic growth and government intervention. On the 
contrary, the social investment paradigm believes in the positive effects of social policies on 
the economy.         
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On the other hand, the socialisation of risks has also gained attention. The expansion of 
welfare programmes can be seen in typical social investment areas such as education, family 
policy, and active labour market policies aimed at maximising human capital. In addition, 
expansions of traditional income security programmes can also be observed. This can be 
explained by flexicurity as addressed above. Socialising risks became more important in 
public pensions, for example, because increasing flexibility might cause incomplete 
entitlements for old-age pensions as well as lower benefit levels. It might lead to old-age 
poverty unless pension systems adapt to these new career profiles in the labour market 
(Hinrichs & Jessoula, 2012: 12-17). In this context, various measures to socialise old-age 
risks are observed in pension reforms over the last decades. For example, ensuring pension 
coverage through more than one pension scheme is a basic trend across countries (OECD, 
2013: 20-21). All OECD members established multi-tier pension systems consisting of 
mandatory public pension scheme, mandatory or quasi-mandatory public / private 
occupational pension scheme, and voluntary private pension scheme. Then several measures 
are employed to increase participation rates in pension plans such as introducing automatic 
enrolment system, relaxing enrolment conditions for atypical workers, and providing tax 
privileges to encourage participation etc. One of the remarkable trends in pension reform is 
pension credit3. This is a policy that provides a publicly funded duration of insurance in his 
or her contributory record. It has been introduced for carers who take care of children, 
disabled, or relatives, the unemployed, students, or citizens who served mandatory military 
service. Some argue that this kind of reform is distinctive from social investment in terms of 
                                                          
3 Pension credit here is a different to pension credit in the UK. The former is an element which gives credits to certain 
insured persons within the pension system, whilst the latter is a general public assistance programme of the UK.    
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“valuing tasks other than those related to the labour market” (Frericks, 2010: 734). This 
thesis argues, however, that pension credit could be seen as a means of flexicurity. It is a 
scheme for new risk groups in flexible labour markets. New risk groups are more likely to 
encounter an incomplete entitlement for their old-age pensions due to interrupted career 
profiles. In order to protect them against old-age poverty, pension credits are introduced by 
taking the concept of ‘behaviour worth rewarding’ (Frericks, 2010; Frericks, et al., 2008). 
By recognising socially valuable activities, it gained accountability to modify the actuarial 
principle of social insurance. This kind of view is also in line with Myles (2002). He argues 
that the pension credit is a “rationalisation of redistributive design” (Myles, 2002: 164). 
During the 1990s, cost reduction is the prevailing goal in many countries, but at the same 
time, “new interpersonal transfers for risk groups [are] now considered to have legitimate 
claims” (Myles, 2002: 164). He saw pension credit as a strategy to spread the cost for ageing 
by creating a separation between the contributory and solidaristic elements in pension 
systems. Including pension credits, various socialisation factors have been witnessed in 
pension reforms in the third phase. They may not be labelled ‘social investment reform’ at 
all times in the reforming process but in many cases, as addressed below, the underlying 
logic for socialising old-age risks through pension reforms is in line with the social 
investment concept of flexicurity. This thesis will examine the trend of the pension reforms 
of OECD countries in the following chapters.      
 
The trend of socialising risks in this phase is one that is re-emerging after the golden age, 
but there is a clear change in its underlying logics. First of all, the ‘aim’ of social protection 
has been changed. The social investment perspective emphasised boosting human capital 
regarding socialising risks. It is even applicable to traditional income security systems based 
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on the concept of flexicurity as addressed above. Despite the wide range of reforms for cost 
reduction, it was not rare for socialisation factors to also be introduced with those 
retrenchments. The social investment perspective rationalised these attempts to improve 
social protection by targeting the ‘deserving individual’ (Myles, 2002: 164). Secondly, the 
underlying social rights for the socialisation of risks might not be identical. Social rights are 
still at the core of the re-emergence of the socialisation of risks from the 1990s onwards 
(Hemerijck, 2013: 138). The state responsibility for protection against social risks is 
emphasised as legitimated citizens’ rights again after the golden age. The social rights in the 
third phase, however, are “not defined in terms of acquired status in a nation state, but as the 
possible contributions in a more open society” (Frericks, 2010: 735). In a similar context, 
Lister also pointed out that social investment in children is treating them as ‘the future 
worker-citizen’ rather than a ‘democratic-citizen’ (Lister, 2003: 433). Her argument mostly 
focused on children, but it would be applicable to all citizens. Under the social investment 
perspective, citizens tend to gain social protection not as a ‘right bearer’ but as a ‘cipher for 
future economic prosperity’ (Lister, 2003: 433). In short, similar to the first phase, the trend 
of the socialisation of risks has been observed in the third phase, but they are not identical 
in terms of their underlying logic. In the first phase, protection against risks was provided 
based on citizenship. Meanwhile, in the third phase, risks are socialised in expectation of 
boosting productivity, on the basis of potential utility to the society.   
 
The specific differences in socialising risks between the first and third phase are as follows. 
First, regarding the class risks, the new paradigm focuses on the high-risk strata. It takes a 
targeting strategy rather than a universal approach: children, low-skilled adults, lone parents, 
carers, unemployed, and students. Targeting those citizens reflects the human capital 
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strategy. It is ‘investment’ for future workers who will bring a “future prosperous, cohesive, 
and inclusive society” (Lister, 2004: 157). Children are prioritised as the largest returns come 
from them. There are two aspects of its meaning; it is part of socialisation in terms of 
providing social protection toward citizens that need it. At the same time, however, it aims 
at cost containment – to use resources more efficiently and target those that need it more 
accurately (Taylor-Gooby, 2009: 13) – which is in line with the neo-liberal approach.  
 
Secondly, it is spread over the life course as new social risks are not limited to children and 
the elderly anymore. It rests on the idea of the generational contract; those of working age 
finance children and the elderly; in return, children will finance the current working 
generation and their offspring in the future. Therefore, when the each generation does its 
best, utility will be maximised. The socialisation of risks in this period aims at making this 
happen by intervening in each stage of the life course. The welfare state introduces prenatal 
measures to secure a healthy development of the foetus, and child care services and parental 
leave to boost family investments in children. Study stipends and vocational training are 
provided to the youth. Unemployment benefits are provided to smooth the transition in and 
out of work for those of prime age (Kvist, 2014: 135-142). It is worth noting that the life-
course risks are broadly covered by the state, but with targeting strategies; most of these 
protections tend to focus on less privileged families.  
 
Lastly, intergenerational risks received attention from the state during this period of time. 
Based on human capital strategies, investment in children from less privileged families is 
regarded as a key measure to alleviate inequality in the future. The features of the 
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socialisation of risks in the first and third phases are summarised in Table 2.2 below using 
the previous frame for social risks (Table 2.1).  
 
 
 
Table 2.2: The socialisation of risks in the first and third phases 
Type 
Targets  
The first phase The third phase 
Class risks All strata High-risk strata                   
e.g. children, low-skilled, lone-parents, 
carers, unemployed, students, etc.  
Life-course risks Children and the elderly Whole life-course  
e.g. foetuses, children, youth, and the 
elderly 
Intergenerational risks N/A  Children of less privileged families 
 
Source: Author based on Esping-Andersen (1999) and Kvist (2014). 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
Welfare states have been constantly changing since the establishment of the first 
encompassing welfare states after the Second World War. The changes are complicated and 
interwoven with the socio-economic contexts of the time. This chapter began with the 
concern that the prevailing terms, ‘welfare expansion’ and ‘retrenchment’, do not adequately 
acknowledge the complexity in the changes. As an alternative, this chapter considered the 
attributes in the changes: the ‘socialisation of risks’ and the ‘individualisation of risks’. 
These concepts helped to trace changes more accurately; specifically, different 
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developments of social policies in different periods of time. This chapter found that 
socialisation arose on the basis of citizenship, and became the core of post-war welfare states. 
It led to encompassing social protections, such as social insurance and universal benefits for 
citizens. New risks and pressures have emerged since 1970s, however, bringing down the 
curtain on the golden age. Individualism is one facet of modern society. This trend, combined 
with neo-liberalism, caused rollbacks in government intervention. Market-oriented reforms 
took place in various areas, and re-commodification has strengthened. The next significant 
transformation has been observed since the 1990s with the social investment perspective. 
The trend of individualisation of risks has continued, but at the same time, the socialisation 
of risks has also been emphasised. The socialisation of risks in the third phase is distinctive 
from the first phase, in terms of its aim and underlying logic for providing protection to 
citizens.  
 
This thesis will pay exclusive attention to the last phase. There has been relatively little 
research done in this area. In the literature on the third phase of welfare states, the trend of 
the individualisation of risks has received much more attention on the continuum of the 
previous era. Much of this literature focused, for example, on how the trend has affected 
social policies for at-risk youth (Kelly, 2001), disadvantaged people (Lymbery, 2014), and 
unemployment (Sinfield, 2013) since the 1990s. Compared to this, the socialisation of risks 
trend seems to have received much less attention. In the literature, this period of time tends 
to be represented by typical activation policies which facilitate entrance into labour markets 
(Hemerijck, 2013; Lister, 2004). This is not to say that they are unimportant, but they are 
not the whole story, especially for traditional social protection (Bonoli, 2000; Bonoli & 
Shinkawa, 2005; Frericks, 2010; Frericks et al., 2007; 2008; Leisering, 2012; Myles, 2002). 
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Various measures can be seen in social protection that aim to socialise risks against 
increasing flexibility in the labour market since the 1990s. Indeed, welfare dynamics of the 
period are associated with both of dimensions – the socialisation and individualisation of 
risks – and we need to analyse welfare states in a way that reflects their complexity. Also, 
the scope of this thesis is pension reform, among many other programmes. Pensions are “the 
bedrock of welfare states” (Hudson & Kühner, 2009: 38) and are the single largest item in 
social expenditures in every welfare state. As has been demonstrated in this chapter, it is also 
a very interesting subject in the period of social investment; it is one area that the trends of 
both socialisation and individualisation of risks are co-present. Considering the significance 
of pension schemes in welfare states, it is worth exploring the unique trajectory of the trend 
of socialisation and individualisation of risks in pension systems across countries since the 
1990s.  
 
In the following chapter, this thesis will focus on the ‘frame’ of analysis: typologies. 
Comparative studies require a specific frame to compare multiple subjects and typologies 
can be one of the most effective measures. The usefulness of typologies in systematic 
comparisons is well documented by the literature. Typologies help us to focus on the core 
of subjects by providing “analytical and explanatory parsimony” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 
88). Also, tracking changes using typologies helps us to reveal underlying mechanisms of 
change. In this regard, this thesis will explore welfare regimes and pension typologies. The 
reason for exploring welfare regimes first is that pension systems do not exist alone, but are 
shaped by institutional arrangements, rules and an understanding of the welfare state 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 80). By examining them, we seek to understand how to design 
comparative analysis of pension reforms across OECD countries for the last 25 years.  
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Chapter 3 : Welfare states and pension institutions in comparison 
 
Building on the knowledge that welfare states are dynamic, and having identified two main 
and distinct flows of welfare reform – socialisation and individualisation of risks – this 
chapter aims at deepening the understanding of pension systems within a comparative 
perspective. Comparative research provides “a basis for making statements about empirical 
regularities and for evaluating and interpreting cases relative to substantive and theoretical 
criteria” (Ragin, 1989: 1). Therefore the main issue here is the comparative method in 
practice; how can we effectively compare different pension systems across countries? This 
chapter pays attention to typologies as they allow us to see the ‘forest’ rather than the myriad 
unique ‘trees’ (Esping-Andersen, 1997: 179).  
 
Taking advantage of this economy of explanation, this chapter explores typologies seen 
within earlier studies. We begin with welfare regimes and will gradually move into pension-
specific typologies. This review of both regime and policy typologies will provide us with a 
good chance to understand pension reform within a broader context. According to Esping-
Andersen, welfare regimes can be defined as “the institutional arrangements, rules and 
understanding that guide and shape concurrent social policy decisions, expenditure 
developments, problem definitions, and even the response-and-demand structure of citizens 
and welfare consumers” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 80). This shows that welfare regimes and 
specific programmes are not isolated, but tightly linked to each other. In this sense, we need 
to pay attention to the socio-economic context of welfare regimes to fully appreciate pension 
reform and respective typologies. In doing so, we can gain a comprehensive understanding 
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of pension systems, e.g. in what context and welfare dynamics are pension schemes 
introduced and reformed.  
 
This thesis then moves on to pension typologies. Like welfare state typologies, pension 
typologies have been widely employed in many studies to compare pension schemes 
between countries. Considering that public pension schemes are “the most important in the 
overall package of social transfers” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 79), and that “they represent 
the largest single item of social expenditure in every EU country” (Johnson, 1999: 597), it 
is a natural consequence that numerous attempts have been made to find unique attributes 
and trajectories within pension schemes. Whereas welfare regime typologies focus on 
outcomes, pension typologies are more interested in institutional design of pension systems 
and their historical development (Bonoli, 2000: 10). By critically examining earlier pension 
typologies, this thesis explores their benefits and shortcomings. Another important issue 
regarding pension institutions is concerned with the concept of time. As pension typologies 
capture the attributes of pension schemes at one point like a ‘snapshot’, a question is raised 
as to whether these attributes are maintained over time. By looking at the mechanisms of 
pension reforms, and the outcome of those reforms, this thesis attempts to understand 
pensions comprehensively. Finally, these explorations lead us to insights regarding a suitable 
pension typology for this thesis. This chapter reaches the conclusion that the existing pension 
typologies cannot adequately answer the research questions in this thesis and therefore sets 
the grounds for an alternative one.   
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3.1 Comparative welfare states  
As many welfare states expanded in the 1960s and have gone through various changes since 
then, a considerable number of researchers have paid attention to typologies of welfare states. 
Based on various methodologies and perspectives, they have tried to compare quantitatively 
and qualitatively different aspects and programmes of the welfare state. They have also 
attempted to explain the formation of the present systems and forecast the future path of 
welfare states using the typologies. From Wilensky and Lebeaux (1965), who are considered 
as the first generation of comparative studies of welfare states, to Esping-Andersen (1990), 
who is renowned for his Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, there are notable studies on 
welfare state typologies.    
 
Various typologies for welfare states 
Wilensky and Lebeaux’s (1965) typology is renowned for its distinction between residual 
and institutional welfare states. Their typology had a strong influence on many typologies 
that followed. The residual model makes the market and the family responsible for an 
individual’s needs. The state only intervenes temporarily when the market or family do not 
function properly. The institutional model regards welfare services as ‘normal’ which are 
granted to everyone. It is “the organized system of social services and institutions” 
(Wilensky & Lebeaux, 1965: 139).   
 
Titmuss (1974: 30-32) went a step further. He suggested three models: the residual welfare 
model, the industrial achievement-performance model, and the institutional redistributive 
model. The residual model echoes Wilensky and Lebeaux’s (1965) categorisation. In the 
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industrial achievement-performance model, welfare benefits are provided in accordance 
with an individual’s role in labour market. It emphasises that merit, work performance and 
productivity should be linked to social needs. The institutional redistributive model 
maintains universalism in welfare policies. The commitment to welfare is realised by 
institutionalised structures. The entire population can have their social needs fulfilled with 
welfare services outside the market.   
 
Furniss and Tilton (1977: 14-21) classify welfare states into three categories based on forms 
of government intervention: the positive state, the social security state, and the social welfare 
state. The positive state’s utmost goal is to protect capitalists from unregulated markets and 
potential redistributive demands. The government-business collaboration for economic 
growth is their basic policy orientation, and welfare services are only provided within the 
bounds of economic efficiency. The social security state, however, aims at guaranteeing a 
national minimum to citizens. It is given to them as of right, but they cannot count on it as 
their property. Also, it is based on the governing principle of ‘equality of opportunity’, not 
equality. Lastly, the primary goal of the social welfare state is equality and solidarity. It 
guarantees a general equality of living conditions beyond the national minimum. Welfare 
services are provided to all without any conditions, making no distinction among recipients. 
In the economic sector, cooperation between government and unions is strong. Also, 
environmental planning, which requires an effort to accept collective values into the liberty 
of the individual, is widely accepted. The power of unions is strong enough to set solidaristic 
wages.    
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Mishra (1984: 102-109) focuses on the relationship between the economy and welfare 
sectors. According to his typology, welfare states can be divided into differentiated welfare 
states (DWS) and integrated welfare states (IWS). In DWS, social welfare is considered as 
distinct from the economic sector, with little connection between them. Welfare policies are 
adopted by process of multiple interest groups such as organisations, parties, and parliament. 
As a consequence, welfare policies tend to be fragmented rather than integrated. On the other 
hand, the economy and social welfare are seen as interdependent and inter-relational within 
IWS. Therefore, welfare and economic policies have functional relations and trade-offs. 
Class cooperation and social consensus play a significant role in adopting policies, and 
welfare and economic policies are often well integrated and organised.           
 
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) 
Esping-Andersen (1990)’s regime theory is considered the most significant work in recent 
years (Bonoli et al., 2000: 12). His typology is distinct from earlier typologies in terms of 
his systematic approach based on deep insight into the nature of welfare states. He argues 
that welfare states are not just the sum total of policies. He links together a state’s political 
history and economic variables and analyses them with statistical measurements. Esping-
Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is intensively examined in this section.   
 
Esping-Andersen’s typology consists of three welfare-state regimes built on three 
dimensions: the de-commodification index, the stratification index, and the degree of public-
private-family welfare mix. ‘De-commodification’ means the status that “a person can 
maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market”, which is entailed through social rights 
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(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21-22). It is measured using pensions, sickness, and 
unemployment cash benefits, the three most important welfare programmes. The 
stratification effect depends on social structures, and it is found in varied forms; some 
countries tend to create or maintain a social hierarchy and status, whereas others prefer 
universal approaches to social policies. The degree of stratification is measured by the degree 
to which social insurance is segmented into social status, welfare states’ residualism, and 
universalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 58, 69). Lastly, the degree of public-private-family 
welfare mix is measured by the degree of dominance in managing social risks within the 
family, labour market, and the state (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 84). According to Esping-
Andersen’s empirical analysis (1990: 29-32), the indices of each dimension in 18 countries 
created three clusters, identifying three different regime types that Esping-Andersen called 
“ideal-types of welfare states”.  
 
The first ideal type is the Liberal type of welfare capitalism. Its manifest feature is the weight 
of residualism and of markets. They allow only limited state intervention to mitigate social 
risks, with a narrow definition of eligibility for welfare programmes. These characteristics 
stem from their basic stance that considers social risks to be an individual’s responsibility. 
In this sense, they prefer needs-based social programmes to rights programmes. The de-
commodification level is very low in Liberal regimes, as they emphasise the market’s role. 
Other elements such as the family and the state, which obstruct the market’s dominant role, 
are limited to marginal power. The UK, the US, and Australia are classified as Liberal regime 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999: 75-77). The second type is the Social Democratic type of welfare 
capitalism. These regimes commit to universalism and de-commodification. Their welfare 
programmes provide comprehensive risk coverage with generous benefit levels based on 
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egalitarianism. Their programmes are mostly rights-based and are attached to individuals. 
Unlike the Liberal type, needs-based assistance is marginalised. They are state-dominated 
welfare states, and the de-commodification level is surprisingly high compared to other types, 
to minimise or abolish an individual’s market dependence. It should be noted that full 
employment and productivity in the labour market are important premises within the Social 
Democratic type. Only by making sure that as many people have a job as is possible is it 
tenable to maintain such a high-level solidaristic welfare system ( Arts & Gelissen, 2002: 
142; Esping-Andersen, 1999: 78-81). The model countries for the Social Democratic regime 
are Scandinavian countries such as Sweden and Norway. The final type is Conservative 
corporatist welfare states. Their key features are the tradition of strong family-oriented 
solidarity and status segmentation. Their familialism assumes that the standard family 
structure is composed of a male breadwinner and a housewife that takes care of the children 
and elderly. The family is primarily responsible for its members in crisis situations, while 
the state carries out a residual role. Welfare programmes also tend to create a high level of 
stratification. This is because corporatism and etatism have historically dominated in these 
countries. The occupational stratification is maintained by income maintenance benefits. 
Germany, Italy, and France are often regarded as representative cases of the Conservative 
corporatist regime. The overall features of the three ideal-types of welfare states are as below 
(Table 3.1).  
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Table 3.1: An overview of regime characteristics 
 Liberal Social 
Democratic 
Conservative 
Role of the family Marginal Marginal Central 
Role of the market Central Marginal Marginal 
Role of the state Marginal Central Central 
Dominant mode of 
solidarity 
Individual Universal Kinship corporatism 
etatism 
Dominant locus of 
solidarity 
Market State Family 
Degree of de-
commodification 
Minimal Maximum High (for 
breadwinner) 
Model examples USA Sweden Germany, Italy  
 
Source: Esping-Andersen (1999: 85) 
 
Even though Esping-Andersen’s typology has had repercussions in welfare studies and 
become “a modern classic” (Arts & Gelissen, 2002: 138), it has also faced significant 
criticisms. One criticism argues that Esping-Andersen’s work neglected the importance of 
gender and the existing debates on the gender dimension in social policy (Bambra, 2004; 
Daly & Lewis, 2000; Lewis, 1992; Sainsbury, 1999; Sainsbury & Ebrary, 1994). It points 
out that Esping-Andersen’s original typology did not pay attention to the family’s role in the 
provision of welfare and care, but only the state and the market. According to Lewis (2000), 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime theory only concerns ‘paid work’ in delineating de-
commodification. The problem is that “the crucial relationship is not just between paid work 
and welfare, but […] between paid work and unpaid work and welfare” (Lewis, 1992: 160). 
She argues that Esping-Andersen’s de-commodification does not consider people 
undertaking unpaid work and as a consequence, it is misleading with regard to the structure 
of welfare regimes. This issue is closely linked to gender, because of the gender stratification 
in paid and unpaid work. Women, who are more likely to take unpaid caring work than men, 
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disappear from the welfare regime discourse despite the fact that they play a role in the 
mechanism of other people’s de-commodification (Lewis, 1992: 160-161). In this vein, the 
additional concept of de-familisation has been demonstrated to reflect gendered aspects of 
welfare states. As Bambra defines, it is “the extent to which the welfare state enables women 
to survive as independent workers and decreases the economic importance of the family in 
women’s lives” (2004: 327). The subject of the analysis also attracted criticism. Esping-
Andersen created the three worlds using data on pensions, sickness, and unemployment cash 
benefits, arguing that they are the most important welfare programmes in welfare states. 
However, there are other programmes that might be important indicators for regime 
classification. For example, Uzuhashi (2011: 24-27) expects that welfare service sectors and 
tax-related programmes will be expanded, rather than cash benefits, in the future. This is due 
to the worldwide trend of minimising cash benefits which will have negative effects on work 
incentives. Care services for children and the elderly, social work, and refundable tax credits 
are often promoted instead. In a similar context, Daly and Lewis (2000: 288-291) 
demonstrate the concept of care as an analytical tool. They argue that paying attention to the 
concept of social care helps us to understand welfare state variation; welfare states play 
different roles in shaping social care and this results in differences within welfare state 
change and development.  
 
Another argument, the most common among critics, concerns his misspecification of 
countries. That is, “too little attention had been given to cross-national differences in welfare 
state structures” (Arts & Gelissen, 2002: 138). From this perspective, alternative welfare 
state typologies have been forwarded since Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds. Arts and 
Gelissen (2002) summarise the relevant arguments of this: the Mediterranean welfare states, 
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and the Antipodes. Firstly, the academic debate on the Mediterranean model stems from the 
argument that Esping-Andersen’s work fails to include Mediterranean countries 
systematically. Esping-Andersen does not cover Spain, Portugal or Greece in his original 
discourse of welfare regimes in 1990. He admits some distinguishing characteristics of 
Mediterranean countries, but does not treat them systematically in his typology (Arts & 
Gelissen, 2002: 142). Ferrera (1996) addresses this point in his work; not only Esping-
Andersen, but also a majority of existing studies simply see Latin countries as late-comers 
similar to other continental, conservative-corporatist nations. He argues that the 
Mediterranean model is based on common traits between Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. 
He identifies four dimensions for classifying welfare states: the rules of access, the 
conditions under which benefits are granted, the financial regulations, and the administration 
of social security programmes. According to Ferrera (1996: 19-29), the Mediterranean 
countries are distinct from others in terms of the highly fragmented and corporatist income 
maintenance systems, universal NHS systems, the low level of state intervention in welfare 
and highly mixed public and non-public actors and institutions, and finally, the persistence 
of clientelism and selectivity with regard to cash subsidies. Bonoli (1997) also identifies the 
Mediterranean regime in classifying welfare states using a new two-dimensional approach 
to categorising welfare states. Bonoli particularly criticises the Esping-Andersen’s concept 
of de-commodification, arguing that it does not effectively capture the difference between 
the Bismarckian and the Beveridgean approaches to social policy (Arts & Gelissen, 2002: 
145). As an alternative, he classifies welfare states according to the quantity of welfare they 
provide – through social expenditure as a proportion of GDP – and their positioning between 
the Bismarck and the Beveridge dimension – the percentage of social expenditure financed 
through contributions (Bonoli, 1997: 359-360). With these two dimensions he classifies 
welfare states into four types: the British countries, the Continental European countries, the 
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Nordic countries and the Southern countries. The Southern countries score low on social 
expenditure and high on the percentage of social expenditure financed through contributions. 
Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Switzerland belong to the Southern model in his study 
(Bonoli, 1997: 360-364). Secondly, Arts and Gelissen (2002) also draw attention to the 
debate surrounding the Antepodes model. Whilst Esping-Anderson classifies Australia and 
New Zealand into the Liberal regime, Castles (1998) argues that these countries are 
characterised by their particular and inclusive approach to social protection compared to 
other countries of the Liberal regime (Arts & Gelissen, 2002:  146). For instance, according 
to Castles (2001) and Deeming (2014), Australia delivered welfare ‘by other means’ than 
those used in Europe; wage controls through arbitration were the primary measure for 
guaranteeing a decent level of life. As a result, waged poverty was significantly lower than 
other welfare states, even though public expenditure in traditional welfare programmes was 
far lower than others (Castles, 2001; Deeming, 2014). Castles notes that policy changes in 
Australia since the 1980s have gradually undermined these aspects (Castles, 2001: 537-543), 
but the overall features as outlined above are major reasons to argue for a separate welfare 
regime that contains the Antepodean nations (Arts & Gelissen, 2002: 146).  
 
In addition to the discourses regarding Mediterranean and Antipodean regimes, there is 
another regime worth noting: the East-Asian model. The East-Asian model has been 
extensively explored by various researchers (Chung, 2007; Goodman et al., 1998; Holliday, 
2000; 2005; Jones, 1993; Lee & Takegawa, 2006). As this thesis covers OECD members 
including Sounth Korea and Japan, this chapter allocates a space for the classification of East 
Asian welfare states. South Korea and Japan tend to be peripheral in comparative studies on 
welfare states. Most of the welfare typologies introduced in this chapter are Europocentric 
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or North America oriented; they are mainly created through observation of the researcher’s 
society. As a natural consequence, when it comes to Eastern countries, those typologies do 
not fit well. In this context, several researchers (Takegawa, 2006; Walker & Wong, 2005) 
have argued that East Asia has been regarded as a homogeneous group in welfare state 
studies because they are analysed by European or American standards. They argue the 
differences among East Asian countries are greater than those among European countries. 
There is a wide variety in language, culture, religion, industrial development processes and 
political institutions within East Asian countries. Therefore, it might be appropriate to take 
a careful look at these countries in a comparative context. There have been numerous 
attempts to place Korea and Japan into Esping-Andersen’s three worlds of welfare capitalism. 
In the following section, earlier findings on East Asia are critically examined.  
 
East Asian countries?  
One of three worlds 
Esping-Andersen has analysed Japan as a representative case of East Asia, which triggered 
debate. His stance on Japan changed between 1990 and 1999. He initially classified Japan 
as a Conservative welfare state in his first book (1990), then “hesitate[d] to draw any 
conclusions at all” in his later study (1997: 187). However, he reversed his temporary 
conclusion and finally set on “assigning Japan squarely to the conservative regime” (1999: 
92).  
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His long consideration over where to place East-Asian countries – “Japan, possibly with 
Korea and Taiwan” (1999: 90) –is derived from their unique version of capitalism, which 
different from European capitalism as he noted in his book (1999: 90).  
“...sustained full employment, highly regulated internal labour markets and industrial 
structure, compressed earnings, and a relatively egalitarian distribution of income, 
all overlaid by rather authoritarian employment practices, a conservative ‘one-party’ 
democracy, and ‘corporatism without labour’” (Pempel, 1989 as cited in Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 90). 
Esping-Andersen claims that Japan has combined features of the Liberal and the 
Conservative regimes; the de-commodification level is moderate and social insurance 
schemes stemming from continental Europe are segmented into occupations. He was 
reluctant to label the Japanese welfare state because of these hybrid characteristics in 1997, 
but in 1999, he stated that Japan is closer to the Conservative regime type rather than the 
Liberal for several reasons. First, social insurance programmes are the core of social security 
systems and they are segmented with social status. Second, strong familialism consists of a 
male breadwinner and ample family support which takes responsibility for family needs 
instead of the state. Third, unlike the United States, Japanese occupational welfare is 
provided as a paternalistic practice, which belongs to the Conservative regime. Lastly, the 
corporatist social insurance system will be mature in decades and the social insurance 
expenditure will occupy a large part of total social expenditure. This means that Japan is 
expected to further strengthen its Conservative attributes (Cho, 2006: 168-169; Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 91-92).  
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Esping-Andersen’s claim provoked a number of controversies. First, there is a view that East 
Asian countries – even though Esping-Andersen mostly confined his examination to Japan– 
are mis-classified in his typologies. Paradoxically this view agrees that Esping-Andersen’s 
typologies are still provide a useful frame for analysing East Asia, but it sees his selection 
of independent variables for classification as inaccurate. For example, Cho (2006: 173-181) 
argues that Esping-Andersen misunderstood Japanese corporatist elements. According to his 
findings, Japan does not encourage familialism with regard a lack of social services for 
family. Also, occupational welfare has developed in Japan, not because of paternalistic 
efforts, but due to the fragmented labour movements and retarded state welfare. As a 
consequence, Cho argues that Japan should be classified in the Liberal category. On the other 
hand, Shinkawa (2001: 7) argues that Japan is hybrid of the Conservative and Liberal 
categories, albeit much closer to the Conservative approach. His claim is similar to Esping-
Andersen’s with respect to the status-segmented social insurance, male breadwinner family 
structure, and quasi-familiar occupational welfare, but he concludes that the Japanese 
welfare state has developed in both of the Liberal and Conservative ways. Uzuhashi (2011: 
18-19) also states that Japan is a hybrid of the Conservative and Liberal models. According 
to him, the de-commodification level is in the middle, conservative stratification is high, and 
the private sector is dominant. In the Korean case, Nam (2002: 192) introduced Korea as a 
Conservative regime, by using empirical data that were collected according to Esping-
Andersen’s criteria after the economic crisis in 1997. He found that here the de-
commodification level is low to medium, trends of conservative stratification have 
strengthened, and familialism is very high. On the other hand, others have suggested a new 
regime model for East Asian countries beyond Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds. They 
argue that the East Asian model is unique and cannot be understood through the standard 
conceptual tools of Esping-Andersen (Chung, 2007; Goodman et al., 1998; Holliday, 2000, 
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2005; Jones, 1993; H. K. Lee & Takegawa, 2006). The details of these representative 
theories are examined in the next section.  
     
East Asian Model 
One author who considers East Asia as a unique welfare state that is explicitly different from 
the Europe and North America in the early stages is Jones (1993). She notices a cultural 
uniqueness in East Asia. She asserts that the most significant factor that forms a different 
welfare development transaction in East Asia is Confucianism, which historically dominated 
in these countries. Confucianism is “hierarchy, duty, consensus, order, harmony, stability 
and staying power” (Jones, 1993: 202). Based on these observations, Jones came to a 
conclusion: the Confucian welfare state. That is, “conservative corporatism without worker 
participation; subsidiarity without the Church; solidarity without equality; laissez-faire 
without libertarianism” (Jones, 1993: 214). Her analysis is meaningful as the first Asian 
model and received positive reviews in terms of analysing the private sector as well as the 
public, and as an appropriate explanation for the foundation of society (Lee, 1998: 193; Na, 
2010: 9; Shim, 2004: 62). However, her work was also criticised because of its cultural 
approach to explaining welfare states. Confucianism is lacking in empirical standards to 
analyse the evolution of East Asian welfare systems due to the abstractness of its definition. 
In addition, it is misleading to consider varied East Asian countries as one homogenous 
model (Goodman et al., 1998: 15-16; Holliday, 2000: 706; Na, 2010: 9-10; Shim, 2004: 62-
63; Takegawa, 2006: 350-351). It is also claimed that the so-called virtues of Confucianism 
are found in other worlds too; Victorian values, American values, the Protestant work ethic, 
and even the ‘Third way’ of the Labour Party in the UK share very similar characteristics to 
Confucianism, such as an emphasis on the work ethic, self-reliance, the entrepreneurial spirit 
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and the care role of the family (Digby, 1989; Giddens, 1999; Lipset, 1990; Walker & Wong, 
2005). This demonstrates that Confucianism is difficult to define as an exclusive driving 
force that establishes a particular Asian model.   
 
Goodman at al. (1998) introduced the concept of a ‘development state’ to explain East Asian 
countries, which sheds light on the internal dynamics and rational choice of political actors 
rather than cultural attributes. They contend that East Asian countries had state-sponsored 
development, and that welfare policies are imposed as a means to achieve the strategic 
priority of rapid industrialisation. The welfare systems were led by political forces and 
institutions which consisted mostly of conservative elites under authoritarian political 
regimes. The general public’s demand for welfare policies did not make a positive impact. 
Also, the relatively well-developed occupational welfare is not a paternalistic practice as 
Esping-Andersen insisted (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 91). It is more of an employers’ strategy 
to wield strong influence over employees. Moreover, it was state-fostered ideology to 
prevent strong unions and a greater demand for welfare (Goodman et al., 1998: 14-17). 
Contrary to Jones (1993: 215), Goodman at al. (1998: 18-19) have a negative outlook on the 
persistence of East Asian welfare model due to upcoming changes in economic and political 
situations, as well as rapid ageing trends. A considerable amount of research has applied this 
theory to explain Korea’s welfare policy development in the 1960s to the 1990s, the era of 
the economic miracle (Choi, 2011; Chung, 2007; Na, 2010; Shim, 2004; Yang, 2008). Yang 
(2008) states that Korea has consistently pursued ‘self-reinforcement’ in line with the 
developmental welfare systems undertaken in 1960s. Similarly, Chung and Na agree that the 
developmental welfare system still has an influence in Korea (Chung, 2007: 297-298; Na, 
2010: 22). On the other hand, Choi argues that the developmental state perspective, or to be 
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specific, the productivist nature of the developmental state perspective is no longer an 
accurate frame to analyse Korea after the Asian economic crisis in 1997, as income security 
systems were extensively expanded (Choi, 2011: 35-36).   
 
Holliday (2000; 2005) goes one step further. He suggests ‘productivist welfare capitalism’ 
as a more sophisticated theory to explain social policy in East Asia. Productivist welfare 
capitalism is a theoretical combination of developmental state theory and the Esping-
Andersen’s Three Worlds (Kim, 2008: 110). Holliday states that the most crucial feature of 
productivist welfare capitalism is the subordination of social policy to economic growth. 
This can explain all other factors, as he claims, such as “minimal social rights with 
extensions linked to productive activity, reinforcement of the position of productive 
elements in society, and state-market-family relationship directed towards growth” 
(Holliday, 2000: 708-709). It is worth noting that he paid attention to differences in five East 
Asian countries despite keeping single productivist perspective; “within the productivist 
world, it is possible to identify distinct clusters” (Holliday, 2000: 710). He classified East 
Asia into three clusters: Facilitative (Hong Kong), Developmental-universalist (Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan), and Developmental-particularist (Singapore).    
 
This perspective helps us to understand the relationship between economic policy and social 
policy in depth. It has descriptive power in understanding state power under development. 
Also, it demonstrates how growth-oriented social policies have formed in East Asia (Kim, 
2008: 111). However, there are sceptical responses too. Many studies indicated that unlike 
Holliday’s assertion, efforts to enhance productivity through welfare programmes are not 
only evidence in East Asia, but also in other countries (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 21; Kim, 
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2008: 111-113). In addition, it is a shared pattern among welfare states to extend the 
coverage of welfare programme from industrial works to others; it is not a distinctive feature 
of East Asia (Kim, 2008: 113; Pierson, 2006: 111). Also, according to Hudson and Kühner’s 
(2009) empirical study using data from 23 OECD countries, protective and productive 
features are not exclusive. East Asian countries have protective features, with or without 
productive features. They demonstrate, in contrast with Holliday’s argument, that Korea 
belongs to the weak-productive-protective hybrid type and Japan belongs to the weak 
protective type (Hudson & Kühner, 2009: 41-44). Kim (2008) also casts doubt on the 
reliability of productivist welfare capitalism. Holliday reconfirmed Korea as ‘clearly 
developmental’ even after the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, based on the productivist 
elements he observed (Holliday, 2005: 156). Kim (2008) refutes that Holliday’s perspective 
loses its theoretical usefulness in interpreting East Asian social policy, since Korea has 
shifted its policy goal from productivity to welfare state consolidation over the past decade. 
Major welfare programmes were reformed to extend their coverage based on citizenship, 
and the top-down policy making tradition was weakening due to emerging new welfare 
coalitions (Kim, 2008: 113-118). Choi (2011: 35-36), like Kim, states that Korea can be 
explained as a productivist model between the 1960s and the 1990s, but it has been 
dismantled since the late 1980s. With the new socio-economic and demographic changes 
since the late 1990s, the Korean regime has deviated from the productivist welfare regime 
and strengthened liberal elements instead.   
 
Accuracy versus parsimony  
So far, we have explored heated debates on welfare state typologies. Esping-Andersen’s 
Three Worlds (1990) became a modern classic, but his work was criticised for the fact that 
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some welfare states did not fit within his model. The debates over additional welfare regimes 
in fact stems from two values within the typologies: analytical and explanatory accuracy and 
parsimony. Both values are essential to comparative research, but in reality, it is hard to 
satisfy them both at the same time. This is due to the simplistic nature of typologies; diverse 
characteristics of nations are hard to consider thoroughly, because typologies are generated 
to highlight similarities and differences among nations through simplification. Therefore, as 
Arts and Gelissen address (2010: 581), there is a trade-off between refinement and 
explanatory power. Highly complex models have the advantage of realistic descriptiveness, 
but they are analytically less powerful. In this context, researchers are only able to put 
relative emphasis on one or another – accuracy or parsimony – as long as “the peculiarities 
of cases are within a distinct overall logic” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 92).    
 
Some researchers who emphasise the accuracy of typologies contrive alternative or modified 
typologies to Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds (1990). As seen in the previous section, 
researchers who argue for the Mediterranean model (Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996) point out 
peculiar traits of southern countries such as fragmented social protection, a low level of 
social services, but with sometimes very generous benefits. For Antipodean nations (Castles, 
1998; Deeming, 2014), the residual but comprehensive welfare systems and achievements 
of equality in pre-welfare stages are their distinguishing features as a separate regime. When 
it comes to East Asian cases, the Confucian model (Jones, 1993), the developmental welfare 
system (Goodman et al., 1998) and productivist welfare capitalism (Holliday, 2000; 2005) 
were established to reflect the uniqueness of the region. The Confucian model analyses it 
through cultural factors whilst the developmental welfare system insists on authoritarian 
state-sponsored development. The productivist perspective focuses more on policy-making 
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processes to achieve the objective of economic growth. However, the Confucian perspective 
has been subject to significant critical review (Holliday, 2000: 706; Na, 2010). Both the 
developmental and productivist perspectives have also been criticised; specifically their 
theoretical weakness which fails to capture the nature of the recent developments in East 
Asia (Choi, 2011; Kim, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, Esping-Andersen was the one who emphasised the parsimony of 
typologies. He is reluctant to add more regime types to his original three (Esping-Andersen, 
1999). He acknowledges the distinct features of the Mediterranean, Antipodean, and East 
Asian countries and positively reacted to the idea of alternative regime in the beginning (Arts 
& Gelissen, 2002: 153-154). However, he eventually concludes that those country variations 
are within the overall logic of the three welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 92). Also, 
he raises a question about the utility in adding a fourth, fifth, or six regime cluster. It might 
bring a greater refinement of analysis, but it would lose explanatory power because of the 
complexity. In this regard, Esping-Andersen emphasises more the value of “analytical and 
explanatory parsimony”, and states that we should weigh “the relative importance” of 
different attributes in typologies (1999: 88, 92). “The principal value of Esping-Andersen’s 
three ideal-types of welfare regimes is that it provides abstract models, so that deviations 
from the ideal types can be noted and explained” (Arts & Gelissen, 2010).  
 
This thesis agrees with Esping-Andersen’s point. Three welfare regimes are sufficient to 
capture welfare state characteristics in this thesis. It does not to mean to say that the 
discourses for alternative regimes are unimportant. Verifying all the arguments on 
alternative regimes is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, we focus here on the practical 
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utility of adding more regimes. In this thesis, the aim of employing welfare typologies is not 
to analyse the welfare state itself, but to examine the welfare state as an influence on pension 
systems. Welfare regimes will be considered as a landmark at interpreting pension reforms 
in a later chapter. More diversified welfare regime clusters might allow us a more accurate 
understanding about regime characteristics, but analytical and explanatory parsimony will 
be the primary goal in this thesis. If it was a debate over pension typologies, we could have 
weighed the value of accuracy more. Considering these facts, the usefulness of additional 
regimes might be less apparent here. In this context, this thesis decides to use Esping-
Andersen’s three welfare regimes as a basic framework in understanding pension reform. 
The following section takes a more direct approach to the thesis topic; the institutional design 
of pensions.   
 
Social investment model of welfare states  
Alongside Esping-Andersen’s three worlds classifications, this section sheds lights on 
alternative welfare typologies and in particular those stemming from the social investment 
approach. Esping-Andersen’s work is highly useful to highlight the differences and 
similarities among welfare states but it might not be enough to capture the current or perhaps 
most recent developments in contemporary welfare states as evidenced with the ‘social 
investment turn’ (Nikolai, 2011: 91). In this regard, researchers have paid attention to 
generating social investment typologies that reflect welfare states’ social investment 
orientation (Nikolai, 2011; Morel, Palier, and Palme, 2012; Finch, Horsfall, and Hudson, 
2017). By exploring two social investment typologies, this thesis aims at having a better 
scope to interpret pension reforms and contextualise the research findings in a later chapter.          
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Firstly, Nikolai (2011) constructs social investment typologies based on public social 
expenditures. She employs disaggregated programme expenditures from OECD SOCX and 
the Education Spending Database. The expenditures for families, active labour market 
policies, and education systems represent ‘investment policies’ whilst the expenditures for 
old-age and passive labour market policies indicate ‘compensatory policies’. Using the 
statistical mean of these expenditures, she classifies 25 OECD members into four categories. 
The first cluster is defined as countries with high expenditures for investment related social 
policies with low or rather modest levels for compensatory social policies. The second 
cluster refers to countries with high expenditures for investment and compensatory social 
policies but focusing more on social investment policies. The third cluster is characterised 
by countries with low expenditures for investment related social policies as well as for 
compensatory social policies. Lastly, the fourth cluster is countries with low expenditures 
for investment related social policies as well as for compensatory social policies.  
 
She traces the changes in memberships between the mid-1980s and 2007. The latest version 
(2007: 109) shows fairly even distribution of countries across clusters. The first cluster has 
five countries:  Norway, the UK, New Zealand, Ireland and the Netherlands. The second 
cluster consists of six countries: Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Belgium, France and Austria. 
Denmark is in the middle of the first and the second cluster. The third cluster is comprised 
of six countries: Australia, Canada, the USA, Slovakia, Switzerland and the Czech Republic. 
Finally, the last cluster has seven countries: Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Germany, 
and Japan. The summery of the result is seen in Table 3.2 below.  
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Table 3.2: Nikolai’s social investment model  
 Definition Representative countries 
Cluster 1 High expenditures for investment related 
social policies, with low or rather modest 
levels for compensatory social policies  
Norway, the UK, New 
Zealand, Ireland and the 
Netherlands (Denmark) 
Cluster 2 High expenditures for investment and 
compensatory social policies, but focusing 
more on social investment policies  
Sweden, Finland, Hungary, 
Belgium, France and 
Austria (Denmark) 
Cluster 3 Low expenditures for investment related 
social policies as well as for compensatory 
social policies 
Australia, Canada, the USA, 
Slovakia, Switzerland and 
the Czech Republic 
Cluster 4 High expenditures for compensatory social 
policies, with low or rather modest levels for 
investment related social policies 
Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, Poland, Germany, 
and Japan  
 
* The classification of countries is based on public social expenditures in 2007.  
Source: Nikolai (2011: 105-110)      
 
On the other hand, Finch et al. (2017) provides similar social investment typologies with 
more recent data. They adapt a similar approach to Nikolai (2011) in generating typologies. 
Based on the expenditures for investment policies and compensatory policies, four 
categories of welfare states are constructed. Compared to Nikolai (2011)’s typology, some 
methodological differences have appeared. For example, the median scores of expenditures 
are applied instead of mean scores. Also, as a research method, Fuzzy-Set Ideal Type 
Analysis is employed to classify countries. Most importantly, it uses the expenditure data in 
2011 providing more updated results on social investment turn. When it comes to coverage 
of nations, Nikola (2011)’s typology covers 25 OECD countries whilst Finch et al. (2017)’s 
typology covers 23 OECD countries. The former does not have data of Korea, and the latter 
does not include East European countries.  
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The classification based on the data 2011 is as follows. The first type is ‘hidden welfare 
states’ referring to countries with low spending on both of investment and compensatory 
social policies. It has five membership countries: Australia, Canada, Korea, Switzerland, and 
the USA. The second type is ‘traditional compensatory welfare systems’. It means countries 
with high expenditures for compensatory social policies, but low for social investment 
policies. Six countries belong to this type: Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and 
Spain. The third type is countries for ‘investing in human capital and low protection’. In 
these countries, the expenditures for investment related social policies are high, but the 
expenditures for compensatory social policies are low. Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, and the UK belong to this type. Lastly, the fourth type is called 
‘social investment with double liability’ or ‘heavy social investment model’. It refers to 
countries with high social expenditures for investment related social policies as well as for 
compensatory social policies. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, and Sweden are 
classified into this type. The summary of the result is shown in Table 3.3 below.  
 
Table 3.3: Finch et al.’s social investment model  
 Definition Representative countries 
Type 1 Hidden welfare state Australia, Canada, Korea, 
Switzerland, and the USA  
Type 2 Traditional compensatory welfare systems Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Japan, Portugal, and Spain 
Type 3 Investing in human capital and low protection Iceland, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, and the UK   
Type 4 Social investment with double liability Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, and 
Sweden  
 
* The classification of countries is based on public social expenditures in 2011.  
Source: Finch et al. (2017)        
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Two social investment typologies above use different categories, but they share similar 
definitions. In fact, the cluster 3 in Nikolai (2011)’s typology is similar to the type 1 in Finch 
et al. (2017)’s typology. Also, the cluster 4 is equal to the type 2. The cluster 1 is similar to 
the type 3 and the cluster 2 fits to the type 4. The country memberships to each cluster and 
type are also similar. Despite the different time points (2007 and 2011) and some differences 
in research method, all countries belong to the same category throughout the time except 
those that are only covered by either of typologies. For example, the UK is classified to the 
cluster 1 in Nikolai’s typology and the type 3 in Finch et al.’s typology. It means the UK 
shows the characteristics of ‘investing in human capital and low protection’ in 2007 and 
2011 data meaning high expenditures for investment related social policies, with low or 
rather modest levels for compensatory social policies. In this way two typologies are similar, 
and this thesis cites Finch et al. (2017)’s typology in the below as it reflects more recent data 
on social investment.   
 
Compared with Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999)’s three worlds, the country memberships of 
Finch et al. (2017)’s social investment typology show some similarities and differences. First, 
English speaking countries that often represent the Liberal type show low spending on 
compensatory policies being classified to the type 1 or 3. The UK and New Zealand 
emphasized expenditures for education, families and active labour market policies but less 
for old-age and passive labour market policies. On the other hand, Australia, Canada, and 
the USA devoted for neither of policies. Secondly, the Social Democratic countries mostly 
belong to the type 4. Sweden, Finland, and Denmark spend remarkable share on investment-
related social policies without neglecting expenditures for compensatory policies (Nikolai, 
89 
 
2011: 110). Norway is an exception belonging to Type 3. Thirdly, the Conservative welfare 
states spend high on the traditional compensatory policies. Some of them only devoted to 
the compensatory policies (Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain), whilst others emphasised the 
compensatory policies and investment-related policies altogether (Austria, Belgium, and 
France). These facts show that Esping-Andersen’s three worlds and Finch et al.’s social 
investment model are not entirely separated, even though they highlight different aspects of 
welfare states. Nikolai (2011: 110) argues that Esping-Andersen’s regime analysis no longer 
represents a valid framework for contemporary analysis based on his typology. It does not 
seem to be true here. Employing both typologies would benefit us by providing better scope 
for welfare states in the era of social investment. Considering these facts, this thesis will 
employ Finch et al. (2017)’s social investment typology in the following chapters. Alongside 
Esping-Andersen’s work, it will be used as background knowledge in analysing the trend of 
pension reforms. 
  
3.2 Comparative pension institutions 
Typologies of welfare states can serve different purposes and focus on variables related to 
cause, institutions, and/or outcomes (Korpi & Palme, 1998: 665). There are several 
typologies of pension schemes. For example, Overbye (1996) classifies pensions by their 
coverage. Nimela and Salminen (1995) suggest a four-type classification based on pension 
entitlement for benefits. However, typologies for pensions have predominantly focused on 
the institutional design of pensions and their evolution in a historical perspectives (Bonoli, 
2000: 10). This is because these variables are not only useful to compare pension schemes, 
but also provide good insights about their confronting issues (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 7). 
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In this sense, this section pays attention to pension institutions. Since the late 19th century 
and the first public pension in Germany, public pension schemes have developed differently 
reflecting changing circumstances. The following section critically examines earlier studies 
on pension typologies; the classical dichotomy and later works spinning off from it. Based 
on this understanding, I go on to examine if they are suitable to analyse pension reforms 
across OECD countries. Finally, I move on to the underlying mechanism of pension systems. 
In doing so, this thesis attempts to understand pensions in the flow of time.   
 
Pension typologies 
The origin of pension dichotomies    
There have been several classifications for pensions, but a dichotomy is the most frequently 
utilised form. The terms ‘Bismarckian’ and ‘Beveridgean’ refer to the original models of 
pension policy at the end of the 19th century. The Bismarckian pension was first introduced 
in Germany as a contribution-based financing scheme. The primary policy goal was not only 
to socialise old-age risks, but also to prevent the rise of the labour movement and to obtain 
workers’ loyalty to the state. Consequently, it was applied only to industry workers resulting 
in status maintenance. It guaranteed retirees a certain level of income related to their previous 
earnings. The Bismarckian pension scheme gradually spread to Italy, France, the United 
States, and Switzerland. The Beveridgean pension model, however, was first adopted in 
Denmark as a tax-financed scheme. It aimed at alleviating poverty across the whole 
population by providing flat-rate benefits through means-testing. It took an ameliorated form 
of the existing traditional poor laws in Denmark at the time. New Zealand, the UK, Sweden, 
and Norway followed the Beveridgean model in subsequent years with some variations 
(Bonoli, 2000: 10-13). It is worth noting that the term ‘Beveridgean pension model’ came 
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from the Beveridge report published in the UK in 1942, emphasising the overall objective 
of Beveridgean social policy such as poverty prevention. However, in fact, the pension 
model was introduced in Denmark far before than the report and the features of Beveridgean 
pension model are not entirely identical to Beveridge’s idea for pension (Bonoli, 2000: 11).   
 
Developed pension typologies 
Most studies agree that modern welfare schemes have their origins in Bismarckian and 
Beveridgean models. Developed forms of typologies stem from this understanding: the 
‘Bismarck/Beveridge’ from Bonoli (2000: 10-13), ‘social insurance/multi-pillar systems’ 
from Bonoli’s other dichotomy (2003: 400-401), ‘mature systems/latecomers’ from 
Pierson’s classification (2001: 307) and ‘social Insurance/latecomers’ from Hinrichs (2001: 
83). Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005: 6) developed another traditional dichotomy, adding the 
pension type ‘Bismarckian lite’ to Bonoli’s earlier ‘social insurance/multi-pillar systems’ 
model.  
 
Differences do exist between those typologies, but their similarities are far greater. For 
instance, most attributes of the ‘social insurance’ and ‘mature systems’ models are identical 
to the Bismarckian pension scheme outlined above. In the same manner, ‘Multi-pillar 
systems’ and ‘latecomers’ have their roots in the Beveridgean pension scheme. It is in line 
with the multipillar system suggested by World Bank (1994)4. They are comprised of three 
                                                          
4 World Bank (1994) argues that multipillar pension systems are the most efficient and effective way for old-age security 
and stable financing. They suggest that the first pillar could take a form of means-tested, minimum pension, or universal 
flat benefit, but not earning-related scheme. For the second pillar, it could be mandatory privately personal saving accounts 
or occupational plans but not publicly managed. By doing so, the World Bank argues, the redistribution and saving 
functions in pension scheme can be separated whilst the insurance function can be better provided.   
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pillars, in principle, consists of two different mandatory pillar and one voluntary pillar. The 
first mandatory pillar takes the basic form of Beveridgean pension scheme – publicly 
managed and tax financed alleviating poverty among older population. The second 
mandatory pillar is privately managed fully funded scheme that carries out the saving 
function. On top of these two pillars, people who want more income can get additional 
protection through the third pillar, the voluntary occupational or personal savings.        
 
Despite of some developments, the major characteristics of Bismarckian and Beveridgean 
pension schemes have clearly remained in these classifications above. They stem from the 
initial models and transformed or added historical perspectives in the various studies. One 
difference is seen in ‘Bismarckian lite’, which was added to the traditional dichotomy by 
Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005: 6). The Bismarckian lite type includes earnings-related basic 
public pensions which provide only a moderate level of benefits. It is a contribution-based 
pension and has lower replacement rates than the social insurance type. It is also often 
supplemented by a second pillar. The second pillar is an occupational/corporate or a personal 
pension. But this is neither compulsory nor widespread because of collective agreements. 
The features of the main pension typologies are as follows (Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).  
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Table 3.4:  Features of the Bismarckian and Beveridgean pension schemes 
 Bismarckian pension  Beveridgean pension  
Goal Containing the rise of labour 
power  
Poverty reduction  
Target Industrial workers The poor  
Benefits Earnings-related 
A level of income related to 
one’s earnings while in 
work 
Flat-rate 
Moderate level  
 
Entitlement To have paid contributions Means-tested 
Finance Contributions by employers 
and employees 
Tax  
Representative states Germany, Italy, France, US, 
Switzerland 
UK, Sweden, Denmark, 
New Zealand, Norway 
 
Source: Author based on Bonoli (2000: 10-13). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Features of the ‘social insurance’ and ‘latecomers’ pension schemes 
  Social insurance  Latecomers  
2nd 
tier 
Goal Similar to the Bismarckian 
pension scheme 
Income continuity during the life 
time 
Target Nearly all employees 
Benefits Earnings-related benefits 
Entitlement Via occupational pension by law 
or collective agreements  
Finance Contributions, funded system 
1st 
tier 
Goal Minimum protection Similar to the Beveridgean 
pension scheme 
Target Elderly whose contribution 
record is insufficient for 
adequate benefits 
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Benefits - 
Entitlement - 
Finance Tax /Contribution, 
Representative 
States 
Germany, Italy, France, US, 
Japan, Sweden, Finland, 
Norway, Canada  
UK, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Australia, Switzerland 
 
Source: Author based on Hinrichs (2001: 80-84). 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Features of the ‘social insurance’, ‘multi-pillar systems’ and ‘Bismarckian 
lite’ pension schemes 
 Social insurance  Multi-pillar systems Bismarckian lite 
Goal Similar to Hinrichs’s 
social insurance 
pension scheme  
Similar to Hinrichs’s 
latecomers Pension 
scheme 
  
 
Target 40-60% of workforce 
(2nd pillar) 
 
Benefits 
Subsistence level of 
benefits (1st pillar)  
Earnings-related, but 
modest level (2nd 
pillar) 
 
 
Entitlement 
 
Having paid 
contributions 
Via occupational 
pension by collective 
agreements 
Finance Contribution / Tax  
Representative 
States 
Germany, Italy, 
France, Sweden (pre-
1990s), Korea 
UK, Sweden (post-
1990s), Switzerland 
Canada, US, Japan  
 
Source: Author based on Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005: 5-8) 
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Revisiting earlier studies on pension typologies  
There is no doubt that the pension typologies introduced above are a usuful tool to compare 
overall pension designs across the countries. As they highlight significant differences in 
pension structures, researchers can analyse the attributes of pension schemes within the big 
picture. They are also useful to trace the trajectory of pension development. With the 
bifurcated pension typologies, researchers are able to pass little details and simplify 
transitions in pension structure. Despite of all these benefits, however, there are several 
downsides of using them. These concerns are spelt out from a critical point of view in this 
section. 
 
First of all, a dichotomy has limited explanatory ability inherent in its nature. Except Bonoli 
and Shinkawa’s (2005) typology, all the typologies are composed of a dichotomy that might 
overlook subtle systematic details and policy changes. For instance, in comparing the 
pension schemes of Japan and South Korea, classic dichotomies would suggest they belong 
to same category; both of them historically stem from the Bismarckian model, so they are 
classified within the Bismarckian or social insurance type. However, if we scope out both 
pension schemes, we can notice many differences between them as well as many similarities, 
such as structural design, consolidation issues, replacement rates, etc. (Kim & Kim, 2005: 
208-211; Shinkawa, 2005: 158-160). In this regard, the pension systems in Japan and Korea 
can be more accurately captured by Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) typology. It has three 
types of pension schemes, and sorts Japan to Bismarckian lite and Korea to the social 
insurance type. Japan’s basic public pension schemes situates it within the social insurance 
style, but the pension amounts are significantly lower than other countries classified within 
this type. On the other hand, Korea fits exceptionally well to the social insurance type 
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(Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 5-6). As we have seen from this case, a bifurcated approach 
might not be suitable for a comparative study that focuses on detailed systematic features.      
 
Secondly, the standard of classification for the social insurance type and the multi-pillar 
pension type might be problematic. The key dimension that distinguishes the two in Bonoli 
(2003), and Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005: 5) typologies is the relative weight of the two 
main pillars of pension policy; public expenditure and the financial assets of pension funds. 
According to Bonoli (2003: 401), whilst social insurance countries spend a large amount of 
their GDP on public pensions and have a small private pension sector, multi-pillar countries 
spend less on public pensions but significantly more on private pensions. On the other hand, 
regarding the financial assets of pension funds, social insurance countries have small pension 
funds since they mostly operate PAYG systems, while multi-pillar countries have larger 
pension funds accumulated by their funded private pension sectors (Bonoli, 2003: 401-402). 
However, this classification might be less reliable as it is based on pension spending. As 
many studies have argued (Choi, 2009: 319; Esping-Andersen, 1990: 19-20; Hinrichs, 2001: 
80; Johnson, 1999: 597-598), comparing countries on pension expenditure can be misleading 
because the size of expenditure does not necessarily reflect the precise characteristics of 
pensions; expenditure is influenced by the ageing population, government subsidies, or tax 
privileges. Also, this approach is difficult to apply to premature pension schemes. For 
instance, the pension expenditure is very low in Korea although it is within the social 
insurance type and the current replacement rate is 60-70%, because it was implemented in 
1988 and has not yet matured. 
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Also, the standards for Bismarckian lite are not clear enough. Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) 
typology tries to ameliorate the classic dichotomy by adding one more category; 
Bismarckian Lite. In short, it is in between the social insurance and multi-pillar systems. 
However, it is obscure as well as a classification standard. First, Bonoli and Shinkawa state 
that the benefit of the first pillar in Bismarckian lite is at a ‘modest level’ (Bonoli & 
Shinkawa, 2005: 6). Since there is no sufficient explanation on this level, it is difficult to put 
other countries into this typology. We can only make an assumption that it would be at 
around 40-50% of earnings, based on indirect information in their study; they sort the USA 
(40% of earnings), Canada (45% of earnings) and Japan (50% of earnings) into Bismarckian 
lite. On the other hand, the benefit of first pillar in the social insurance type should be at least 
60% of earnings (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 6). So if countries have benefit levels very close 
to 60% of earnings, to which type do they belong? Are there grounds for this? It shows that 
classifying countries through the level of pension benefits might not be very clear. A similar 
problem is also found in the second pillar. The second pillar in Bismarckian lite is an 
occupational / corporate or a personal pension, which is “neither compulsory nor widespread” 
(Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 6). Again, it is very vague concept. The Japanese occupational 
pension is claimed to be “not too widespread”, because slightly over 50% of people receive 
a proper pension, despite more than 90% of companies offering some form of retirement 
benefits (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 15). To clarify the concept, it is required to define a 
‘proper occupational pension’ as well as the level of ‘widespread’. Whereas it has a decided 
advantage in catching subtle systemic changes compared to the previous dichotomies (Jung, 
2010: 338), the absence of description of the required standards and a lack of a systematic 
understanding may lead to confusion. 
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Considering these facts, we can tell that all three pension typologies have different weak 
points when comparing pension schemes. The typologies of Bonoli (2003) and Hinrichs 
(2001) have difficulty in capturing specific national variations in pension institutions, as they 
are dichotomous. Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) typology could be a better option as it has 
a  third type, Bismarkian lite. It is, however, not free from criticism as the criteria for 
classification is less clearly addressed in their description. Also, the fact that their typology 
classifies pensions based on the size of pension spending and funds is another concern. As 
pension expenditure is influenced by multiple external factors such as demographic changes, 
taxation, and the maturity of the pension scheme, it does not accurately reflect the features 
of pension systems. This is not to say that they are unimportant, but it is necessary to think 
carefully about their usefulness in applying them to this thesis. They might be very useful to 
understand major differences and generalise overall development, but less useful in 
capturing detailed systematic changes.  
 
Changes in pension systems 
The majority of pension typologies reviewed in the previous section mostly capture a single 
point in time. Contrary to this, pension systems can be understood within a longer period of 
time. This entails an approach that focuses on changes in pensions and tracks the trends of 
pension systems over time. Therefore, this approach is closely related to analysing pension 
reforms, which is the main aims of this thesis. In this section, two issues are addressed: the 
mechanisms of pension reform and path-dependence / convergence. It can be said that the 
former is about the processes of change in pensions, whilst the latter is about the outcome of 
those changes.  
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Mechanisms of pension reform 
A growing literature has explored the mechanisms of changing welfare states (Bonoli et al., 
2000; Bonoli & Natali, 2012; Hinrichs, 2001; Pierson, 1998; Pierson, 1994, 2001). For 
example, Pierson (1994; 2001) argues that a new perspective is required to understand the 
dynamics of the contemporary welfare state that takes into account ‘the new politics of 
welfare’. As a part of welfare states, pension dynamics share many aspects in common with 
welfare politics, but it is necessary to develop a pension-specific approach and typology that 
can give clear insights into understanding pension reforms. For example, as seen previously, 
countries have various pension institutions which might create distinctive dynamics within 
pension changes. Several studies have centred on pensions’ institutional designs, but they 
are mostly focused on revealing the different levels of effectiveness within pension systems 
(Hong, 2005; Johnson, 1999; Kim, 2000; Korpi & Palme, 1998) or the outcomes of pension 
changes such as convergence and divergence (Bonoli, 2000; Hinrichs, 2001; Overbye, 1994; 
Scruggs, 2007). 
 
Among many others, Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005: 1-21) research is particularly worth 
attention, for its systematic approach to understanding the process of pension change. They 
classified pension institutions into three types as seen in the previous section. They then 
explain the mechanisms of pension reforms based on case studies of 11 welfare states. They 
argue there are two main factors – demographic change and a pension’s institutional 
characteristics – which shape pension reform. These interact with each other and exert 
influence on pension politics, which leads to pension reform (see Figure 3.1 below).    
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Figure 3.1: The mechanisms of pension reforms 
 
Source: Author based on Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005: 5-8) 
 
Let us examine the process step by step. Firstly, two factors have an impact on pension 
politics: demographic change and pension institutions. Population ageing is a common issue 
but occurs at a different pace and from different starting points. Differences in demographic 
change generate different pressures on pension sustainability. Consequently, the effects of 
population ageing on pension politics varies depending on the pattern of demographic 
change. For instance, Western Europe pursued gradual retrenchment reforms as ageing is 
occurring at a moderate pace, whilst North America has not seen any major reforms thanks 
to a stable demographic situation (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 3). When it comes to East Asia, 
Japan is under pressure to retrench as its ageing pace is faster than Western Europe, whilst 
Korea expanded its pension system as its ageing is not at a concerning level. At the same 
time, the different infrastructures of pension systems generate different incentives for 
pension politics. For example, the social insurance type is under pressure to retrench because 
its earning-related pension is sensitive to population ageing. There is strong resistance, 
however, against retrenchment due to double payment problems as well as a strong sense of 
entitlement. On the other hand, different pressures co-exist within the multi-pillar system. 
The first pillar, the basic pension, is under moderate pressure for sustainability. Meanwhile 
the second pillar, mandatory/quasi-mandatory private pensions, has some room for 
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expansion due to its limited coverage. Bismarckian lite is located in the middle of the two 
types. The first pillar has a sustainability issue but this is relatively moderate due to its 
smaller size. In the second pillar, reforming occupational pensions is less politicised due to 
the absence of an explicit commitment to replace them for middle-class earners. As a result, 
policy drift does not lead to significant political controversy. In this context, the interplay 
between demographic change and pension institutions “determines the kind of politics that 
is likely to surround pensions … by affecting patterns of political competition in the electoral 
and in the policy-making arenas” (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 21). 
 
The kind of politics here refers to blame avoidance and credit claiming (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 
2005: 21). According to Pierson (1994: 18), blame avoidance is one of the distinguishing 
attributes in the new politics of welfare states. Government leaders generally have two goals; 
re-election and implementing their policy agendas. However, they face a dilemma when they 
pursue cutbacks in welfare programmes, since their two goals seem to be mutually exclusive. 
As examined in Chapter Two, the post-war welfare states expanded welfare programmes in 
terms of coverage and generosity. This generated massive support from welfare beneficiaries, 
their family members, and potential beneficiaries. Politicians who favour retrenchment of 
welfare states come up against bitter opposition. In addition, whilst the beneficiaries of 
welfare cutbacks are generally diffused and invisible, welfare losers are often a visible group 
of people, who have a concentrated interest in it. Furthermore, voters often have ‘negativity 
bias’, namely the tendency of voters on the losing side of reforms to respond more 
proactively and exercise the right to vote compared to those on the winning side (Bonoli, 
2012: 94-95). This means policy makers who advance retrenchment policies are likely to 
suffer political retaliation from welfare supporters. Blame avoidance is the policy makers’ 
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strategy for minimising these risks. In the era of the golden age, politicians favoured credit 
claiming for their ‘give away’ policies. Welfare states fully enjoyed prosperous economic 
and demographic support at that time. Politicians were able to proclaim welfare expansions 
to voters, which proved to be useful for re-election. However, the situation has changed. 
Policy makers have limited capacity for popular policies, but pursue retrenchment despite 
the views of voters. They pursue reforms while avoiding public blame as much as possible, 
using several strategies. Obfuscation is the most commonly used, providing deliberately 
indirect and insufficient information about policy changes. Strategies of division isolate 
subgroups of large organised opposition to diminish their potential power. Suggesting a 
trade-off as a compensation for potential losers of particular reforms is also widely employed 
(Pierson, 1994: 19-24). In this way, Pierson (1994: 18) considered blame avoidance as a key 
mechanism to understand welfare politics. According to him, policy makers present blame-
avoidance strategies in order not to lose votes in elections. Also, according to Pierson, credit 
claiming is no longer used because little room remained for popular policies, unlike in 
previous eras. In addition, even if a government carries out unpopular reforms using blame-
avoidance strategies, it limits the range of application.  
 
However, several instances that point to the contrary were observed over the decade. There 
are three anomalies observed (Bonoli, 2012: 96-100). One is the case that credit claiming is 
used for propaganda; politicians or government leaders promote their ability to carry out 
unpopular but necessary retrenchment for the nation. In this case, they can claim credit even 
though significant cutbacks have damaged voters. One another instance is a radical reform 
with blame avoidance. This is not unexpected, considering governments pursue strategies to 
make reforms nearly imperceptible. However, radical reforms have adopted over time, 
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especially in pensions, including increasing the pension age and replacement rates;in the 
early 1990s, Germany, France, and Italy cut the replacement rates from around 70% to 40-
50% (Bonoli, 2012: 98). Lastly, there has been welfare expansion in policies targeting new 
social risks. In the perspective of blame avoidance, policy makers would have chosen 
minimising welfare cutbacks rather than spending for new programmes, if they have spare 
cash. Bonoli (2012: 100-107) explains that these anomalies can take place when welfare 
states are in major crisis situations; specifically, when voters are convinced that they are in 
major crisis. In that case, “retrenchment does not need to be performed by stealth” (pp. 106-
107), and politicians can even claim credit. Also, politicians prefer ‘affordable credit 
claiming’ which is achievable through high visibility and low-cost reforms. Even so, to 
minimise risks, they look for the most vulnerable groups to be veto players when they cut 
benefits, such as the young and marginal workers.   
 
Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005: 2) note that there are other relevant factors to pension reforms, 
but they have less systematic effects. For example, several studies on welfare politics 
consider veto points as one of the elements that explain institutional changes in welfare states 
(Huber & Stephens, 2001; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Pierson, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002). They 
argue that the number and the location of veto points show policy stability, or difficulty in 
changing the status quo. If they are individuals (a president or a monolithic political party), 
decisions are easily made based on their preferences. If they are collectives (a parliament or 
a weak political party), it depends on the internal decision-making rule (unanimity, qualified 
or simple majority) and who controls the agenda (Tsebelis, 2002: 17-18). However, Bonoli 
and Shinkawa (2005) argue that political institutions and the political orientation of the 
government have an impact on the process to adopt pension reforms rather than reform 
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contents. They claim that the processes are related to the content, but that the link between 
them does not emerge systematically. This is of course an important consideration in 
understanding pension reforms, but it “tells us little about the actual policy measures that are 
likely to be adopted under different configurations of political institutions” (Bonoli & 
Shinkawa, 2005: 2).    
 
Convergence of pension systems?  
In comparing the results of pension reforms, one of the frequently discussed issues is if the 
pension systems have converged across countries. Sceptical standpoints argue that 
significant differences still remain after major pension reform in many countries. This is 
because the strong power of path-dependence has worked in pension trajectories for a long 
time. Path-dependence is the concept that explains how the initial policy course limits 
consequent decision-making; individual and organisational adaptations are rarely able to 
reverse the initial course set in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be 
relevant (Pierson, 2001: 414). The notion of path-dependence has been widely applied to 
institutional studies. Pierson (1994; 2004; 2011) elaborated how and why a policy choice at 
one point continuously influences subsequent choices, and Esping-Andersen (1990) 
demonstrated how attributes of welfare regimes are maintained over time are examples 
(Steinmo, 2008: 127). Pierson illustrates the ‘lock-in’ effects of institutions. Institutions have 
a tendency to reinforce existing pathways due to this effects. This means that the initial set-
up cost, emerging social networks, and learning effects all create strong incentives to stay 
within the previous setting. As North (1990: 95) said, “the interdependent web of an 
institutional matrix produces massive increasing returns”. As a consequence, path-
dependence becomes an obstacle to the pursuit of reforms making them an unattractive 
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option (Pierson, 2001: 414-416). The mechanism of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ explains how 
the first path is initiated in institutions. It is the idea that institutions are stable because path-
dependence works until they face exogenous shocks. When the impact on institutions is great 
enough, they choose an alternative instead of the existing path at ‘critical juncture’ moments 
(Steinmo, 2008: 129-130; Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 6-7). To sum up, long “path-dependent 
equilibrium is periodically ruptured by radical change, making for sudden bends in the path 
of history” (Pempel, 1998: 3, cited in Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 7).   
 
According to this perspective, “starting points matter” (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 5). Initial 
institutional designs of pension system have developed for more than 100 years, sustaining 
the original shape without much deviation. This is because the different infrastructures of 
the initial pensions create different incentives and pressures for policy makers. Consequently, 
pension schemes are not likely to make drastic changes (Bonoli, 2000: 13; 2003: 400; Bonoli 
& Shinkawa, 2005: 5-8; Jung, 2010: 335). Pierson also addresses pension reforms may slow 
down the rate of spending growth, but hardly reverse it. Policy makers are only able to 
choose options constrained by institutional and programmatic designs inherited from the past. 
Furthermore, veto points can be a formidable obstacle for pension reform. As pension 
reforms involve the alteration of an existing distributional equilibrium, potential losers from 
such reforms are likely to exploit veto points where available, to defend their interests. 
Although policy makers seek a consensual solution to overcome veto players, it is 
exceptionally difficult to devise fully consensual pension reforms. As a result, the tendency 
towards reform is centrist, rather than radical (Pierson, 2001: 305-306, 330-333). However, 
there is room for the possibility of future retrenchment; “[p]erhaps the real era of 
retrenchment begins now” (Pierson, 2011: 21). As Pierson himself said, the definition of 
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major retrenchment is up to the researcher’s perspective (Pierson, 2011: 18). Johnson (1999: 
616) empirically supports this view; there has been increased variance rather than 
convergence in the outcomes of public pension schemes across countries since the mid-
1980s.   
 
On the other hand, one theory that supports the convergence of pension systems suggests the 
‘opened; approach of path-dependence as its underlying mechanism. The ‘opened’ approach 
holds the view that welfare policies are changeable without path-breaking, gradually and 
incrementally. Initial settings of welfare programmes have an influence on the decisions of 
policy makers and voters, but it is not deterministic all the time. The ‘opened’ approach grew 
from a questioning of ‘closed’ – the traditional perspective of path-dependence – approach. 
According to the ‘closed’ approach, institutional changes heavily rely on exogenous shocks. 
This perspective has been criticised as it “gives human beings no agency” in institutional 
change, and regards institutional changes as “a product of fate” (Steinmo, 2008: 129). The 
closed perspective also emphasises the role of critical junctures, but does not give a full 
explanation as to what causes critical junctures other than wars and economic crises. Overall, 
the traditional perspective on path-dependence is “overly deterministic” (Thelen, 1999: 396) 
to apply to changing welfare states (Steinmo, 2008: 129-130; Thelen, 1999: 396-399). As 
Streeck & Thelen (2005) argue, even radical changes occur gradually and those changes are 
frequently unobserved, making them unlikely to disrupt electoral incentives. Ebbinghaus 
(2005) takes a similar point of view. He divides path-dependence into a ‘trodden path’ 
(unplanned and diffusive) and a ‘branching path’ (chosen and developmental). He stresses 
the latter, the more open development approach. According to his study, pathways can be 
developed through three steps: an institution emerges at a critical juncture (step one), it then 
107 
 
becomes institutionalised through self-reinforcement (step two), then it structures the 
alternatives of later pathways (step three). The range of the alternatives depends on the 
timing of previous institutions, the subsequent degree of institutionalisation, and the 
juncture’s situation (Ebbinghaus, 2005: 15-17). He argues that the nature of path-dependence 
is neither simple nor necessarily deterministic. Path development has the possibility to 
transform. It might not experience any changes despite of environmental changes. It might 
go through partial renewal sometimes, or even end the initial path and start a new path.  
 
In this vein, Hinrichs (2001: 96) argues that “substantial path changes were thus indeed 
possible and have occurred” in pensions. His study shows that Beveridgean countries with 
universal top-ups gradually moved towards the Bismarck model as their relative weights of 
the ‘basic pension pillar’ declined or even vanished. Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Canada 
are examples. According to his article, these four countries established a second pillar in the 
1960s, aiming at income continuity during the life course. As time passed, they have become 
similar structures to the social insurance model, with a matured second pillar (Hinrichs, 2001: 
78, 80-84). Hinrichs named these countries ‘new social insurance countries’, distinguishing 
them from ‘traditional insurance countries’ (the Bismarckian model). The UK is a good 
example to demonstrate the path-break theory. The UK was the representative Beveridgean 
country in the early 20th century but moved to become a social insurance country in 1978 
with the introduction of SERPS. However, reforms for retrenchment in their pension systems 
under the Thatcher government reversed this course, thus the UK is now classified to 
‘Latecomers’, meaning two-tiered pensions. His study agrees that public pension systems 
have moved towards the direction which their original diversity has been diminished. 
However, for the most part, they have taken a different form (Hinrichs, 2001: 77).  
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Various researchers support this view on path changes. For example, Bonoli (2000) observed 
a trend in pension reforms since the early 1980s. According to his research, the initial 
pension systems, whether Bismarckian or Beveridgean, converged towards a two-tiered 
pension system in most countries. The first tier exists to guarantee a minimum income to the 
whole population, whilst the second tier is designed to maintain a similar level of living 
standards as experience during their working lives (Bonoli, 2000: 13). Overbye (1994) also 
states that the dual structural design has developed similarly in most countries because of 
risk exposition, political institutions and actor strategies. Hall (1993: 278) found the trend of 
convergence in standard retirement ages, pension credits for unpaid care work in the family, 
and benefit formulas tightening the relationship between contributions and benefits. Scruggs 
(2007) analysed replacement rates, coverage, and other eligibility conditions of pensions, 
unemployment, and sickness benefits using the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 
(CWED). According to his study, the general level of benefits has converged upwards since 
the 1970s, and then downwards after the mid- to late-1980s. Even though social insurance 
coverage has gradually converged towards full coverage and been maintained over time, 
Scruggs argues that there are clear signs of retrenchment since 1980 based on analysis of his 
generosity index (Scruggs, 2007: 149-161). Similarly, Goldberg (2002) claims that 
retrenchment has occurred and converged towards a liberal model among welfare states. He 
points out that despite GDP increasing in eight countries by an average of 30% between 
1980 and 1995, only two countries (Sweden and Canada) spent their extra wealth on welfare. 
He also analysed changes in welfare programmes, levels of poverty and inequality, and other 
economic indicators. According to his case studies, the common trend is “toward reduction 
of whatever employment guarantees there were, as well as toward greater selectivity or 
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means testing, more restrictive unemployment insurance policies, tightening of work 
requirements, privatization, and lower benefits” (Goldberg, 2002: 342). 
 
3.3 Application to the thesis 
This chapter has examined key literatures that focus on welfare regimes and pension 
typologies. The mechanisms of changes in pension schemes and the outcome of those 
changes were delineated. Building on this knowledge, this section critically examines their 
application to this thesis. It examines whether existing typologies can be employed to answer 
the research questions posed in this thesis regarding the trend of pension reforms across 
OECD countries.  
 
Section 3.1 explored welfare state typologies. Welfare regimes provide us with analytical 
and explanatory parsimony in comparing welfare states. Among many other welfare state 
typologies, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) work has contributed to our understanding of 
differences among welfare states. He argues three core elements distinguish welfare states: 
de-commodification, stratification and the public-private-family welfare mix. His findings 
on welfare regimes are important to understand pension reforms, as pension systems do not 
exist alone but are shaped by institutional arrangements, rules and an understanding of 
welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 80). In this sense, a welfare regime can serve as a 
key to interpreting the trend of pension reforms. It is, however, an unsuitable typology to 
directly apply to pension reform analysis. The most obvious reason is that Esping-
Andersen’s welfare state typologies concentrated more on outcomes than on the institutional 
design of pension systems (Bonoli, 2000: 10). As this thesis aims to analyse the institutional 
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changes of pensions rather than the outcomes of those changes, welfare state typologies are 
not a suitable option. In addition, current welfare states have contextual differences than 
those seen within Esping-Andersen’s model. He identifies three welfare regimes based on 
the degree of their protective social rights in 1990, but since then, many welfare states have 
been increasingly affected by the new wave of welfare reform, encapsulated in the social 
investment perspective. In this respect, we explored social investment typologies in Section 
3.1 in addition to Esping-Andersen’s work. Finch et al. (2017)’s social investment typology 
is useful to understand the social investment orientation across countries. However, it does 
not adequately capture specific dynamics in pension systems as it classifies countries based 
on two big categories of expenditure, investment related policies and compensatory policies. 
In this regard, analysing pension reforms since the 1990s requires a new typology that 
reflects these changing dynamics (Hudson & Kühner, 2009: 34). 
 
Secondly, this chapter examined three existing pension typologies: Bonoli’s (2003),  
Hinrichs’ (2001) and Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005). They offer several benefits to 
comparative studies. First, they are best suited to comparing pensions as they exclusively 
focus on pension institutions. Typologies for pensions are generally focused on pensions’ 
institutional designs and their evolution in an historical perspective (Bonoli, 2000: 10). 
Therefore, pension typologies are directly associated with the thesis topic; the changes in 
pension institutions. In addition, they serve to highlight major similarities and differences 
among pension schemes. By simplifying small changes, researchers can easily compare the 
development of pensions over time. However, it is crucial to examine whether they are 
applicable to this thesis. The pension typology for this thesis must reflect particular elements 
of pensions in order to answer the research questions. Are these typologies useful in 
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classifying countries in a way that highlights reform trends such as socialisation and the 
individualisation of old-age risks? Is it possible to compare the variety of pension reform 
strategies adopted across countries? Are they sufficient to cover as many OECD countries 
as possible?   
   
When considering these questions, neither of the three pension typologies appear to be 
appropriate to this thesis. This thesis aims to look into trends in pension reforms among 
OECD countries since the 1990s. This requires a comparison of the specific changes in 
pension systems of each country. Existing pension typologies are not suitable for comparing 
these details of pension systems, as they focus more on overall structural designs. They 
primarily focus on the institutional design in one moment as a ‘snapshot’; it is hard to trace 
the specific changes in pensions over 25 years. This is not to say that they are unimportant, 
but less effective to analyse pension trends. Considering these facts, this thesis argues that a 
new pension typology is required. The pension typology for this thesis must contain 
dimensions of socialisation and the individualisation of old-age risks in a way that reflects 
changing welfare states. The elements within the typology should be measurable with clear 
standards. Also, it should categorise OECD countries effectively according to the distinct 
attributes of pension reform strategies. In the next section, we explore what kind of indicators 
can cover these aspects.   
 
3.4 Conclusion  
Comparing welfare states is a common debate among researchers. There have been 
numerous attempts to compare their unique institutions and histories. Many of these 
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approaches have employed typologies since Wilensky and Lebeau (1965). This is mainly 
due to the beauty of typologies; they offer analytical and explanatory parsimony. Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) regime theory is considered the most significant work which maximised 
those benefits. This chapter devoted significant attention to examining his typologies. He 
linked together states’ political histories and economic variables and statistically analysed 
them. Esping-Andersen’s theory demonstrates that the 18 countries he analysed have unique 
attributes but can be classified into three clusters: the Liberal model, the Social Democratic 
model, and the Conservative model. Although his theory offers great insight into 
understanding welfare states, it has been the subject of much debate and criticism. This thesis 
paid particular attention to the issue of alternative regimes: the Mediterranean, the Antipodes, 
and the East Asian country model. They might provide us better chance of greater refinement 
of analysis. However, giving more weight to the explanatory parsimony - “the relative 
importance” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 92) of different attributes - rather than explanatory 
accuracy will be more suitable for the aim of this thesis. It means Esping-Andersen’s original 
classifications will be employed as background knowledge in the remainder of this thesis. In 
addition to this, this thesis also explored social investment typologies. Social investment 
typologies aim at highlighting the different extent of social investment turn across welfare 
states. By examining typologies of Nikolai (2011) and Finch et al. (2017), this thesis chose 
to employ the latter for the analysis of pension reforms in a later chapter.     
 
The second section of this chapter focused on pension typologies. Most studies agree that 
Bismarckian and Beveridgean typologies are the origin of modern pension schemes, and the 
original form and major characteristics of pension dichotomies has remained in the recent 
developed typologies. This chapter examined the four most frequently cited pension 
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typologies including Bismarckian and Beveridgean types. Each model has its own attributes, 
but none were adequate for this thesis. Existing pension typologies are less effective in 
capturing the details of institutional change in pension systems as they were created to 
highlight major differences and similarities among pension structures. By focusing on a few 
dimensions – e.g. funding and coverage – they aimed at simplifying the characteristics of 
pension institutions and presenting them as a ‘snapshot’. Tracing pension reforms for 25 
years in detail does not correspond to the utilisation of existing pension typologies.     
 
As a consequence, this chapter concludes that it is necessary to generate a new typology of 
pension reforms. In order to answer the research questions, the pension typology for this 
thesis must reflect the following features. First, it must reflect the dynamics of current 
welfare states. As addressed in Chapter Two, welfare states have shown distinctive dynamics 
since the 1990s. The social investment approach has been widely accepted across countries 
resulting in complex trends of socialisation and the individualisation of risks. In order to 
more accurately capture the trend of pension reforms, it is necessary to have a typology that 
reflects these changing dynamics. Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds are, for example, 
generated on the basis of “the varying strength of their protective social rights” (Hudson & 
Kühner, 2009: 34). His typology is very useful in terms of the surrounding influences on 
pension system in this thesis, but it has limited explanatory power due to its ‘snapshot’ 
approach, that is now outdated. Secondly, the new typology must exclusively focus on 
pensions, rather than welfare states. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the trend of pension 
reforms across OECD countries, not the general changes in welfare states. Pensions are the 
core programme of welfare states, but we cannot equate pension dynamics to welfare states 
dynamics. In addition, this thesis aims at analysing pension reforms, not the results of 
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reforms. It means indicators of reform outcomes – e.g. pension expenditures and poverty 
rates – are not suitable in constructing a typology for this thesis. The important consideration 
to keep in mind is that generating such a pension typology is not an easy task, due to the 
limited data and the difficulty in operationalising the variables. We will return to this issue 
in Chapter Five. Before generating a new pension typology, this thesis explores another 
relevant issue in the following chapter; poverty among older people.    
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Chapter 4 : Poverty in older people and the welfare states 
 
Pension reforms in a country can be closely interrelated with the prevalence of pensioner 
poverty. Depending on the level of old-age risks in a country, along with many other factors, 
welfare states choose their strategies in shaping pension reforms. Retirees often do not have 
any income from the labour market or assets and rely solely on their pensions, and pensions 
can be a decisive factor on poverty among older people. Welfare states might have different 
policy goals with their pension systems, as seen in the previous chapter – e.g. poverty 
reduction or income continuity during the life time – but it is hard to refute that the central 
function of pensions is intervention in old-age risks. Consequently, any reforms in pension 
systems impact poverty rates among older people. The reforms that socialise or individualise 
old-age risks might result in changes to poverty among the older population. In this context, 
this final contextual chapter attempts to reach a more nuanced understanding of poverty in 
older people and welfare states. We aim at providing a ‘big picture’ of the poverty situation 
across OECD countries before turning to the empirical analysis on pension reforms.     
 
Measuring poverty requires adequate data in terms of detail and quality. Whilst the sheer 
volume of information is now much greater (Atkinson, 1995: 64-65), a definitive measure 
of poverty is not possible (Barr, 2012: 114). We should bear in mind that even a researcher’s 
single choice over the various indicators and measures may greatly affect the result of 
poverty rates. Therefore, it is important to fully understand the process of measuring poverty, 
and select indicators that are appropriate to one’s research. From this perspective, this 
chapter begins with examining the three steps of measuring poverty: poverty indicators, 
poverty lines, and poverty measures. This thesis then compares the three most commonly 
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used international datasets on poverty. Based on an understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each dataset, the LIS microdata is selected for the analysis of poverty in this 
chapter. This chapter demonstrates the poverty situation in OECD countries between the 
early 1990s and the late 2000s using various indicators: multiple income thresholds, relative 
poverty rates, the poverty gap, the squared poverty gap, and decomposed incomes. Finally, 
poverty levels are compared with welfare regimes and pension typologies. Through this 
process, this chapter attempts to understand the poverty situation more precisely and gain 
insights on national variations in the role of income security systems on poverty alleviation.   
 
4.1 Defining and measuring poverty 
What to measure: poverty indicators 
The first step for measuring poverty is to conceptualise it. This is a crucial step for all 
research, and most importantly, for comparative studies. Building a common framework to 
analyse poverty across countries implies that a framework must be equally applicable to all 
countries and give consistent results (OECD, 2008: 98). It is not, however, that simple a 
process. Researchers face various problems in conceptualising poverty as it consists of 
multiple factors that researchers must carefully define within the limits of their data. Every 
factor can significantly affect the results of poverty computations. There are a number of 
indicators to which we should pay attention, but the central issues are as follows.  
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Consumption / income 
It can be said that someone is poor when their income does not match their consumption 
needs to live. In this case, income is a proxy for living standards; we can assume that people 
with income would spend their money to maintain their living. Or as a more direct way, we 
may use a person’s consumption data; someone is said to be poor if their total amount of 
consumption is below the specific standard. The latter could be a more accurate indicator as 
it is more closely related to current basic needs. For example, researchers are able to 
understand someone’s real living conditions when they are going through seasonal 
unemployment or fluctuating incomes, as consumption data reflect one’s access to credit 
markets or savings even though they do not have enough income at the moment (Klugman, 
2002: 30; World Bank, 2008: 67). However, consumption indicators are not always available. 
Due to the difficulty of data collection, income indicators tend to be utilised in international 
research including that undertaken by the UN, the OECD, and the World Bank.  
 
A more detailed breakdown is also required when researchers choose to use income data. 
The OECD (2008: 98-99) outlines four components of income: factor income (wages and 
salaries + self-employed income + property income), market income (factor income + 
occupational and private pensions), gross income (market income + social security cash 
benefits + private transfers + other cash income), and cash disposable income (gross income 
– income tax and employee social security contributions). Among them, cash disposable 
income is the most frequently employed indicator in measuring poverty. Meanwhile, it is 
worth noting that the UK also publishes data on disposable income net of housing costs (after 
deduction of housing costs, AHC). It treats housing costs as unavoidable outlays, and detach 
them from other general consumptions (Atkinson, 1995: 84). AHC is able to capture living 
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standards more accurately as it reflects regional differences and personal preferences within 
housing costs. However, it is not commonly used in international comparisons of poverty as 
most OECD countries prefer disposable income to AHC (except Australia). Also, when the 
variety of housing systems across countries is considered, it is particularly challenging to 
employ the concept of AHC. Some countries, for instance, address poverty risks by 
subsidising housing costs, which makes international comparisons difficult.   
 
Annual / current  
Data can be collected annually, monthly, or weekly. Most datasets specify current 
consumption or income as a monthly or weekly amount. In general, annually based 
indicators are more effective in reflecting real poverty than current indicators, because they 
cover seasonal fluctuations. Accordingly, the figures measured by current incomes would be 
higher than those by the annual incomes. Atkinson (1995: 83), however, points out that short-
term indicators might be more accurate, if the nation has a ‘minimum rights’ standpoint. In 
this case, people are guaranteed not to fall below a certain level of income regardless of 
seasonal fluctuations, and even weekly income may be a sufficient indicator.   
 
Household / family 
It is more common to analyse poverty through the household or family unit rather than 
through individuals. The underlying assumption here is that people living together would 
share broadly equal levels of living regardless of any individual’s income. For example, 
consider an unemployed man who is 20 years old. If he lives independently and is reliant on 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, he is likely to be categorised as poor. On the other hand, if he lives 
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with parents who receive sufficient pensions, he would be much better off than if living 
independently. This demonstrates that the concept of ‘residence’ may be an important factor 
in analysing poverty. As Atkinson (1995: 86-88) describes, residents might be comprised of 
friends or lodgers in addition to blood or marital relationships. He defines the household as 
“those resident in a dwelling and sharing some degree of common housekeeping” (Atkinson, 
1995: 87). Consequently, this is the most extensive unit of analysis. He also defines family 
as blood or marital relationships, and further subdivides it into inner family, a single person 
or couple with dependent children. The most common unit in poverty studies is the 
household, mainly because of practical difficulties. It should be noted that the choice of unit 
significantly changes the result of poverty rates.  
 
Adjustment  
Once researchers have made a choice over household or family units, the next step in the 
process is adjustment. This is based on the fact that the total amount of family need does not 
necessarily increase with the number of family members. Larger households may have more 
opportunity to purchase goods for a wholesale price, and cut down expenses for consumer 
durables. Thus, poverty should be considered together with the economies of scale in the 
household. Also, researchers need to take account of the age of household members. For 
example, the overall cost of basic needs for a child is less than the cost for an adult (Klugman, 
2002: 31). From this perspective, there are two points to consider: the size and composition 
of one unit. An equivalence scale is set by researchers to reflect this. As these decisions 
largely depend on a researcher’s assumptions, there is a wide range of variation in scales. In 
Atkinson’s observation on nine references, the scale for a couple ranged from 1.25 to 2.0, 
and for a child varied between 0.15 and 0.75, when a single adult is 1 (1995: 89). The 
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equivalence scale employed in the OECD’s statistical studies is the square root of the 
household size, and the modified OECD scale for Eurostat gives a weight of 1 to the first 
person, 0.5 for each additional adult and 0.3 for each additional child (OECD, 2008: 153-
154). However, there is a debate that surrounds the adoption of such equivalence scales. An 
EC report (2011: 54) argues that necessities budgets do not have the large economies of scale 
that are assumed in the modified OECD scale. The report argues it has no basis in science 
and that the EU needs an alternative scale that reflects economies of scale and equivalent 
needs for the budget standard (EC, 2011: 6-14).   
 
Which level to set: poverty lines 
The second step for measuring poverty is deciding on the standard that will delineate ‘the 
poor’ from others. What level of income or consumption can be regarded as insufficient? 
There are two concepts that influence this decision: absolute poverty and relative poverty. 
Both of them are widely employed to measure poverty in the world. According to the UN’s 
Global Survey on Poverty Measurement, 40% of 60 countries employ an absolute poverty 
line, 30% use a relative poverty line, and the remaining 30% employ a combination of the 
two. Whilst the concept of absolute poverty is more widely used in Asia, Africa, and the 
USA, the relative poverty concept is dominant in Europe (UN, 2005: 397-406).   
 
Absolute poverty line 
Absolute poverty is “deprivation in an absolute sense, i.e., the value of a set level of resources 
deemed necessary to maintain a minimal standard of well-being” (UN, 2005: 32). The 
measurement of absolute poverty was introduced by Rowntree (1901). He attempted to 
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define poverty objectively in subsistence terms. In his study of town life, he calculated what 
income level was necessary to acquire the food, clothing, and shelter necessary to maintain 
physical health. He also considered the size of household, the age of its members, work type, 
etc. (Rowntree, 1901: 86-87). With systematic and scientific multiple assumptions, he aimed 
to suggest the universally applicable standard for absolute poverty. His approach laid the 
foundation of measuring absolute poverty but was criticised for its unrealistic and arbitrary 
attributes. For example, the question of what items were ‘necessary’ was not critically 
considered in his study. It is also unrealistic to expect people to spend money efficiently only 
for assigned items (Barr, 2012: 109; Townsend, 1954: 131-133).    
 
The measurement of absolute poverty has been developed since Rowntree’s first study. The 
core principle is similar to his initial method, which is to estimate the cost of ‘necessary’ 
goods for a minimum standard of life, but the modern process is much more sophisticated 
and is designed to reflect what is necessary in more detail (Klugman, 2002: 33-34; OECD, 
2008: 130). The concept is widely employed in many countries and organisations, including 
the USA and the World Bank. Employing absolute poverty in comparative studies requires 
extra care, as incomes or expenditures in different countries need to be translated into a 
common currency (Barr, 2012: 114). For example, the World Bank uses a common dollar 
figure, adjusted by purchasing power parities to compare the poverty rates of developing 
countries. The current international poverty line in local currency is the international poverty 
lines of $1.25 and $2.00 a day in 2005 prices, converted to local currency using the 
purchasing power parities conversion factors estimated by the International Comparison 
Programme (World Bank, 2014: 25). Meanwhile, researchers may rather convert absolute 
poverty data to a relative standard to compare poverty rates for cross-country comparisons. 
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In these cases, a relative threshold in a base year, which is kept unchanged in real terms in 
later years, may be used (OECD, 2008: 130).   
 
Relative poverty line  
Adam Smith (1776) is often cited as the first person to describe relative deprivation. He 
explains that the necessities for life are “not only the commodities which are indispensably 
necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent 
for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without” (Smith, 1776: book 5, part 2, 
article 4). He refers to a linen shirt as an example; linen shirts are not a necessity of life but 
“a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public” without one, at his time 
of writing (Smith, 1776: book 5, part 2, article 4). The point made here is that the concept of 
poverty should be considered in the context of the relative society. Townsend (1979: 31) 
also conceptualised poverty as “the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or 
are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong”. This 
means that at the core of poverty is the relative deprivation. In this perspective, the definition 
of poverty changes over time and space. Similarly, just as the absence of a linen shirt is no 
longer a source of shame in the present day, the standard of poverty relies on the culture and 
the economic development of a society.  
 
The OECD and the EU widely employ the relative poverty line in their statistical studies. 
The OECD provides poverty rates at 40%, 50% and 60% of median income thresholds. As 
the EU sets a benchmark at the threshold of 60%, and the absolute poverty line in the USA 
is close to 40% of median income, the OECD mainly focuses on 50% of median income, the 
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mid-point between the EU and the USA (OECD, 2008: 148). The threshold may also be 
decided in relation to certain welfare benefits. For example, the level of social assistance 
was often the basis for defining low incomes in Europe in the post-war era. It is worth noting 
that poverty rates may be affected by social policies if they are designed to guarantee a 
certain level of income, and if a large portion of the population is clustered around the 
poverty line threshold (OECD, 2008: 126); as Atkinson describes, poverty rates employing 
a 50% of income threshold might be significantly different in two countries, if the social 
minimum wage is set at 47.5% of average income in Country A and at 52.5% in Country B 
(Atkinson, 1995: 86). Researchers should be aware of this possibility to mislead when 
measuring poverty. 
 
How to measure: poverty measures  
The final step for measuring poverty entails choosing a statistical measure to estimate the 
extent of poverty. There have been several practices of calculating poverty statistics, but 
measures described in the below section have been the most commonly employed measures 
over the past 20 years. These provide the process for answering two questions: “how many 
poor people are there in a region?” (headcount index) and “how deep is their deprivation?” 
(poverty gap) (UN, 2005: 52-53). Since these measures shed light on the different aspects of 
poverty, it is common to use them simultaneously.   
 
Headcount index 
A headcount index is defined as “the share of the population whose income or consumption 
is below the poverty line” (Klugman, 2002: 34). It is the simplest way to grasp poverty rates 
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as it literally counts how many people fall below the poverty line. Because of its analytical 
and explanatory parsimony, it is the most common measure used to compute poverty levels 
and is often employed as the basis for policy making. 
 
However, there are shortcomings. First, headcount measures do not provide detailed 
information on poverty. For example, researchers cannot estimate the depth of poverty; how 
far on average people are from the poverty line. A headcount index can help to grasp the 
extent of poverty – how many people are under the poverty line – but not the degree of 
seriousness. In the same manner, it cannot capture any changes under the poverty line. We 
cannot observe any change in headcount index when people become even poorer, as long as 
they remain below the poverty line. It thus may not provide us with insights into the 
implications for poverty alleviation, for instance. Second, a headcount measure is vulnerable 
to manipulation; as it only focuses on the size of populations above and below the poverty 
line, the index can be instantly fluctuated by policy interventions. For instance, policy 
makers are able to input resources solely to people who sit just below the poverty line in 
order to boost them over the threshold. In this instance, the poverty headcount would be 
dramatically decreased in a very short time, but it would be difficult to argue that poverty is 
alleviated in real terms (Barr, 2012: 113; UN, 2005: 59). In this regard, the UN suggests that 
researchers should create a sub-poverty headcount index in addition to the total poverty 
index. By calculating poverty at lower thresholds than the overall poverty line, researchers 
might get a more accurate picture of poverty (UN, 2005: 60).  
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Poverty gap / squared poverty gap 
A poverty gap reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence. It is “the mean shortfall 
from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a 
percentage of the poverty line” (World Bank, 2014: 25). In other words, a poverty gap 
demonstrates what is required to raise all the people in poverty to the poverty line. It 
calculates the total amount of the gap between the poor and the poverty line, and then divides 
it by the total population (Klugman, 2002: 35). A squared poverty gap is introduced to show 
income differences. By squaring the poverty gap, it weights the value of the poorest 
individuals, since their initial resource gap is largest (UN, 2005: 67). It provides us clearer 
picture of distributions of poverty as it shows not only the distance separating the poor from 
the poverty line, but also the inequality between them (Klugman, 2002: 35). However, it 
lacks intuitive appeal and is not easy to interpret. As a result, it is not widely applied to 
comparative studies despite being the measure that takes into account inequality among the 
poor (World Bank, 2005: 73-74). It can be more useful as a complementary measure to the 
headcount measure.  
 
4.2 Poverty trends in the 1990s and 2000s 
Comparing poverty measures of the OECD, Eurostat and LIS 
Building on our understanding of poverty as detailed in the previous section, it is now 
necessary to compute poverty levels across OECD countries in the 1990s and 2000s. Three 
of the most commonly used data sources are the OECD, Eurostat, and the Luxembourg 
126 
 
Income Study (LIS)5. As mentioned earlier, the conceptualisation of poverty is a complicated 
process. The choice among various indicators takes on particular importance in international 
comparisons, since they require further adjustments to take into account differences such as 
currency, income concepts, weighting, etc. The OECD, Eurostat, and LIS generally take a 
similar approach to calculating poverty; they compute poverty rates based on annual 
disposable equivalised median income by household units. However, some differences do 
exist.  
 
First of all, the coverage is different. Whilst the OECD covers 34 countries, LIS collects data 
from 43 countries as of 2015. Eurostat mainly analyses EU countries, whilst some indicators 
are also provided for non-member countries such as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and 
Turkey. Second, the concept of income is slightly different in their macro-level summary 
figures. For example, the OECD classifies occupational and private pensions into market 
income, whilst LIS regards it as capital income. As factor income is defined as the sum of 
labour income and capital income in the LIS microdata, occupational and private pensions 
belong to ‘factor income’, whilst they belong to ‘market income’ in the OECD data. 
However, this is not problematic when comparing disposable income. Also, as the LIS and 
Eurostat data can be accessed in micro-level form, researchers can operationalise them any 
way they require. Thirdly, they show distinctions in their equivalence scales. When it comes 
                                                          
5 These three datasets are generated by independent sources of microdata. The OECD data is from Income Distribution 
and Poverty data which is directly collected from member countries via questionnaires 
(https://www.oecd.org/statistics/data-collection/).  
EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) are collected on the basis of an agreement between Eurostat and 
member states (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Income_distribution_statistics.)LIS acquires 
microdata from data providers based on surveys then harmonise it into a common template in order to make the datasets 
comparable (http://www.lisdatacenter.org/).  
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to the OECD and the LIS microdata, equivalised income is equal to unadjusted household 
income divided by the square root of the number of household members (equivalised income 
= unadjusted household income / √household size). All members of a given household have 
the same equivalent income, regardless of age, gender, or relationship to the household head 
(LIS website6). On the other hand, the Eurostat employs the modified OECD equivalence 
scale which gives a weight of 1 to the first person, 0.5 for each additional adult and 0.3 for 
each additional child (OECD, 2008: 154). Fourth, whilst the OECD mainly focuses on a 
poverty threshold of 50% of median income, the Eurostat adopts a threshold of 60% of 
median income as a benchmark for at-risk-of-poverty. However, it is not a significant 
problem when comparing poverty levels as they generally provide three types of income 
thresholds (60%, 50%, and 40% of the median income). Also, there are some minor 
differences, such as weighting, bottom and top coding. 
 
Table 4.1 shows a comparison of the main estimates among the OECD, the Eurostat, and the 
LIS. It shows poverty rates for the entire population at 50% and 60% of median income 
thresholds and child poverty rates at 50% of the median income threshold. As we can see, 
differences in poverty rates of the three sources are minor. This confirms the reliability of 
the three datasets when comparing poverty levels across countries. Researchers can choose 
between them according to the aim of their studies, coverage of countries, and time period, 
as long as they are aware of the precise definitions of poverty indicators the dataset has 
employed. From this perspective, and considering various advantages, this thesis examines 
poverty levels based on the LIS dataset; the LIS covers a relatively large sample of countries 
                                                          
6 http://www.lisdatacenter.org/ 
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and provides subdivided income concepts that allow researchers to compare various poverty 
rates. Further background information of the LIS microdata is explained in the following 
section.
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Table 4.1: Comparisons of main estimates in the OECD, Eurostat, and LIS datasets 
 Reference years (incomes) Poverty rates: 50% median Poverty rates: 60% median Child poverty rates: 50% median 
 OECD Eurostat LIS OECD Eurostat LIS OECD Eurostat LIS OECD Eurostat LIS 
Australia 2004 - 2003 12 - 12 20 - 20 12 - 14 
Austria 2004 2004 2000 7 6 8 13 12 13 6 6 8 
Belgium 2004 2004 2000 9 8 8 16 15 16 10 9 7 
Canada 2005 - 2000 12 - 12 19 - 19 15 - 16 
Czech Republic 2004 2004 - 6 5 - 11 10 - 10 9 - 
Denmark 2004 2004 2004 5 6 6 12 12 13 3 5 4 
Finland 2004 2004 2004 7 5 7 15 12 14 4 3 4 
France 2004 2004 2000 7 6 7 14 13 14 8 6 8 
Germany 2004 2004 2000 11 7 8 17 12 13 16 6 9 
Greece 2004 2004 2000 13 13 14 20 20 21 13 13 13 
Hungary 2005 2004 1999 7 7 6 12 13 13 9 11 8 
Iceland 2004 2004 - 7 5 - 12 10 - 8 6 - 
Ireland 2004 2004 2000 15 11 16 23 20 22 16 15 16 
Italy 2004 2004 2000 11 12 13 20 19 20 16 16 17 
Japan 2000 - - 15 - - 21 - - 14 - - 
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Korea 2005 - - 15 - - 21 - - 10 - - 
Luxembourg 2004 2004 2000 8 7 6 13 13 12 12 10 9 
Mexico 2004 - 2002 18 - 20 25 - 27 22 - 25 
Netherlands 2004 2004 2000 8 6 5 14 11 11 12 9 6 
New Zealand 2003 - - 11 - - 23 - - 15 - - 
Norway 2004 2004 2000 7 7 6 12 11 12 5 5 3 
Poland 2004 2004 1999 15 15 13 21 21 19 22 22 18 
Portugal 2004 2004 - 13 13 - 21 19 - 17 17 - 
Slovak Republic 2004 2004 - 8 8 - 14 13 - 11 12 - 
Spain 2004 2004 2000 14 13 14 21 20 21 17 16 15 
Sweden 2004 2004 2000 5 5 7 11 9 12 4 5 4 
Switzerland 2001 - 2002 9 - 8 12 - 14 8 - 7 
Turkey 2004 2002 - 18 18 - 24 26 - 25 - - 
UK 2005 2004 1999 8 12 12 16 19 21 10 13 17 
US 2005 - 2005 17 - 17 24 - 24 21 - 21 
 
Source: OECD (2008: 154).
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Analysing poverty rates with the LIS microdata 
The Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS) provides household- and personal-level data 
on market and government income, demography, employment, and expenditures at regular 
intervals. As the LIS microdata covers a relatively broad range of countries and has 
subdivided numerous variables, it is often used to analyse the relationship between economic 
and social policies and their outcomes. In particular, the LIS microdata is apt for comparing 
the effect of social policies on poverty across countries, since it provides separated 
household and individual data for specific transfer incomes. For example, researchers who 
analyse policies for older people are able to track the effect of a particular social policy such 
as mandatory individual pensions, old-age universal pensions, and old-age assistance 
pensions. Researchers are able to select variables for their research models and 
operationalise them. Of course, a comparison based on the LIS microdata does have 
limitations. Despite the dataset covering a broad range of countries that share a good number 
of variables, some variables are missing for some countries. For instance, all country datasets 
have variables for major aggregates and upper concepts, but variables for their 
subcomponents are not always available. Consequently, researchers may have difficulty 
when comparing countries using those variables. This thesis returns to this issue below.  
 
In this section, this thesis computed poverty rates using the raw LIS microdata. The results 
are shown in three steps to grasp poverty changes in OECD countries for the last two decades. 
First, this section shows relative poverty rates for different income thresholds; poverty rates 
at 40%, 50%, and 60% of the median disposable income are analysed. Then, as the next step, 
the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap will be shown to complement the headcount 
index. This highlights hidden changes under the poverty line. The ‘50% of median 
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disposable income’ rate is employed for this step. Finally, this section shows relative poverty 
rates based on decomposed income: factor income, income after social security transfers, 
and disposable income. This allows us to track poverty changes according to government 
interventions. All of the analysis in this section is based on household income and is analysed 
from 1990 to 2010 at ten-year intervals. As the LIS provides datasets at slightly different 
intervals depending on the country, the closest available data are used in the analysis. 
 
Employed poverty indicators and variables for analyses   
As examined in the previous section, researchers have various options when measuring 
poverty. The result might vary depending on poverty indicators and the method that 
researchers employ. This thesis computed poverty rates mainly using the guidelines from the 
LIS. The LIS website7 provides “Inequality and poverty key figures”, which are generated 
by LIS staff and are widely employed in numerous studies. It shows multiple inequality 
measures (e.g., Gini and Atkinson coefficients, percentile ratios), relative poverty rates for 
various demographic groups, and median and mean disposable household income. In this 
section, similar measures to the LIS key figures are used for the first and the second steps. 
Based on them, this thesis breaks down relative poverty rates in the third step for an in-depth 
analysis of poverty.   
  
In the key figures, poverty lines are calculated based on the total population, and a subgroup 
of the population for children and the elderly at a threshold of 40%, 50%, and 60% of the 
                                                          
7 http://www.lisdatacenter.org/. 
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disposable median income. The disposable income is divided by the square root of the 
number of household members to adjust for different family size (equivalence scale). 
Extreme values of each variable were eliminated by bottom and top coding. The bottom is 
coded at 1% of equivalised median income and the top is coded at 10 times the median of 
the non-equivalised income. The major indicators that this thesis employed to compute 
poverty rates are as seen in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Basic Information for the LIS Inequality and Poverty Key Figures 
Indicators  LIS inequality and poverty key figures 
Countries covered 43 countries  
(Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and  
Australasia) 
Period covered 1971-2013, at regular intervals 
Poverty line A threshold of 40%, 50%, and 60% of disposable equivalised 
median income 
Unit of analysis Household  
Equivalence scale  Equivalised Income = unadjusted household income /  
√household size 
Weighting For the total population: person-level adjusted weights  
Bottom and top 
coding 
Bottom-coded at 1% of equivalised median income and top-
coded at 10 times the median of non-equivalised income   
Treatment of 
currency 
Median equivalised income expressed in the units of national 
currency that were in use at the time of data collection 
 
Source: Author based on LIS website, http://www.lisdatacenter.org/ 
 
The major variables for income used in the analysis are in Table 4.3 as follows. Disposable 
household income is current net income after income taxes and social security contributions. 
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Factor income means market income, which is the sum of labour income and capital income. 
This represents the original income before any type of redistribution. Social security 
transfers are the sum of social security transfers which cover work-related insurance 
transfers, universal benefits and assistance benefits. In the analysis in step three, income after 
social security transfers are used, which is the sum of factor income and social security 
transfers. 
 
Table 4.3: LIS variable definitions 
Name Label Definition 
DHI Disposable 
household income 
Total monetary and non-monetary current income net of 
income taxes and social security contributions. (HI – 
HXIT) 
FACTOR Factor income Total current monetary and non-monetary income from 
labour and capital. (HIL + HIC) 
HITS Social security 
transfers 
Monetary and non-monetary transfers that result from 
an institutional arrangement between the recipient and 
the government and/or the employer, with the explicit 
intention to relieve household and individuals of the 
burden of a defined set of risks or needs; these transfers 
may be paid either directly from public bodies, or 
through private bodies representing the institutional 
arrangement as defined above. 
Social security universal transfers in kind defined as 
government-provided services that benefit individuals, 
but are provided with the primary objective of meeting 
the general needs of the overall population, rather than 
that of assisting the poor (typically these include non-
monetary transfers in the areas of housing, care 
(including child care), education, or health) are not 
considered as current income and hence not included 
among the LIS variables. (SOCRED) 
HI Total household 
income 
Total monetary and non-monetary (goods and services) 
payments received by the household or its individual 
members at annual or more frequent intervals, that are 
available for current consumption and that do not 
reduce the net worth of the household.   
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HIL Labour household 
income 
Monetary and non-monetary payments received in 
counterpart for labour. 
HIC Capital household 
income 
Monetary payments received in counterpart for 
providing capital (including financial and non-financial 
assets). 
HXIT Income taxes and 
social security 
contributions 
Monetary expenditures (i.e. paid directly by the 
household and/or its members) and non-monetary 
expenditures (paid on behalf of the household and/or its 
members) on income taxes and social security 
contributions. 
 
Source: LIS website, http://www.lisdatacenter.org/. 
 
Relative poverty rates for different income thresholds  
As the first step of analyses in this section, relative poverty rates are computed at 40%, 50%, 
and 60% of the median disposable income. The results are shown in Table 4.4. It shows 
poverty rates of the total population and of people aged 65 and over between 1989 and 2010. 
 
The poverty rates of the total population generally show similar results, regardless of income 
thresholds. For example, countries that show the highest poverty rates at 40% of the income 
threshold also show the highest poverty rates at 50% and 60% of the income threshold. 
Regardless of income thresholds and years, poverty rates in the total population are 
consistently high in Mexico, the USA, Spain, and South Korea, roughly in this order, for the 
last two decades. At the other end of the spectrum, the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, 
the Czech Republic, Finland and Denmark are consistently the lowest group in the same 
period. When it comes to changes in poverty rates, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, and the Slovak Republic show a gradual increase in poverty 
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from 1990 to 2010. The UK, Greece, and Austria, on the other hand, show continuous 
decreases in poverty during the same period.   
 
Despite the general trend, it is worth noting that the relative severity of poverty may vary 
depending on the income threshold. For example, Sweden generally scores low on poverty 
rates for 20 years, but the ranking in total is different depending on the income threshold. 
Sweden is the country with the lowest poverty at 40% of the income threshold (4.1% in 1992 
and 2.6% in 2005), but the second lowest at 50% of the income threshold (6.7% in 1992 and 
5.6% in 2005) and the fourth lowest at 60% of the income threshold (12.1% in 1992 and 
12.0% in 2005). As another example, Australia does not sit among the countries with high 
poverty rates at 40% (6.0% in 1989 and 5.9% in 2010) and 50% (12.2% in 1989 and 13.9% 
in 2010) of income, but it is the fourth highest at 60% of the income threshold (19.0% in 
1989 and 21.2% in 2010). It is very close to Spain (17.1% in 1990 and 22.4% in 2010) and 
South Korea (20.6% in 2006), which have had consistently high poverty rates for the last 
two decades. These cases show different income clusters across countries. In the earlier 
example, we can imagine that the poverty population is clustered between 40% and 50% of 
the median income in Australia and above 50% of the median income in Sweden, whilst risk 
of poverty is more prevalent across all income thresholds in Spain and South Korea. This 
demonstrates that the choice of income threshold can greatly affect poverty rates, and 
additional measures are required to gain a fuller understanding of the actual situation.   
   
The overall features are similar in the older population. The countries that show high poverty 
rates in the total population also show high poverty rates in the older population, and vice 
versa. There are, however, some distinct features. First, there is one country that stands out 
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in the poverty rates of older people: South Korea. It is impossible to observe changes in 
poverty as the LIS provides only one dataset for South Korea (2006), but the older poverty 
rates in 2006 are remarkably high at all income thresholds (30.5% at 40% of the income 
threshold, 41.4% at 50% of the income threshold, and 51.7% at 60% of the income threshold). 
They are much higher than those of total population (9.2% at 40% of the income threshold, 
14.0% at 50% of the income threshold, and 20.6% at 60% of the income threshold) and the 
older population in other countries. Second, some countries show significantly higher 
poverty levels at 50% and 60% of the income threshold compared to those at 40% of the 
income threshold. For example, poverty rates of older people in Australia at 40% of the 
income threshold are at a moderate level (5.6% in 1989 and 8.0% in 2010) compared to other 
countries, but Australia marks the second highest poverty rates at 50% (24.2% in 1989 and 
33.7% in 2010) and 60% (46.1% in 1989 and 50.3% in 2010) of income thresholds. Sweden 
also shows similar features. Third, poverty trends in the older and total population are quite 
varied in some countries. There are cases where the poverty rates of the older population 
have decreased whilst those of the total population have increased over the last 20 years. For 
instance, Greece shows significant poverty alleviation among older people, especially since 
2000 (26.8% in 2000 to 11.6% in 2010 at 50% of the income threshold), despite poverty 
changes in the overall population remaining moderate (14.3% in 2000 to 13.5% in 2010 at 
50% of the income threshold). Similarly, Hungary, Norway, and Poland show a decrease in 
the poverty rates of older people whilst increases in those of the total population. Meanwhile, 
some countries show an increase in poverty in the older population despite an overall 
decrease in poverty in the total population, such as Switzerland. Overall, all this implies that 
there are certain different interventions which affect the income level of the older population 
across countries. It is also fairly predictable that the interventions would be social security 
transfers, the largest body in transfers, especially for retirees.     
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Table 4.4: Relative poverty rates for different income thresholds, 1990s and 2000s 
Country Year Total population Older population 
At 40% of 
income 
At 50% of 
income 
At 60% of 
income 
At 40% of 
income 
At 50% of 
income 
At 60% of 
income 
Australia 
 
2010 5.9 13.9 21.2 8.0 33.7 50.3 
2001 5.5 13.0 21.6 4.7 23.0 46.7 
1989 6.0 12.2 19.0 5.6 24.2 46.1 
Austria 
 
2004 3.4 7.1 13.4 2.0 9.4 17.8 
2000 3.6 7.7 13.4 5.8 13.6 21.4 
1994 4.6 8.7 14.7 5.2 11.9 22.3 
Belgium 
 
2000 3.7 8.1 16.1 5.8 15.4 35.9 
1992 1.8 5.1 10.4 4.1 12.1 24.6 
Canada 
 
2010 7.0 12.5 20.2 2.3 9.8 22.4 
2000 7.2 12.4 18.9 1.4 5.4 16.2 
1991 6.3 11.0 16.6 1.3 5.8 19.4 
Czech 
Republic 
2010 2.9 6.3 11.3 0.5 3.3 12.1 
2002 1.6 4.2 9.8 0.1 1.9 9.5 
1992 0.7 2.4 6.8 0.3 5.7 19.5 
Denmark 2010 3.2 6.3 13.5 0.8 6.6 24.0 
2000 2.0 5.4 13.1 0.8 12.1 36.9 
1992 3.8 7.2 14.6 3.6 11.0 35.7 
Finland 2010 2.8 7.2 15.0 1.8 9.7 24.3 
2000 2.2 5.5 12.7 1.2 8.8 25.8 
1991 2.5 5.5 10.7 3.4 14.1 30.6 
France 2010 4.7 9.1 15.5 2.0 5.2 11.7 
2000 2.8 7.3 13.8 3.0 8.5 16.2 
1989 4.8 8.9 15.5 7.2 14.7 25.6 
Germany 2010 4.6 9.5 16.4 4.5 10.6 20.2 
2000 4.1 7.6 12.7 3.7 10.0 17.9 
1989 3.0 5.6 11.8 4.9 10.4 21.6 
Greece 2010 7.6 13.5 20.9 4.6 11.6 20.2 
2000 8.6 14.3 21.4 17.0 26.8 38.3 
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1995 10.2 15.4 21.5 19.1 27.3 35.6 
Hungary 2009 4.3 7.9 15.2 0.5 1.8 6.3 
1999 3.1 6.8 13.6 1.3 4.4 14.0 
1991 4.3 7.8 14.4 4.1 13.6 28.2 
Iceland 2010 3.2 6.1 11.5 2.1 3.3 11.8 
2004 2.9 5.3 11.2 1.3 3.5 15.9 
Ireland 2010 4.6 9.4 16.6 5.3 8.2 21.5 
2000 7.4 16.2 22.5 15.2 36.8 54.9 
1994 2.6 11.9 20.4 3.4 17.3 32.9 
Italy 2010 7.5 12.5 19.1 3.8 8.8 16.6 
2000 7.5 12.7 20.0 6.1 14.4 22.9 
1991 4.5 10.4 19.1 5.5 15.7 27.4 
Japan 2008 6.6 10.9 17.6 8.9 13.6 22.1 
Luxembourg 2010 2.8 6.1 13.1 1.0 1.6 6.9 
2000 1.4 5.9 12.3 1.1 3.7 10.5 
1991 0.8 4.5 12.2 2.6 11.8 23.1 
Mexico 2010 14.3 19.9 25.9 18.7 26.3 33.9 
2000 15.2 21.3 28.2 21.7 29.4 37.8 
1992 13.3 18.9 25.4 18.0 25.6 32.7 
Netherlands 2010 2.7 5.2 11.1 1.8 2.2 7.4 
1999 2.5 4.9 11.1 0.4 1.6 15.0 
1990 3.8 6.3 12.2 2.2 3.2 19.4 
Norway 2010 4.3 7.4 12.9 0.8 5.5 16.2 
2000 3.0 6.4 12.3 1.3 12.2 28.9 
1991 2.3 6.4 12.1 0.9 14.0 29.4 
Poland 2010 4.9 9.5 16.2 2.7 7.1 14.9 
1999 4.7 9.1 15.2 2.1 5.0 10.8 
1992 2.4 5.7 12.3 4.0 10.9 23.0 
Slovak 
Republic 
2010 4.5 8.0 13.4 0.8 4.4 12.2 
2004 4.6 8.0 14.2 2.0 6.0 17.8 
1992 0.7 2.0 6.3 0.4 2.2 14.8 
South Korea 2006 9.2 14.0 20.6 30.5 41.4 51.7 
140 
 
Spain 2010 9.8 15.2 22.4 5.3 13.2 25.5 
2000 7.6 14.2 20.8 9.3 23.3 33.8 
1990 5.1 10.0 17.1 4.1 12.0 25.1 
Sweden 2005 2.6 5.6 12.0 1.5 6.6 20.6 
2000 3.8 6.6 12.3 2.2 8.0 21.4 
1992 4.1 6.7 12.1 1.5 6.4 19.8 
Switzerland 2004 4.3 8.0 14.8 8.0 15.1 30.7 
2000 3.7 7.5 13.8 4.9 13.5 28.3 
1992 6.7 9.3 14.6 4.7 8.4 19.0 
United 
Kingdom 
2010 5.3 9.8 17.4 4.6 10.3 19.9 
1999 5.9 13.2 21.8 8.3 18.2 33.9 
1991 6.7 14.6 22.8 8.2 24.1 43.6 
United States 2010 10.9 16.9 23.9 11.5 19.8 28.8 
2000 10.4 16.6 23.5 14.4 24.1 33.3 
1991 11.2 17.5 23.9 12.2 21.5 30.2 
 
Source: Author based on LIS Microdata.  
 
The poverty gap and the squared poverty gap 
A headcount index, often synonymously used with poverty rates, is useful to make 
comparisons of poverty levels across countries, but it does not provide sufficient evidence 
about poverty changes below the poverty line. As a headcount index only informs us about 
the relative size of the population based on the poverty line, we cannot estimate the depth of 
poverty. In this regard, the poverty gap is a useful measure to grasp “how deep their 
deprivation is” (UN, 2005: 52-53). The squared poverty gap more vividly highlights the 
deprivation by squaring the poverty gap. Therefore, this thesis computed the poverty gap 
index and the squared poverty gap index using the raw LIS microdata as the second step to 
explore poverty rates across the OECD. It aims at complementing the headcount index as 
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observed above. The results are shown in Table 4.5. The 50% of median disposable income 
threshold is used here to make a simple comparison. Also, the poverty gap and the squared 
poverty gap mean the average normalised poverty gap and the average squared normalised 
poverty gap. The figures are the average of the ratio of the poverty gap to the poverty line 
(World Bank, 2005: 72). 
 
Overall, Table 4.5 shows a similar trend across relative poverty rates (headcount index), the 
poverty gap index and the squared poverty gap index. Countries with a higher incidence of 
poverty rates also record higher poverty gaps and squared poverty gaps. Similarly, countries 
belonging to the group of low poverty rates show low poverty gaps and squared poverty gaps. 
For example, three indicators are high in Mexico, the USA, and South Korea in both the total 
and the older population. Meanwhile, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Sweden show the 
lowest scores in all three indicators.  
 
The general trends in poverty changes during the selected 20 years are also similar. When 
the relative poverty rates increased in one country, the poverty gap and the squared poverty 
gap similarly increased during the same period. There are, however, some exceptions. First, 
the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap decrease whilst poverty rates increase in some 
countries. In Germany, the relative poverty rates in older people slightly increased from 
10.4% (1989) to 10.6% (2010). However, over the same period the poverty gap decreased 
from 0.027 (1989) to 0.022 (2010). The change in the squared poverty gap also shows clear 
poverty alleviation. It decreased from 0.013 (1989) to 0.007 (2010). It indicates that the 
extent of poverty in older people increased, but the depth of poverty was alleviated during 
the period. France is a similar case. Whilst the relative poverty rates in the total population 
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increased from 8.9% (1989) to 9.1% (2010), the poverty gap dropped from 0.032 (1989) to 
0.026 (2010) and the squared poverty gap decreased from 0.02 (1989) to 0.013 (2010). 
Second, there are cases where the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap increased whilst 
poverty rates decreased over the 20 years. Ireland shows a significant decrease in relative 
poverty rates in older people from 17.3% (1994) to 8.2% (2010). However, the poverty gap 
increased from 0.025 (1994) to 0.037 (2010) and the squared poverty gap also rose from 
0.009 (1994) to 0.026 (2010). Similarly, the USA shows overall decreases in relative poverty 
rates in the total population, but increases in the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap. 
The poverty rates slightly decreased from 17.5% (1991) to 16.9% (2010), whilst the poverty 
gap increased from 0.058 (1991) to 0.059 (2010) and the squared poverty gap rose from 
0.029 (1991) to 0.031 (2010). Third, there are cases where the poverty gap and the squared 
poverty gap show different trends. In the UK, despite the alleviation of relative poverty rates 
and the poverty gap in the total population, the squared poverty gap was aggravated for 20 
years. Poverty rates significantly dropped from 14.6% (1991) to 9.8% (2010) and the poverty 
gap also decreased from 0.036 (1991) to 0.031 (2010). Contrary to this trend of poverty 
alleviation, the squared poverty gap increased from 0.017 (1991) to 0.018 (2010).    
 
Table 4.5: Poverty headcounts, the poverty gap, and the squared poverty gap at 50% 
of the median income threshold, 1990s and 2000s 
 
Country 
 
Year 
Total population Older population 
Relative 
poverty 
rates 
Poverty gap 
index 
Squared 
poverty gap 
index 
Relative 
poverty 
rates 
Poverty gap 
index 
Squared 
poverty gap 
index 
Australia 
 
2010 13.9 0.036 0.017 33.7 0.059 0.022 
2001 13.0 0.034 0.019 23.0 0.038 0.015 
1989 12.2 0.034 0.017 24.2 0.042 0.016 
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Austria 
 
2004 7.1 0.019 0.009 9.4 0.014 0.005 
2000 7.7 0.022 0.011 13.6 0.029 0.012 
1994 8.7 0.027 0.015 11.9 0.029 0.015 
Belgium 
 
2000 8.1 0.019 0.008 15.4 0.028 0.010 
1992 5.1 0.010 0.004 12.1 0.023 0.008 
Canada 
 
2010 12.5 0.037 0.018 9.8 0.015 0.005 
2000 12.4 0.038 0.020 5.4 0.010 0.005 
1991 11.0 0.031 0.014 5.8 0.008 0.002 
Czech 
Republic 
 
2010 6.3 0.015 0.006 3.3 0.004 0.001 
2002 4.2 0.008 0.003 1.9 0.002 0.000 
1992 2.4 0.004 0.001 5.7 0.005 0.001 
Denmark 
 
2010 6.3 0.020 0.012 6.6 0.008 0.003 
2000 5.4 0.012 0.005 12.1 0.011 0.002 
1992 7.2 0.023 0.014 11.0 0.028 0.018 
Finland 
 
2010 7.2 0.015 0.006 9.7 0.011 0.003 
2000 5.5 0.011 0.004 8.8 0.011 0.003 
1991 5.5 0.013 0.006 14.1 0.019 0.005 
France 
 
2010 9.1 0.026 0.013 5.2 0.013 0.006 
2000 7.3 0.016 0.007 8.5 0.018 0.007 
1989 8.9 0.032 0.020 14.7 0.049 0.032 
Germany 
 
2010 9.5 0.023 0.009 10.6 0.022 0.007 
2000 7.6 0.019 0.008 10.0 0.021 0.008 
1989 5.6 0.016 0.008 10.4 0.027 0.013 
Greece 
 
2010 13.5 0.042 0.023 11.6 0.023 0.009 
2000 14.3 0.044 0.021 26.8 0.078 0.033 
1995 15.4 0.055 0.031 27.3 0.097 0.048 
Hungary 
 
2009 7.9 0.022 0.010 1.8 0.004 0.002 
1999 6.8 0.016 0.007 4.4 0.008 0.003 
1991 7.8 0.024 0.012 13.6 0.025 0.010 
Iceland 2010 6.1 0.017 0.008 3.3 0.011 0.005 
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 2004 5.3 0.015 0.008 3.5 0.005 0.001 
Ireland 
 
2010 9.4 0.028 0.015 8.2 0.037 0.026 
2000 16.2 0.037 0.014 36.8 0.069 0.021 
1994 11.9 0.020 0.007 17.3 0.025 0.009 
Italy 
 
2010 12.5 0.042 0.024 8.8 0.017 0.006 
2000 12.7 0.041 0.021 14.4 0.034 0.014 
1991 10.4 0.024 0.010 15.7 0.029 0.008 
Japan 2008 10.9 0.034 0.017 13.6 0.044 0.022 
Luxembourg 
 
2010 6.1 0.016 0.008 1.6 0.007 0.006 
2000 5.9 0.009 0.002 3.7 0.006 0.001 
1991 4.5 0.006 0.002 11.8 0.015 0.003 
Mexico 
 
2010 19.9 0.082 0.049 26.3 0.103 0.057 
2000 21.3 0.076 0.038 29.4 0.120 0.069 
1992 18.9 0.066 0.033 25.6 0.100 0.057 
Netherlands 
 
2010 5.2 0.016 0.009 2.2 0.010 0.007 
1999 4.9 0.014 0.008 1.6 0.003 0.001 
1990 6.3 0.026 0.018 3.2 0.013 0.008 
Norway 
 
2010 7.4 0.026 0.015 5.5 0.006 0.003 
2000 6.4 0.019 0.010 12.2 0.015 0.004 
1991 6.4 0.016 0.008 14.0 0.015 0.003 
Poland 
 
2010 9.5 0.028 0.015 7.1 0.016 0.008 
1999 9.1 0.027 0.015 5.0 0.014 0.008 
1992 5.7 0.012 0.004 10.9 0.021 0.007 
Slovak 
Republic 
 
2010 8.0 0.025 0.012 4.4 0.006 0.002 
2004 8.0 0.022 0.010 6.0 0.010 0.003 
1992 2.0 0.004 0.001 2.2 0.003 0.001 
South Korea 2006 14.0 0.049 0.026 41.4 0.158 0.082 
Spain 
 
2010 15.2 0.058 0.035 13.2 0.030 0.013 
2000 14.2 0.039 0.019 23.3 0.042 0.013 
1990 10.0 0.027 0.012 12.0 0.022 0.008 
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Sweden 
 
2005 5.6 0.015 0.008 6.6 0.009 0.003 
2000 6.6 0.021 0.011 8.0 0.012 0.004 
1992 6.7 0.025 0.014 6.4 0.010 0.003 
Switzerland 
 
2004 8.0 0.026 0.016 15.1 0.044 0.023 
2000 7.5 0.021 0.012 13.5 0.029 0.014 
1992 9.3 0.050 0.040 8.4 0.033 0.024 
United 
Kingdom 
 
2010 9.8 0.031 0.018 10.3 0.023 0.009 
1999 13.2 0.034 0.017 18.2 0.038 0.013 
1991 14.6 0.036 0.017 24.1 0.039 0.010 
United 
States 
 
2010 16.9 0.059 0.031 19.8 0.056 0.025 
2000 16.6 0.054 0.028 24.1 0.070 0.031 
1991 17.5 0.058 0.029 21.5 0.061 0.027 
 
* The poverty gap is the average normalised poverty gap and the squared poverty gap is the average squared 
normalised poverty gap. 
Source: Author based on LIS Microdata.   
 
 
Relative poverty rates based on decomposed incomes  
In previous sections relative poverty rates, the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap have 
been examined. This has been helpful in understanding the overall situation of OECD 
countries, but it offers a mere glimpse at the big picture of poverty. As the third step, 
therefore, it is necessary to compare poverty levels across countries in detail, considering the 
effect of government transfers on poverty. In this sense, this thesis employs the raw LIS 
microdata again, and computed poverty rates based on decomposed incomes. To be specific, 
poverty rates are calculated based on three different incomes: income before any taxes and 
government transfers (factor income), income after social insurance, universal benefits, and 
assistance benefits (factor income + social security transfers), and income after taxes and 
all transfers including social security transfers and private transfers (disposable income).  
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This thesis uses social security transfers among many other concepts, mainly due to the 
limited data. Because each dataset has different coverage of variables, highly decomposed 
concepts result in more missing values in comparative analysis. For example, the dataset of 
the UK 2010 has a variable for old-age insurance public pensions (ITSILEPO), but other 
datasets do not cover the same variable, such as Japan 2006. The Japan 2006 dataset has a 
variable for occupational pensions (ITSILO) instead, but it is an upper concept of ITSILEPO 
and the content does not match. The incidence of unmatched variables is more likely to occur 
when using highly decomposed concepts with a large number of datasets. Researchers 
therefore have to choose between using highly decomposed variables or analysing a large 
number of datasets. When considering the fact that this thesis focuses on pension systems, 
the best way of using this data might be to look at the most relevant variables such as old-
age transfers (IATOLD), old-age insurance public pensions (ITSILEPO), and old-age 
universal pensions (ITSUPO). However, datasets that cover those variables are very limited 
and it is difficult to make clear comparisons among OECD countries. As a consequence, the 
upper concept of all public redistribution, the variable for social security transfers (ITS), is 
used to analyse government intervention in this section. In doing so, it is possible to get 
useful insights into the effect of income security systems on poverty, even though it is not 
exclusive to the topic of this thesis.  
 
The basic approach here is similar to that taken within the “Inequality and poverty key 
figures” data provided by the LIS (see Table 4.2). The poverty line is set at 50% of the 
median disposable income, and the same poverty line is applied to the other two types of 
income. The top- and bottom-code value which are generated based on disposable income 
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are also applied to both of the other two incomes. Meanwhile, the approach to zero incomes 
needs some careful consideration. Although all households where disposable income is 
missing or exactly equal to zero are excluded from the analysis, households where factor 
income or factor income + social security transfers is zero are not excluded. In doing so, we 
can analyse households in extreme poverty or households that do not receive any public 
transfers.  
 
The results are shown in Table 4.6. It is worth noting that the figures for poverty rates based 
on disposable income are slightly different to those in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. This is due 
to the data cleaning process which is conducted in this thesis. When we analyse poverty rates 
based on three types of decomposed incomes, households where at least one in three 
variables have a missing value are excluded from the analysis. Therefore, the total number 
of households is reduced compared to the previous cases. This results in slightly different 
poverty rates despite the figures originating from same dataset, and the same poverty line. 
In the strict sense, the figures in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 are more accurate since they are 
calculated based on larger observations, but the difference is very small. This chapter shows 
both sets of data in this respect.  
 
Table 4.6 shows the large drop in poverty rates after social security transfers. It shows the 
poverty rates we have seen in the previous stages were largely shaped by the government 
intervention. For example, when it comes to the total population, the gap between poverty 
rates based in factor income (A) and poverty rates based in factor income + social security 
transfers (B) is a 21 point average, whilst the gap between (B) and poverty rates based in 
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disposable income (C) is only a 1.4 point average8. Also, whilst the former shows positive 
changes in poverty rates, the latter shows a mix of positive and negative changes in poverty 
rates. This is because the latter covers private transfers and taxes and social security 
contributions; if the amount of taxes and social security contributions is larger than private 
transfers, the gap between (B) and (C) is a negative value. One other point to note is that 
poverty rates based on disposable income (C) are not relative to those based on factor income 
(A). As an example, let us compare the poverty rates based on two income concepts in the 
last year. When it comes to (A), poverty rates are relatively severe in Hungary (55.5% in 
2009), France (40.9% in 2010), Poland (37.5% in 2010), and the UK (38.7% in 2010). Their 
poverty rates based on (C) are, however, not particularly high compared to the others; 
Hungary (9.2% in 2009), France (9.1% in 2010), Poland (9.5% in 2010), and the UK (9.8% 
in 2010). On the other hand, Mexico (19.9% in 2010), the USA (16.9% in 2010), and South 
Korea (14.0% in 2006) are the highest poverty countries in (C), but their poverty rates in (A) 
are moderate (Mexico: 30.9% in 2010, the USA: 32.3% in 2010, South Korea: 22.3% in 
2006). Meanwhile, poverty rates based on disposable income are proportional to those based 
on factor income + social security transfers. Mexico (19.9% in 2010), the USA (16.9% in 
2010), and South Korea (14.0% in 2006) are the highest poverty countries in (C), in the latest 
year. They also show the highest poverty levels in (B) (Mexico: 25.4% in 2010; the USA: 
16.1% in 2010; South Korea: 19.5% in 2006). To sum up, the factor that seriously affects 
final poverty rates are social security transfers, although we do not know which programmes 
have the greatest effects on poverty reduction through this analysis. When considering the 
small gap between poverty rates based on B and C (on average 1.4 points), the effect of 
                                                          
8 These figures are from the data in Table 4.6. The average gap between (A) and (B) is 21 points, computed by taking the 
average of (A-B) of every row. The average gap between (B) and (C) is 1.4 points in the same way. It is computed by 
taking the average of (B-C) of every row in the table.  
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private transfers on poverty might be limited to marginal, even though it is not clearly 
observed in this analysis as its effect can be offset by income taxes and social security 
contributions. 
 
Table 4.6: Relative poverty rates at 50% of the median income threshold for different 
income compositions, 1990s and 2000s 
 Total population Older population 
Country Year Factor 
income 
(A) 
Factor income + 
social security 
transfers (B) 
Disposable 
income (C)  
Factor 
income  
(A) 
Factor income + 
social security 
transfers (B) 
Disposable 
income (C) 
Australia 
 
2010 30.0  15.0  13.9  78.4  34.6  33.7  
2001 30.3  13.6  13.0  80.5  23.3  23.0  
1989 23.4  12.1  12.2  74.6  24.1  24.2  
Austria 
 
2004 28.2  5.7  7.1  79.4  6.4  9.4  
2000 33.1  8.4  7.7  81.0  13.8  13.6  
1994 33.6  9.7  8.7  83.4  12.6  11.9  
Belgium 
 
2000 36.1  8.3  8.1  94.8  14.4  15.4  
1992 28.2  4.7  5.1  89.0  12.1  12.1  
Canada 
 
2010 32.3  12.5  12.5  79.5  10.1  9.8  
2000 28.5  11.6  12.4  77.0  5.1  5.4  
1991 25.9  10.5  11.0  72.5  6.1  5.8  
Czech 
Republic 
 
2010 29.7  6.8  6.3  83.7  4.0  3.3  
2002 29.5  4.7  4.2  85.0  2.1  1.9  
1992 26.1  2.7  2.4  84.4  5.8  5.7  
Denmark 
 
2010 30.8  3.8  6.3  85.9  1.0  6.6  
2000 28.0  2.3  5.4  88.7  1.1  12.1  
1992 30.1  5.3  7.2  86.0  8.7  11.0  
Finland 
 
2010 33.1  5.5  7.1  88.8  6.6  9.4  
2000 30.7  4.2  5.4  87.7  6.6  8.7  
1991 25.7  4.6  5.5  88.6  12.8  14.1  
150 
 
France 
 
2010 40.9  10.5  9.1  89.3  5.6  5.2  
2000 37.2  7.9  7.3  89.0  9.0  8.5  
1989 35.8  9.2  8.9  86.2  14.4  14.7  
Germany 
 
2010 35.5  8.3  9.5  86.4  7.5  10.6  
2000 29.5  6.8  7.6  86.7  7.5  10.0  
1989 24.9  4.9  5.6  86.4  8.2  10.4  
Greece 
 
2010 33.9  9.9  13.2  77.2  7.0  11.3  
2000 32.0  14.6  14.3  76.6  27.2  26.8  
1995 33.2  16.3  15.4  77.0  28.2  27.3  
Hungary 
 
2009 55.5  16.7  9.2  91.0  6.9  2.3  
1999 44.0  7.6  6.8  86.4  4.7  4.4  
1991 39.6  8.5  7.8  77.9  14.1  13.6  
Iceland 
 
2010 22.8  5.5  6.1  67.9  2.6  3.3  
2004 17.2  4.5  5.3  67.6  1.6  3.5  
Ireland 
 
2010 43.5  9.8  9.4  84.5  8.0  8.2  
2000 29.8  16.3  16.2  81.5  36.3  36.8  
1994 35.7  12.3  11.9  79.7  17.4  17.3  
Italy 
 
2010 37.8  13.0  12.5  84.6  8.9  8.8  
2000 34.0  13.0  12.7  77.7  14.6  14.4  
1991 27.9  10.7  10.4  74.0  15.8  15.7  
Japan 2008 20.0  8.8  10.9  45.6  11.5  13.6  
Luxembourg 
 
2010 31.2  3.8  6.1  81.5  1.3  1.6  
2000 33.5  6.2  5.9  86.1  3.7  3.7  
1991 25.5  4.7  4.5  75.3  11.8  11.8  
Mexico 
 
2010 30.9  25.4  19.9  55.4  38.5  26.3  
2000 27.9  25.8  21.3  49.9  38.7  29.4  
1992 23.7  21.8  18.9  43.0  33.2  25.6  
Netherlands 
 
2010 28.2  3.4  5.2  90.4  1.0  2.2  
1999 26.5  3.7  4.9  92.9  0.8  1.6  
1990 29.0  4.7  6.3  92.6  2.6  3.2  
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Norway 
 
2010 28.8  5.7  7.4  82.0  3.8  5.5  
2000 26.0  5.4  6.4  85.7  9.1  12.2  
1991 23.4  6.1  6.4  78.3  12.7  14.0  
Poland 
 
2010 37.5  11.3  9.5  81.5  7.0  7.1  
1999 37.7  8.9  9.1  80.2  3.5  5.0  
1992 38.4  11.5  5.7  81.8  17.8  10.9  
Slovak 
Republic 
 
2010 28.8  6.7  8.0  77.8  4.3  4.4  
2004 28.3  7.0  8.1  84.9  6.1  6.1  
1992 28.8  1.9  2.0  80.2  2.3  2.2  
South 
Korea 
2006 
22.3  19.5  14.0  63.3  55.4  41.4  
Spain 
 
2010 35.6  13.8  15.2  79.7  13.3  13.2  
2000 13.2  14.8  14.2  75.8  23.9  23.3  
1990 28.9  10.7  10.0  73.1  13.1  12.0  
Sweden 
 
2005 31.8  4.0  5.6  87.3  1.4  6.6  
2000 31.3  5.1  6.6  88.4  5.1  8.0  
1992 34.6  5.2  5.2  91.6  5.2  6.4  
Switzerland 
 
2004 23.4  3.8  8.0  87.1  3.0  15.1  
2000 20.7  3.5  7.5  81.9  3.1  13.5  
1992 22.4  8.8  9.3  73.8  8.1  8.4  
United 
Kingdom 
 
2010 38.7  9.6  9.8  88.5  10.4  10.3  
1999 36.1  10.5  13.2  84.7  13.2  18.2  
1991 32.2  12.0  14.6  79.4  15.5  24.1  
United 
States 
 
2010 32.3  16.1  16.9  68.9  19.5  19.8  
2000 26.3  15.5  16.6  70.9  23.8  24.1  
1991 27.9  16.3  17.5  69.7  21.5  21.5  
 
Source: Author based on LIS Microdata.   
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The overall trend is similar in the older population. For a clear comparison, Figure 4.1 
highlights the case of the older population in the early 1990s. Each country’s dataset from 
the early 1990s or the late 1980s are employed except Austria (1994), Greece (1995), Iceland 
(1994), Ireland (1994), Japan (2008), and South Korea (2006). The bar graph shows clear 
contrasts in poverty rates before and after social security transfers, and the final poverty rates. 
Compared to those in the total population, the first thing to notice is the strikingly severe 
poverty rates in factor income. The poverty rates among older people based on factor income 
are more than 90% in Sweden and Netherland. Also, a third of 27 countries record more than 
80% poverty rates (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Poland, and the Slovak Republic). However, such high poverty levels are dramatically 
decreased after social security transfers. Most countries record lower than 15% poverty rates 
after social security transfers, except for six countries (South Korea, Greece, Mexico, 
Australia, the UK, and the USA). This implies the massive influence of government 
intervention for poverty reduction in the older population.  
 
When it comes to disposable income, the effect of poverty reduction is moderate or even 
negative, compared to income after social security transfers. This is because of the moderate 
effects of private transfers and the offset of taxes and social security contributions, as 
explained above. However, two exceptions can be observed here: South Korea and Mexico. 
Both countries show the great effects of poverty reduction between disposable income and 
income after social security transfers. In South Korea, the gap of the poverty rates between 
the two incomes is 14 points, and in Mexico it is 7.6 points. Interestingly, the poverty rates 
among the older population based on income after social security transfers are at the top 
level in both countries, as seen above. This implies two possibilities. The first is that private 
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transfers play a significant role in reducing older people’s poverty in South Korea and 
Mexico, rather than social security systems. The second is that the level of income taxes and 
social security contributions is very low in these two countries. The latter is highly likely to 
be true, but more in-depth information is required to examine this theory.
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Source: Author based on LIS Microdata.   
 
Figure 4.1: Relative poverty rates at 50% of the median income threshold for different income compositions, early 1990s, older 
population 
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Figure 4.2 below shows the poverty rates of the older populations based on the data in the 
latest available datasets. Each country’s 2010 dataset is employed except Austria (2004), 
Belgium (2000), Hungary (2009), Japan (2008), South Korea (2006), Sweden (2005), and 
Switzerland (2004).  
 
The overall features are similar to the previous figure. First, poverty rates in factor income 
are strikingly severe. The poverty rates based on factor income are more than 90% in 
Belgium, Hungary, and the Netherlands. Also, half of the 27 countries record more than 80% 
poverty rates. Compared to the data from the early 1990s, the poverty rates based on factor 
income became aggravated in most of the countries. Secondly, also similar to the previous 
figure, the high poverty levels significantly dropped after social security transfers. Twenty-
three out of the 27 countries record less than 10% poverty rates after social security transfers. 
Four countries are the exception: South Korea, Mexico, Australia, and the US. When it 
comes to disposable income, the poverty rates moderately decreased or slightly increased, 
as addressed in Figure 4.1. South Korea and Mexico demonstrate further anomalies. South 
Korea here is based on a single dataset (2006), so it is necessary to look at Mexico. Compared 
to the previous graph, the gap between the poverty rate based on disposable income and 
income after social security transfers is 12.3 points, which is significantly improved from 
7.6 points in the early 1990s. However, for the selected 20 years, the poverty rate based on 
disposable income was aggravated from 25.6% to 26.3% in Mexico due to the increase in 
poverty rates based on factor income and the relatively small effects of social security 
transfers on poverty.  
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Figure 4.2: Relative poverty rates at 50% of the median income threshold for different income compositions, latest available data, older 
population 
 
 
Source: Author based on LIS Microdata.   
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Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of reduced poverty rates by social security transfers 
compared to the poverty rates based on factor income. For a clear comparison, this thesis 
provides two graphs together. The first bar graph illustrates the early 1990s and the second 
illustrates the latest available data, the early 2010s. According to the bar graphs, there is a 
wide range of poverty reduction effects in social security transfers across OECD countries. 
In the first graph, Iceland, the Netherlands, and the Slovak Republic decrease poverty among 
older people by 98% and 97% through social security transfers. At the other end, however, 
South Korea only eliminates 13% of old-age poverty. This implies that each OECD country 
employs income security systems very differently. They play a vital role in combatting 
poverty in older people in some countries, whilst only playing an ‘assistant’ role in other 
countries. When we look at the figures at 10%, the levels of poverty reduction effects cluster 
together. Despite the long spectrum, two thirds of the countries (the UK, Hungary, Spain, 
France, Norway, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, 
Canada, the Czech Republic, Sweden, the Slovak Republic, the Netherlands, and Iceland) 
are distributed between the range of 80% to 98%. There are four countries (Japan, Ireland, 
Poland, and Italy) in the range of 75% to 79%, and three countries (Greece, Australia and 
the USA) between 63% and 69%. Lastly, there are two countries where poverty reduction 
effects are less than 30%; South Korea and Mexico.  
 
The overall characteristics are also applicable to the second graph. The Netherlands, 
Denmark, Sweden and Luxembourg decrease poverty in the elderly by almost 99% through 
social security transfers. Additionally, when we look at figures at 10%, two thirds of the 
countries (Ireland, Greece, Germany, Poland, Austria, Hungary, Finland, France, the Slovak 
Republic, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) are 
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distributed in the range of 91% to 99%. There are five countries (Spain, Belgium, Canada, 
the UK, and Italy) in the range of 83% to 89%, and two countries (Japan and the US) are 
around 70%. Lastly, there are three countries where poverty reduction effects are less than 
60%; South Korea, Mexico, and Australia. Compared to the first graph, the decrease in 
poverty rates after social security transfers improved in general. This implies changes to 
social security transfer systems since the early 1990s. As addressed above, we do not know 
which specific programmes made these impacts on the poverty rates. However, considering 
that pensions are the largest single item in welfare expenditure in welfare states, it might be 
reasonable to expect pensions to play a significant role in the changes in poverty alleviation 
for the period.   
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Figure 4.3: Decrease in poverty rates after social security transfers, early 1990s and 
early 2010s, older population
Source: Author based on LIS Microdata.   
 
4.3 Poverty rates and welfare regimes and pension typologies 
As a last step to building a background knowledge on pension reforms, this section compares 
poverty rates with welfare regimes and pension typologies. Poverty is an issue that is closely 
associated with welfare states and pensions. Since the golden age, social protection has been 
“firmly anchored in the explicit normative commitment of granting industrial and social 
rights” (Esping-Andersen, 1994: 712). Most welfare states have a long history of 
commitment to combatting old-age risks through pensions. In the previous chapter, this 
thesis examined them in order to understand pension reform within a broader context. After 
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reviewing various existing typologies, the chapter concluded that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
welfare regimes and Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) pensions typology are applicable to this 
thesis as contextual information. Therefore, this section compares poverty rates among older 
people in the early 1990s and 2010s with Esping-Andersen’s (1990)’s welfare regimes and 
Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) pension typology. The comparison offers only a partial result, 
as neither typology covers all OECD countries. This section attempts a rather simple 
comparison using countries that are explicitly referred to in their original research. Also, as 
addressed in the previous section, some countries have limited data. For example, LIS 
microdata provides only 2006 data for South Korea and 2008 for Japan. It also provides only 
2000 data for Belgium, 2005 for Sweden, and 2004 for Switzerland, instead of data from the 
early 2010s.  
 
Table 4.7 below is the result of the comparison between poverty rates among older people 
and welfare regimes. First, the poverty rates among older people are lowest in the Social 
Democratic regime. They were 9.8% on average in the early 1990s and 7.6% in the early 
2010s. Conversely, the welfare regime with the highest poverty rates for 20 years is the 
Liberal regime. The rates were 18.6% in the early 1990s and then 16.4% in the early 2010s. 
The Conservative regime is in the middle of two regimes; its rates were 17.4% in the early 
1990s and 15.8% in the early 2010s. It is worth noting, however, that the Conservative 
regime has one outlier in its membership countries: South Korea. The poverty among older 
people in Korea is 41.4% (2006), by far the highest level9 compared to other Conservative 
countries. If we remove South Korea, the poverty rate of the Conservative regime is 12.6% 
                                                          
9 The poverty rate among older people in South Korea is the highest level in all OECD countries. See Table 4.5 and 
Table 4.6 for more information.  
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in the early 1990s and 10.7% in the early 2010s, on average. This average decreases about 
five percentage points if South Korea is removed, but still comes second to the Social 
Democratic regime. Secondly, poverty rates decreased in all welfare regimes from the early 
1990s to the early 2010s. There are a few exceptional cases – e.g. Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland, and Belgium – but more than half of the welfare states alleviated poverty or 
maintained the similar level of poverty in their older populations for the selected 20 years. 
The reduction varies depending on the welfare regime. In the Liberal and the Social 
Democratic regimes, poverty rates drop 2.2 percentage points. In the Conservative regime it 
is slightly lower, at 1.6 percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
 
Table 4.7: Welfare regimes and poverty rates of older people (early 1990s and early 
2010s) 
Welfare regime 
 
Poverty rates Average Poverty rates Average 
Early 1990s Early 2010s 
Liberal  Australia 24.2 
18.6 
33.7 
16.4 
Canada 5.8 9.8 
USA 21.5 19.8 
New 
Zealand 
- - 
Ireland 17.3 8.2 
UK 24.1 10.3 
Conservative Italy 15.7 
17.4 
 
8.8 
15.8 
 
Japan 13.6 13.6 
France 14.7 5.2 
Germany 10.4 10.6 
Switzerland 8.4 15.1 
Korea 41.4 41.4 
Social 
Democratic  
Austria 11.9 
9.8 
9.4 
7.6 
Belgium 12.1 15.4 
Netherlands 3.2 2.2 
Denmark 11.0 6.6 
Norway 14.0 5.5 
Sweden 6.4 6.6 
 
* The classification of countries is based on Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999). The cases of South Korea and 
Japan follow Nam’s (2002) and Shinkawa’s (2001) view.  
Source: Author based on LIS Microdata.   
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Table 4.8 below shows the results of a comparison between poverty rates among older people 
and pension typologies. It is a very limited comparison as the original research (Bonoli & 
Shinkawa, 2005) only includes ten countries. First, on average, poverty rates are highest in 
the social insurance type and lowest in their multi-pillar type throughout the period. The 
former is 20.6% in the early 1990s and 16.5% in the early 2010s. When it comes to the latter, 
it was 13.0% in the early 1990s and then 10.7% in the early 2010s. Secondly, similar to 
Table 4.7 above, all types reduced poverty rates for the selected 20 years. The social 
insurance type showed the largest drop in poverty rates with 4.1 percentage points, whilst 
Bismarckian lite showed the smallest drop with 0.1 percentage points. The multi-pillar type 
is in the middle, with a 2.3 percentage point drop. If we remove South Korea from the 
comparison, the average poverty rate is 13.6 percentage points in the early 1990s and 8.2 
percentage points in the early 2010s. It is however, difficult to generalise this trend to the 
characteristics of each type. Despite the fact that the general trend of poverty in each pension 
type was maintained for 20 years – highest in the social insurance type and lowest in the 
multi-pillar type – their membership countries do not show common trends in poverty 
changes. For example, the average poverty rate in the social insurance type dropped largely 
because Italy and France significantly reduced poverty rates during the period. Germany, on 
the other hand, slightly increased poverty rates in the same period. Also, when it comes to 
the multi-pillar type, the average poverty rate decreased because the UK dramatically 
reduced poverty over the 20 years. Poverty rates in Sweden and Switzerland, however, 
increased in the same period. This suggests that the association between poverty among older 
people and pension type needs to be explored further using a more detailed research design. 
This will be delineated in the following empirical chapters on pension reforms.       
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Table 4.8: Pension typology and poverty rates of older people (early 1990s and early 
2010s) 
Pension typology 
Poverty rates Average Poverty rates Average 
Early 1990s Early 2010s 
Social 
insurance 
Germany 10.4 
20.6 
 
10.6 
16.5 
 
Italy 15.7 8.8 
France 14.7 5.2 
Korea 41.4 41.4 
Multi-pillar UK 24.1 
13.0 
10.3 
10.7 
 
Sweden 6.4 6.6 
Switzerland 8.4 15.1 
Bismarckian 
lite  
Canada 5.8 
14.5 
9.8 
14.4 US 24.1 19.8 
Japan 13.6 13.6 
 
* Classification of countries is based on Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005).  
Source: Author based on LIS Microdata.   
 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter aimed to explore the poverty situation across OECD countries between the early 
1990s and the early 2010s. A comprehensive understanding of poverty is an indispensable 
step in this thesis, as the core element of a pension system is protection against poverty in 
later life. Welfare states introduced pension systems in order to mitigate old-age risks. 
Pension systems have had a direct impact on poverty among older people, as they are often 
big parts of retirement income; according to OECD Family Resources Data, the share of 
public pensions in retirement income reaches 81.6% for single household in Germany, 
71.1% in Sweden, 60.8% in the UK and 52.4% in Japan (Boersch-Supan & Reil-Held, 1998: 
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18). Considering these facts, an understanding of the poverty situation since the early 1990s 
can be a foundation for an analysis of the trends in pension reforms.  
 
Considering this, this chapter has attempted to view the poverty situation from various angles. 
Using LIS microdata, poverty levels were computed across OECD countries based on 
relative poverty rates with three types of income thresholds; the poverty gap, the squared 
poverty gap, and decomposed income concepts. The chapter allocates significant space to 
comparing relative poverty based on decomposed incomes. Poverty rates are computed 
separately on the basis of factor income, income after social security transfers, and 
disposable income. In doing so, poverty rates were compared from before and after the social 
security transfers. The results showed a wide range of poverty reduction effects in social 
security transfers across OECD countries. Considering the fact that public pensions are the 
largest segment of social security transfers, this implies that each country employs pension 
systems very differently. They play a vital role in combatting poverty among older people 
in some countries, whilst it is only an ‘assistant’ role in others. Lastly, poverty rates among 
the older population are compared with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regimes and 
Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) pension typology. This revealed that poverty rates are lowest 
in the Social Democratic regime and highest in the Liberal regime. Also, poverty rates 
among older people decreased in all three regime types over the selected 20 years. When it 
comes to Bonoli and Shinkawa’s pension typology, poverty rates are lowest in the multi-
pillar type and highest in the social insurance type. The Bismarckian lite type lay in the 
middle. These trends were maintained throughout the 20 years, but caution must be taken 
when generalising it to the characteristics of each pension type. The association between 
poverty and pension design requires further discussion based on a more sophisticated 
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research design. Pension reforms that socialise or individualise old-age risks generate 
impacts on poverty among older people. Thus poverty might be closely related to pension 
reforms as the reason and the result of pension reforms. In Chapters Two to Four, this thesis 
has delineated the context of pension reforms. Building on the knowledge from these three 
chapters, the following empirical analysis chapters will demonstrate the process for 
analysing the trend in pension reforms.     
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Part 2: Empirical analysis of pension reform strategies 
 
Building on the contextual chapters, the second part of this thesis pursues an empirical 
analysis of pension reform strategies. The following three chapters are comprised of 
methodological reflections, empirical analysis and discussion. The second part includes the 
process for sourcing data, the research method and empirical analysis, and the interpretation 
of the results. This thesis aims at answering the following research questions.   
▪ What are the trends in pension reforms among OECD countries since the 1990s? 
▪ How can we categorise the variety of pension reform strategies adopted across the OECD 
since the 1990s?  
▪ How do pension reform strategies compare with existing welfare and pension typologies?  
▪ How can we explain reform pathways found across OECD countries?   
 
The first step for the analysis is to source data. Very few data sources provide detailed 
comparative and historical information about pension systems or pension reforms. This is a 
factor that makes comparative research on pensions challenging. Therefore, in Chapter Five, 
we utilise existing data available in Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles to 
construct a new dataset. In doing so, the benefits of both data sources of maximised; a well-
categorised summary of pension reforms in Pensions at a Glance and comprehensive 
information on social security systems in ISSA Country Profiles. Due to limited space, the 
time-consuming process and the final data set are only briefly presented in the chapter. The 
full version of the final data is available in the appendix of this thesis. The new dataset allows 
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us to explore pension reforms both comparatively and historically across OECD countries, 
beyond a simple ‘snapshot’. 
 
The second step requires categorising pension reform strategies using the data. First, a 
research method is required. This thesis does not have separate methods chapter, but 
introduces the method within this analysis chapter. In doing so, it aims at highlighting the 
continuity of empirical analysis. In Chapter Six, the research method that maximises the 
benefits of the generated data is explored. Fuzzy-set ideal type analysis (FSITA) is employed, 
as it is apt for comparative study for middle-N cases without forsaking objectivity in 
diversity. Most importantly, FSITA allows the generation of typologies that reflect both the 
socialisation and individualisation of risks in pension reforms. In this regard, we categorise 
pension reform strategies using FSITA. From the first analysis four ideal types are 
constructed from two dimensions, the socialisation and individualisation of risks. This is 
then followed by a second analysis, the categorisation of the socialisation of risks, based on 
three elements: coverage, adequacy, and security of investment.  
 
The final step of empirical analysis is the interpretation of the results. Chapter Seven 
delineates three findings from the results of the FSITA. First, four types of configuration in 
pension reform strategies are analysed. Country memberships and their conformity to each 
type are addressed in detail. Case commentaries for each type are also provided to support 
the result of the empirical analysis. It reveals that individualisation reforms were the most 
dominant trend over the last 25 years, but it was not the whole story. Both the socialisation 
of social risks and stability was observed. Secondly, the pension reform strategies are 
compared with existing welfare and pension typologies. The result from the FSITA matches 
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with neither Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regimes nor Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) 
pension typologies. Rather, it shows the general trends in pension reform strategies 
regardless of regimes and pension institutions. The result is interpreted with reflections on 
the path departure for pension systems across the OECD. The second finding leads us to the 
last finding, namely the factors that have shaped pension reforms over the last 25 years. 
Building up on Bonoli & Shinkawa’s (2005) findings, this thesis argues that the poverty 
level in older people is a factor that shapes pension reform in addition to population ageing 
and pension institutions. We confirm the relationship between old-age poverty and the trend 
of pension reform strategies. The relationship between the decrease in old-age poverty after 
social security transfers and the trend of pension reform strategies are also confirmed. 
Reflecting the findings from the data used in previous chapters, the role of poverty in shaping 
pension reform strategies in the time of continuing prevalence of austerity is highlighted.    
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Chapter 5 : Capturing pension reform strategies 
 
This chapter aims at delineating the first step for the empirical analysis: sourcing data. It is 
the most basic step for any kind of research, but is not an easy or straightforward process for 
this study. The chapter confronts several issues – conceptualising pension dynamics, 
securing appropriate data and converting the data for analysis. The process is outlined in the 
following sections step by step.    
 
The first task is to establish how to capture pension reform strategies in the 34 OECD 
countries. The aim is to go beyond simple statistics and a literature review. A comparison of 
pension reforms must engage national policies in considerable detail (Hinrichs, 2000: 80). 
This means that the data must contain highly detailed information that outlines specific 
changes in pension components. Researchers often use social expenditure or legislative 
change as they are widely employed data sources in comparative research (Castles, 2004; 
Goldberg, 2002; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Kuitto, 2016; Scruggs, 2007). By examining them, 
this thesis argues that tracing legislative change can provide greater benefits than a focus on 
social expenditure.  
 
The issue that follows is sourcing such data. Considering the long period of time and the 
number of countries, a few data sources are appropriate for this study: Pensions at a Glance 
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by the OECD and ISSA Country Profiles10. They have a significant amount of information 
on pension reforms, but it is necessary to generate a single consolidated dataset. This dataset 
also needs to be transformed into a comparable form for the analysis. In this vein, this chapter 
allocates considerable space to describing the procedures of reshaping the existing data. It 
consists of four steps: creating an identical standard, reclassifying all the data, extracting 
common elements and identifying reform subtypes, and assigning a code.     
 
Lastly, two overviews of patterns and trends in pension reforms are provided based on the 
generated data. The first is a simple overview that shows which reform measures were taken 
in each country between 1990 and 2015, echoing the format used in Pensions at a Glance. 
This provides us with a quick overview, but it is insufficient to capture an accurate trend of 
pension reforms. To supplement this overview, the chapter provides a more detailed picture 
by analysing the frequency of reforms. This allows us to explore the intensity of reforms in 
each country.  
    
5.1 How to capture: legislative changes in pensions 
Analysing the dynamics of pensions is not a simple and clear process, due to the difficulty 
of conceptualisation. Like many other concepts in social science, ‘pension change’ is hard 
to define. What is the evidence for expansion or retrenchment? What degree of changes can 
                                                          
10 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international economic organisation of 
34 countries. It uses its information on a broad range of topics to help governments foster prosperity and fight poverty 
through economic growth and financial stability (http://www.oecd.org/).  
The International Social Security Association (ISSA) is the principal international institution bringing together social 
security agencies and organisations. It provides access to information, expert advice, business standards, practical 
guidelines and platforms for members to build and promote dynamic social security systems worldwide 
(http://www.issa.int/).  
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be considered meaningful? The absence of a universal definition may result in different 
interpretations of the circumstances in different studies. Securing an appropriate indicator is 
another problem; results may differ depending on the indicators that a researcher chooses. 
Therefore, it is necessary to carefully consider what measures to use in order to accurately 
capture pension dynamics. In the welfare literature, analysing welfare states based on 
welfare expenditure is a frequently applied method (Castles, 2004; Goldberg, 2002; Huber 
& Stephens, 2001; Kuitto, 2016). This is due to the assumption that welfare spending 
indicates the level of welfare efforts of welfare states. However, a growing number of 
researchers have highlighted several concerns over this approach, and explored possible 
alternatives instead (Allan & Scruggs, 2004; Bonoli et al., 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Hinrichs, 2000; Scruggs, 2007). This section examines frequently used indicators in order to 
seek the most appropriate approach for this thesis.     
 
Social expenditure  
Since the first generation of comparative studies, many researchers have assumed welfare 
spending as a reliable barometer of a state’s commitment to welfare (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 19). This is because spending data is relatively easy and handy to make comparisons 
among countries. International organisations including the OECD and the ILO provide 
information on social expenditure, collected by each government according to universal 
criteria. Also, in many cases expenditure datasets have wide coverage in terms of time and 
countries, and they are updated frequently. For instance, the OECD have provided data for 
36 countries from 1980 to 2016, which is segmented into 39 types of welfare programmes. 
Moreover, social spending appears to be a representative indicator of welfare states at first 
glance, when we consider the simple fact that more generous welfare programmes cost more. 
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Consequently, the data on welfare spending such as total public social expenditure, total 
transfer payments, and programmatic expenditure have been enthusiastically employed by 
various studies (Castles, 2004; Goldberg, 2002; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Kuitto, 2016).  
 
However, despite its multiple advantages, expenditure data might mislead on welfare 
dynamics (Allan & Scruggs, 2004; Bonoli et al., 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hinrichs, 
2000; Scruggs, 2007). First, growth in social spending can be caused by increased recipients, 
not by increased coverage or benefit levels. For example, social expenditure in the UK under 
the Thatcher government was increased despite the government reducing benefits and 
reinforcing selectivity, because unemployment rates skyrocketed (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 
20). Similar cases are possibly happening within rapidly ageing societies; social expenditure 
rises regardless of welfare expansion or cuts, due to an increased population of older people 
which cause rises in social expenditure on old-age pensions and health care services. Second, 
different economic growth rates may distort the picture of welfare spending. Welfare 
literatures often use total social spending as a ratio of GDP as social expenditure. As the 
GDP of each welfare state increases or decreases at a different speed, the spending ratio 
(spending / GDP) may mislead on inflation-adjusted welfare expansion (Scruggs, 2007: 137). 
Third, social expenditure does not capture changes in tax policy. Governments can increase 
the disposable income of their citizens by changing tax rates (Allan & Scruggs, 2004: 498), 
or they can attach tax privileges to certain programmes such as private insurance plans 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 20). As these tax treatments are not included in social expenditure 
indicators, a gap may exist between the actual commitment to welfare states and their welfare 
expenditure. Lastly, changes in welfare programmes may take a long time to be seen in the 
expenditure data (Hinrichs, 2000: 80). This is particularly the case for pensions. Policy 
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makers often employ delaying tactics when implementing unpopular reforms. For instance, 
raising the pension age to around 65 is a universal trend across most countries, but in most 
cases a fairly long phasing-in period was set. Policy makers in South Korea decided to raise 
pension age from 60 to 65 in 2007, but the process has been gradual and it will not be 
completed until 2033. Additionally, in some cases the full effect of reforms remains 
uncertain until the benefits are handed to recipients. A pension formula that reflects 
economic and demographic changes is a fair example. The benefit level depends on the 
country’s circumstances over a long period, and its total expenditure will not be seen until 
the end of that (Bonoli et al., 2000: 36). When considering these facts, analysing pension 
expenditure might not be the best way to capture pension dynamics.   
 
Social citizenship and legislation   
Social citizenship has been widely applied to measuring welfare efforts instead of social 
expenditure. The concept of social citizenship was first introduced by T. H. Marshall, as a 
core idea of welfare states (1977: 106). According to him, social citizenship includes “the 
whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to 
share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in society” (Marshall, 2006: 30). Esping-Andersen (1990: 21) put flesh 
on Marshall’s concept of social citizenship and derived his ideas of de-commodification and 
social stratification from it. The concept of social citizenship can be a useful parameter to 
analyse the dynamics of welfare states. As it represents the core value of welfare states, we 
can tell the extent of welfare state expansion or retrenchment based on the changes in the 
status of social citizenship.  
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When analysing social citizenship, the problem that arises is how to conceptualise it. It is 
not easy especially when we consider the availability of comparable data which cover such 
variables. In this vein, earlier studies (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Scruggs, 2007; Kvist, 2007) 
have chosen a few indicators that represent social citizenship in social insurance and 
compared them across countries. The replacement rates for benefits, the size of the insured 
population (coverage), the qualifying condition, the take-up rates, and the funding ratio are 
considered as indicators that represent welfare state commitments to social insurance. For 
example, Scruggs (2007: 139) conceptualises social citizenship with the generosity and 
universalism of social insurance. The former is measured by the replacement rates for 
unemployment and sickness benefits, and pension. The latter concept is measured by the 
unemployment and sickness insurance coverage and pension take-up rates using the 
Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED).  Similarly, Kvist (2007: 206-207) 
conceptualises social citizenship in unemployment insurance with three concepts: 
accessibility, generosity, and obligations. An index for the various eligibility criteria, the net 
replacement rates, and an index of negative sanctions imposed on claimants refusing to 
accept job and active labour market policy are used to operationalise each concept.  
 
This method – selecting a few representative indicators for social citizenship and comparing 
them across countries – can be an alternative method to analysing social spending. With this 
approach, researchers can explore multi-dimensional characteristics of welfare 
commitments in the respective programme. Also, this method allows us to trace changes in 
the key elements such as the entitlement of the programme across time. However, it also has 
limitations. First of all, the selected indicators may not be sufficient enough to capture the 
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trend of pension reforms across countries. Comparing a few representative indicators of 
pension schemes could be efficient to capture the major features of pension in each country 
but it has a limited scope to understand the whole and in fact the complexity of pension 
reforms. For example, it is difficult to examine distributional effects of pension systems 
across income and social strata as indicators are limited. Capturing dynamics in multi-tier 
pension systems is also challenging with this approach for the same reason. These concerns 
could be alleviated if there is a dataset which covers the complexity and character of pension 
reforms. It is, however, as Scruggs (2007: 139-140) illustrated well in his study11, not easy 
to find datasets that contain the variables that researchers are interested in, with a comparable 
period covering various countries. Datasets may not contain the welfare programmes that 
researchers want to observe. Also, they may not take into account many of the important 
features of benefits. Or, they might not offer variables that are adequately operationalised to 
serve a researcher’s purpose.  
 
Against this backdrop, Bonoli et al. (2000: 29-49) suggest legislation data as an ideal 
indicator to reflect social citizenship. They argue that tracking legislative changes allow us 
to capture a clear view of welfare dynamics. In doing so, researchers are able to “assess the 
likely implications for the coverage, level and quality of welfare provision” (2000: 29). This 
provides an important insight into seeking an appropriate method to compare pension 
reforms; legislation changes in pension schemes in each OECD country. If we comparatively 
analyse the entire legislation changes in pension systems between 1990 and 2015 in each 
                                                          
11 The Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset, SOFI’s Social Citizenship Indicators Project, The Nordic Social 
Statistical Committee’s Social protection in the Nordic Countries are considerable dataset when we analyse social 
citizenship in social insurance systems across countries. However, mostly the number of indicators are limited, and the 
coverage of nations and the time period do not fit to this thesis.    
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country, we could capture the complexity of pension dynamics among them. Comparing 
them using typologies might be the most plausible way to accurately analyse the trend of 
pension dynamics. It can satisfy two goals of comparative research; analytical and 
explanatory accuracy and parsimony. This approach has, however, one challenging problem: 
the availability of the data source that covers the whole legislative information in pension 
reforms in the OECD for the last 25 years. In the following section, we will explore the 
availability of such dataset.       
 
5.2 Overview of the data: Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles 
The OECD and ISSA have collected data on pension reforms for decades and released them 
in different ways and formats. The series Pensions at a Glance from the OECD and Country 
Profiles from ISSA have unique features and advantages. Pensions at a Glance is a series of 
books published by the OECD since 2005, which present a framework to compare pension 
systems across OECD members and G20 countries. The books are issued every other year. 
So far, the OECD has published books in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015. As 
Pensions at a Glance covers a wide range of countries and collects data directly from each 
government based on the common format, researchers are able to compare various pension 
systems across the world. It is particularly useful when exploring pension components rather 
than the ‘big picture’ of the system. A variety of pension parameters – e.g. indicators for 
coverage, benefit levels, and contributions – are rare to see in other sources of this kind. 
Additionally, the dataset has also included data on special policy issues such as pension 
reform, retirement, and private pensions since 2007.  
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On the other hand, the ISSA Country Profiles dataset provides comprehensive information 
on social security systems around the world. It covers more than 200 countries including 
OECD members, and has been compiled since 1995; the data for 2014 has recently been 
updated. ISSA collects data from various sources: government documents, press releases, 
relevant websites, the series of Social security programs throughout the world, etc. It 
provides narrative descriptions about reforms based on those resources. This helps in our 
understanding of how and why a certain reform was undertaken as it offers descriptive data 
from the moment the bill was announced. This allows researchers to understand reforms 
beyond simple summaries. All things considered, both Pensions at a Glance and ISSA 
Country Profiles provide very useful information to capture pension reform strategies across 
countries. Operationalising these datasets, however, involves several challenges. This 
section carefully examines the features of Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles 
and considers if they can be applied to this thesis.    
   
Pension reforms in Pensions at a Glance  
Pensions at a Glance 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2015 provide categorised summaries of pension 
reforms which took place in OECD countries since the early 1990s. When examining this 
data, the criteria used in each book are an important point to consider. As the series of books 
categorised pension reforms using similar but not identical criteria, it causes challenges in 
analysing the data altogether. For example, whilst some of books classified data according 
to the ‘objectives’ of the reforms, others classified it in accordance with ‘measures’ for those 
objectives. Therefore, we need to examine each criterion prior to beginning any analysis.  
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The 2007 book covers pension reforms in 30 OECD countries from 1990 to 2003. Reforms 
are classified based on six measures of change. The first measure is pension eligibility age: 
how was the pension eligibility age increased and equalised for men and women? The second 
measure is adjusted retirement incentives: how were penalties for early retirement or 
incentives for delayed retirement introduced? How was the number of contribution years to 
receive a full pension increased? The third measure is change of years in benefit formula or 
qualifying conditions: how was the period over which earnings were measured to calculate 
benefits changed? The fourth measure is the link to life expectancy and/or financial 
sustainability: how were defined contribution (DC) schemes or mechanisms that adjust 
benefits or the pension age to increasing life expectancy implemented? The fifth was DC 
scheme: how were DC plans introduced as a substitute for part of the public, earnings-related 
pension scheme? Lastly, other includes introducing pre-funded public pensions, and 
changing the valorisation or the indexation of pensions in payment.  
 
The 2007 book also explains four impacts of pension reforms in connection with its criteria 
for changes. Changes in pension eligibility age and the link to life expectancy and/or 
financial sustainability result in financial impact and work incentives. Also, changes in 
adjusted retirement incentives are connected to financial impact and distributional impact. 
Change of years in benefit formula or qualifying conditions affects financial impact. Lastly, 
DC scheme is related to structure of pension system and work incentives. The example of 
the UK which summarised pension reform in Pensions at a Glance 2007 is shown in Table 
5.1. 
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Table 5.1: Reforms summarised in Pensions at a Glance 2007, the case of the UK (1990–
2003) 
Country 
Pension 
eligibility 
age 
Adjusted 
retireme
nt 
incentive
s 
Change of 
years in 
benefit 
formula or 
qualifying 
conditions 
Link to life 
expectancy 
and/or 
financial 
sustainability 
DC 
scheme 
Other 
UK Women’s 
pension 
age and 
eligibility 
for 
guarantee 
credit 
rising from 
60 to 65. 
Increment 
for 
deferring 
pension 
claim 
increased. 
Lump-
sum 
option 
added. 
  Employers 
required to 
provide 
access to 
DC 
pension. 
Increase in 
basic 
pension. 
Extension 
of means-
tested 
supplement
. Increased 
progressivi
ty of 
earnings-
related 
pension. 
 
Source: OECD (2007: 60).  
  
Pensions at a Glance 2009 covers pension reforms which took place from 2004 to 2008 in 
the same 30 OECD countries. It classified reforms into six categories similar to the previous 
book, but the criteria were completely different. Pensions at a Glance 2009 presented “six 
objectives of retirement income provision” on the premise that “there are clear objectives 
and principles that all well designed pension systems share” (2009: 85). They are as follows: 
coverage of the pension system, by both mandatory and voluntary schemes; adequacy of 
retirement benefits; financial sustainability and affordability of pensions to taxpayers and 
contributors; economic efficiency to minimise the distortions of the retirement-income 
system on an individual’s economic behaviour; administrative efficiency such as keeping the 
cost of collecting contributions, paying benefits and managing investments as low as 
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possible; and security of benefits in the face of different risks and uncertainties (2009: 85). 
The example of the UK classified by categories above is shown in Table 5.2. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Reforms summarised in Pensions at a Glance 2009, the case of the UK (2004– 
2008)  
Country Coverage Adequacy 
Financia
l 
sustaina-
bility 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administra
-tive 
efficiency 
Security 
UK National 
pension 
savings 
scheme 
from 2012: 
automatic 
enrolment of 
22-65 year 
olds without 
an OP or 
PP; 
employee 
contribution 
of 4%, 
employer of 
3% and 
government 
of 1% 
phased in. 
Reduction in 
number of 
years 
required for 
full basic 
pension to 
30. 
Basic 
pension to 
be indexed 
to average 
earnings 
from 2012; 
increases 
2004-08 in 
line with 
earnings. 
Acceleration 
of change of 
state second 
pension 
from an 
earnings-
related to a 
flat-rate 
scheme, 
with initial 
benefits 
indexed to 
average 
earnings; 
improved 
credits for 
carers. 
 Increment 
for late 
retirement 
raised 
from 7.4% 
to 10.4% a 
year; 
increment 
now 
payable as 
a one-off 
bonus. 
Central 
clearing 
house for 
new 
national 
pension 
savings 
scheme; aim 
to have 
costs 
of 0.5% of 
balance 
initially, 
falling to 
0.3%. 
New 
Pensions 
Regulator 
established 
in 2005, 
combing 
previous 
agencies. 
Pension 
Protection 
Fund, to 
insure 
defined-
benefit 
plans, 
established 
in 2004. 
Premiums 
paid by 
plans, 
related to 
measures of 
risk, 
double the 
originally 
predicted 
level. 
Tightening 
of recovery 
rules for 
plans in 
deficit. 
Extension of 
financial 
assistance 
Scheme 
for insolvent 
OPs, 
covering 
140,000 
extra 
workers. 
 
Source: OECD (2009: 94) 
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Pensions at a Glance 2011 does not provide summaries for pension reforms, but the 2013 
book presents pension reforms from 2009 to September of 2013 instead. In the 2013 book, 
34 OECD countries are covered as four countries (Chile, Estonia, Israel, and Slovenia) had 
recently joined the OECD. Regarding classifications, Pensions at a Glance 2013 presents 
“six key goals of pension reform”, which are similar to those of Pensions at a Glance 2009. 
However, the criteria are somewhat changed and there are actually seven categories of 
reform, not six, as a category for “other” is added. The seven categories are as follows: 
coverage, adequacy, financial and fiscal sustainability, work incentives, administrative 
efficiency, diversification and security, and other. Compared to the six categories of the 2009 
book, economic efficiency has changed to work efficiency, and security has changed to 
diversification and security. In addition to these changes, a category for other has been 
included to cover other types of change such as temporary measures and those designed to 
stimulate economic recovery. The example of the UK classified by the seven categories is 
shown in Table 5.3. 
  
Table 5.3: Reforms summarised in Pensions at a Glance 2013, the case of the UK (2009– 
Sep 2013) 
Country Coverage Adequacy 
Financial 
and fiscal 
sustainability 
Work 
incentives 
Administrative 
efficiency 
Diversification 
and security 
Other 
United 
Kingdom 
Large 
employers 
(12, 000 plus 
employees) 
must 
automatically 
enrol workers 
in company 
scheme or 
state-run 
National 
Employment 
Savings Trust 
(NEST) from 
Oct 2012; 
medium-sized 
employers 
(50 plus) 
from June 
One-off 
payment 
of GBP 60 
to 
pensioners 
(Jan 
2009). 
Increase 
basic State 
Pension 
by higher 
of CPI 
earnings 
growth or 
2.5% from 
Apr 2011. 
Contribution 
rates increase 
of 1% to 2% 
for both 
employer and 
employee in 
2012-16. A1% 
contribution -
related tax 
credit 
introduced. 
In Oct 2017, 
the employer 
will pay 3% 
and the 
employee will 
pay 4% 
(Pensions Act 
2011). 
Equalise 
pension ages 
at 65 by 
2018. Bring 
forward 
pension age 
to 66 by 
2020 and 
increase 
from 66 to 67 
by 2026.  
Removal of 
the default 
retirement 
age (DRA) of 
65 to provide 
workers 
greater 
opportunities 
New NEST 
scheme planned 
in 2010 and 
implemented in 
2012. It aims at 
reducing 
investment – 
management 
charges 
significantly, 
compared to 
current DC 
plans. 
New NEST 
scheme planned 
in 2010 and 
implemented in 
2012. 
In Jan 2013, 
the DWP 
published a 
draft bill 
introducing 
STP to 
replace the 
existing 
multi-tier 
State 
Pension. The 
STP will be 
implemented 
in Apr 2016. 
The reform is 
expected to 
particularly 
benefit 
people who 
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2013, and 
small 
employers 
(fewer than 
50) from May 
2015. 
Contributions 
will be 
increased 
from total of 
2% of 
earnings in 
2012 to 5% in 
2016 and 8% 
in 2017. 
to remain in 
the labour 
market 
afterwards. 
From Oct 
2011, 
employers 
cannot 
compel 
employees to 
retire using 
DRA. 
were 
expecting a 
low amount 
of Addition 
Pension due 
to their work 
history. It 
will represent 
a significant 
simplification 
of the state 
system and 
be a clear 
foundation 
for retirement 
saving. 
The 
government 
has also 
legislated to 
accelerate 
increase in 
State Pension 
age and 
introduced a 
regular 
review 
process to set 
Spa based on 
the principle 
that a fixed 
proportion of 
adult life 
should be 
spent in 
retirement. 
Increase 
contribution 
rates of 
public sector 
workers and 
amend the 
DB plan for 
Members of 
the 
Parliament 
2010). 
 
Source: OECD (2013: 40). 
 
Pensions at a Glance 2015 covers 34 OECD countries for the period from September 2013 
to September 2015. It has similarly used different criteria for reforms, as in the previous 
three books. Firstly, the book 2015 clearly separates the objectives and measures of reforms 
for the first time. Regarding pension effects, enhancing the financial sustainability and 
income adequacy are two objectives of reform. For measures for the objectives, seven types 
are suggested: coverage, diversification and security, pension benefits, taxes and defined 
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benefit contributions, indexation, work incentives, administrative efficiency, and other. It 
then classifies pension reforms that took place over the last two years according to the seven 
measures. Compared to previous categories in 2007 and 2013, the criteria contain subdivided 
elements that comprise pension reforms. The newly added terms taxes and defined benefit 
contributions and indexation were considered subordinate concepts of sustainability 
previously. The example of the UK using the new criteria is shown in Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4: Reforms summarised in Pensions at a Glance 2015, the case of the UK (Sep 
2013 – Sep 2015) 
Country Coverage 
Diversif-
ication 
and 
security 
Pension 
benefits 
Taxes 
and DB 
contrib-
utions 
Indexati-
on 
Work 
incentives 
Administra-
tive efficiency 
Other 
United 
Kingdo
m 
The 
National 
Employ
ment 
Savings 
Trust 
(NEST) 
is 
being 
extended 
to small 
employe
rs 
from 
January 
2016. 
New 
rules 
for 
defined 
contrib
ution 
pension 
withdra
wals 
were 
legislat
ed 
in May 
2014 
and 
will 
enable 
large 
lump-
sum 
withdra
wals. 
From 
2016, a 
new 
state 
pension 
(single-
tier 
pension, 
STP) 
will 
replace 
at a 
higher 
level 
both the 
basic 
pension 
and 
the 
minimu
m 
income 
guarant
ee 
(Pensio
n 
Credit). 
Taxes 
on 
withdra
wals 
from 
pension 
account
s were 
lowere
d and 
tax-free 
amount
s 
were 
increas
ed 
in 
2015. 
 Bring 
forward 
pension 
age to 
66 
by 2026 
and to 
67 
by 2028. 
Gradual
ly 
increasi
ng 
the 
private 
pension 
savings 
age 
from 55 
to 57 
in 2028. 
Private 
pension 
will be 
availabl
e for 
withdra
wal 
from 
NEST 
scheme will 
create 
economies 
of scale 
compared 
to current 
DC 
plans. 
Pension 
providers 
and trust-
based 
managers 
must 
offer DC 
members 
free and 
impartial 
face-to-face 
advice. 
Small DC 
plans are 
automatical
ly 
transferred 
to 
the new 
pension 
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10 years 
before 
the 
normal 
pension 
age. 
plan when 
workers 
change 
jobs. 
The 
government
’s 
authority to 
introduced 
minimum 
governance 
standards, 
fees, 
etc. have 
been 
strengthene
d 
to mitigate 
excessive 
charges 
and to 
increase 
standards. 
 
Source: OECD (2015: 43). 
 
Pension reforms in ISSA Country Profiles 
ISSA Country Profiles provide rich explanations on reforms compared to Pensions at a 
Glance. The data on reforms are descriptive and displayed in chronological order on the 
ISSA website. As they are descriptive, it is easier to understand the context of reforms and 
it minimises the risks of misunderstanding. They also have data for Chile, Estonia, and 
Slovenia from 1995 to 2008, which the books of Pensions at a Glance do not cover12. It is, 
however, challenging to apply ISSA Country profiles solely to a comparative study because 
of their data format and narrative nature. First, they provide a ‘chunk’ of information. ISSA 
Country Profiles include all reforms in social security systems and display them together. 
                                                          
12 Israel is not covered by ISSA Country profiles as well as Pensions at a Glance 2007 and 2009.    
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The data on social security reforms for 34 OECD members from 1995 to 2014 reaches almost 
two thousand entries. Thus, the sorting process is an essential precondition for using the data. 
Also, they lacks comparative standards because of their narrative nature. As seen in Table 
5.5 below, each entry is a story of reform and it is difficult to extract a standard for 
comparison among countries.              
 
Table 5.5: Examples of entries about pension reforms in ISSA Country profiles, the 
case of the UK in 2006 
 
Pension education initiative 
 
The Pensions Education fund offers short-term funding for not-for-profit organisations to set up 
and manage initiatives to increase the awareness and importance of planning for retirement 
amongst people of working age. The aim is to fund initiatives that provide both employed and 
self-employed people with the range of information they need to make their own decisions about 
their retirement, including understanding the potential consequences of early retirement on their 
retirement scheme.  
 
Implementation date: 06.2005   
Source:  Department for Work and Pensions, Ministerial initiative to increase savings for 
retirement.   
 
Financial assistance when pension schemes wind up 
 
The Financial Assistance Scheme offers help to some people who have lost out on their 
occupational pension because their scheme was under funded and their employer has been 
unable to make up the deficit (see entry no. 3346). It provides assistance to members of defined 
benefit schemes which began winding up between 1 January 1997 and 5 April 2005, and whose 
employer becomes insolvent by 28 February 2006. To be eligible, members must belong to a 
qualifying scheme and be within three years of their scheme's normal retirement age, or older, 
on 14 May 2004. Those eligible could see their pension topped up to 80 per cent of the core 
pension benefits for life, up to a maximum pension of GBP 12,000 per year.  
 
Legislation date: 11.2004 11.2004  
Implementation date: 09.2005   
Source:  Department for Work and Pensions.  
Reference:  Pension Act 2004 (Chapter 35, Part 6).   
 
Two retirement pension deferral options now available 
 
The State Pension age is currently 60 for a woman and 65 for a man. The age at which persons 
retire from employment does not affect when they can start drawing their State Pension. From 6 
April 2005, there are two deferral options available to clients who delay claiming their State 
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Pension: 
- an increased retirement pension for life; or 
- a one-off taxable lump sum payment.  
 
The extra State Pension is calculated at 10.4 per cent for every year a member defers claiming 
their pension (before April 2005, persons could receive 7.5 per cent extra per year of 
deferral).Moreover, the maximum time limit of 5 years that persons could defer claiming their 
State Pension to earn extra State Pension has been removed. This means that since April 2005, 
persons can put off claiming their State Pension for as long as they want and will be able to earn 
extra State Pension or a lump sum. The lump-sum alternative is made up of the State Pension the 
member has not claimed plus interest at the rate calculated at 2 per cent above the Bank of 
England base rate. Persons will also receive their State Pension when they claim it paid at the 
normal rate. In order to receive the lump sum, persons must have delayed claiming their State 
Pension for a minimum of 12 consecutive months.  
 
Legislation date: 11.2004 11.2004  
Implementation date: 04.2005   
Source:  Department for Work and Pensions.  
Reference:  Pension Act 2004 (Part 8).  
 
 
Source: ISSA Country Profiles (2006). 
 
As we have seen above, both Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country profiles provide 
summaries of pension reforms across OECD countries from 1990 to 2015. They contain vast 
and detailed information about pension reforms, which is hard to find in other kinds of data 
when the wide coverage of countries and the time period are considered. On the other hand, 
they contain weaknesses that are problematic for comparative studies. Analysing patterns 
and trends of pension reforms using one of them might be challenging as the criteria for 
classification are not identical in four books of Pensions at a Glance, and the ISSA Country 
Profiles are too long and descriptive to identify patterns and trends over 34 countries. All 
things considered, it is logical to combine the two resources to optimise the advantages that 
each one offers. This thesis, therefore, extracts a single criteria using Pensions at a Glance, 
and then reshapes the existing data into a single comparative form. ISSA Country Profiles 
are applied to the process as a complementary resource, and then cross-checked with 
Pensions at a Glance; this minimises the potential for missing information and errors in 
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classification. This goes beyond a simple process of merging and requires several steps. In 
the following section, the four steps that were taken to analyse the patterns and trends of 
pension reforms with Pensions at a Glance 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2015 and the ISSA Country 
Profiles are addressed in detail.   
 
5.3 Reshaping and coding the data    
Two elements of data preparation are required to analyse the patterns and trends of pension 
reforms using Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles. The first is creating a single 
consolidated dataset, and the second is transforming it to an easily comparable form. This 
section introduces the four steps that were undertaken in data-preparation process. Steps One 
and Two are the processes for creating a single set of data, and Steps Three and Four are the 
processes to turn it into a comparable form.     
• Step One: Create an identical standard to compare pension reforms.  
• Step Two: Reclassify all the data according to the unified category for pension reforms.   
• Step Three: Extract common elements from the summaries of pension reforms and simplify 
them to identify reform types.  
• Step Four: Assign a code to summaries of pension reforms using the reform types.  
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Step One: Create a unified category for comparison  
As mentioned in the previous section, four books of Pensions at a Glance used objectives of 
pension reforms mixed with measures of reforms in classifying data. As seen in Table 5.6 
below, the 2009 book classified pension reforms based on what they aimed to achieve 
through the reform, whilst the 2007 and 2015 books categorised reform cases by essential 
measures for reforms. The book 2013 mixed these two approaches13. 
 
Considering the aim of this thesis, Pensions at a Glance 2009 is the most appropriate dataset 
for this study as it is based on clear objectives of pension reforms. In light of this, this thesis 
generates new criteria based principally on Pensions at a Glance 2009, but with small 
amendments. The new criteria encapsulate eight measures for pension reform: coverage, 
adequacy, financial and fiscal sustainability, economic efficiency, administrative efficiency, 
diversification, security of investment, and other. In brief, coverage refers to reforms that 
aim to increase the number of insured people. Adequacy captures reforms that raise the level 
of pension benefits. Financial and fiscal sustainability is general retrenchment in pension 
benefits through changes in pension mechanisms. Economic efficiency puts a stronger focus 
on the labour market; it tries to minimise the distortions of pension systems influenced by 
factors outside of these systems. Reforms related to administrative efficiency aim at 
increasing the cost efficiency of the administrative processes. Diversification captures 
reforms that diversify retirement income sources by generating more options to individuals. 
                                                          
13 As a result, researchers might confront difficulties when analysing all the data together. For instance, it would be very 
confusing when comparing the categories in 2009 and 2013. The 2009 book describes that “improving retirement incentives 
comes under the heading of economic efficiency” (2009: 87) along with other measures to reduce the distortions to the 
labour market. It implies work incentives are one of the subordinate components of economic efficiency. In the 2013 book, 
however, work incentives are used as one of the “key goals of pension reforms” (2013: 18), and all the measures used to 
prevent labour market distortion are classified into this category. 
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Security of investment is a response to the increasing need for systematic guidelines for 
security as retirement income is diversified. Lastly, other includes measures to stimulate 
economic recovery and structural reforms. The criteria and definitions are outlined in Table 
5.7 below.    
 
Table 5.6: Summary of pension reforms in Pensions at a Glance 
 2007 2009 2013 2015 
Number 
of 
countries 
30 30 34 34 
Periods 1990 – 2003 2004 – 2008 2009 – Sep 2013 
Sep 2013 – Sep 
2015 
 
 
Categories 
of change 
- Pension              el
igibility age  
- Adjusted retireme
nt incentives 
- Change of years i
n benefit formula 
or qualifying cond
itions  
- Link to life        ex
pectancy and/or fi
nancial        sustai
nability 
- DC scheme 
- Others  
- Coverage 
- Adequacy 
- Financial sustaina
bility 
- and affordability 
- Economic          ef
ficiency 
- Administrative  ef
ficiency 
- Security 
- Coverage 
- Adequacy 
- Financial sustaina
bility and       affor
dability 
- Work incentives 
- Administrative  ef
ficiency 
- Diversity and    se
curity 
- Others 
- Coverage 
- Diversity and    se
curity 
- Pension benefits 
- Taxes and defined
 benefit contributi
ons 
- Indexation 
- Work incentives 
- Administrative  ef
ficiency 
- Others 
 
Source: OECD (2007, 2009, 2013, and 2015).  
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Table 5.7: New categories for pension reforms 
Categories Definition 
Coverage 
Increasing the coverage of pension systems by both mandatory and 
voluntary schemes 
Adequacy Increasing retirement income adequacy 
Financial and fiscal 
sustainability 
Improving long-term financial sustainability to taxpayers and 
contributors 
Economic efficiency 
Minimising the distortions of the retirement income system on 
individuals’ economic behaviour, such as labour supply and savings 
outside of pension plans 
Administrative 
efficiency 
Keeping the cost of collecting contributions, paying benefits and 
managing investments as low as possible 
Diversification  
Diversifying retirement income sources across providers, the three 
pillars, and financing forms by allowing greater options to 
individuals  
Security of investment Improving security of pension funds against investment failure 
Other  
Taking measures to stimulate economic recovery and changing 
pension structures 
 
Source: Author based on OECD (2009: 85; 2013: 18; 2015: 18-19). 
 
Step Two: Reclassify the data 
Reclassifying the data into the new categories is not easy an process, as, first of all, elements 
of reforms often have more than one objective. Trade-offs and synergies occur between the 
objectives. For instance, widening the coverage of occupational pensions improves the 
adequacy, and contributes to diversification by easing pressure on the state budget (OECD, 
2013: 19). Therefore, researchers must have sufficient knowledge of the reforms and classify 
them based on their main function. Secondly, reclassifying might be challenging as Pensions 
at a Glance only provides summarised information about reforms. Individual researchers 
therefore need to check related references to understand reforms precisely. As ISSA Country 
Profiles provide this information in detail, they are applied in this study to confirm the 
classification when there is uncertainty in the data from Pensions at a Glance. In addition to 
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the ISSA profiles, country profiles in the final chapter in each of the Pensions at a Glance  
books (2007, 2009, 2013, and 2015), and Social Security Programmes throughout the World 
(2013, 2014a, 2014b) are useful to fill the gap in knowledge.  
 
The process for reclassification began with Pensions at a Glance followed by ISSA Country 
Profiles. Reclassifying Pensions at a Glance 2009 and 2013 was a relatively simple process 
as the categories within them closely reflect the new categories developed for this study. On 
the other hand, the 2007 and 2015 books required much more attention, since they utilise 
very different categories. Every element of the 2007 and 2015 books was consequently 
carefully examined and assigned to the new categories. Then data from the ISSA Country 
profiles was employed to complement them. In short, the ISSA data was collected and 
merged from the website (about 2,000 entries) and the entries that possibly related to pension 
reforms were picked based on their titles (about 600 entries). These were compared to the 
data from Pensions at a Glance, and checked to see if they were either already covered by 
Pensions at a Glance, irrelevant to the analysis, or needed to be added. Here, ‘irrelevant’ 
entries means reforms irrelevant to pensions, or reforms that have not yet been legislated. 
The entries that needed to be added were classified by the new criteria as outlined in Table 
5.7. An example of the process is shown in Table 5.8. By the end more than 250 entries had 
been supplemented by ISSA Country Profiles. As pension reforms often span across 
numerous policy areas, it was not easy to collect relevant information without omission. This 
highlights the importance of cross-checking when employing data on pension reforms in 
comparative studies. There are overlapping descriptions in some cases and they are 
eliminated to avoid confusion. Entries that refer to ongoing processes are also eliminated.  
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Table 5.8: Reforms summarised in ISSA Country Profiles, the case of the UK (1995– 
2014) 
  
Entries in the ISSA Country profiles  
Comparison with Pensions at a 
Glance 
2014 
  
Overhaul of the pension system Irrelevant  
More choice in accessing pension saving 
introduced 
Covered 
2013 A single-tier pension to replace the multi-
tier public pension system 
Irrelevant 
2012 
  
Proposal to change the state pension system Covered 
Measures to improve the financing of the 
pension system 
Covered 
2011 
  
Encouraging people to work longer Covered  
Major changes to public-sector pensions Irrelevant 
2010 
  
The Pensions Regulator’s Corporate plan 
released 
Irrelevant 
New government’s agenda on public 
pension provision 
Irrelevant 
2009 Pension quality mark" award for defined 
contribution employer schemes" 
Security of investment 
2007 Another raft of pension reform proposals Irrelevant 
2006 
  
  
  
Changes to tax credits  Irrelevant 
Pension education initiative Security of investment 
Financial assistance when pension schemes 
wind up  
Security of investment 
Two retirement pension deferral options 
now available  
Partly covered. Economic efficiency 
2005 
  
  
Second Pensions Commission report 
released  
Irrelevant 
New funding requirements for defined 
benefit schemes  
Security of investment 
Employer Task Force on Pensions 
publishes its report  
Irrelevant 
2004 
  
  
  
  
The Pensions Act approved  
Partly covered. Coverage, 
administrative efficiency, security of 
investment 
Modernized network of services for older 
persons being developed 
Irrelevant 
The first report of the Pensions Commission 
submitted  
Irrelevant 
New pension and benefit rights for same sex 
couples  
Coverage 
Pensions Bill introduced in Parliament  Irrelevant 
2003 
  
  
  
Annual illustrations of future pension 
benefits required under law 
Irrelevant 
State Pensions Credit Act implementation  Adequacy 
Employer task force on pensions 
established  
Irrelevant 
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New measures to protect members of 
occupational schemes  
Partly covered. Administrative 
efficiency, security of investment 
2002 
  
  
Measures to simplify the regulatory 
framework for pensions introduced 
Adequacy, administrative efficiency 
State Second Pension implemented  Others 
Pension credit proposed  Irrelevant 
2001 
  
  
  
A new Department for Work and Pensions 
created  
Administrative efficiency 
Stakeholder pensions  Covered 
New tele-claim service for pensioners  Administrative efficiency 
Measures for pensioners  Irrelevant 
2000 Bill provides for reform in the area of old-
age provision  
Irrelevant 
1998 
  
Pilot projects to help poorest pensioners  Irrelevant 
Procedure to claim retirement pension over 
the phone is being tested 
Irrelevant 
1997 Minimum funding requirement for salary-
related pension schemes 
Security of investment 
1996 
  
  
  
  
New rules for contracted-out occupational 
pension schemes  
Security of investment 
Third tier of pension provision to be 
encouraged  
Irrelevant 
Changes to National Insurance 
Contributions  
Economic efficiency 
Equal Access to Pension Schemes for Men 
and Women  
Coverage  
New Compensation Scheme for 
Occupational Pensions  
Security of investment 
1995 Pensions Bill  Irrelevant 
 
* Irrelevant: the entry is not relevant to pension reforms, or is not yet legislated.  
* Covered: the entry is covered by Pensions at a Glance.  
* Coverage, Adequacy, Financial and fiscal sustainability, Economic efficiency, Administrative efficiency, 
Diversification, Security of investment, and Other: See Table 5.7 for definitions.     
 
Source: ISSA Country Profiles. 
 
Table 5.9 below shows the results for the UK after the process of reclassification for 
Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles. The five sources used for the process are 
put in different colours in the table. In doing so, the original sources are easily traceable, and 
above all, an analysis with a time dimension becomes possible. They sources are as follows: 
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the entries in blue are from Pensions at Glance 2007 showing reforms that took place from 
1990 to 2003. The entries in brown are from Pensions at Glance 2009 showing reforms from 
2004 to 2008. The entries in orange are from Pensions at Glance 2013 showing reforms 
from 2009 to September 2013. The entries in green are from Pensions at Glance 2015 
showing reforms from September 2013 to September 2015. Lastly, the entries in red are from 
ISSA Country Profiles showing reforms of the total period, from 1990 to 2015. As seen in 
the table, only the entries in red contain the specific year of each reform as only the ISSA 
Country Profiles provides the year for each reform. Pensions at a Glance only provides data 
in large clusters of time. See the Appendix for the whole result.   
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Table 5.9: Reclassified pension reforms, the case of the UK (1990 – 2015) 
 
Country Coverage Adequacy Sustainability 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administrative 
efficiency 
Diversification Security of investment Other 
United 
Kingdom 
Employers required 
to provide access to 
DC (“stakeholder”) 
pension.  Extension 
of means-tested 
supplements. Equal 
access to pension 
schemes for men 
and women (1996). 
New pension and 
benefit rights for 
same sex couples. 
Periods of adoption 
and paternity leave 
are treated in the 
same way as those 
of normal work for 
the purpose of 
employment-related 
pension schemes 
(2004). Reduction 
in number of years 
required for full 
basic pension to 30. 
Large employers 
(120 000 plus 
employees) must 
automatically enrol 
workers in company 
scheme or state-run 
National 
Employment 
Savings Trust 
(NEST) from 
October 2012; 
medium-sized 
employers (50 plus) 
from June 2013, 
Increased 
progressivity of 
earnings-related 
pension. Increase 
in basic pension. 
People who are 
unmarried at the 
time they purchase 
a pension annuity 
no longer have to 
take out a pension 
that provides for 
survivor benefits 
(2002). State 
pension credit is 
introduced (2003). 
Vesting rights to 
those who leave 
OPs early (2004). 
Basic pension to be 
indexed to average 
earnings from 2012; 
increases 2004-08 
in line with 
earnings. Improved 
credits for carers. 
One-off payment of 
GBP 60 to 
pensioners 
(January 2009). 
Increase basic 
State Pension by 
higher of CPI, 
earnings growth or 
2.5% from April 
2011 (triple lock 
guarantee). 
Contributions will 
Employee 
contribution of 4%, 
employer of 3% and 
government of 1% 
phased in. 
Contribution rates 
increase of 1% to 
2% for both 
employer and 
employee in 2012-
16. A 1% 
contribution-related 
tax credit 
introduced. In 
October 2017, the 
employer will pay 
3% and the 
employee will pay 
4% (Pensions Act 
2011). Indexation of 
private-sector OPs 
is changed from the 
retail price index to 
the consumer price 
index (2011).  
Employers who 
take on someone 
who has been 
unemployed for two 
years are able to 
take 'contributional 
holiday'. The main 
rate of employers' 
NICs is cut. The 
rate for self-
employed is cut 
(1996). Increment 
for late retirement 
raised from 7.4% to 
10.4% a year; 
increment now 
payable as a one-
off bonus. The 
maximum time limit 
of 5 years to defer 
State pension is 
removed (2006). 
Equalise pension 
ages at 65 by 2018. 
Bring forward 
pension age to 66 
by 2020 and 
increase from 66 to 
67 by 2026 
(October 2010 and 
amendments in 
January 2011 and 
2012 that 
accelerated the 
pace of reform). 
Removal of the 
default retirement 
age (DRA) of 65 to 
A new department 
for Work and 
Pensions created. 
New tele-claim 
service for 
pensioners (2001). 
Measures to 
simplify the 
regulatory 
framework: pension 
schemes are no 
longer required to 
produce actuarial 
certificates every 
three years; 
provision for the 
commutation of 
equivalent pension 
benefits prior to 
normal pension age 
providing that 
certain conditions 
are met (2002). 
Legislation 
regarding tax and 
contracting-out is 
simplified (2003). 
The rules on limited 
price indexation 
have been changed 
to make the 
regulation simpler 
(2004). Central 
clearing house for 
new national 
pension savings 
scheme; aim to 
have costs of 0.5% 
A reduction in the 
amount of 
information that 
must be provided 
by an employer 
electing to contract-
out or vary the 
contracting-out 
certificate (2002). 
New NEST scheme 
planned in 2010 
and implemented in 
2012.  
Contracted-out occupational pension 
schemes need to meet a benchmark by 
providing a pension broadly equivalent to, 
or better than the statutory standard. New 
compensation scheme for occupational 
pensions as measures to safeguard 
pension funds (1996). Minimum funding 
requirement for salary-related pension 
scheme (1997). Measures to safeguard the 
rights of members of Ops: introduction of a 
Pensions Protection Fund; full buy out 
policy for a solvent company who winds up 
its pension scheme; revision of the priority 
order which applies on wind-up; 
introduction of a new system of private 
pension regulation with a Pensions 
Regulator; requirement that employers 
consult before making changes to pension 
schemes (2003). Premiums paid by plans, 
related to measures of risk, double the 
originally predicted level. Tightening of 
recovery rules for plans in deficit. Extension 
of Financial Assistance Scheme for 
insolvent OPs, covering 140 000 extra 
workers. Pension Protection Fund, to insure 
DB plans, established in 2004.The 
Pensions Regulator to assist in protecting 
members' benefits (2004). New funding 
requirements for DB schemes: preparing a 
statement of funding principles; obtaining 
regular actuarial valuations and reports; 
putting in place a recovery plan addressing 
any funding shortfall; and keeping scheme 
members informed about their scheme's 
funding position (2005). Pension education 
initiatives. Financial assistance when 
pension schemes wind up (2006). Pension 
quality mark "award for DC employer 
S2P replaces 
SERPS (2002). 
Acceleration of 
change of state 
second pension from 
an earnings-related 
to a flat-rate 
scheme, with initial 
benefits indexed to 
average earnings. In 
January 2013, the 
Department for Work 
and Pensions 
published a draft bill 
introducing a flat-
rate single-tier 
pension (STP) to 
replace the existing 
multi-tier State 
Pension system. 
The STP will be 
implemented in April 
2016. The reform is 
expected to 
particularly benefit 
people who were 
expecting a low 
amount of Addition 
Pension due to their 
work history. It will 
represent a 
significant 
simplification of the 
state system and be 
a clear foundation 
for retirement 
saving. The 
government has also 
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and small 
employers (fewer 
than 50) from May 
2015. The National 
Employment 
Savings Trust 
(NEST) is being 
extended to small 
employers from 
January 2016.  
be increased from 
total of 2% of 
earnings in 2012 to 
5% in 2016 and 8% 
in 2017. Taxes on 
withdrawals from 
pension accounts 
were lowered and 
tax-free amounts 
were increased in 
2015. 
provide workers 
greater 
opportunities to 
remain in the labour 
market afterwards. 
From October 
2011, employers 
cannot compel 
employees to retire 
using DRA. Bring 
forward pension 
age to 66 by 2026 
and to 67 by 2028. 
Gradually 
increasing the 
private pension 
savings age from 
55 to 57 in 2028. 
Private pension will 
be available for 
withdrawal from 10 
years before the 
normal pension 
age. 
of balance initially, 
falling to 0.3%. New 
Pensions Regulator 
established in 2005, 
combing previous 
agencies. 
schemes" (2009).  NEST scheme will 
create economies of scale compared to 
current DC plans. Pension providers and 
trust-based managers must offer DC 
members free and impartial face-to-face 
advice. Small DC plans are automatically 
transferred to the new pension plan when 
workers change jobs. The government’s 
authority to introduced minimum 
governance standards, fees, etc. have 
been strengthened to mitigate excessive 
charges and to increase standards.   New 
rules for defined contribution pension 
withdrawals were legislated in May 2014 
and will enable large lump-sum 
withdrawals. 
legislated to 
accelerate increase 
in State Pension age 
and introduced a 
regular review 
process to set Spa 
based on the 
principle that a fixed 
proportion of adult 
life should be spent 
in retirement. 
Increase contribution 
rates of public sector 
workers and amend 
the DB plan for 
Members of the 
Parliament (2010). 
From 2016, a new 
state pension 
(single-tier pension, 
STP) will replace at 
a higher level both 
the basic pension 
and the minimum 
income guarantee 
(Pension Credit). 
 
*Blue: pension reforms from 1990 to 2003 
 Brown: pension reforms from 2004 to 2008 
 Orange: pension reforms from 2009 to Sep 2013 
Green: pension reforms from Sep 2013 to Sep 2015 
Red: pension reforms from 1995 to 2014 
Source: Reclassified by author, based on OECD data (2007, 2009, 2013, 2015) and ISSA Country Profiles. 
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Step Three: Generating subtypes of pension reforms 
The third step is generating the list of reform types. Since the data generated in the previous 
stage is too descriptive, it may not be easy to make comparisons across countries. Therefore, 
common elements in each category are extracted and simplified to improve efficiency. For 
the process, the descriptions and the analysis of criteria in Pensions at a Glance are 
referenced as the 2009 book (pp. 85-89) and 2013 book (pp. 20-26) provide summarised 
features of each category. For example, the 2013 book addresses the three main types of 
measure that were adopted to improve coverage: private pension provisions in addition to 
public schemes, the introduction or extension of mandatory occupational pensions, and 
automatic enrolment in voluntary schemes. When it comes to adequacy, it addresses its 
features such as new means-tested benefits, higher benefits to the elderly, improving the 
progressive nature of social security systems, one-off payments, and so on (pp. 20-21). This 
thesis uses this information as a basic frame and then fleshes it out by close examination of 
previous work (see Appendix).  
 
The following Table 5.10 is the output: subtypes of pension reforms in OECD countries from 
1990 to 2015. It has seven categories, which are identical with those in Table 5.7 and each 
category consists of different elements of pension reforms, which are named ‘subtypes of 
reforms’. Coverage, for example, has ten subtypes of pension reforms. This means that 
OECD countries employed ten types of measures to improve coverage in pension schemes.  
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Table 5.10: Subtypes of pension reforms in OECD countries from 1990 to 2015 
Category Type of reforms 
Coverage ① Introduction or extension of public pensions (1st tier)   
② Relaxing qualifying conditions for public pensions 
③ Credit or subsidy for targeted groups  
④ Introduction or extension of mandatory public pensions (2nd tier)   
⑤ Introduction or extension of mandatory private pensions (2nd tier)  
⑥ Automatic enrolment in voluntary pensions (3rd tier)  
⑦ Tax privileges or subsidies for voluntary pensions 
⑧ Introduction or extension of voluntary pensions  
⑨ Conversion of severance-pay into pension plans  
⑩ Other 
Adequacy ① Increases in the benefit levels for all pensioners  
② Guarantee of the benefit levels / favourable treatments for low-income 
seniors 
③ Additional benefits / favourable treatments for carers 
④ Additional benefits / favourable treatments for other targeted groups 
⑤ One-off payments / Occasional transfers 
⑥ Tax reduction for pensioners 
⑦ Changes in indexation mechanisms 
⑧ Increases in the contribution rates 
⑨ Easing conditions for claiming benefits 
⑩ Allowing early retirement for targeted groups 
⑪ Other 
Financial and fiscal 
sustainability 
① Changes in indexation mechanisms / valorisation  
② Changes in pension formula (accrual rates, automatic mechanism, 
reflection of life expectancy etc.) 
③ Best years to lifetime average / longer years  
④ Direct cut in benefits 
⑤ Taxation of pension benefits or contributions / Abolition of favourable 
tax treatment 
⑥ Increases in the contribution rates / Tightening the conditions for 
benefits   
⑦ Minimising the government’s financial obligations in pensions 
⑧ Introduction of Mandatory DC  
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⑨ Pre-funding  
⑩ Introduction of notional account schemes or point system 
⑪ Diversion from private pensions to public pensions 
⑫ Other 
Economic efficiency ① Equalising normal pension ages for men and women 
② Increases in the pension age  
③ Increases in the statutory retirement ages / Abolition of compulsory 
retirement age  
④ Disadvantages for early retirement or no early retirement schemes 
⑤ Financial incentives to work beyond retirement age  
⑥ Regulations to protect aged employees  
⑦ Increases in contributed years for full pensions  
⑧ Financial incentives to save 
⑨ Incentives to hire aged workers to employers / Disadvantages for fire 
aged workers to employers 
⑩ Abolishing age limit to contribute / Allowing to receive pensions while 
working  
⑪ Reducing employers' contributions 
⑫ Other 
Administrative 
efficiency 
① Making public pension schemes cost efficient 
② Merging pension schemes 
③ Setting up information systems for managing social security systems 
④ Limiting operational costs 
⑤ Other 
Diversification  ① Voluntary pension plans to improve investment options for workers 
② Regulations that allow workers greater choice over the way their 
savings are invested in private pensions 
③ Relaxing of restrictions on investment options 
Security of 
investment 
① Action to improve pension funds’ solvency rates 
② Governance, education and risk management of pension plans to 
improve security 
③ Other 
Other ① Measures to stimulate economic recovery 
② Other (structural change, etc.) 
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Source: Reclassified by author, based on OECD (2007, 2009, 2013, 2015) and ISSA Country 
profiles.  
 
Step Four: Codify the data  
The last step is assigning a code to the summary of pension reforms using the subtypes of 
pension reforms. This is the process that converts the previous work taken in the second step 
into a comparable form. During the second stage, the types of pension reforms are derived 
from summaries of pension reform, and now the original work is coded using these new 
types. Therefore, coding is not technically difficult in principle, but where there are grey 
areas the ISSA Country Profiles are referenced. Table 5.11 shows how the original 
description in Pensions at a Glance (merged and reclassified by the author) is coded using 
the new subtypes of pension reforms. Table 5.12 is an example of the coding process for the 
UK case.  
 
Now, the process for analysis and data preparation using Pensions at a Glance and ISSA 
Country Profiles are completed. We have a single consolidated dataset ready for comparison. 
The following section provides an overview and analyses patterns and trends of pension 
reforms within it. 
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Table 5.11: An example of the coding process for Coverage, the case of the UK    
Country Coverage 
Original description  Code  
United 
Kingdom 
Employers required to provide access to DC 
(“stakeholder”) pension.   
⑤ Introduction or extension 
of private pension in 
addition to public pensions 
Extension of means-tested supplements. ③ Credit or subsidy for 
targeted groups 
Equal access to pension schemes for men and women 
(1996). 
① Introduction or extension 
of public pensions 
New pension and benefit rights for same sex couples. ① Introduction or extension 
of public pensions 
Periods of adoption and paternity leave are treated 
in the same way as those of normal work for the 
purpose of employment-related pension schemes 
(2004). 
① Introduction or extension 
of public pensions 
Reduction in number of years required for full basic 
pension to 30. 
② Relaxing qualifying 
conditions for public 
pensions 
Large employers (120,000+ employees) must 
automatically enrol workers in company scheme or 
state-run National Employment Savings Trust 
(NEST) from October 2012; medium-sized employers 
(50 plus) from June 2013, and small employers 
(fewer than 50) from May 2015. 
⑥ Automatic enrolment in 
voluntary pensions (3rd 
tier) 
The National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) is 
being extended to small employers from January 
2016. 
⑧ Introduction or extension 
of voluntary pensions 
 
Source: Reclassified and coded by author, based on OECD data (2007, 2009, 2013 and 
2015) and ISSA Country Profiles. 
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Table 5.12: An example of the coding process, the case of the UK   
Country Coverage Adequacy 
Financial and 
fiscal 
sustainability 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administrative 
efficiency 
Diversification 
Security of 
investment 
Other 
United 
Kingdom 
① 
Introduction 
or extension 
of public 
pensions (1st 
tier) ② 
Relaxing 
qualifying 
conditions for 
public 
pensions ③ 
Credit or 
subsidy for 
targeted 
groups 
⑤ 
Introduction 
or extension 
of mandatory 
private 
pensions (2nd 
tier) ⑥ 
Automatic 
enrolment in 
① Increases 
in the benefit 
levels for all 
pensioners  
② Guarantee 
of the benefit 
levels / 
favourable 
treatments for 
low-income 
seniors 
③ Additional 
benefits / 
favourable 
treatments for 
carers 
④ Additional 
benefits / 
favourable 
treatments for 
other targeted 
groups 
⑤ One-off 
payments / 
① Changes in 
indexation 
mechanisms / 
valorisation  
⑥ Increases 
in the 
contribution 
rates / 
Tightening the 
conditions for 
benefits    
① Equalising 
normal 
pension ages 
for men and 
women 
② Increases 
in the pension 
age  
③ Increases 
in the 
statutory 
retirement 
ages / 
Abolition of 
compulsory 
retirement age  
⑤ Financial 
incentives to 
work beyond 
retirement age  
⑪ Reducing 
employers' 
contributions 
① Making 
public pension 
schemes cost 
efficient 
③ Setting up 
information 
systems for 
managing 
social security 
systems 
⑤ Other  
① Voluntary 
pension plans 
to improve 
investment 
options for 
workers 
③ Relaxing of 
restrictions on 
investment 
options  
① Action to 
improve 
pension fund's 
solvency rates 
② 
Governance, 
education and 
risk 
management 
of pension 
plans to 
improve 
security 
③ Other 
 
② Other  
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Source: Reclassified and coded by author, based on OECD data (2007, 2009, 2013 and 2015) and ISSA Country Profiles.  
 
 
voluntary 
pensions (3rd 
tier) ⑧ 
Introduction 
or extension 
of voluntary 
pensions      
Occasional 
transfers 
⑥ Tax 
reduction for 
pensioners 
⑦ Changes in 
indexation 
mechanisms 
⑧ Increases 
in the 
contribution 
rates  
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5.4 Data analysis     
This section uses overview tables to show the data at a glance. Firstly, this thesis shows 
simple overview tables that check the use of each reform measure. They are made based on 
the coded data in the previous section, and the basic format of the tables comes from 
Pensions at a Glance (OECD, 2013: 19). They are changed and updated to reflect the 
purpose of this thesis. The overview of all types of reform package is provided first, followed 
by two tables which reflect the time dimension. Secondly, this thesis also provides a more 
detailed view using ‘frequency of reform’ measures. This demonstrates the intensity of 
pension reforms in each OECD country. The frequency tables are also displayed with a time 
dimension.    
 
An overview of all measures for pension reforms  
Table 5.13 is an overview of the seven types of reforms in pension systems: coverage, 
adequacy, financial and fiscal sustainability, economic efficiency, administrative efficiency, 
diversification, and security of investment. The table shows which measures were taken in 
each of the 34 OECD member countries between 1990 and 2015. If a measure was taken at 
least once during a period of time, the box is marked. A blank space indicates that the 
relevant measure was not employed in that country. At the bottom of the table, the total 
frequency that the measure was adopted in the 34 countries is provided.     
 
First of all, it is evident that most OECD countries adopted most of the measures to reform 
pension systems over the last 25 years. If we leave other out of the analysis, 13 out of the 34 
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countries employed all seven types of reform measure, and 18 countries adopted five or six 
measures. In other words, more than 85% of the OECD countries reformed pensions evenly 
using most of the reform packages between 1990 and 2015. The frequency of each measure 
is also shown. Except for security of investment, the frequency of all measures is in the range 
of 24 to 33. This result is noteworthy given that the period of time is often called “the era of 
austerity”. It shows that most of the OECD countries carried out reforms with multiple aims; 
they paid attention not only to retrenchment, but also to protection, despite of the fiscal 
distress. On the other hand, two countries turned out to be less active in reforms compared 
to most of the other OECD countries; specifically, Iceland and Israel. Both only adopted 
three types of measures. Considering the fact that Israel was not covered by ISSA Country 
Profiles nor Pensions at a Glance 2007 and 2009, Iceland might be the only country where 
pension reforms took place for limited purposes over the last 25 years.             
 
Table 5.13: Overview of pension reform measures in OECD countries, 1990–2015 
  Coverage Adequacy 
Financial and 
fiscal 
Sustainability 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administ-
rative 
efficiency 
Diversifica-
tion 
Security of 
investment 
Australia o o o o o o o 
Austria o o o o       
Belgium o o o o   o   
Canada o o o o o o o 
Chile o o     o o o 
Czech 
Republic 
o o o o o o   
Denmark o   o o o o   
Estonia o o o o o   o 
Finland o o o o o o o 
France o o o o o o o 
Germany o o o o o o   
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Greece o o o o o     
Hungary o o o o   o o 
Iceland   o o       o 
Ireland o o o o o o o 
Israel o o       o   
Italy o o o o o o o 
Japan o o o o o o o 
Korea o o o o o o o 
Luxembourg o o o o o     
Mexico o o o   o o   
Netherlands   o o o o   o 
New Zealand o o o o     o 
Norway o o o o   o   
Poland o o o o o o o 
Portugal o o o o o o o 
Slovak 
Republic 
o o o o   o o 
Slovenia o o o o   o   
Spain o o o o o o   
Sweden   o o o o   o 
Switzerland o o o o   o o 
Turkey   o o o o o   
United 
Kingdom 
o o o o o o o 
United States o o o o o o o 
Total 30 33 32 30 24 26 21 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Regarding the trend analysed above, one might be curious about its consistency; 25 years is 
not a short period of time for any policy. Were the trends in reform measures maintained 
over the years? If not, were there any remarkable changes during the years? Tables 5.14 and 
5.15 below provide insights on changes over the 25 years. They provide the same overview 
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of reform packages as the previous table, but add in a time dimension. They separately 
illustrate what measures each country adopted over two periods of time: between 1990 and 
2003, and between 2004 and 201514.  
 
As shown in Table 5.14 below, less diverse reform measures were employed in the first time 
period. If we leave other out of discussion as in the previous table, France is the only country 
out of the 34 that employed all seven types of measure, and eight countries adopted five or 
six of them. Two countries, Iceland and Israel, did not undertake any reform during this 
period. On the other hand, despite the overall decrease in frequency, two measures were 
significantly preferred in many countries: measures for financial and fiscal sustainability 
and economic efficiency. Both measures were employed in 25 of the countries, whilst other 
measures were in the range of 8 to 21 countries. This differs significantly from the previous 
analysis that considered the total period, which indicates that all measures of reform were 
relatively evenly adopted in most countries.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 
Because of the limitations of the original data sources, there is little room for dividing the period of time further. Pensions 
at a Glance does not provide a specific year for each reform, while the ISSA Country Profiles provides a data basis for 
every year. Pensions at a Glance only provides data in large clusters of time; reforms between 1990 and 2003 (OECD, 
2007), 2004 and 2008 (OECD, 2009), 2009 and September 2013 (OECD, 2013), and September 2013 and September 2015 
(OECD, 2015). Considering the limits of this data, this study divided the total period of time into halves: reforms that took 
place between 1990 and 2003, and between 2004 and 2015.  
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Table 5.14: Overview of pension reform measures in OECD countries, 1990–2003 
  
Coverage Adequacy 
Financial 
and fiscal 
Sustainabili
ty 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administra
-tive 
efficiency 
Diversifi-
cation 
Security of 
investment 
Australia o o o o       
Austria o o o o       
Belgium o o o o       
Canada o   o o o o o 
Chile   o         o 
Czech 
Republic 
o o o o o     
Denmark o   o         
Estonia o o           
Finland   o o o o o   
France o o o o o o o 
Germany o o o o   o   
Greece   o o o o     
Hungary o o o o     o 
Iceland               
Ireland o o o       o 
Israel               
Italy     o o       
Japan o   o o   o   
Korea o o   o   o   
Luxembourg o o o   o     
Mexico o       o o   
Netherlands     o o o     
New Zealand     o o       
Norway     o         
Poland     o o       
Portugal   o o o       
Slovak 
Republic 
  o o o       
Slovenia o o o o   o   
Spain   o   o   o   
Sweden     o o       
Switzerland o o o o     o 
Turkey     o o   o   
United 
Kingdom 
o o   o o o o 
United States   o   o o   o 
Total 18 21 25 25 10 11 8 
 
Source: Author. 
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Meanwhile, the latter time period (2004–2015) shows similar trends to the results for the 
total period. According to Table 5.15 below, reform measures were diversified compared to 
the first period; seven of the 34 countries employed all of seven types of measure, and 14 
countries adopted five or six of them. Chile, Norway and Poland, all of whom did not make 
many reforms in the first period, adopted five measures or more in the second period. The 
frequency of each measure is shown. All measures appear between 19 and 30 times. This 
indicates that many OECD countries tried to enhance pension systems throughout this period, 
but not necessarily to tighten budgets, as mentioned above with Table 5.13. Another finding 
to note is the fact that the number of countries that adopted measures for coverage, adequacy, 
administrative efficiency, diversification, and security of investment considerably increased 
during this period. Whilst only 8 to 21 countries adopted these measures in the first period, 
19 to 30 countries employed them in the second. Financial and fiscal sustainability and 
economic efficiency saw a relatively moderate increase during the same period; the number 
of countries that used financial and fiscal sustainability increased from 25 to 30, and those 
using the measure of economic efficiency increased from 25 to 27.  
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Table 5.15: Overview of pension reform measures in OECD countries, 2004–2015 
 
  Coverage Adequacy 
Financial and 
fiscal 
Sustainability 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administra-
tive 
efficiency 
Diversifica-
tion 
Security of 
investment 
Australia o o o o o o o 
Austria o o o o       
Belgium   o   o   o   
Canada o o o o o o o 
Chile o o     o o o 
Czech 
Republic 
o   o o   o   
Denmark       o o o   
Estonia   o o o o   o 
Finland o o o o o o o 
France o o o o o     
Germany o o o o o o   
Greece o o o o o     
Hungary o o o o   o   
Iceland   o o       o 
Ireland o o o o o o o 
Israel o o o     o   
Italy o o o o o o o 
Japan o o o o o   o 
Korea o o o o o   o 
Luxembourg o o o o       
Mexico o o o   o o   
Netherlands   o o o     o 
New Zealand o o o       o 
Norway o o o o   o   
Poland o o o o o o o 
Portugal o o o o o o o 
Slovak 
Republic 
o   o     o o 
Slovenia o   o o       
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Spain o o o o o     
Sweden   o o o o   o 
Switzerland o o o o   o o 
Turkey   o   o o o   
United 
Kingdom 
o o o o o o o 
United States o o o     o o 
Total 27 30 30 27 20 21 19 
 
Source: Author. 
 
An overview of the frequency of pension reforms  
We turn now to a more detailed overview of the data: the frequency of reforms. Previously, 
we examined the data to ascertain whether a certain type of reform measure had been 
employed by countries. It provided a quick overview to provide insights into the overall 
trend. Pensions at a Glance (OECD, 2013: 19) used the same format for its description of 
the reform data. It is, however, difficult to show more than a general understanding of 
available reform trends from this approach. Too much information from the original data is 
lost. This is the nature of a crisp-set in the simple overview tables; a ‘yes or no’ format 
cannot hold profound information on the original data (see Appendix).  
 
This thesis consequently presents the frequency of pension reforms to supplement our 
understanding. Counting each reform measure permits us to explore the intensity of reforms 
in each country. In times of economic hardship, the allocation of limited resources to social 
provisions is politically contentious (Kuitto, 2016: 447), and pensions are not immune. In 
such situations, each country is forced to take a strategic choice over reform measures to 
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achieve policy goals within their limited capability. This leads them to focus on particular 
measures to cover the priority issues in pension systems. If a country has an issue of 
insufficient pension benefits, for example, the government might gain political traction to 
increase pension adequacy despite the general trend of austerity. In the same sense, if a 
pension system has been criticised for its growing budgetary stress, it would be reasonable 
for the government to focus on sustainability measures. One point to note is the fact that 
these changes are not associated with major structural reforms in most cases (Ebbinghaus, 
2012: 184-196). This can be explained by path-dependent inertia and the mechanisms of 
welfare politics as addressed in Chapter Three. Radical reforms – especially radical cut-
backs – are likely to be avoided by vote-seeking politicians and gradual path-developments 
are more likely to happen (Ebbinghaus, 2005; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). As a result, changes 
in pension systems nowadays often occur “through multiple smaller public policy 
interventions, sometimes through non-decisions by public actors, and by subterranean 
adaptations by non-state actors such as employees, unions, and individuals” (Ebbinghaus, 
2012: 200).        
 
In this context, the frequency of the seven types of reform measures indicates the emphasis 
of governments and their general welfare orientation in pensions. Calculating the frequency 
provides us with a greater capacity to grasp patterns of pension reforms, beyond simple 
analysis of a ‘yes or no’ format. This does raise concerns over the different sizes of impact 
of each reform. Counting the frequency of reform measures indeed does not reflect the size 
of the impact of the measure; a significant systematic reform and a small parametric reform 
are counted as one frequency for each. This thesis, however, has demonstrated that the 
majority of reforms in OECD countries for the last 25 years can be classified into 97 
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subtypes15 (see Table 5.10). As addressed in the previous sector, those subtypes are mainly 
based on Pensions at a Glance. This indicates that most of the pension reforms took a similar 
form, specifically that of small interventions, which is in line with Ebbinghaus’ s (2012: 200) 
argument above. Considering these facts, measuring the frequency of pension reforms as a 
proxy of reform intensity is reliable. Still, there may be information that is not captured by 
using a frequency measure. Such a loss of information is inevitable in processing descriptive 
data into quantitative form, and it can be considered as an acceptable margin in this thesis.          
 
Table 5.16 below is an overview of the frequencies of pension reform measures. The figures 
in the tables are the frequency of reform measures employed in each country. For example, 
the table shows Australia is 4 in coverage, meaning Australia employed measures to expand 
coverage of pension systems in their pension system through four reforms between 1990 and 
2015. A blank space indicates that the relevant measure was not employed in that country. 
The total frequency of measures adopted in the 34 countries is provided at the bottom of the 
table. Also, the total frequency of measures adopted in each country is provided at the right 
end of column.   
 
As was revealed in Table 5.13, many OECD countries employed most of the seven measures. 
Table 5.16 forwards a more accurate view of their preferences. Firstly, the most frequently 
adopted measures for the last 25 years are financial and fiscal sustainability (197) and 
economic efficiency (191). They account for almost half of the total frequency (804). This 
                                                          
15 This is the sum of all subtypes of pension reforms in Table 5.10 except the subtypes ‘other’. The 
total number of subtypes including ‘other’ is 105.    
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supports earlier research on welfare austerity in many welfare states. Changes in indexation 
mechanisms and pension formulae, best years to lifetime average or longer year, abolition 
of favourable tax treatment, and tightening the conditions for benefits were commonly 
employed to increase pension financial and fiscal sustainability. For economic efficiency, 
equalising and raising the pension age, limiting early retirement and encouraging longer 
working are observed in the majority of member countries.  
 
The next common measures are adequacy (132) and coverage (115). They account for 30% 
of all the reforms. Considering the economic hardship of the period, such an intensity of 
pension expansion is surprising. For adequacy, the most preferred method was a universal 
rise in pension amounts. Tax reduction for pensioners also aims at a general increase in 
pension amounts. Other subtypes are more focused on targeted groups; specifically, those 
who are unlikely to have a sufficient contribution record for full a pension such as carers, 
the unemployed, students, and others who rely on benefits. The reforms are adopted to fill 
the insufficient contribution record of those people, so that they are entitled to a full pension 
when they reach pension age. Coverage was expanded in all tiers of the income security 
system. An introduction or extension of the 1st tier was dominant, but the 2nd and 3rd tiers 
also expanded their coverage. Crediting targeted groups was also frequently employed. The 
targeted groups are mostly carers, students, and unemployed. The reforms aimed to help 
them to receive a full pension when they reach the pension age. This is a response to 
emerging new risks in the era of austerity, as pointed out in many studies16 (Bonoli, 2006: 
6-11; Pierson, 2011: 8-11; Taylor-Gooby, 2004: 3-7). Finally, security of investment (68), 
                                                          
16 As described in Chapter Two.  
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administrative efficiency (57), and diversification (44) were the three least commonly 
employed reforms.      
   
Table 5.16 also shows country variations in frequency, which ranges from 3 to 63. The 
average number of measures for all countries is 23.6. The least intensively reformed country 
is Iceland (3), followed by Israel (5). The most intensively reformed countries are the UK 
(63) and France (57). They have pursued pension reforms very frequently, but their preferred 
reform measures were different. The UK was dedicated to improving security of investment 
(21), and increasing the adequacy of pension benefits (11). Financial and fiscal 
sustainability (4) and diversification (2) did not received much attention. France’s major 
concern, however, were economic efficiency (17). Adequacy (13), coverage (10), and 
financial and fiscal sustainability (10) were also intensively reformed. On the other hand, 
diversification (1) and security of investment (1) were the least common measures in France.  
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Table 5.16: Frequencies of pension reform measures in OECD countries, 1990–2015 
  Coverage Adequacy 
Financial 
and fiscal 
sustainabi
-lity 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administra-
tive 
efficiency 
Diversifi-
cation 
Security of 
investment 
Total 
Australia 4 11 5 12 3 1 1 37 
Austria 6 5 4 6 0 0 0 21 
Belgium 1 2 1 13 0 1 0 18 
Canada 7 3 8 6 2 3 4 33 
Chile 5 4 0 0 2 3 3 17 
Czech 
Republic 
3 2 6 8 2 1 0 22 
Denmark 3 0 1 4 1 1 0 10 
Estonia 3 2 3 2 2 0 1 13 
Finland 2 6 9 15 2 2 1 37 
France 10 13 10 17 5 1 1 57 
Germany 4 7 11 3 2 2 0 29 
Greece 2 9 9 13 7 0 0 40 
Hungary 4 2 9 5 0 1 1 22 
Iceland 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Ireland 5 8 10 3 1 1 8 36 
Israel 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Italy 1 1 10 10 1 1 2 26 
Japan 8 4 11 2 2 2 2 31 
Korea 8 3 3 4 1 1 1 21 
Luxemburg 3 6 4 2 1 0 0 16 
Mexico 4 1 1 0 5 6 0 17 
Netherlands 0 1 5 5 1 0 2 14 
New 
Zealand 
4 3 6 1 0 0 2 16 
Norway 1 1 6 3 0 1 0 12 
Poland 4 1 7 6 2 3 2 25 
Portugal 3 2 12 8 1 1 1 28 
Slovak 
Republic 
3 2 7 1 0 1 4 18 
Slovenia 2 1 8 3 0 1 0 15 
Spain 1 6 4 11 1 1 0 24 
Sweden 0 3 9 6 3 0 2 23 
Switzerland 4 2 9 4 0 3 4 26 
Turkey 0 2 2 5 1 2 0 12 
United 
Kingdom 
8 11 4 9 8 2 21 63 
United 
States 
1 4 2 4 1 1 4 17 
Total 115 132 197 191 57 44 68 804 
  
Source: Author. 
218 
 
 
Tables 5.17 and 5.18 below are overviews of the same frequency data, but divided into the 
two periods of time, 1990-2003 and 2004-2015. The first thing to note is the large gap in the 
number of measures between the two periods. The total frequency has more than doubled, 
from 263 (1990-2003) to 541 (2004-2015). Greece, for example, was relatively inactive in 
the first period, with only six reform measures. In the second period, however, Greece turned 
to intensive reforms, recording 34 during this time. Similarly, Australia pursued reforms 
eight times in the first period and 29 times in the second period. The frequency in the UK 
has also doubled from 21 to 42 between the two periods. Most countries therefore increased 
their pursuit of pension reforms in the second period, but there are three countries that are 
exceptions. The frequency of reform decreased in the second period in Austria, Luxembourg, 
and Slovenia.  
 
The preferences for reform measures are also different between the two periods. Compared 
to the first period, all seven measures were increasingly employed in the second period. 
However, some of them were preferred in particular. The use of security of investment has 
tripled. The frequencies of diversification, economic efficiency, and adequacy have more 
than doubled. Nevertheless, the most frequently adopted measures in both periods were 
steadily financial and fiscal sustainability and economic efficiency, which account for almost 
half of the total frequencies for each period. Adequacy and coverage were the third and fourth 
most popular measures in both periods.  
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Table 5.17: Frequencies of pension reform measures in OECD countries, 1990-2003 
  Coverage Adequacy 
Financial 
and fiscal 
sustainabil
-ity 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administ-
rative 
efficiency 
Diversifi-
cation 
Security 
of 
investmen
t 
Total 
Australia 2 1 1 4 0 0 0 8 
Austria 4 2 3 5 0 0 0 14 
Belgium 1 1 1 5 0 0 0 8 
Canada 1 0 5 1 1 1 1 10 
Chile 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 
Czech 
Republic 
2 2 1 3 2 0 0 10 
Denmark 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Estonia 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Finland 0 1 6 4 1 1 0 13 
France 4 6 4 3 3 1 1 22 
Germany 2 1 6 2 0 1 0 12 
Greece 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 6 
Hungary 1 1 4 3 0 0 1 10 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 4 4 1 0 0 0 1 10 
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 6 
Japan 1 0 7 1 0 2 0 11 
Korea 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 7 
Luxembourg 2 5 2 0 1 0 0 10 
Mexico 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 
Netherlands 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 5 
New Zealand 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Norway 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Poland 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 5 
Portugal 0 1 3 4 0 0 0 8 
Slovak 
Republic 
0 2 3 1 0 0 0 6 
Slovenia 1 1 6 2 0 1 0 11 
Spain 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 5 
Sweden 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 7 
Switzerland 2 1 1 1 0 0 2 7 
Turkey 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 4 
United 
Kingdom 
3 4 0 1 5 1 7 21 
United States 0 2 0 4 1 0 1 8 
Total 40 42 78 57 18 12 16 263 
 
Source: Author.  
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Table 5.18: Frequencies of pension reform measures in OECD countries, 2004-2015 
  Coverage Adequacy 
Financial 
and fiscal 
sustainabi
-lity 
Economic 
efficiency 
Administra-
tive 
efficiency 
Diversifi-
cation 
Security 
of 
investmen
t 
Total 
Australia 2 10 4 8 3 1 1 29 
Austria 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 7 
Belgium 0 1 0 8 0 1 0 10 
Canada 6 3 3 5 1 2 3 23 
Chile 5 3 0 0 2 3 1 14 
Czech 
Republic 
1 0 5 5 0 1 0 12 
Denmark 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 6 
Estonia 0 1 3 2 2 0 1 9 
Finland 2 5 3 11 1 1 1 24 
France 6 7 6 14 2 0 0 35 
Germany 2 6 5 1 2 1 0 17 
Greece 2 8 8 11 5 0 0 34 
Hungary 3 1 5 2 0 1 0 12 
Iceland 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Ireland 1 4 9 3 1 1 7 26 
Israel 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Italy 1 1 6 8 1 1 2 20 
Japan 7 4 4 1 2 0 2 20 
Korea 6 1 3 2 1 0 1 14 
Luxembourg 1 1 2 2 0 0 0 6 
Mexico 2 1 1 0 4 5 0 13 
Netherlands 0 1 2 4 0 0 2 9 
New Zealand 4 3 5 0 0 0 2 14 
Norway 1 1 4 3 0 1 0 10 
Poland 4 1 3 5 2 3 2 20 
Portugal 3 1 9 4 1 1 1 20 
Slovak 
Republic 
3 0 4 0 0 1 4 12 
Slovenia 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 
Spain 1 4 4 9 1 0 0 19 
Sweden 0 3 3 5 3 0 2 16 
Switzerland 2 1 8 3 0 3 2 19 
Turkey 0 2 0 4 1 1 0 8 
United 
Kingdom 
5 7 4 8 3 1 14 42 
United States 1 2 2 0 0 1 3 9 
Total 75 90 119 134 39 32 52 541 
 
Source: Author.  
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5.5 Conclusion  
The six overviews provided in the previous sections allow us to draw some conclusions. 
First, OECD countries generally shared common goals for pension reforms despite their 
different circumstances. Most of OECD countries adopted most of the following seven 
measures between 1990 and 2015: coverage, adequacy, financial and fiscal sustainability, 
economic efficiency, administrative efficiency, diversification, and security of investment. 
These measures are broadly shared across countries despite the variety in maturity and 
functions of their pension systems, and different levels of fiscal distress and poverty rates in 
each country. For example, France introduced public pensions in the early 20th century and 
stabilised them many years ago, whilst South Korea introduced its first pension in the 1980s. 
The level of fiscal distress caused by demographic factors is very severe in Japan, but not in 
the US. Poverty rates17 in people aged 65 and over reached 33.6% in Australia, but 9.7% in 
Canada in 2010. This shows that they shared common goals and employed similar measures 
to achieve them regardless of their circumstances over the last 25 years.  
  
Second, OECD countries’ common goals for reforms were not limited to retrenchment in 
pensions. Despite the fact that welfare states are “facing a context of permanent austerity” 
(Pierson, 2001: 411), pension reforms were implemented to strengthen protection (measures 
for coverage, adequacy, and security of investment) as well as to cut costs (sustainability, 
economic efficiency, and administrative efficiency, diversification). This might be explained 
by the theory of credit claiming, even though Pierson (2001) argues that it no longer occurs 
                                                          
17 The relative poverty rates are calculated by the author based on LIS data. See Chapter Four for more information.   
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due to the limited space available for popular policies nowadays. We will return to this topic 
in later chapters.  
 
Third, retrenchment measures were the most preferred reform types throughout the whole 
period. The trend of employing sustainability and economic efficiency was consistent in 
many countries. However, an increase in the adoption of other measures since 2004 is 
noteworthy. Compared to the first period, the increase in frequency of other measures is 
much higher than financial and fiscal sustainability. Particularly, reforms to improve 
security of investment received significant attention. Diversification, adequacy, and 
coverage have also been widely adopted since 2004. This could be a counter-action to the 
pension retrenchment in the first period, or could have resulted from changes in other 
circumstances. This is beyond the limit of this thesis and in-depth case studies are required 
to understand this in more detail.  
 
It is noteworthy that the analysis here is limited to understanding what types of measures 
were used in pension reforms. The goals of these reforms, such as poverty reduction and cost 
cutting, could be inferred through the measures, but we do not know the actual effects of the 
reforms from this analysis. Also, we cannot analyse the size of the impact of each measure. 
Therefore, it could be possible that reform measures taken place in a country have different 
weights between them. This means that the data here does not provide information about 
whether each reform was major or minor. Instead, this chapter shows us the emphasis of 
governments and their general welfare orientation regarding pensions by capturing pension 
reform strategies for the last 25 years across OECD countries. Based on this understanding, 
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this thesis attempts to produce a more accurate picture of the trends in pension reforms in 
the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6 : Categorising pension reform strategies: using fuzzy-set 
theory 
 
The previous chapter examined the available data on pension reforms across OECD 
countries between 1990 and 2015. Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles were 
combined and transformed to a comparative single dataset. There are multiple ways of using 
this dataset, but establishing the frequency of pension reforms is an appropriate approach for 
this thesis as it permits us to explore the intensity of reforms. It provides a better capacity to 
grasp patterns of pension reforms, beyond a simple analysis of whether or not a certain type 
of reform took place. In this context, the data on the frequency of reforms is analysed to 
answer the major research questions: what are the general trends in pension reforms adopted 
across the OECD from the 1990s to the mid-2010s? How can we categorise the variety of 
pension reforms? What are the trends in the socialisation of risks in pension reforms in 
particular? As a research method, Fuzzy-Set Ideal Type Analysis (FSITA) is employed. 
FSITA is a relatively new method for policy analysis with various benefits. t allows 
researchers to assess qualitative and quantitative changes of policy preventing outlier effects. 
As a result, FSITA has been widely introduced in comparative studies. There have, however, 
been relatively few attempts to analyse pension reforms with FSITA. Choi (2009) classifies 
pension schemes in the OECD based on the pension replacement rates and de-
commodification index, but most of the existing literatures focused on other programmes: 
unemployment insurance (Kvist, 2007), child well-being (Hudson & Kuhner, 2013), parental 
leave (Ciccia & Verloo, 2012), and childcare services (Ciccia & Bleijenbergh, 2014). Or, 
researches that classify welfare states using FSITA (Finch et al., 2017; Hudson & Kuhner, 
2009; Vis, 2007; Kvist, 1999) limitedly include old-age pension scheme as one of the core 
225 
 
programmes that characterise welfare states. Thus, employing the extensive pension reform 
data and identifying the trends in pension reforms based on FSITA would be significant 
methodological contribution to existing knowledge.          
 
The chapter begins with an explanation of the research method. Two analytical sections 
follow. For a primary analysis, the chapter identifies the general trends in the socialisation 
and individualisation of old-age risks for the last 25 years. It then separates the data into the 
two periods of time to reveal if the trend was consistent or disruptive for a period. As a 
second analysis, the socialisation of old-age risks is highlighted further. The trends in three 
elements of the socialisation in pension reforms are analysed.     
 
6.1 Research method  
Fuzzy-set social science was first introduced by Zadeh (1965), but it has only recently 
became popular in comparative studies. Among others, Ragin (2000) articulated fuzzy-set 
theory and contributed the broadening of its horizons. By applying it to Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA), he suggested a new approach for the conceptualisation and 
measurement of cases using the Boolean method. It has numerous benefits for comparative 
studies with a medium number of cases, such as bridging diversity and in-depth 
understanding. Of course, like any other research method, fuzzy-set QCA has its 
weaknesses; some argue that it is unable to capture the randomness and error in data unlike 
conventional quantitative methods (Lieberson, 2004: 13-14). Also, its operationalisation 
could be subjective as the calibration process reflects the researcher’s own knowledge. 
However, researchers are able to cope with these shortcomings by familiarising themselves 
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with empirical evidence and substantive case knowledge. As Ragin has highlighted several 
times in his work, QCA is a method to formalise case-oriented analysis. It is based on the 
premise that the researcher has built substantive case knowledge before the application of 
the method. Therefore, as long as researchers meet this assumption, they are able to 
recognise problems in their data during the operationalisation, and as such should be able to 
justify their selection on qualitative anchors (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004: 22-23). In this section, 
a general explanation of fuzzy-set theory and the specific process of fuzzy-set ideal type 
analysis (FSITA) is outlined.  
 
Fuzzy-set theory 
One of the most distinctive features of fuzzy-set theory is its use of set-theoretic language. 
As most social phenomena are comprised of diverse and intertwined attributes, set-theory 
has a strong power in comparative study; it specifies objects to compare and reduces 
ambiguity. The concept of ‘fuzzy’ set is best understood in contrast to crisp set. In crisp set 
analysis (‘classic’ or ‘conventional’ set), an object dichotomously belongs to a set: it is either 
‘in’ or ‘out’ of a set (Ragin, 2000: 6). For example, assume a researcher analyses the change 
in pension adequacy in South Korea. The possible outcome could be complex, but the crisp 
set only allows a binary variable with two values, 1 (‘in’) and 0 (‘out’). Thus, when it comes 
to the concept of ‘pension adequacy’, South Korea could be a member of a specific set, 1 
(pension adequacy was reinforced) or 0 (pension adequacy was not reinforced). Contrary to 
this, fuzzy-set theory allows categorical and continuous variables with scores between 0 and 
1. Using the previous example, a fuzzy-set is able to assign a score of 1.0 (‘fully in’, i.e., 
pension adequacy was strongly reinforced), .9 (‘almost fully in’, i.e., pension adequacy was 
reinforced), .5 (neither ‘more in’ nor ‘more out’, i.e., it is difficult to say whether pension 
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adequacy was reinforced or not), .45 (‘barely more out than in’, i.e., pension adequacy was 
almost not reinforced), and 0 (‘fully out’, i.e., pension adequacy was not reinforced). In this 
way, fuzzy-set provides much more room for researchers to express subtle differences on a 
spectrum. This demonstrates why fuzzy-set theory was named ‘fuzzy’; it permits ‘shades of 
grey’ (fuzziness) to analyse whereas the crisp set is constrained to simple dichotomy 
(Hudson & Kühner, 2009: 36; Ragin, 2000: 154). When considering that the real world is 
far from black and white, fuzzy-set is designed to accurately reflect the reality that 
researchers are trying to capture.  
 
Comparative studies using fuzzy-set theory have various advantages. First, fuzzy-set 
analysis functions as a bridge between variable- and case-oriented studies. Variable- and 
case-oriented studies are different in terms of their goals, strategies, number of cases, and of 
course, methods. Whilst variable-oriented research focuses on ‘breadth’, ‘extensive’, ‘large-
N’, and ‘quantitative’, case-oriented studies are more apt for ‘depth’, ‘intensive’, ‘small-N’, 
and ‘qualitative’ (Ragin, 2000: 21). Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses. For 
example, it could be said that variable-oriented work is scientific but less sensitive to reflect 
heterogeneous cases in the analysis (Ragin, 2000: 34). One the other hand, case-oriented 
study might be “rich and emancipatory but soft and subjective” (Ragin, 2000: 22). A fuzzy-
set approach is the middle ground of the dual diversity. It sees cases in a holistic perspective 
in the manner of a case-oriented approach, without forsaking objectivity in diversity such as 
in the variable-oriented approach.  
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Second, the fuzzy-set method is apt for a comparative study that contains a limited set of 
cases. As Ragin (2000: 25) pointed out, numerous comparative studies have been published 
in the field of social science, but most of them are either large-N quantitative studies or 
small-N qualitative studies. When he drew a graph of the frequency distribution of studies 
in comparative sociology and politics, a clear U-shaped pattern appeared; there were many 
studies at the small-N end of the horizontal axis and the large-N end of this axis; the 
frequency in the middle of the axis was, however, very low. This shows the difficulty in 
conducting middle-N comparative studies. In quantitative studies, more than 50 cases are 
usually required to identify generic patterns across the observations. In qualitative studies, 
however, a researcher’s goal is to interpret phenomena in detail, making it difficult to 
examine more than one or two cases. The fuzzy-set approach can overcome problems of 
measurement validity and precision and be a reliable alternative for analysis with 10 to 30 
cases (Kvist, 2007; 199; Ragin, 2000; 23-25). As the number of OECD members is 34, the 
fuzzy-set method is a good option to analyse trends in the OECD.     
 
Third, the fuzzy-set method minimises the gap between theory and data analysis. Because 
fuzzy-set theory requires researchers to establish two or three qualitative breakpoints to 
determine when a case is ‘fully in’ or ‘fully out’, researchers must pay careful attention to 
the data and concepts that they employ (Kvist, 2007: 204-205; Ragin, 2000: 180; Vis, 2007: 
108). Suppose we analyse pension adequacy using levels of benefits. We might say that 60% 
of the replacement rate is the upper cut-off point, which represents ‘fully adequate’ in the 
research. When it comes to the lower cut-off point, we might say that 30% of the replacement 
rate is considered ‘fully inadequate’. This means that countries which provide a level of 
pension benefit above the upper cut-off point are analytically indistinguishable; two 
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countries that have replacement rates of 70% and 80% respectively will be treated equally 
as both fall within the ‘fully adequate’ level. Similarly, two countries at a 15% and 25% 
replacement rate respectively are both categorised within the ‘fully inadequate’ level. In this 
way, fuzzy-set analysis allows researchers space to reflect their case knowledge upon the 
process of operationalisation. 
 
Lastly and the most importantly, fuzzy-set analysis takes a configurational approach in 
recognition of the fact that social phenomena consist of multiple conceptually rooted 
attributes. The fuzzy-set approach focuses on the combinations of these attributes. 
Researchers group cases into a relatively small number of configurations of attributes and 
recognise each of them as different ‘kinds’ of cases. In doing so, it is possible to understand 
types of cases as different configurations of attributes (Ragin, 2000: 66). This is a holistic 
perspective which examines all aspects of cases as packages. Accordingly, a single 
difference between cases may constitute different kinds of cases, beyond simple difference 
in their degree (Kvist, 1999: 234). The configurational approach therefore has an advantage 
which variable- and case-oriented research does not. For example, variable-oriented studies 
treat cases as independent, analytically separable aspects. Since cases are not understood 
within their context, it masks the real extent of diversity such as in the case of an additive 
index (Hudson & Kühner, 2009: 37-38; 2013: 303-304). Case-oriented researchers, on the 
contrary, could lose sight of the larger context, because their focus is limited to very specific 
cases that have special significance. Fuzzy-sets are able to compensate for these 
shortcomings; they show ‘variation’ without losing the core emphasis on type and kinds of 
cases (Ragin, 2000: 5-6, 87). This characteristic of fuzzy-set analysis is especially valuable 
in analysing post-industrial welfare reforms. Governments often introduced policies as 
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‘reform packages’ these days, and it has become a pattern of welfare reform in many 
countries. Thus we need to look at the combined reforms to accurately capture the dynamics 
of post-industrial welfare reform (Häusermann, 2012: 116). In this sense, the configurational 
approach of fuzzy-set analysis allows us to understand the complex combined features of 
reforms.    
 
There are two ways of applying fuzzy-set theory to comparative social policy. One is Fuzzy-
set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Fs/QCA) which reveals multiple conjunctural causal 
configurations of cases and investigates their relations (Lee et al., 2013b: 1911). This method 
was developed based on QCA, mainly by Ragin (1989; 1994; 2000). The second approach 
is Fuzzy-Set Ideal Type Analysis (FSITA). This uses the basic idea of assigning membership 
scores reflecting differences in both kind and degree at the same time. It makes it possible 
for researchers to construct ideal type of cases and measure the conformity of cases to a 
particular ideal type (Kvist, 1999: 234). The latter method is applied in this thesis to create 
a new typology for pension reforms. The following section addresses the four basic steps of 
analysis.   
 
Fuzzy-Set Ideal Type Analysis  
Kvist (1999: 2007) explains the process of FSITA through four steps: empirical indicators, 
calibration of sets, scoring cases and identifying the memberships of ideal types. 
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Empirical indicators  
The first step requires setting empirical indicators and constructing property space. 
Researchers identify attributes of an ideal type and relations within them. These can be 
described as sets. When empirical indicators which reflect these attributes are chosen, 
theoretical and substantive knowledge should support them (Kvist, 1999: 234; Ragin, 2000: 
169). This is the most important step in FSITA, even without any element of fuzzy-set theory, 
because the property space for the fuzzy-set is determined by indicators that the researcher 
chooses at this stage. Suppose we are concerned with ‘benefit adequacy in pensions’. We 
might have various options for indicators which reflect the concept, such as ‘pension 
replacement rates’, ‘benefit formula’, ‘indexation mechanism’, or a combination of the three. 
The property space and further analysis significantly vary depending on the indicators. 
Accordingly, researchers should pay close attention to empirical indicators to minimise the 
gap between theory and reality.  
 
Calibration of sets  
The second step sets the standard for the transformation of empirical data. It should be done 
in a way that reflects the theoretical concepts. Kvist (2007: 206-208) suggests two steps 
within it. First, establish qualitative breakpoints for ‘fully in’ and ‘fully out’. Then, fine-tune 
the set by describing how it looks within the range of the two breakpoints. Similar to the 
previous step, all calibrations should be based on an explicit rationale. As an example, Vis 
(2007: 110-112), who analysed welfare state changes from welfare towards workfare, 
calibrated three empirical indicators: generosity, protection, and activation. She employed 
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logics, existing research, and the range of the index of the empirical indicator in selecting 
qualitative breakpoints.  
 
Scoring cases  
The third step computes the membership of each case in the ideal-typical model (Kvist, 1999: 
234). Formal set theory axioms are applied to identify configurations of sets. The most 
frequently applied three principles to calculate membership scores are minimum principle, 
maximum principle, and principle of negation (Ragin, 2000: 171-180). When two or more 
sets are brought together to form compound sets, the minimum principle is applied. It is also 
called logical and. This means taking the minimum membership score of each case in the 
sets that are intersected. In the case of a union of sets, the maximum principle, also called 
logical or, is applied taking the maximum value of the case’s membership. Lastly, the 
principle of negation is described as ~A (not A). This means subtracting its membership in 
set A from 1. With these principles of sets, researchers are able to calculate the case’s 
membership of ideal types. Suppose there is a case scoring 0.2 on dimension A and 0.6 on 
dimension B. The case would have 0.2 membership of the ideal type if the minimum 
principle (A and B) is applied. In the same case, it would have 0.6 membership if the 
maximum principle (A or B) is applied instead. On the other hand, the case scoring 0.2 on 
dimension A would score 0.8 if the principle of negation (~A) is applied. 
 
Identifying the memberships of ideal types 
The final step identifies the memberships of ideal types and evaluates the homogeneity of 
cases within each ideal type. Researchers reveal explicit configurational attributes of ideal 
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types. At this stage, researchers employ their substantive case knowledge to check the 
conformity of each case to the ideal-typical instance (Kvist, 1999: 234). In doing so, 
researchers might find a further need to clarify their concepts, to refine the calibrating, or to 
deepen case knowledge. It is therefore completely acceptable to go back to the earlier steps 
to solve such problems. This ‘back-and-forth’ manner is encouraged during FSITA, as it 
allows researchers intensive dialogue between the idea and the evidence (Ragin, 2000: 317). 
It thus minimises the gap between theory and analysis. This ‘back-and-forth’ manner is 
illustrated in the following section. In particular, it shows how to reflect case knowledge on 
the calibration when heterogeneity of some of the cases is observed.    
 
6.2 Analysis on the socialisation and individualisation of risks 
Empirical indicators   
This thesis has argued that there are two ways of dealing with social risks: through 
socialisation or individualisation. As addressed in Chapter Two, the socialisation of risks 
refers to institutionalised government intervention which socialises individuals’ risks. It is 
state activity that absorbs these social risks from individuals. It therefore eventually results 
in de-commodification and de-familisation, as the risks would have been internalised in the 
family or allocated to the market without any state action. Meanwhile, the individualisation 
of risks refers to the shift towards an individualisation of responsibility in handling social 
risks. It is the transference of the responsibility for protection on individuals. It allows more 
choice to individuals for their own future development by imposing more responsibility on 
them for the outcome. This thesis applies these two distinctive dimensions to pension 
reforms using fuzzy-set ideal type analysis.      
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Two fuzzy-sets are identified with these two dimensions. This generates a total of four ideal 
types in our property space (Table 6.1). First, countries that score highly for both 
socialisation and individualisation are the socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type. 
These countries have intensively reformed their pension schemes to provide further state 
protection that aims at externalising old-age risks from individuals to the state. At the same 
time, however, they have also partly transferred responsibility for protection from the states 
onto individual pensioners in order to reduce budgetary stress. Secondly, countries that score 
highly on socialisation but low on individualisation belong to the socialisation reform ideal 
type. These countries have placed a high importance on government interventions to absorb 
old-age risks within their pension reforms, but less on self-responsibility. Thirdly, countries 
which score highly on individualisation but low on socialisation belong to the 
individualisation reform ideal type. Pension reforms have taken place to facilitate self-
responsibility for old-age risks, but social protection for old-age has been treated with less 
importance within reforms in these countries. Finally, stable ideal types score low on both 
socialisation and individualisation, meaning the capacity of countries to make pension 
reforms was low in terms of strengthening state protection and self-responsibility for old-
age risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
235 
 
Table 6.1: Socialisation-individualisation reform fuzzy-set ideal types  
 Socialisation (S) Individualisation (I) Model 
Socialisation-
individualisation reform  
IN IN S*I 
Socialisation reform IN OUT S*~I 
Individualisation reform OUT IN ~S*I 
Stable  OUT OUT ~S*~I 
Source: Author. 
 
The next step entails finding empirical indicators that represent the socialisation and 
individualisation of risks in pension reforms. In the previous chapter, this thesis examined 
the vast amounts of data on pension reforms across OECD countries. In doing so, seven 
categories of subtypes of reforms were identified: coverage, adequacy, financial and fiscal 
sustainability, economic efficiency, administrative efficiency, diversification and security of 
investment (Table 5.7)18. It might be appropriated to explore whether they fit to the empirical 
indicators here.  
 
Let’s begin with the socialisation of risks. In old-age, disrupted income due to retirement is 
one of the most serious social risks. The state thus intervenes in retirement income to reduce 
these risks by reinforcing pension systems. As examined in the previous chapter, 
socialisation appears in pension reform in various respects. First, pension systems need to 
cover as many people as possible in order to protect them from old-age poverty. Expanding 
coverage is therefore one of the primary tasks for public mandatory pensions. This is 
especially true for earnings-related pension schemes. As these schemes require long-term 
                                                          
18 See Table 5.10 for subcategories of Table 5.7. 
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contributions in order to gain entitlement, those with irregular jobs or the unemployed tend 
to be excluded by the scheme. Universal pension schemes, however, are relatively free from 
this issue. In addition, many countries have introduced voluntary schemes on top of the 
existing mandatory scheme as fiscal pressure has continued to rise. As a result, the expansion 
of coverage is no longer limited to public pensions, but includes mandatory private pensions 
or voluntary pension schemes19. In this context, this thesis would select coverage from the 
reform categories as an indicator for the socialisation of risks. Secondly, an adequate benefit 
level is directly related to the socialisation of risks. If the pension benefit is set at a marginal 
level, it is hard to say that the pension system effectively socialises old-age risks, even if it 
has a wide range of coverage. There are various ways to improve benefit levels. Increasing 
general benefit levels would benefit all pensioners, but a targeting strategy has been more 
frequently observed since the 1990s. This is because certain groups of people are revealed 
to be more vulnerable to old-age risks. For example, the average poverty rate in older people 
in the OECD is much higher among women (12.5%) than men (8.6%)20 (OECD, 2015: 171). 
Under the mood of austerity, many countries have chosen to spend their limited resources 
on providing extra-favourable treatment to the most vulnerable. Considering this, this thesis 
would include adequacy among the seven categories as an indicator for the socialisation of 
risks. Adequacy is the category for reforms aimed at increasing retirement income adequacy 
by favourable treatment for targeted groups, tax reduction, and increasing benefit levels. 
Finally, introducing security measures against investment risks in pension funds is a new 
type of protection. This type of socialisation of old-age risks was less common before the 
                                                          
19 The introduction or expansion of voluntary pensions is classified into coverage if it aims at increasing the coverage of 
a pension system. It is classified into financial and fiscal sustainability if the voluntary pension is introduced or expanded 
in order to replace existing public pension scheme. See Table 5.10 for more information.   
20 It is percentage with incomes less than 50% of median household disposable income, based on 2012 or latest available 
data.  
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1990s. It has emerged since then as a counteraction against increasing investor choice in 
pension systems. Since the 1990s, various countries have promoted mandatory and voluntary 
private pensions to reduce the financial burden on public pensions. The spread of private 
provision in old age was also accompanied with a shift from DB to DC pensions for workers 
in the private sector. The benefit level of DC pensions depends on an individual’s 
contributions and investment returns, resulting in an increase in risk for individuals due to 
investment failures and the lack of a contribution record. In this regard, government actions 
for risk management and governance are now required (OECD, 2015: 31). On the one hand, 
improving a pension fund’s solvency rates is necessary, on the other various measures such 
as education and risk management plans are needed. Considering this, security of investment 
would belong to the socialisation of risks as it is a state activity that absorbs old-age risks 
from individuals. It is a new type of protection against a new type of old-age risk which is 
distinct from coverage and adequacy, the protections against traditional risks.   
 
The individualisation of risks, the second dimension, can also be explained in a similar 
context. It is the process that transfers the state’s responsibility to individuals in the pension 
arena. It allows individuals to have more freedom to plan their retirement income, but at the 
same time it exposes them to old-age risks as they have to rely on their own assets and 
income rather than public transfers. The reform category of financial and fiscal sustainability 
fits this dimension, as it refers to reforms that cut life-time pension benefits. It aims at 
improving long-term financial sustainability by tightening conditions for benefits, 
minimising the government’s financial obligations, and introducing mandatory defined 
contribution (DC) scheme or notional defined contribution (NDC) replacing the existing 
defined benefits (DB) scheme. As seen in Chapter Two, this has been a continuous trend 
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since the 1970s in many developed countries due to gloomy long-term fiscal projections. It 
is worth noting, however, that the extent to which the benefit level has been reduced varies 
depending on the fiscal stress and ideological differences in each country. Secondly, 
increasing pension age and discouraging early retirement is one of the clear trends in the 
individualisation of risks since the 1990s. This aims at increasing individuals’ working 
periods. It encourages people to maintain their lives through work as long as possible, so 
that the state can reduce its old-age protection for the period. The category for economic 
efficiency refers to reforms that minimise the distortions of the retirement income system in 
order to facilitate a longer working period. This thesis therefore would select it as an 
indicator for the individualisation of risks. This category consists of various measures to 
increase the working period, including abolishing the age limit to contribute, and financial 
incentives to save. Lastly, diversified investment options in pension plans could be 
considered as a new type of individualisation of risks in pension systems. This is a measure 
that aims to increase individuals’ control over their pension fund and to provide opportunities 
to make better returns for their future benefit. At the same time, it might result in detrimental 
investment failures due to individuals’ myopic behaviours and insufficient financial literacy 
(OECD, 2015: 31). It thus implies a shift towards an individualisation of responsibility in 
handling old-age risks. This thesis would consequently include the category for 
diversification to the indicator of the individualisation of risks. It refers to diversifying 
investment options to maximise individuals’ choice for their retirement. These reforms have 
relaxed restrictions on investment and promoted private voluntary pension plans.   
 
In summary, this thesis uses these six categories as key components of the two dimensions: 
coverage, adequacy, and security of investment for the socialisation of risks, and financial 
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and fiscal sustainability, economic efficiency, and diversification for the individualisation of 
risks. This thesis has dropped, however, the other category outlined in Table 5.7 – 
administrative efficiency – from further analysis. Administrative efficiency is similar to 
financial and fiscal sustainability and economic efficiency in terms of reducing the financial 
burden of the state, but it is less related to individualisation; it refers to measures taken to 
minimise the cost of the programme through enhancing the efficiency of the government, 
not transferring the burden to individuals.  
 
Before we turn to operationalising these categories, it is necessary to acknowledge that some 
of the countries in the new dataset do not have enough information to analyse here. The 
original source for the data was principally the OECD dataset, which provides limited data 
for countries that have only recently joined the organisation. It means the data in this thesis 
only has information on reforms after 2010 for four countries (Chile, Estonia, Israel, and 
Slovenia) and after 2000 for the Slovak Republic. This thesis has consequently decided to 
exclude these five countries due to this paucity of data. Four countries (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Korea), which joined the OECD between 1995 and 
1996 are included however, as the lost data is relatively small. Additionally, this thesis has 
decided to remove Mexico, Turkey, and Iceland in order to reduce heterogeneity in the data. 
The GDP per capita is particularly low in Mexico and Turkey, and the current pension system 
has only been recently developed in Iceland. As a result, the total number of OECD countries 
subject to the analysis is 26.  
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Calibration of sets  
After defining the fuzzy-sets, it is necessary to determine whether the sets are continuous or 
with a limited number of values. This should be on the basis of the definition of the set in 
question, and the type of available data (Ragin, 2000: 158). This thesis uses continuous 
values as it enables more accurate analysis on the reform changes between 1990 and 2015 
(Vis, 2007: 110). Moreover, as the data in this thesis was measured by the frequencies of 
reforms, it is possible to peg fuzzy membership scores to the existing ratio-scale measure 
(Ragin, 2000: 167). 
 
The next step is setting the qualitative breakpoints. The researcher might select three anchors 
– upper cut-off point, cross-over point, and lower cut-off point – to calibrate the raw data to 
a fuzzy-set score. In continuous fuzzy-sets, however, the cross-over point is less important 
as the researcher is able to designate the point of maximum ambiguity (fuzzy-set score = .5) 
by selecting the upper cut-off point (fuzzy-set score = 1) and lower cut-off point (fuzzy-set 
score = 0). This is one of the advantages of continuous sets, as Vis (2007: 111) highlighted, 
because there is a significant difference between the assessment of whether a case is ‘fully 
in (1)’ or ‘fully out (0)’ and the assessment of whether it is ‘neither in nor out (.5)’. The 
different nature of these two assessments might be an additional challenge to a researcher in 
selecting and justifying qualitative breakpoints. It is particularly a problem when the data 
are interval- and ratio-scale measures that reveal only the relative positions of cases in a 
distribution (Ragin, 2000: 317). In this case, explicit evidence for three breakpoints may be 
harder to source due to the nature of the data. With continuous fuzzy-sets, however, the 
researcher is able to reduce these burdens, keeping the basic rationale.   
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Selecting and justifying qualitative anchors are a difficult, but very important, step. As 
addressed above, it minimises the gap between theory and data. It also prevents the 
possibility that an exceptionally high or low score skews the overall data upwards or 
downwards. The majority of the literature (Kvist, 1999; 2007; Ragin, 2000; Rihoux & Ragin, 
2008; Vis, 2007) has emphasised the researcher’s empirical and substantive knowledge 
when setting the cut-off points, in order to avoid arbitrary decisions. However, researchers 
might encounter practical challenges here. There are many cases where relevant objective 
knowledge has not yet been built, or where the concept is inadequate to apply empirical 
logics to set cut-off points. Ragin himself addressed this issue regarding conventional 
interval- and ratio-scale measures: “They rarely indicate how much is ‘a lot’ or how much 
is ‘a little’ ” (Ragin, 2000: 317). This is the case with this study. How can we identify how 
many reforms in a country should be considered to be ‘fully in’ the socialisation set? How 
many times is adequate to be a standard, and on what grounds? In such cases, some 
arithmetic compromises are likely to be necessary without affecting the qualitative nature of 
fuzzy-set analysis. Echoing the existing literature (Hudson & Kühner, 2009; 2013; Lee, 
2013; Lee, et al., 2013a), this thesis applies the mean ± one standard deviation as the upper 
and lower cut-off points. This method was also illustrated by Ragin in calibrating the data 
with little objective knowledge. He used the mean ± 1.5 standard deviation as “a more 
mechanistic approach” (Ragin, 2000: 317-318). In calibrating raw data into fuzzy-set scores, 
using the mean ± one standard deviation and the mean ± 1.5 standard deviation results in an 
identical outcome for ideal type membership. This thesis follows the more commonly used 
approach in the literature, the mean ± one standard deviation.  
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Figure 6.1 below shows the frequencies of reforms for the socialisation of risks. This study 
calculated the frequencies of the dimension by taking the sum of frequencies of coverage, 
adequacy, and security of investment. As seen in the orange bars of Figure 6.1, the 
distribution of the frequencies is concentrated around 10, and relatively equally distributed 
between 3 and 15. Three outstanding values were 21, 24 and 40. The mean of the 
socialisation of risks is 10.62, with a standard deviation of 5.53. The mean ± one standard 
deviation is therefore 16.14 and 5.09. 
 
In the first attempt, this thesis operationalised the data using the mean ± one standard 
deviation above as the upper and lower cut-off points. It then revealed the heterogeneous 
cases in memberships: Austria and Germany. Their frequency of socialisation reform is 11 
and they are barely ‘IN’ the fuzzy-set of the socialisation of risks, scoring 0.56. This means 
that they belong in the same group as Korea, Japan, Canada, Greece, Australia, Ireland, 
France and the UK. Based on the case knowledge and evidence presented in the previous 
two chapters, this thesis noticed that Austria and Germany are qualitatively different from 
the rest of the group. It is especially so when we examine them with other countries with 
similar frequencies in the group, South Korea and Japan. Whilst the socialisation reforms in 
Korea and Japan aimed at fundamental changes bringing about the general improvement of 
pension system, those in Austria and Germany were rather peripheral; the socialisation 
reforms in Austria and Germany tend to have limited scope for the general impact as they 
mainly focused on targeted groups or small reforms.      
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For example, the frequency of socialisation reforms in South Korea is 12, which is very close 
to the 11 seen in Austria and Germany, but the level of socialisation was significantly 
different. South Korea introduced their first public pension in 1988 and the utmost goal since 
then was the expansion of its coverage. As its coverage was initially limited to workplaces 
with 10 or more employees in urban area, reforms continued to extend its mandatory 
coverage to the whole working-age population since 1995. The immature pension system 
has caused the old-age poverty issue; the poverty rates among older people was the highest 
level (41.4% in 2006) in the OECD. However, Korea was yet demographically the fourth 
youngest country in the OECD (OECD, 2015: 159) and socialisation reforms extensively 
took place in South Korea throughout the 1990s and 2000s. During this period, three-tier 
pension system was established with the introduction of tax-based basic pension and quasi-
mandatory occupational pension. With the rapid increase in the old-age dependency ratio, 
Korea also introduced several retrenchment measures since the late 2000s but the dominant 
trend in pension reforms was the general expansion in pension system. Japan can be 
explained in a similar context. Again, the frequency of the socialisation reforms in Japan is 
13, which is not substantially higher than Austria and Germany but the traits of their 
socialisation reforms are significantly different. For Japan, pension sustainability was 
concerned due to the demographic change in an earlier stage. As a result, individualisation 
reforms continued since the mid-1980s. However, at the same time, Japan had a growing 
concern over the limited coverage of pension system. The actual coverage of the first-tier 
basic pension was nearly 60% of the mandatory population (MHLW, 2015) due to the strict 
qualifying conditions and deep mistrust of public pension scheme. The second-tier 
mandatory occupational pension also had a coverage issue. It did not fit the changing 
employment patterns in the labour market generating massive risk groups. As such, the 
socialisation reforms in Japan continuously aimed at easing qualifying conditions for 
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participating pension schemes since the 2000s. Students, atypical workers, carers, and low-
income earners are actively covered by socialisation reforms. In Japan, targeting strategy 
was often employed in improving benefit adequacy while the coverage was extended in a 
general form.              
 
Meanwhile, the traits of socialisation reforms in Germany and Austria were significantly 
different with them. Especially the situation in Germany in the 1990s and 2000s was exactly 
opposite to the one in South Korea. Pension system in Germany was fully matured and 
expanded before the 1990s. Public pension promised generous replacement rates and 
encouraged to take up the early retirement scheme to promote employment (Boersh-Supan 
& Wilke, 2003: 18-21). Due to the well-developed old-age protection system, the poverty 
level among older population remained lower (10.0% in 2000) than the average OECD level. 
Thus, the major concern in Germany in the 1990s and the 2000s was not socialisation 
reforms, but individualisation reforms. Pension sustainability received much more attention 
due to the top level of dependency ratio (26.2% in 2000 and 35.3% in 2015) across the OECD 
(OECD, 2015: 159). The economic downturn and increasing unemployment rates in the 
2000s also exacerbated the situation. In these circumstances, the socialisation reforms in 
Germany are characterised by the targeting strategy for the risk groups and the slight 
increases in benefit levels. The latter especially explains half of the socialisation reforms; 
pensions were adjusted in line with the rate of inflation rather than with the net wage 
development since 2000 and the rates of increase were counted as the socialisation reforms 
for several times.   
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Austria is also a similar case. Austria was demographically the oldest OECD country in 1975 
and has remained as one of the oldest countries even in 2015. The old-age dependency ratio 
was 27.3% in 1976 and reached 30.3% in 2015 (OECD, 2015: 159). Like the German case, 
the pension system in Austria was implemented at an early stage and covered, in principle, 
all people in gainful employment (EC & SPC, 2015: 253). In this circumstance, the most 
important pension reforms for the last 25 years were a series of individualisation reforms in 
2001-2004 and 2010-2013. They were large-scale reforms that included the changes in 
pension formula and benefit calculation base, resulting in the decreases in the accrual rate. 
Socialisation reforms, on the other hand, took place through the early 2000s, but they 
“intended to soften the possible negative consequences of the (retrenchment) pension 
reforms” (EC & SPC, 2015: 255). As a result, they were mainly limited to targeting the risks 
groups, especially women.  
 
In this way, the traits of socialisation reforms in these countries are qualitatively different 
despite the frequency of socialisation reforms are not so different (11 in Austria and 
Germany, 12 in South Korea, and 13 in Japan). When considering the differences in these 
cases, it seems that Austria and Germany belong more to ‘OUT’ than ‘IN’ in the socialisation 
of risks set. The ‘OUT’ set consists of 15 countries including Switzerland, Luxembourg, 
Finland, New Zealand, and the USA. Besides, there is only a slight difference between the 
fuzzy scores of Austria and Germany (0.53) and the cross-over point (0.5), whilst other 
members of ‘IN’ scored much higher than (0.63, 0.81 or 1). This implies that these two 
countries are already located on the boundary of ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ when we employed the 
mean ± one as cut-off points on the first try. Taking these considerations into account, it 
might be reasonable to slightly adjust the cut-off points to assign Austria and Germany to 
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‘OUT’ in the set. Thus, this thesis uses 5.97 as the lower cut-off point instead of 5.09, the 
original lower cut-off point21. This gives Austria and Germany a score of 0.49 rather than 
0.53 in the set. As noted previously, such a ‘back-and-forth manner’ in the course of 
assigning fuzzy membership scores is not only common but also a strength of fuzzy-set 
analysis. It enables rich interplay between an idea and the evidence. Ragin emphasised that 
the operationalisation of FSITA is “not linear or step-by-step anyway” (2000: 166), and 
researchers need to work in a back-and-forth manner (2000: 317). In Figure 6.1 below, the 
two blue lines indicate the cut-off points. The modified lower cut-off point is set at 5.97 and 
the upper cut-off point is not changed from the original figure, 16.14. 
 
Figure 6.1: Frequencies of the socialisation of risks and the two cut-off points 
 
Source: Author. 
 
                                                          
21 See Appendix 2 for the results of FSITA with the original lower cut-off point, 5.09.  
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Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of frequencies of the individualisation of risks. The 
frequencies were calculated in the same way as those of the socialisation of risks above. The 
mean is 14.92, and standard deviation is 4.33. The value is concentrated around 15; 21, 26, 
and 28 are outstanding values. The mean ± one standard deviation is 19.25 and 10.59. They 
are the upper and lower cut-off points indicated by the red lines in Figure 6.2 below.  
 
 
Figure 6.22: Frequencies of the individualisation of risks and the two cut-off points 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
There are various approaches to calibration (Ragin, 2008: 86-96). This thesis follows Vis 
(2007: 111) and Ragin (2000: 319) to assign the remaining scores within the cut-off points, 
which is the most straightforward method to compute a continuous scale of values (Hudson 
& Kühner, 2009: 17). It consists of three steps. First, recode all raw data below the lower 
cut-off point to the lower cut-off point. Recode all raw data above the upper cut-off point to 
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the upper cut-off point. Second, take the transformed raw data and subtract the lower cut-off 
point from each score. Lastly, divide the result by the [upper cut-off point – lower cut-off 
point]. The formula is as follows (Vis, 2007: 111): 
fuzzy-set score = [transformed raw data – lower cut-off point] / [upper cut-off point 
– lower cut-off point]  
 
The outcome is shown in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.3 below.  
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Table 6.1: Frequency and fuzzy-set score of the socialisation-individualisation of risks, 
total period  
1990 - 2015 
  Frequency Fuzzy-set score 
  Socialisation Individualisation Socialisation Individualisation 
Australia 16 18 1.00 0.86 
Austria 11 10 0.49 0.00 
Belgium 3 15 0.00 0.51 
Canada 14 17 0.79 0.74 
Czech Republic 5 15 0.00 0.51 
Denmark 3 6 0.00 0.00 
Finland 9 26 0.30 1.00 
France 24 28 1.00 1.00 
Germany 11 16 0.49 0.62 
Greece 15 25 0.89 1.00 
Hungary 7 15 0.10 0.51 
Ireland 21 14 1.00 0.39 
Italy 4 21 0.00 1.00 
Japan 14 15 0.79 0.51 
Korea 12 8 0.59 0.00 
Luxembourg 9 6 0.30 0.00 
Netherlands 3 10 0.00 0.00 
New Zealand 9 7 0.30 0.00 
Norway 2 10 0.00 0.00 
Poland 7 16 0.10 0.62 
Portugal 6 21 0.00 1.00 
Spain 7 16 0.10 0.62 
Sweden 5 15 0.00 0.51 
Switzerland 10 16 0.40 0.62 
United Kingdom 40 15 1.00 0.51 
United States 9 7 0.30 0.00 
 
Source: Author.  
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Figure 6.3: Scatterplot for the fuzzy-set score of the socialisation-individualisation of 
risks, total period 
 
Source: Author.  
 
This study also analysed the same data separately over two periods of time. The first period 
is 1990 to 2003 and the second period is 2004 to 2015. This periodisation reflects the shape 
of the original data sources. As addressed in Chapter Five, the data for pension reforms was 
collected from Pensions at a Glance and the ISSA Country Profiles. Because the first 
Pensions at a Glance book (2007) covers pension reforms from 1990 to 2003 as a big 
‘chunk’, it is impossible to break it down further. The later books (2009, 2013, and 2015) 
cover a shorter period for each issue, but dividing the 25 years into two, almost in equal 
halves, is enough to provide good insights into the changes of the time. In doing so, we are 
able to know if the trend of reforms was consistent or disruptive for the last 25 years.  
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The same approach to selecting cut-off points and assigning the scores is undertaken. The 
upper and lower cut-off points for the socialisation of risks are 5.96 and 0.8 respectively in 
the first period, and those for the individualisation of risks are 7.38 and 2.54 respectively. 
For the second period, the upper and lower cut-off points for the socialisation of risks are 
11.34 and 3.12 respectively. When it comes to the individualisation of risks, the mean ± one 
standard deviation were originally 14.15 and 5.77. These were initially the cut-off points; 
however, once the calibration process had been completed with these figures, it was revealed 
that Canada scored 0.5 in the individualisation set. This means Canada (frequency = 10) is 
neither IN nor OUT of the fuzzy-set. In order to maximise the scope of the analysis, the 0.5 
value should be avoided in practice (Schneider & Eggert, 2014: 318). This thesis thus 
slightly moved the lower cut-off point from 5.77 to 5.5. This did not affect any other 
countries’ membership. As a result, the upper cut-off point for the individualisation of risks 
is 14.15 and the modified lower cut-off point is 5.5. The fuzzy-set scores are seen in Table 
6.3 and Figure 6.4 below. 
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Table 6.2: Frequency and fuzzy-set score of the socialisation-individualisation of risks, 
1990–2003 and 2004–2015. 
 1990-2003 2004-2015 
 Frequency Fuzzy-set score Frequency Fuzzy-set score 
  
Socialisa-
tion 
Individua-
lisation 
Socialisa-
tion 
Individua-
lisation 
Socialisa-
tion 
Individua-
lisation 
Socialisa- 
tion 
Individua-
lisation 
Australia 3 5 0.43 0.51 13 13 1.00 0.87 
Austria 6 8 1.00 1.00 5 2 0.23 0.00 
Belgium 2 6 0.23 0.71 1 9 0.00 0.40 
Canada 2 7 0.23 0.92 12 10 1.00 0.52 
Czech 
Republic 
4 4 0.62 0.30 1 11 0.00 0.64 
Denmark 3 1 0.43 0.00 0 5 0.00 0.00 
Finland 1 11 0.04 1.00 8 15 0.59 1.00 
France 11 8 1.00 1.00 13 20 1.00 1.00 
Germany 3 9 0.43 1.00 8 7 0.59 0.17 
Greece 4 3 0.62 0.10 11 22 0.96 1.00 
Hungary 3 7 0.43 0.92 4 8 0.11 0.29 
Ireland 9 1 1.00 0.00 12 13 1.00 0.87 
Italy 0 6 0.00 0.71 4 15 0.11 1.00 
Japan 1 10 0.04 1.00 13 5 1.00 0.00 
Korea 4 3 0.62 0.10 8 5 0.59 0.00 
Luxembourg 7 2 1.00 0.00 2 4 0.00 0.00 
Netherlands 0 4 0.00 0.30 3 6 0.00 0.06 
New Zealand 0 2 0.00 0.00 9 5 0.72 0.00 
Norway 0 2 0.00 0.00 2 8 0.00 0.29 
Poland 0 5 0.00 0.51 7 11 0.47 0.64 
Portugal 1 7 0.04 0.92 5 14 0.23 0.98 
Spain 2 3 0.23 0.10 5 13 0.23 0.87 
Sweden 0 7 0.00 0.92 5 8 0.23 0.29 
Switzerland 5 2 0.81 0.00 5 14 0.23 0.98 
United 
Kingdom 
14 2 1.00 0.00 26 13 1.00 0.87 
United States 3 4 0.43 0.30 6 3 0.35 0.00 
 
Source: Author.  
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Figure 6.4: Scatterplot for the fuzzy-set score of socialisation-individualisation of risks, 
1990–2003 and 2004–2015. 
 
 
Source: Author.  
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Scoring cases 
The next step for fuzzy-set ideal type analysis is computing the cases’ membership of each 
set. As explained above, there are several principles of fuzzy logic and two of them are 
employed here: the minimum principle (logical AND) and the principle of negation (logical 
NOT). The minimum principle is indicated by the symbol ‘*’ implying the use of the lowest 
scores for each of the sets combined. Meanwhile, the principle of negation is written as ‘~’, 
meaning one minus the score in a given set (1-n). Table 6.4 and 6.5 below shows the outcome 
of the calculation with these two principles. Whilst the fuzzy-scores of the socialisation and 
individualisation sets were presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 earlier, here we capture all the 
possible combinations of both sets. The highlighted score in each country in Tables 6.4 and 
6.5 designates membership of a particular ideal type. The fuzzy membership scores are 
interpreted as follows:  
 
fuzzy-set score 1   = ‘fully in’  
fuzzy-set score . 5 < χi <  1  = more ‘in’ than ‘out’  
fuzzy-set score .5   = neither ‘in’ nor ‘out’ (crossover point)  
fuzzy-set score 0 < χi < 0.5  = more ‘out’ than ‘in’   
fuzzy-set score 0   = ‘fully out’  
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Table 6.3: Fuzzy membership scores of the socialisation-individualisation of risks, total 
period 
 
Socialisation-
individualisation 
reform 
Socialisation 
reform 
Individualisation 
reform 
Stable 
(S*I) (S*~I) (~S*I) (~S*~I) 
Australia 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Austria 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.51 
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.49 
Canada 0.74 0.26 0.21 0.21 
Czech 
Republic 
0.00 0.00 0.51 0.49 
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Finland 0.30 0.00 0.70 0.00 
France 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Germany 0.49 0.38 0.51 0.38 
Greece 0.89 0.00 0.11 0.00 
Hungary 0.10 0.10 0.51 0.49 
Ireland 0.39 0.61 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Japan 0.51 0.49 0.21 0.21 
Korea 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.41 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.70 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
New Zealand 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.70 
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Poland 0.10 0.10 0.62 0.38 
Portugal 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Spain 0.10 0.10 0.62 0.38 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.49 
Switzerland 0.40 0.38 0.60 0.38 
United 
Kingdom 
0.51 0.49 0.00 0.00 
United States 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.70 
 
Source: Author.  
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Table 6.4: Fuzzy-set scores of the socialisation-individualisation of risks, 1990–2003 and 
2004–2015 
 
 
1990-2003 2004-2015 
Socialisati
on-Indivi-
dalisation 
Sociali-
sation 
Individua-
lisation 
Stable 
Socialisati
on-Indivi-
dalisation 
Sociali-
sation 
Individua-
lisation 
Stable 
(S*I) (S*~I) (~S*I) (~S*~I) (S*I) (S*~I) (~S*I) (~S*~I) 
Australia 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.49 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Austria 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.77 
Belgium 0.23 0.23 0.71 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 
Canada 0.23 0.08 0.77 0.08 0.52 0.48 0.00 0.00 
Czech 
Republic 
0.30 0.62 0.30 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.36 
Denmark 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Finland 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.41 0.00 
France 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Germany 0.43 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.17 0.59 0.17 0.41 
Greece 0.10 0.62 0.10 0.38 0.96 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Hungary 0.43 0.08 0.57 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.29 0.71 
Ireland 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.89 0.00 
Japan 0.04 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Korea 0.10 0.62 0.10 0.38 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.41 
Luxembourg 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.94 
New Zealand 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.28 
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.71 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.36 0.53 0.36 
Portugal 0.04 0.04 0.92 0.08 0.23 0.02 0.77 0.02 
Spain 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.77 0.23 0.13 0.77 0.13 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.71 
Switzerland 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.19 0.23 0.02 0.77 0.02 
United 
Kingdom 
0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.13 0.00 0.00 
United States  0.30 0.43 0.30 0.57 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.65 
 
Source: Author.  
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Identifying the memberships of ideal types 
Figure 6.5 below is the outcome of the fuzzy-set ideal type analysis. It is the visualised 
outcome of Table 6.4 above. There are four ideal types with different country memberships. 
First, the socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type has six member countries: 
Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Japan and the UK. While belong to the same ideal type, 
there are some differences among them. Whilst France is fully-in, Japan and the UK barely 
passed the cross-over point. Australia, Canada and Greece are in the middle, scoring between 
0.74 and 0.89. Secondly, the socialisation reform ideal type has only two membership 
countries: Korea and Ireland. This is a relatively homogeneous group. Both countries are 
close to the cross-over point. Thirdly, the individualisation reform ideal type has 11 
membership countries, making it the biggest group: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. This group is 
roughly divided into three parts by membership degree. Whilst Italy and Portugal are fully 
in, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden barely passed the 
cross-over point. Finland, Poland, Spain and Switzerland are located in the middle, with 
scores ranging from 0.62 to 0.7. Finally, the stable ideal type has seven member countries: 
Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway and the USA. Denmark, 
Netherland and Norway are fully in, whilst the others are distributed between 0.51 and 0.7.  
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Figure 6.5: Country memberships of the socialisation-individualisation fuzzy-set ideal 
types, total period 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Figure 6.6 below shows changes in fuzzy-set ideal type country membership during the same 
period. It is also visualised based on Table 6.5. There are clear shifts in most of the countries 
from the first period (1990–2003) to the second period (2004–2015). First, only nine out of 
the 26 countries stayed in the same ideal type over the total period: France, Korea, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and the USA. This means only one third 
of OECD countries intensively pursued pension reforms in the same direction over the 25 
years. The majority of countries changed their focus on pension reform. It is interesting that 
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some countries even show a shift in the opposite direction. For example, Austria belonged 
to the socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type in the first period, but then shifted to 
the stable type in the second period. Germany and Japan were in the individualisation reform 
ideal type in the first period, then shifted to the socialisation reform ideal type in the second. 
On the other hand, Switzerland and the Czech Republic moved from the socialisation reform 
ideal type to the individualisation reform ideal type during the period. Another point to note 
is the change in overall intensity within socialisation reforms. The socialisation reform ideal 
type has seven membership countries in the first period, but it was reduced to four in the 
second period. On the other hand, the number of countries that intensively pursued both 
socialisation and individualisation reforms increased from two to seven. Also, countries that 
belong to the stable type significantly increased from six to nine.  
 
Figure 6.6: Changes in country memberships of the socialisation-individualisation 
fuzzy-set ideal types 
 
Source: Author. 
260 
 
6.3 Analysis on the three dimensions of socialisation 
Under the mood of austerity, much of the pension literature has focused on how welfare 
states have managed to improve pension sustainability. Only a few researchers have paid 
attention to the socialisation of old-age risks in pension reforms (Bonoli, 2003; Hinrichs, 
2000; Hinrichs & Jessoula, 2012; van Vliet et al., 2012). As this thesis reveals, however, 
pension reforms took place to socialise old-age risks as well as to individualise them in 
OECD countries. The intensity of these reforms varied depending on the country, but every 
single country reformed their pension system to socialise risks. Clearly, this has not been the 
dominant trend of pension reform for the last 25 years; socialisation reforms took place 10.6 
times whilst individualisation reforms took place 14.9 times on average for the total period 
(Table 6.2). This indicates that OECD countries were mostly concerned with the 
sustainability of pension systems, but also continued to pay attention to socialisation during 
the period. It is worth noting that the difference of intensity is not remarkable. It might be 
too arithmetic to argue, but for reference, the frequency of socialisation reforms is equal to 
71% of individualisation reforms for the period. Considering that, it may be appropriate to 
highlight the aspect of socialising risks in pension reforms further in order to fill the gap in 
the literature. In this respect, this section sheds light on the three elements of socialisation of 
old-age risks.  
 
Empirical indicators   
This section solely pays attention to the socialisation of old-age risks. As demonstrated in 
the first analysis, the socialisation of risks refers to institutionalised government intervention 
which socialises individuals’ risks. In old-age, the major risk is disrupted income due to 
retirement. In this regard, the state aims at reinforcing the role of pensions in order to 
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collectively reduce individuals’ risks. Previously, this thesis has identified three empirical 
indicators for the socialisation of old-age risks in the data: coverage, adequacy, and security 
of investment. In brief, coverage is the reform category for expanding pension coverage to 
protect as many people as possible through public, mandatory private and voluntary pensions. 
Adequacy refers to reforms aimed at providing adequate level of benefits to all, or vulnerable 
groups of people who need additional favourable treatment. Whilst coverage and adequacy 
are traditional forms of protection in pension systems, security of investment, the last 
dimension, is a new type of protection since circa 1990. It entails security measures against 
investment risks in pension funds. It stems from the growing role of private pensions in old-
age provision which allows more investment choice for individuals in pension funds. As 
increased choice may result in inadequate benefits for pensioners, the government has 
introduced measures to protect people from investment failures and excessive administrative 
cost. This type of socialisation is a new phenomenon as it is a counteraction against the new 
type of risks in pension systems seen since the spread of individualisation from the 1990s. 
In this regard, coverage, adequacy, and security of investment form the three dimensions of 
the socialisation of risks in this section. It can be illustrated as a triangle, as seen in Figure 
6.7. 
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Figure 6.7: The three dimensions of the socialisation of risks 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Three fuzzy-sets are identified using these three dimensions. This generates a total of eight 
types in our property space. In order to facilitate a better understanding, this thesis visualised 
it as an octahedron comprised of eight triangles (Figure 6.8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
263 
 
Figure 6.8: Property space for the three dimensions of the socialisation of risks 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
This thesis labelled the eight ideal types on the basis of the dimensions that each ideal type 
scored highly on: all-inclusive, coverage-and-adequacy-focused, coverage-and-security-
focused, adequacy-and-security-focused, coverage-focused, adequacy-focused, security-
focused, and stable. First, countries which scored highly on all three dimensions belong to 
the all-inclusive reform type. Then there are countries that scored highly on only two 
dimensions. For example, the coverage-and-adequacy-focused reform type is for countries 
that score highly on both coverage and adequacy, but not on security of investment. The 
coverage-and-adequacy-focused reform type is for countries that score highly on coverage 
and security of investment but low on adequacy. The adequacy-and-security-focused reform 
type refers to countries that score highly on adequacy and security of investment but low on 
coverage. On the other hand, some countries only scored highly on one dimension. The 
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coverage-focused reform type refers to countries that score highly on coverage, but low on 
adequacy and security of investment. The adequacy-focused reform type is for countries that 
score highly on adequacy, but low on coverage and security of investment. The security-
focused reform type is for countries that score highly only on security of investment. Lastly, 
the stable type refers to countries which scored low on all three dimensions. The summary 
of models of these ideal types is shown in Table 6.6 below. The subject of the analysis is the 
26 OECD countries that were used in the first analysis in this chapter.  
 
Table 6.5: Property space for the three dimensions of the socialisation of risks 
Fuzzy-set ideal type  Coverage (C) Adequacy (A) 
Security of  
Investment (S) 
Model 
All-inclusive IN IN IN C*A*S 
Coverage & Adequacy-focused  IN IN OUT C*A*~S 
Coverage & Security-focused IN OUT IN C*~A*S 
Adequacy & Security-focused OUT IN IN ~C*A*S 
Coverage-focused IN OUT OUT C*~A*~S 
Adequacy-focused OUT IN OUT ~C*A*~S 
Security-focused OUT OUT IN ~C*~A*S 
Stable OUT OUT OUT ~C*~A*~S 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Calibration of sets  
This section takes the same approach to calibration as the first analysis. It uses continuous 
values to capture subtle variations in countries, taking advantage of the ratio-scale of the 
data. Then an arithmetic method is applied to select breakpoints, as neither objective 
knowledge nor empirical logics have been established in this area. In accordance to existing 
studies (Hudson & Kühner, 2009; 2013; Lee, 2013; Lee et al., 2013a), this thesis uses the 
mean ± one standard deviation as the upper and lower cut-off points in the calibration.  
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First, Figure 6.9 below shows the frequencies of reforms in the category of coverage between 
1990 and 2015. All the figures come from the dataset created in Chapter Five. As the bars 
show, the frequencies are evenly distributed between 0 and 8. is are, however, one 
outstanding value: 10 in the France. The mean of coverage is 3.73 and the standard deviation 
is 2.12. The two red lines indicate the two cut-off points; the upper cut-off point is set at 5.85 
and the lower cut-off point is set at 1.62, the mean ± one standard deviation.  
 
Figure 6.9: Frequencies of coverage and the two cut-off points 
 
Source: Author. 
 
The second dimension is adequacy. The red bars in Figure 6.10 below show the frequencies 
of reforms in the category of adequacy for the last 25 years. As seen in the figures, the 
distribution of the frequencies is concentrated between 1 and 8. Twenty-one out of the 26 
countries are located within this range and most of them are evenly distributed; four 
countries for 1, five countries for 2, four countries for 3, two countries for 4, one county for 
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5, and three countries for 6. Meanwhile, France shows an outstanding value of reform 
frequency scoring 13, much higher than the next highest group at 11 (Australia, Greece, and 
the UK). The mean of adequacy is 4.54 and the standard deviation is 2.97. The two blue 
lines in Figure 6.10 indicate the two cut-off points. The upper cut-off point is set at 7.51 and 
the lower at 1.57, the mean ± one standard deviation 
 
Figure 6.10: Frequencies of adequacy and the two cut-off points 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Lastly, Figure 6.11 below shows the frequencies of security of investment. It is clearly 
distinct from those of coverage and adequacy above. Whilst the frequencies are evenly 
spread over between countries in coverage and adequacy, reforms for security of investment 
is observed in only 18 countries, less than 70% of all countries. When considering that 13 
countries pursued reforms once or twice, the values of the UK and Ireland are unique. The 
frequency is 21 in the UK and 8 in Ireland. Then Canada, Switzerland and the US followed 
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scoring 4. The mean of security of investment is 2.35 and standard deviation is 2.25. The two 
red lines in Figure 6.11 indicate the two cut-off points. The upper cut-off point is set at 4.6 
and the lower at 0.09, the mean ± one standard deviation 
 
Figure 6.11: Frequencies of security of investment and two cut-off points 
 
Source: Author. 
 
Similar to the first analysis in the previous section, the calibration here follows the most 
straightforward method for a continuous scale of value. It is represented by the following 
formula22 (Vis, 2007: 111):  
 
fuzzy-set score = [transformed raw data – lower cut-off point] / [upper cut-off point 
– lower cut-off point]  
                                                          
22 See the previous section for an explanation of the formula. 
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The outcome is shown in Table 6.7 below. Unlikely the first analysis, the scatterplot for the 
fuzzy-set score is not provided here as a three-dimensional chart is difficult to illustrate.  
 
Table 6.6: Frequency and fuzzy score of the socialisation of risks 
 
1990–2015 
 
Frequency Fuzzy-score 
  
Coverage Adequacy 
Security of 
investment 
Coverage Adequacy 
Security of 
investment 
Australia 4 11 1 0.56 1.00 0.20 
Austria 6 5 0 1.00 0.58 0.00 
Belgium 1 2 0 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Canada 7 3 4 1.00 0.24 0.87 
Czech Republic 3 2 0 0.33 0.60 0.00 
Denmark 3 0 0 0.33 0.00 0.00 
Finland 2 6 1 0.09 0.75 0.20 
France 10 13 1 1.00 1.00 0.20 
Germany 4 7 0 0.56 0.91 0.00 
Greece 2 11 2 0.09 1.00 0.42 
Hungary 4 2 1 0.56 0.07 0.20 
Ireland 5 8 8 0.80 1.00 1.00 
Italy 1 1 2 0.00 0.00 0.42 
Japan 8 4 2 1.00 0.41 0.42 
Korea 8 3 1 1.00 0.24 0.20 
Luxembourg 3 6 0 0.33 0.75 0.00 
Netherlands 0 1 2 0.00 0.00 0.42 
New Zealand 4 3 2 0.56 0.24 0.42 
Norway 1 1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Poland 4 1 2 0.56 0.00 0.42 
Portugal 3 2 1 0.33 0.07 0.20 
Spain 1 6 0 0.00 0.75 0.00 
Sweden 0 3 2 0.00 0.24 0.42 
Switzerland 4 2 4 0.56 0.07 0.87 
United 
Kingdom 
8 11 21 1.00 1.00 1.00 
United States 1 4 4 0.00 0.41 0.87 
 
Source: Author.  
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Scoring cases  
As a next step, the membership of each set is computed. The same principles of fuzzy logic 
used in the first analysis are applied: the minimum principle (logical AND) and the principle 
of negation (logical NOT). The symbol ‘*’ is used for the former principle and ‘~’ for the 
latter. Table 6.8 below is the computed outcome. As can be seen in the table, the fuzzy-set 
in which each country scored highest is filled in with a grey colour to show the country’s 
designated ideal type. For example, Australia belongs to the coverage-and-adequacy-
focused reform type, with a score of 0.56. It is the highest score that Australia gained out of 
the eight ideal types. It means Australia is ‘IN’ the ideal type showing the best conformity 
to it among the ideal types
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Table 6.7: Fuzzy membership scores of the socialisation of risks 
  
All-inclusive 
Coverage  
& adequacy 
-focused 
Coverage 
& security  
-focused 
Adequacy 
& security  
-focused 
Coverage  
-focused 
Adequacy  
-focused 
Security 
-focused 
Stable  
C*A*S C*A*~S C*~A*S ~C*A*S C*~A*~S ~C*A*~S ~C*~A*S ~C*~A*~S 
Australia 0.20 0.56 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 
Austria 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.93 
Canada 0.24 0.13 0.76 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Czech Republic 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.60 0.00 0.40 
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 
Finland 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.75 0.20 0.25 
France 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Germany 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.44 0.00 0.09 
Greece 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 
Hungary 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.56 0.07 0.20 0.44 
Ireland 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.58 
Japan 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.58 0.00 0.42 0.00 
Korea 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.76 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.25 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.58 
New Zealand 0.24 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.56 0.24 0.42 0.44 
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Poland 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.42 0.44 
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Portugal 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.33 0.07 0.20 0.67 
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.25 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.42 0.58 
Switzerland 0.07 0.07 0.56 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.44 0.13 
United 
Kingdom 
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
United States 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.13 0.59 0.13 
 
Source: Author.  
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Identifying the membership of the ideal types 
As seen earlier, this thesis has visualised three dimensions and the property space to promote 
a better understanding of the data. The three dimensions of the socialisation of old-age risks 
construct a triangle (Figure 6.7) and it forms property spaces, an octahedron (Figure 6.8). 
The eight faces of the octahedron represent eight ideal types of reforms for the socialisation 
of old-age risks. Figure 6.12 below is a plane net of the octahedron in Figure 6.8. It shows 
the country membership of each ideal type. It consists of eight triangles, and three sides of 
each triangle are linked to three dimensions: C or ~C, A or ~A, and S or ~S. Country names 
with their membership scores are provided in each face. 
 
First, the all-inclusive reform type has only two membership countries: the UK and Ireland. 
Their conformities to the ideal type are high as the UK is fully in and Ireland scored 0.8. 
Secondly, the coverage-and-adequacy-focused reform type has four membership countries: 
France, Austria, Australia, and Germany. While these four countries belong to the same ideal 
type, their conformities vary; France scored 0.8, meaning full membership of the ideal type, 
whilst the other three countries scored between 0.56 and 0.58. Third, the coverage-and-
security-focused ideal type consists of two membership countries: Switzerland and Canada. 
Their membership scores are 0.56 and 0.76 respectively. Meanwhile, there are no matching 
membership countries for the fourth ideal type, adequacy-and-security-focused. No 
countries scored higher than the cross-over point (fuzzy membership > 0.5) in this ideal type. 
This implies that the adequacy-and-security-focused reform type might exist in theory, but 
not in the 26 OECD countries in this dataset. Fifth, the coverage-focused reform type has 
five countries: Korea, Japan, Hungary, New Zealand, and Poland. It is a relatively 
homogeneous group as their membership scores are in the range of 0.56 to 0.76. The sixth, 
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the adequacy-focused reform type, has five countries (Spain, Finland, Luxembourg, the 
Czech Republic, and Greece) and they are distributed between 0.58 and 0.75. The seventh, 
the security-focused reform type has only one member country: the USA. It is the smallest 
group except the adequacy-and-security-focused reform type, the theoretical ideal type. The 
last ideal type is stable. It is the biggest group among the eight ideal types. Seven countries 
belong to it: Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands. 
Whilst the membership scores of Norway and Belgium are fully in or almost fully in, the 
rest of group are in a range of 0.58 to 0.67, just above the cross-over point.  
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Figure 6.12: Country memberships of the fuzzy-set ideal types for reform strategies for the socialisation of risks 
Source: Author.
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6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed pension reforms across OECD countries between 1990 and 2015. 
The design of the analysis was gradually developed through the findings of previous chapters. 
Previously, Chapter Two identified two distinctive streams in dealing with social risks: 
socialisation and individualisation. These two trends have coexisted since the 1990s, with 
the rise of the social investment perspective. This thesis therefore has employed them as two 
dimensions that explain pension reforms that deal with old-age risks for the last 25 years. 
One of the effective ways to compare pension reforms might be typologies. They enable a 
systematic comparison among countries by “analytical and explanatory parsimony” (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 88). In Chapter Three, we examined frequently used typical models in 
earlier studies, but they did not serve the purpose of this thesis; most existing typologies 
were designed to classify pension structures or reform outcomes, not the contents of those 
reforms. When it comes to the data for analysis, it must contain highly detailed information 
on specific changes in pension systems. Therefore, considering the long period of time and 
the number of countries, Chapter Five combined two secondary sources from international 
organisations: the Pensions at a Glance series and ISSA Country Profiles. With the data, this 
chapter created new typologies for pension reform using FSITA, an innovative method for 
typologies. 
 
The analysis consists of two parts. The first analysis is on the two dimensions: the 
socialisation and individualisation of old-age risks. For the last 25 years, the most dominant 
ideal type has been the individualisation reform type. Eleven out of the 26 countries belong 
to it. Meanwhile, the socialisation reform type has only two member countries. This might 
reflect the prevalent concern in most countries about fiscal stress, as many earlier researchers 
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have argued. On the other hand, more than a quarter of the countries belong to the stable 
reform type. In FSITA, this does not mean that these countries did not pursue any pension 
reforms, but that any reforms they did pursue were not intensive enough to be classified to 
any other ideal type. Nevertheless, it reflects that the prevailing view of austerity and the 
increase in needs for old-age protection do not necessarily lead to pension reform in some 
countries. This may be due to welfare politics and institutional characteristics. On the other 
hand, the socialisation-individualisation reform type was less common, with only six 
member countries. This chapter also divided the overall time period into two halves. It 
revealed the trends of pension reform were disrupted rather than continuous. Most countries 
did not maintain their focus in any particular direction in pension reform over the 25 years. 
This might indicate that path dependency plays a limited role within a series of pension 
reforms in a country over a long period. Path development in pension reform demonstrates 
complexity and we will return to this issue in the following chapter. In the second analysis, 
the socialisation of old-age risk was explored further. Eight ideal types were created through 
three dimensions: coverage, adequacy, and security of investment. The stable reform type 
had seven membership countries. It is the biggest group among the eight ideal types, but it 
indicates that the other 19 countries socialised old-age risks despite of the prevailing pressure 
for fiscal austerity. The all-inclusive reform type, however, only had two member countries. 
This means only a few countries reformed pensions in a comprehensive manner. Instead, a 
considerable number of countries chose one or two elements to socialise risks in pension 
systems. This may imply the lack of capacity to expand pension systems in many countries 
during the period. 
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Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the analysis here is on reform intensity, not on 
the pension system or the reform outcome. Therefore, the label of each ideal type does not 
represent the features of membership countries’ pension systems. For example, the all-
inclusive reform type in the second analysis must be interpreted as meaning that countries 
within it intensively pursued pension reforms in a comprehensive manner. It does not 
necessarily mean their pension system is robust in terms of socialising risks. In the following 
chapter, we will closely examine each ideal type of the first and the second analysis and 
interpret them.   
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Chapter 7 : Analysing pension reforms   
 
This chapter comprehensively reviews earlier chapters and draws implications from them. 
The previous chapter explored the trend of pension reforms across OECD countries for the 
last 25 years. The first part of the analysis looked at general trends in the socialisation and 
individualisation of old-age risks for the period. Then the period was divided into halves to 
examine changes over the 25 years. The second part of the analysis looked at the three 
measures of socialisation reforms. Based on three empirical indicators that represent the 
socialisation of old-age risks, the chapter analysed the trends of measures for socialisation 
reforms. With this background in mind, this chapter begins by looking closely at the trend 
of pension reforms. It explores four types of configuration in pension reforms, paying 
attention to the characteristics of each ideal type. It produces insights into dominant and less 
dominant trends in pension reform over the last 25 years. It then moves on to the relationship 
between pension reforms and earlier typologies. In doing so, it reflects on whether the trends 
of pension reform can be seen as regime characteristics or as a pension’s institutional features. 
The chapter also engages with the arguments on path dependency in pension systems and 
explores similarities and differences in their development. Finally, the relationship between 
pension reforms and the level of poverty in older people is compared. Based on earlier 
evidence, this chapter suggests old-age poverty as an additional factor that shapes pension 
reforms along with the pattern of demographic change and pension institutions.    
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7.1 Pension reforms in the era of social investment 
Social investment and pension systems 
Welfare states have considered social risks to be their main concern since their establishment. 
This thesis has argued that two streams exist in dealing with social risks in welfare states. 
The first is the socialisation of risks, which means institutionalised government intervention 
absorbing risks from individuals. It results in the de-commodification and de-familisation of 
risks, as they would have been handled by market or family if the state had not intervened. 
Meanwhile, the individualisation of risks is on the other end of the spectrum. It refers to the 
shift towards an individualisation of responsibility in managing social risks. It imposed more 
responsibility on individuals for the outcome whilst providing more room for choice. These 
distinctive streams have been emphasised differently in the history of welfare states, 
depending on the economic thought or philosophy of the time. This thesis has addressed 
Keynesianism, neo-liberalism and the social investment perspective as the major ideologies 
that are tied with the two streams. These phases are not mutually exclusive as they have co-
existed at some points. Nevertheless, this thesis sees the 1990s onwards as the phase of the 
social investment perspective based on earlier studies (Garland, 2016; Hemerijck, 2013; 
Jenson, 2012; Nikolai, 2012). The territory of social risks is also not a fixed concept, but old-
age has been recognised as one of the major risks across time and countries. Individuals 
generally experience a loss of income due to retirement in this stage of life. Without 
government intervention, this would cause a high level of poverty among older people. 
Welfare states therefore introduced pension systems to socialise those risks, which formed 
the bedrock of poverty protection in old age.  
 
This thesis has argued that pension reforms from the 1990s onward show diverse 
configurations of the socialisation and the individualisation of risks. As this is the period of 
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time when the social investment perspective has been widely accepted (OECD, 2005: 7), 
pension reforms during this period should be understood in its context. The social investment 
perspective was introduced as an alternative way for welfare states to adapt to the changing 
needs of contemporary society. Traditional income security systems showed limited capacity 
in providing adequate protection against new social risks. Furthermore, the dominant trend 
of the individualisation of risks due to budgetary stresses was criticised as it created an 
increase in poverty and inequality. From this standpoint, the social investment perspective 
recognises pension systems as part of ‘flexicurity’ (Hinrichs & Jessoula, 2012: 4-5). The 
social investment perspective supports a network of labour market measures that promote 
labour flexibility along with a series of activation policies. For older people, a pension is a 
last safety-net for those who are not fully activated. In this respect, it is too a simplistic view 
to place pensions on the opposite side of the productive social investment perspective. 
Pensions are a traditional protective programme, but they are not necessarily contrary to the 
social investment perspective. Rather, they function complementarily to the social 
investment perspective, reducing the risks of the flexible labour market. This complementary 
relationship between traditional income security systems and social investment policies has 
been stressed in previous research (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; 
Hemerijck, 2013; Kuitto, 2016; OECD, 2005). Reforming pensions in this era thus reflects 
both dimensions. For one, retrenchment should continue to improve the sustainability of 
pension systems in an ageing society. At the same time, however, further protection is 
required from the flexible labour market. As Bonoli and Natali (2012: 12) address, it is “the 
emergence of policy objectives unrelated to austerity”. It may result in reform packages that 
meet multiple – even contradictory – objectives. Therefore, the analysis on welfare states in 
the era of social investment requires multi-dimensional indicators to accurately capture 
welfare dynamics. Retrenchment, the prevailing indicator for welfare states in austerity, may 
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not be sufficient because of its narrow and restrictive nature (Clasen, 2005: 94). In this 
context, this thesis has argued that pension reforms since the 1990s can be classified into 
four ideal types on the basis of two dimensions, the socialisation and individualisation of 
risks. 
 
One thing to note is the substantial national variation in the social investment perspective. It 
has spread over welfare states since the 1990s, but the timing of its adoption varied in each 
country. Garland (2016: 130-131) states that welfare regimes, the timing of the transition to 
a post-industrial society and the level of economic performance affect the pace and the 
degree to which the social investment perspective is accepted. For example, liberal and 
social-democratic welfare states embraced the social investment approach at an early stage, 
whilst conservative welfare states and East Asian countries were late-comers. According to 
Jenson (2012: 29-32), the social investment perspective is now widely shared across regions 
and welfare regimes, but countries show different preferences in social investment strategies. 
Social-democratic countries emphasise human capital through lifelong learning, whilst 
liberal countries focus more on the orientation to the future. Conservative countries prefer 
the notion that investment in individuals enriches the entire community. Nikolai’s (2012: 97-
105) research on social expenditure profiles also shows a large variation across OECD 
countries in social investment. She demonstrated spending on family policies, active labour 
market policies, and education as investment-related expenditures contrasting compensatory 
expenditures. First, spending on family policy was continuously increased between 1980 and 
2007, but a large variation is observed across countries. Family spending was over 3% of 
GDP in the UK, Sweden, Denmark and Hungary in 2007, whilst it was less than 1% of GDP 
in Japan and the USA. When it comes to active labour market policies, the spending during 
the time was stable. However, if we take a closer look at country profiles, extreme levels of 
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cross-national variation exist ranging from 0.1% of GDP in the USA to 1.3% of GDP in 
Denmark in 2007. Also, on average, education spending has decreased from 5.67% in 1980 
to 4.88% in 2007. This is an interesting finding, but exceptional cases are also observed such 
as Belgium, Denmark, France, and the UK. Considering these earlier studies, it would be 
reasonable to expect country variation in pension reforms under the social investment 
perspective. As will be discussed in more detail later, however, it may not follow regime 
theory since pension reforms are influenced by a variety of factors.    
 
As explored in the previous chapter, this thesis has analysed the pension reforms of 26 OECD 
countries between 1990 and 2015. Two fuzzy-sets were identified against two dimensions, 
generating four ideal types of pension reform. First, the outcome of the fuzzy-set ideal type 
analysis shows that all of four ideal types have member countries. This means that all the 
theoretical combinations are empirically observed. The outcome confirms the variety of 
configurations in pension reforms that is constructed from the socialisation and 
individualisation of risks, as this thesis has argued. The details of the membership of each 
ideal type are identified in the following section.  
 
Four types of configuration in pension reforms 
The analysis shows us a landscape of pension reforms in the OECD. First, it reveals that the 
dominant reform type is the individualisation reform. More than 40% of countries committed 
to individualising old-age risks through their pension systems. This is not a surprising result 
as various earlier studies have demonstrated the retreat of old-age protection under the 
pervading pressure for fiscal austerity (Bonoli et al., 2000; Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005; 
Ebbinghaus, 2005; 2012; Goldberg, 2002; Scruggs, 2007). As Goldberg (2002: 342) 
addresses, the common trend is “toward reduction of whatever employment guarantees there 
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were, as well as toward greater selectivity or means testing, more restrictive unemployment 
insurance policies, tightening of work requirements, privatisation, and lower benefits”. The 
empirical evidence of this research confirms that the austerity trend can be clearly observed 
in pension reforms over the last 25 years.  
 
Germany is a fair example of the trend. Germany is a member of the individualisation reform 
type. The biggest concern over the German pension system was its sustainability, for several 
reasons. First, population ageing began at an early stage (OECD, 2015: 159). The 
dependency ratio was already 26.3% in 1975, the second highest among the 34 OECD 
countries (OECD, 2015: 159). The ageing pace was moderate then but reached 35.3% in 
2015, the third highest in the OECD, increasing the financial burden on the public pension. 
Early retirement schemes to maintain high levels of employment and generous replacements 
of the public pension (Boersch-Supan & Wilke, 2003: 18-21) aggravated this financial 
burden. Germany also experienced an economic downturn in the 2000s, imposing further 
fiscal pressure on the pension system. A high level of fiscal deficits and mass unemployment 
were persistent, and GDP per capita declined below the EU average for the first time since 
the 1980s (Clasen, 2005: 4). The pension system was projected to be economically 
unsustainable and pension reform became a major focus of attention. Meanwhile, the poverty 
level among older people was steadily maintained throughout the 1990s and the 2000s23. For 
the older population, the relative poverty rates at 50% of the median income threshold were 
10.4% (1989), 10.0% (2000) and 10.6% (2010), lower than the average of the OECD. The 
poverty rates for total population, however, gradually increased during the same period from 
5.6% (1989) to 9.5% (2010). Consequently, the socialisation of old-age risks was not the 
                                                          
23 See Chapter Four for the poverty rates of OECD countries.  
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priority for Germany at the time, but individualisation reforms were.       
 
Pension reforms in the 1990s and the 2000s therefore took place mainly to improve the 
financial sustainability of the German pension system. Various measures were taken such as: 
including a demographic factor within the pension formula, the abolition of the favourable 
tax treatment for pension income, a reduction in replacement rates, benefit cuts for disability 
and survivor pensions, a tightening of the conditions for benefits, and an increase in the 
contribution rates for employees (OECD, 2007: 58-60). A new environment tax on energy 
consumption was also introduced. Some of these revenues were channelled into the social 
insurance budget that aimed at covering the expenditure on non-contributory benefits and 
facilitating a lower contribution rate (Hinrichs, 2005: 58). However, they were proved  to be 
insufficient measures in terms of pension sustainability, and the Schröder government 
attempted a structural reform which would allow significant savings in 2001 (Clasen, 2005: 
104-131). However, its overall scale was smaller than originally intended; replacement rates 
were dropped by three percentage points rather than six, and a funded private pillar was 
introduced based on voluntary contributions rather than mandatory, and tax incentives were 
added to the collectively agreed pension plans as a concession to trade unions. A few years 
later, attention was drawn to pension adequacy during the 2013 federal election. Future old-
age poverty was projected to increase due to the individualisation reforms undertaken since 
the 1990s (EC & SPC, 2015: 70-72). As a result, the Pension Improvement Act introduced 
multiple adequacy measures, such as extended pension credits for caring children, and 
contribution cuts for disability pensions. The retirement age was also lowered from 65 to 63 
for people with 45 years of contributory years (OECD, 2015: 34-43).  
 
Reflecting these circumstances, the prevailing type of pension reforms in Germany for the 
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last 25 years were individualisation reforms. Reforms for financial and fiscal sustainability 
were particularly intensive, reaching a frequency rate of 11 for the total period. Economic 
efficiency and diversification received far less attention. However, when the period is divided 
into two halves, Germany belonged to the individualisation reform type in the first period, 
transitioned to the socialisation reform type for the second. This shift reflects the change of 
mood that occurred with the 2013 federal election, and the rising concern over inadequate 
old-age protection. It is worth noting that the major trend in Germany continued to be 
individualisation in the second period, despite of this change in reform type; Germany 
pursued reforms for socialisation relatively more frequently than other OECD countries, but 
the overall frequency was still higher in individualisation (16) than socialisation (11).   
 
The second most common reform type is the stable type. More than a quarter of the countries 
were rather inactive or less intensive in introducing pension reforms. This does not mean 
that no reforms took place, but rather that the frequency rate of reforms was too low to be 
classified into any of the other ideal types. When considering the fluctuations of the world 
economy and dynamic changes in societies over the last 25 years, it is surprising that seven 
out of 26 OECD countries did not intensively engage in pension reforms. This result may 
stem from the way this thesis operationalised the reform data. It analysed the trend of reforms 
using the frequencies of six categories in the raw data. These frequencies allow us to 
understand each country’s overall actions in a specific direction, but as addressed in Chapter 
Five, they do not represent the significance of each reform. Therefore, it is possible that 
countries that belong to the stable type actually pursued pension reforms that brought about 
a significant impact, such as structural reforms. Aside from this possibility, there may be two 
other possible explanations: (1) pension reforms were not their primary concern; or (2) 
pension reforms were required, but discouraged by pension politics. 
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 The Netherlands is an example of the former. The Netherlands established a very robust 
multi-pillar pension system early on. It consisted of a flat-rate state pension (AOW), funded 
occupational pensions, and individual savings. As the first and second pillar pensions already 
provided adequate protection to older people before the 1990s, further socialisation of old-
age risks was not a major concern in the Netherlands (EC & SPC, 2015: 245). The broad 
coverage and high replacement rates of the first and second pillar pensions did not necessitate 
reform. AOW, the first pillar pension, is a tax-financed state pension that covers all residents 
who have lived in Netherlands for 50 years. On top of this, the second pillar occupational 
pension is a quasi-mandatory pension covering 91% of employees (OECD, 2015: 310). The 
pension scheme is negotiated by collective agreements between employers and unions. The 
benefit level is also very generous. The flat rate of benefit of the AOW is linked to the 
minimum wage, and the total replacement rate reaches 70% when combined with 
occupational pensions, after 40 years of employment (EC & SPC, 2015: 241). When it comes 
to the third pillar, individual savings were not highlighted as the first and the second pillar 
pension were extensive enough. Therefore, it is a natural consequence that the Netherlands 
had the lowest level of poverty among older people. The old-age poverty rate in 1990 was 
3.2%, and this low level has been sustained until the present day. The old-age poverty rate 
was 2.2% and the poverty reduction effects of the pension system reached 99% in 201024.  
 
Like many other countries, the sustainability of pensions was raised in the Netherlands. 
According to the OECD (2015: 159), old-age dependency increased from 19.5% (1975) to 
21.9% (2000), but this reflected the average among OECD countries. The Netherlands had 
                                                          
24All statistics are computed using LIS microdata. See Chapter Four for more information. 
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undertaken sustainability measures since the 1980s. The law on AOW indexation was 
moderated several times, and reserve funds were introduced for financial stability. The trend 
of individualisation reform has continued through the 1990s and the 2000s, but at a basic 
level; there has been a gradual increase in the pension age, the introduction of disadvantages 
for early retirement, and the reduction of favourable tax treatments for occupational pension 
(EC & SPC, 2015: 243).    
 
Considering these facts, the Netherlands did not intensively pursue pension reforms mainly 
because their pension systems were functioning soundly in terms of the socialisation and 
individualisation of old-age risks, and partly due to the ability of social partners to engage 
and review these issues early on. As a result, the Netherlands belongs to the stable type 
throughout the period from 1990 to 2015. The reform frequency of each category also 
supports this view. Pension reforms did not take place for improving coverage at all and only 
twice for adequacy, as their first and second pillar pensions already had “a very strong record 
concerning pension adequacy because of the relative generosity of the AOW pension and the 
wide coverage of second pillar pensions” (EC & SPC, 2015: 245). Notably, security of 
investment was not the prevailing concern throughout the time under research here. 
Occupational pensions are quasi-mandatory and 94% of covered employees had a DB 
scheme in 2011 (OECD, 2015: 310). Also, the third pillar private pension was 
underdeveloped in the Netherlands, accounting for only 5% of all pension savings in the 
second half of the 2000s (EC & SPC, 2015: 243). Nevertheless, the 2008 financial crisis 
damaged pension funds. According to ISSA Country Profiles, the coverage ratios dropped 
from an average of 144% in 2007 to 95% by the end of 2008. As a result, measures for 
security of investment were introduced twice. When it comes to the individualisation reforms, 
diversification did not receive any attention. Whilst five pension reforms took place in order 
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to improve both financial and fiscal sustainability and economic efficiency,  they were less 
intensive compared to other OECD countries.   
 
On the other hand, it was less common to undertake intensive reforms for both the 
socialisation and individualisation of risks at the same time. There are also important 
differences among countries that adopted socialisation reforms. This might be due to the 
fiscal pressures of public finance and the politics of welfare austerity. By no stretch of the 
imagination, countries would have had strong motivation when they decided to strengthen 
old-age protection under growing budgetary pressure. This might be related to their ‘starting 
point’. If a pension system did not sufficiently socialise old-age risks in the beginning of the 
1990s, there might be a motivation to improve protection since then. On the other hand, 
countries that had already achieved a high level of socialisation of old-age risks in the 
beginning of the 1990s might feel less urgency to socialise pension systems further.  
 
In this regard, Korea serves as an interesting example of the socialisation reform type. As 
the pension system played a marginalised role in socialising old-age risks before the 1990s, 
Korea witnessed the continued expansion of its pension systems over the last 25 years. Korea 
introduced its first public pension in 1988. It was a social insurance system that provided a 
benefit level equal to 70% of life-time average earnings after 40 years of contributions. The 
benefit level was generous but the coverage of the scheme was limited to employees working 
at large firms. As a result, since the 1990s, a series of pension reforms took place to extend 
pension coverage. The expansion was remarkably rapid; it took only 11 years to expand the 
mandatory coverage from employees working at firms with ten or more workers to the whole 
working-age population in urban and rural areas (Kim, 2012: 76-78). Parallel to its public 
pension, Korea established a multi-tier pension system in the 2000s. A severance pay system 
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has gradually transformed into an occupational pension as a second pillar pension. It became 
mandatory for firms with five or fewer workers from 2010. Additionally, a tax-financed basic 
pension was introduced in 2008. It granted 60% of those who are over 65 a monthly fixed 
amount of pension benefits. It then extended its coverage to 70% of older people, and the 
benefit was doubled from 5% to 10% of average earnings in 2013 (OECD, 2009: 90-94).  
 
These continuous socialisation reforms stem from the extremely high poverty rates in the 
older population in Korea25. The relative poverty rate at 50% of the median income threshold 
reached 41.4% in 2006, the highest level in the OECD. It is worth noting that the poverty 
rate in the total population was 14%; far lower than the poverty rate in the older population. 
This is mainly because of the marginalised role of the income security system in Korea. In 
2006, the poverty rate among the older population based on factor income was 69.3%, the 
second lowest level in OECD countries. However, social security transfers reversed this. The 
poverty rate after social security transfers was 55.4%, the highest level in the OECD. This 
means the old-age risks was only decreased by 13% by social security transfers. It then 
dropped further, to 41.4%, after private transfers. This is a distinctive feature of Korea, as 
the majority of countries reduced old-age poverty by 60–90% through social security 
transfers (see Figure 4.3). Consequently, these pressures exerted the government to keep on 
the path of socialisation reforms to alleviate the problem; pension reforms took place 
intensively to improve coverage and adequacy over the last 25 years.    
 
Meanwhile, the concern about financial stability has risen with the rapid population ageing 
since the 2000s. The dependent ratio was 7.5% in 1975 but increased to 19.6% in 2015 
                                                          
25 See Chapter Four for more information. 
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(OECD, 2015: 159). This would be considered is moderate level now, but due to the rapid 
ageing pace (the highest in the OECD), Korea is projected to have the oldest population in 
the OECD by 2075, reaching 77.2% of dependency ratio (OECD, 2015: 158). As a result, 
individualisation reforms have received attention since the late 1990s. There were three 
pension reforms during 1998-2007 that introduced a variety of sustainability measures for 
the public pension, including changes in the replacement rate from 70% to 40%. The reform 
process was very controversial. Considering the pension system was only introduced in 1988, 
the “confidence in the scheme’s continuity and stability” (Hinrichs, 2005: 49) had not been 
firmly anchored in the broader public conscience at this point. Consequently the radical 
individualisation reforms since the late 1990s were met with resistance, and even anti-
pension movements emerged on a nationwide scale. The introduction of a tax-financed basic 
pension in 2009 was the countermeasure against these concerns.  
 
Despite the several reforms to improve the sustainability of pensions, the overall reform 
trend in Korea for the last 25 years remained as socialisation reform. In terms of frequency, 
reforms for expanding coverage were most intensively pursued and adequacy measures 
followed. Reforms for financial and fiscal sustainability and economic efficiency also took 
place, but their frequencies were under the average level for the OECD. Reforms for the 
security of investment and diversification took place only once. Some might argue that Korea 
is an exceptional case as its pension system is immature. However, Ireland also belongs to 
the socialisation reform type, and if we expand the scope to the socialisation and 
individualisation reform type, six other countries were also engaged in old-age protection. 
Certainly, it was not the dominant trend, but still a trend worth noting when considering the 
continued fiscal pressure of the time.  
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7.2 Pension reforms and welfare regimes and pension typologies 
This thesis explored earlier studies on welfare regimes and pension typologies in Chapter 
Three. For welfare regimes, Esping-Andersen (1990) classified welfare states into three ideal 
types: Liberal, Social Democratic, and Conservative regimes. For pension typologies, 
Chapter Three introduced Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) model. It classifies countries into 
three types: social insurance, multi-pillar systems, and Bismarckian lite. This section looks 
at the relationship between pension reforms and welfare regimes or pension typologies. 
Considering the fact that a pension system does not exist alone but is shaped by institutional 
arrangements, rules and an understanding of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 80), 
we might expect certain relationships between pension reforms and welfare regimes or social 
investment models; countries might have reacted differently in managing old-age risks 
depending on the weflare models. Or, they might have chosen similar measures in pension 
reforms regardless of their welfare models. Pension typologies, on the other hand, directly 
focus on a pension’s institutional design. Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005: 1-22) argue that 
pension institutions and the pattern of population ageing best explain pension reforms as 
they shape the problems and affect the logic of pension policy. Clasen (2005: 93-95) holds a 
similar point of view. According to his case studies on Germany and the UK, the feasibility 
of pension reforms highly depends on existing national pension systems. If this is true, 
pension reforms for the last 25 years would be associated with a pension’s institutional 
design. We could also expect country variation in the trend of pension reforms depending on 
pension typologies. 
 
Another issue relating to welfare regimes and pension typologies is path development in the 
pension system. As addressed in Chapter Three, path dependence has attracted significant 
attention from welfare researchers over the last decades. Chapter Three reviewed the relevant 
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literature and introduced two of the main streams of theory on path dependence: the ‘closed’ 
– traditional and deterministic – approach, and the ‘opened’ – transformative and 
developmental – approach. Esping-Andersen’s regime theory is based on the assumption that 
countries keep their regime characteristics across time. The ‘closed’ approach of path 
dependence expects persistent diversity or divergence among welfare regimes unless they 
experience a critical juncture (Bonoli & Natali, 2012: 10-11). This view forwards the 
resilience of welfare states as evidence; major programmes are resilient and welfare states 
have maintained their regime-specific attributes even under austerity (Pierson, 2006; Pierson, 
1994, 2001). Meanwhile, those who takes the ‘opened’ approach to path dependence argue 
that the path can be gradually and incrementally changeable without path-breaking. Such 
gradual adaptations to the changing environment might even be a necessary condition for 
institutions for their long-term survival (Ebbinghaus, 2005: 11). As supporting evidence, 
they argue that path-departure has been observed, resulting in convergence across countries 
that face similar challenges (Allan & Scruggs, 2004; Bonoli & Natali, 2012; Bonoli & 
Shinkawa, 2005; Goldberg, 2002; Scruggs, 2007). In this section, this study verifies which 
argument demonstrates the most validity concerning the trend of pension reforms; to 
establish if the path development in pension reforms was either deterministically path-
dependent or transformative over the last 25 years. In this context, this section compares the 
country membership of socialisation and individualisation in pension reforms with Esping-
Andersen’s welfare regimes and Bonoli and Shinkawa’s pension typologies.  
 
Table 7.1 below shows the combined results of the four typologies. The results of the fuzzy-
set ideal type analysis on pension reform in this thesis does not match with Esping-
Andersen’s welfare regimes. No link between them can be identified; no particular reform 
type is dominant in any welfare regime type. Likewise, the pension reform ideal types do 
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not match with Finch et al. (2017)’s social investment typology. Also, the ideal types do not 
fit into Bonoli and Shinkawa’s pension typologies. This means the trend of pension reforms 
cannot be explained by regime theory or by a pension’s institutional designs. That is not to 
say that they are unimportant factors in pension reforms, but a systematic relationship is not 
confirmed in this thesis. This result might lead us to search for other factors that explain the 
reform trends. We will return to this subject in the following section. The comparison 
attempted here is only a partial result, as neither of typologies covers all 26 of the OECD 
countries covered in this study. Nevertheless, it is possible to confirm that there is no 
particular trend in pension reforms that depends on welfare typologies or pension typologies. 
Rather, it shows general trends in pension reforms over regimes, social investment models 
and a pension’s institution. Individualisation reforms took place in more than 40% of OECD 
counties, whilst socialisation reforms were less prevalent over the 25 years, as addressed 
earlier. It might be appropriate to classify this as convergence in the direction of pension 
reforms.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
294 
 
Table 7.1: Country memberships and welfare regimes (1990–2015) 
Socialisation and 
individualisation reform 
typology 
  
Welfare 
regime  
(Esping-
Andersen, 
1999) 
Social 
investment 
typology  
(Finch et al., 
2017)  
Pension 
typology (Bonoli 
and Shinkawa, 
2005)  
Socialisation- 
individualisation 
France Conservative Type 4 Social insurance 
Greece - Type 2 - 
Australia Liberal Type 1 - 
Canada Liberal Type 1 Bismarckian lite 
Japan  Conservative Type 2 Bismarckian lite  
UK Liberal Type 3 Multipillar 
Socialisation  Ireland Liberal Type 3 - 
Korea Conservative Type 1 Social insurance 
Individualisation Italy Conservative Type 2 Social insurance 
Portugal - Type 2 - 
Finland Social 
Democratic 
Type 4 - 
Poland - - - 
Spain Conservative Type 2 - 
Switzerland - Type 1 Multi-pillar 
Belgium Conservative Type 4 - 
Czech 
Republic 
- - - 
Germany Conservative Type 2 Social insurance 
Hungary - - - 
Sweden Social 
Democratic 
Type 4 Multi-pillar 
Stable  Denmark Social 
Democratic 
Type 4 - 
Netherland Liberal Type 3 - 
Norway  Social 
Democratic 
Type 3 - 
Luxembourg - - - 
New Zealand Liberal Type 3 - 
USA Liberal Type 1 Bismarckian lite 
Austria Conservative Type 4 - 
 
* The classification of welfare regimes is mainly based on Esping-Andersen (1999: 74-94). As Esping-
Andersen did not clearly reveal every country membership of each regime, this thesis only addresses countries 
that he named as examples in describing the characteristics of three regimes. The classification of Korea and 
Japan followed Nam (2002) and Shinkawa (2001)’s view (see Chapter Three).  
* The classification of pension typologies is from Finche et al. (2017).  
* The classification of pension typologies is from Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005: 6).  
Source: Author.  
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This result leads us to the second issue, that of path development. The converging trend 
across countries toward individualisation reforms hints at a path-deviant development in 
some countries. Regardless of regime characteristics or pension structure, the 
individualisation of old-age risks was the dominant trend. This means that the reform path 
was not on the continuum of their regime or pension development for some countries. Also, 
the path of pension reform has been unsteady for 25 years in most countries. The trend of 
pension reforms has not continued in one direction. As seen in the previous chapter, there 
are clear shifts in the path of many countries from the first period (1990–2003) to the second 
(2004–2015). Seventeen out of 26 OECD countries changed their strategies in managing 
old-age risks during the time (Figure 6.6), a total of 65% of the countries. Some of them 
even showed a complete path-deviation by taking the opposite direction. For example, Japan 
pursued individualisation reforms in the first period then took measures for socialisation in 
the second. Austria also intensively reformed pension systems for both the socialisation and 
individualisation of risks in the first period, but belong to the stable in the second. From this 
result, it can be said that there was no clear persistent path in pension reforms. These results 
contradict the closed approach of path dependence – that policy choices at one point 
continuously influence the subsequent choices – in pension reforms. Rather, in this thesis, 
path deviance is observed in a twofold way: the overall convergence in reform strategies 
regardless of regime, and the discontinuity of reform strategies in each country.   
 
This result supports the ‘opened’ approach of path dependence, which argues for more 
openness to change path. Ebbinghaus explains the mechanisms of open developmental path 
dependence in three steps (2005: 15-16). First, an institution emerges at a critical juncture as 
a consequence of political conflicts and power relations. Second, it is institutionalised 
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through self-reinforcement. The newly established institution is accepted into society by 
positive feedback. Finally, the institutionalised path structures the alternatives at the 
sequential juncture, and collective actors choose which pathway they will follow to the next 
juncture. This last step is particularly distinct from the closed approach of path dependence. 
The opened approach is open to the possibility of changes at every juncture, whilst the 
traditional closed approach assumes chance events will have long-term consequences 
without interruptions until they experience a significant exogenous shock. However, the 
opened approach does not mean limitless changes of path, as actors’ “decisions are bound 
by past and current institutions” (Ebbinghaus, 2005: 14). According to Ebbinghaus, path 
development follows one of three scenarios (2005: 17): path stabilisation, path departure, 
and path cessation or switching.  
 
Among these, the concept of path departure explains the path-deviant cases in this study 
well. It refers to “gradual adaptation through partial renewal of institutional arrangements 
and limited redirection of core principles” (Ebbinghaus, 2005: 17). Ebbinghaus (2005: 15-
16) explains that path departure occurs when an institution faces environmental changes and 
the self-reinforcing mechanism of the institution allows enough resources to gradually adapt 
to the changed environment. This mechanism explains the UK case in this thesis, for example. 
It can be said that the UK showed path departure in pension reforms when we consider that 
the UK is a representative case of the Liberal regime. The Liberal regime is characterised by 
limited state intervention for social risks with a narrow definition of eligibility for welfare 
programmes. It is also well known that the UK continuously individualised old-age risks 
throughout the 1980s under the Thatcher premiership. It can be said that the trend of 
individualisation was selected and institutionalised through self-reinforcing process in the 
UK until the early 1990s. This process then structured the alternatives toward socialisation 
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reforms, and path departure commenced during the last 25 years. The shift to socialisation 
was not, however, associated with a radical improvement in social protection. In terms of 
de-commodification, it was still within the boundary of the Liberal welfare regime 
characteristics. Nevertheless, it can be seen as path departure from the previous path under 
the Thatcher premiership. Ebbinghaus (2005: 16) explains that how the alternatives are 
structured is dependent on multiple factors: the timing of the previous institutions, their 
subsequent degree of institutionalisation, and the circumstances of the juncture. Identifying 
the specific events that generated the alternative path is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, we might think of several factors that affect the emergence of the trend of 
socialisation in the UK, such as high pensioner poverty and rising concerns about pension 
adequacy since the 1990s26. We return to the case of the UK in the following section. It 
indicates the pathway of pension reforms in the UK over the last 25 years was transformative, 
rather than deterministic. Also, 65% of OECD countries that changed their pension strategies 
from the first period to the second period could also be argued to be influenced by path 
departure. 
 
It is worth noting that such path departure does not necessarily mean convergence in regimes 
or a pension’s institution. The convergence that we have confirmed in this thesis is the 
converging trend in managing old-age risks in pension reforms. In other words, it is the 
convergence in input – legislation – rather than output – the effects of legislation – in 
pensions. As this thesis does not measure the size of the effects of pension reforms, its finding 
is only limited to reform itself. Therefore, regime specific characteristics or a pension’s 
institutions can be maintained despite of the converging trend in pension reforms. In the case 
                                                          
26 Refer to the case commentary about the UK in the following section for further information.  
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of the UK above, this thesis only shows the direction of reforms that the UK chose for the 
last 25 years. The pension reforms indicated path departure from the previous path, but the 
outcome of those reforms might not be path-breaking. Also, discontinuity of reform 
strategies in each country might contribute to maintaining the original regime characteristics. 
For instance, in the examples of Japan and Austria above, the direction of reform strategies 
changed over the 25 years. The attempt to change direction followed by a return to the earlier 
approach might result in the status quo. As a result, their pension’s original characteristics 
might be maintained despite the reforms. This is in line with Bonoli and Natali’s (2012) 
findings on country variation under the social investment perspective. They noted that 
“countries have adopted policies that broadly go in the same direction, but maintain 
substantial differences” (Bonoli & Natali, 2012: 14). This implies that even path-deviant 
pension reforms might only result in changes within the designated regime or pension 
typology. Vis (2007: 113-118) labelled such change as a ‘regime-specific change’ in contrast 
to a regime shift in her analysis on welfare and workfare states. In short, the trend in pension 
reforms over the last 25 years converged on individualisation reforms across welfare regimes 
or a pension’s institution, but a country’s regime shift or a pension’s institutional change are 
not confirmed in this thesis.  
 
Finally, it is worth remembering that the findings in this section do not deny the influence of 
regimes and pension institutions on pension reforms. The comparative result – that pension 
reforms for the last 25 years do not match with welfare regimes and pension typologies – 
does not mean that institutional characteristics do not play a role in delineating pension 
reforms. Rather, when considering earlier findings on pension institutions, it indicates the 
fact that institutional characteristics might affect pension reforms, but they are not the single 
decisive factor that shapes pension reforms. These are outlined in the following section, with 
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a particular focus on Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005)’s literature.   
 
 
7.3 Factors shaping pension reforms 
Demographic change and pension institution  
Various researchers have attempted to understand the underlying mechanisms of pension 
reform. The infrastructures of pension systems have received particular attention, as different 
pension systems cope with old-age risks differently. This has been well documented by the 
growing literature on pension institutions; different institutions explain country variation in 
reforms, expenditures, poverty rates, the ways in which risks are transferred over generations 
and so on (Barr & Diamond, 2009; Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005; Hong, 2005; Korpi & Palme, 
1998; Whitehouse, 2003). This thesis paid particular attention to Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005) 
in Chapter Three. Their findings on the factors that shape pension reforms helps us to 
understand the analysis results in this thesis. They introduced three categories within their 
pension typology – social insurance, multi-pillar system, and Bismarckian lite (see Chapter 
Three). Using the typology, Bonoli and Shinkawa argue that there are two factors that best 
explain pension reforms. The first is the pattern of population ageing. Demographic change 
has occurred within most welfare states, but Bonoli and Shinkawa focus on the different 
global patterns of change. They argue that population ageing takes place at different speeds 
depending on regions. For instance, it is progressing at a moderate pace in Western Europe 
and North America, but at a much faster pace in East Asia. The population of people older 
than 65 is unlikely to reach an extreme level in North America, whilst in Western European 
countries the over-65 population is projected to exceed 25% of the total population by 2040  
(Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 3-4). East Asia, Bonoli and Shinkawa argue, will not face the 
300 
 
same severe population ageing by 2040 due to the lower starting point, the one exception 
being Japan (2005: 3). This does not seem to be correct, however, when the recent trend of 
extremely low fertility rates in Korea and Taiwan are considered. These patterns of 
population ageing have a powerful impact on pension reforms as it indicates the fiscal 
pressure on pension sustainability in the future (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 3).  
 
The second factor is the institutional structure of pension systems. Bonoli and Shinkawa 
(2005: 7) argue that a pension’s structural design is “a powerful determinant of the kind of 
pension problems a country has”. They explain that each of the three pension types has 
different pension problems and different possibilities to resolve those problems. First, the 
social insurance type has a severe sustainability problem due to the PAYG based system. It 
is the most resistant type to change, according to Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005: 7-9), because 
of the double payment issue and a strong sense of entitlement. Secondly, the Bismarckian 
lite type is the least likely to face severe sustainability problems thanks to the small size of 
the state pension. As its occupational pension and voluntary pension is generally not 
considered to be the direct responsibility of the state, austerity measures are likely to be taken 
without electoral punishment (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 7).  Finally, the multi-pillar type 
has less of a sustainability issue for the first pillar due to the relatively small basic pension. 
The second pillar is mainly run by the private sector, although people still have a strong 
sense of rights. As a result, austerity measures are difficult to implement (2005: 7). Bonoli 
and Shinkawa argue that these two factors – demographic change and pension institutions – 
interact with each other. They interact and influence pension politics by affecting the logic 
of pension policy. This eventually leads to pension reforms.  
 
Bonoli and Shinkawa are sceptical about other factors that shape policy change in pensions; 
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“[t]his is not to say that other variables are unimportant, but they tend to emerge less as 
systematically related to policy change” (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 2). They argue that 
political institutions affect the processes of adopting pension reforms, not the contents of the 
reforms. For instance, they say that political institutions shape the interactions between 
actors and facilitate reforms in a given direction by limiting the politically feasible options. 
This means that political institutions have an impact on pension reforms, but it tells us little 
about the actual policy measures that countries adopt. Similarly, Bonoli and Shinkawa argue 
that the political orientation of the government does not systematically influence the macro 
decisions for pension policy. They conclude in their analysis that there is no evidence for 
any systematic effects on pension reforms apart from through the two factors of demographic 
change and  institutional structure (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 2).      
 
 
Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005)’s findings, however, are insufficient to explain the trend of 
pension reform that is revealed in this study. As seen in the previous section, the type of 
pension institution does not account for the variation in pension reform strategies of OECD 
countries over the last 25 years. Their assertion that demographic factors are influential also 
does not match with these findings on pension reform strategies. This could be attributed to 
the fact that their analysis is based on pension reforms before 2000, targeting only 11 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Canada, the USA, Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan).  Alternatively, we might think of another factor that has affected 
pension reforms over the last 25 years: poverty in older people. In the following sections, 
this thesis explores the influence of poverty as one possible additional piece of the jigsaw, 
which perhaps helps explain those cases that are not fully explained by previous typologies.   
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Possible additional factor: poverty among older people 
The level of poverty among older people might have an impact on shaping pension reforms 
in addition to demographic change and pension institutions. This idea stems from the context 
where pensions have been placed in the contemporary welfare states. First, income security 
systems form the bedrock of welfare states and public pensions were introduced as an 
essential safety net. This is accepted within the social rights of citizenship, as social 
citizenship includes “the right to economic welfare and security” as well as “the right to 
share social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being” (Marshall, 2006: 30). As social 
citizenship is a core value of welfare states, the damage to social citizenship is regarded as a 
significant retreat of welfare states (Scruggs, 2007: 139-143). Furthermore, pensions are one 
of the programmes that can create strong interest groups. As welfare states matured, interest 
groups linked to social provision have been prominent political actors. They exercise 
political leverage to convince policy makers that they can take action to reward or punish 
them (Pierson, 1994: 30). As pensions are contribution-based benefits and enjoy a high 
degree of legal protection, current and future recipients expect them to be honoured (Clasen, 
2005: 93). Therefore, they wield mobilised power as welfare defenders; pension reforms 
involve an alteration of the existing distributional equilibrium, and potential losers from such 
reforms are likely to exploit veto points where available to defend their benefits (Pierson, 
2001: 305-306, 330-333).  
 
Also, the empirical evidence from Chapter Four implies the link between poverty and 
pensions. Previously this thesis demonstrated the national variation in poverty using the LIS 
microdata. This showed a wide range of poverty rates in older populations across countries. 
For example, the relative poverty rate in the Netherlands was the lowest level (3.2% in 1990), 
whilst Korea was the highest (41.4% in 2006) out of the 26 countries of the OECD. Also, 
303 
 
when the decrease in poverty rates after social security transfers were compared across 
countries, they ranged from 13% to 97% in the early 1990s. As addressed in Chapter Four, 
this indicates the different role of social security systems – mainly pension systems – in each 
country. Some countries intervene deeply in old-age risks, whilst other countries rely more 
on individuals to tackle poverty in later life. This empirical evidence from Chapter Four 
leads us to consider poverty in older people as an additional factor that influences the 
variation in pension reforms.   
 
In this regard, and building on Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) findings, we can expect that 
the level of poverty in older people plays a role in shaping pension reforms in a particular 
direction, in addition to population ageing and pension institutions. Different levels of 
poverty among older people might generate different incentives and pressures for pension 
politics. When old-age poverty is severe, incentives for pension politics might be generated 
to expand the pension system and block pension cuts. This may not have a straightforward 
impact on pension expansion, however, as such demand is constrained by the fiscal concerns 
of the period. In fact, as seen in Chapter Five, many countries employed targeting strategies 
rather than a universal approach. Additional benefits or favourable treatment for those on 
low incomes, carers, or other vulnerable groups are commonly observed in pension reforms 
over the last 25 years. However, it certainly represents “the emergence of policy objectives 
unrelated to austerity” (Bonoli & Natali, 2012: 12). It is therefore quite logical to expect that 
there would be a growing need for socialisation in the pension arena when a country has 
experienced severe poverty rates in older people. On the other hand, if the poverty rates were 
not severe, the country would not necessarily focus on the socialisation of risks but is more 
likely to adopt individualisation when under growing budgetary stress. Previously, Bonoli 
and Shinkawa (2005: 18) argue that the interplay between population ageing and pension 
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institutions delineate political confrontation in pension systems. In addition to them, this 
thesis suggests old-age poverty as another factor that affects pension reforms. It interacts 
with pension institutions, along with demographic change, to generate pressure and 
incentives on pension politics. These factors subsequently determine the direction of pension 
reforms taken by policy change (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 21) (Figure 7.1 below).   
 
Figure 7.1: Factors that shape pension reforms 
 
Source: Revised by author based on Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005).  
 
There are several studies on the impacts of pension designs and structures on the poverty 
level in a country (Hong, 2005; Kim, 2000; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Seok, 2010; Whitehouse, 
2003; Yamada, 2002). There are also various studies on pension reforms and income 
inequality (Oshio & Shimizutani, 2005; van Vliet et al., 2012). However, researchers have 
not explored the specific content of pension reforms in relation to old-age poverty in as much 
detail. Furthermore, individualisation seems to be a more attractive topic than socialisation 
in pension research (Hinrichs, 2000: 84-90). Also, relatively little attention has been paid to 
poverty rates as a motive for pension reforms. This might be because the causal relationship 
between poverty and pension reforms is not easy to capture. As there are various factors that 
affect decision making in the policy arena, and the timing of the introduction of certain 
reforms varies depending on each circumstance, it is unlikely to be possible to analyse this 
quantitatively. Alternatively, one might consider qualitative research, but then it would be 
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limited to small-N. In this context, this thesis attempts a rather simple comparison of poverty 
among older people and pension reforms. It seems to be intuitive and may not serve as a 
conclusive empirical evidence that proves the link between poverty and pension reform 
strategies. However, it possibly shows the ‘big picture’, as the data used here is highly 
sophisticated and has rich information. It provides us with a good insight about the link 
between pension reforms and old-age poverty. 
 
The correlation between poverty and pension reforms  
Based on the arguments above, it can be hypothesised that higher poverty rates in people 
aged 65 and over in the early 1990s has led to more socialisation within pension reforms in 
the period 1990-2015. This thesis computed the poverty rates of OECD countries in the early 
1990s in Chapter Four. Poverty rates for those aged 65 and over – calculated as 50% of the 
median income using the LIS microdata – has showed wide variation across countries (Table 
4.6). The poverty rates are combined here with the country memberships of ideal types from 
Chapter Six (Figure 6.5). Because of data paucity Portugal and New Zealand are excluded, 
and poverty rates in Korea and Japan are based on figures in the middle of the 2000s instead 
of the early 1990s. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 7.2 below, there is a loose relationship 
between ideal types and poverty rates. The average poverty rates tend to be higher in 
countries that belong to the socialisation reform ideal type (29.4% on average) and the 
socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type (18.3% on average). Compared to these two, 
the countries in the stable type (12.2% on average) and individualisation reform ideal type 
(10.9% on average) show relatively lower poverty rates among older people. Some 
exceptions are also observed. The poverty rate was relatively high (21.5%) in the USA, but 
pension reforms did not intensively take place for 25 years for either socialisation or 
individualisation. On the contrary, Canada pursued pension reforms for both socialisation 
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and individualisation, even though the poverty rates among older population were at a 
relatively lower level (5.8%).  
 
 
Table 7.2: Country memberships and poverty rates (1990–2015) 
    Old-age poverty 
rates  
(early 1990s) 
Average of old-age  
poverty rates  
(early 1990s) 
Socialisation  Korea 41.4 29.4 
Ireland 17.3 
Socialisation- 
individualisation 
Greece 27.3 18.3 
Australia 24.2 
UK 24.1 
France 14.7 
Japan  13.6 
Canada 5.8 
Stable  USA  21.5 12.2 
Norway 14 
Austria  11.9 
Luxembourg 11.8 
Denmark 11 
Netherland 3.2 
New Zealand - 
Individualisation Italy 15.7 10.9 
Finland 14.1 
Hungary 13.6 
Belgium 12.1 
Spain 12 
Poland 10.9 
Germany 10.4 
Switzerland  8.4 
Sweden 6.4 
Czech Republic 5.7 
Portugal - 
 
* Relative poverty rates at 50% of the median income threshold, aged 65 and over. 
* Poverty rates in Korea and Japan are based on figures from the mid- 2000s.    
* Portugal and New Zealand are not covered in the LIS Microdata.  
Source: Author based on the LIS Microdata.   
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This thesis has also showed the size of the effects of social security transfers on poverty in 
Chapter Four (Figure 4.2). This demonstrated a wide variation across countries. Income 
security systems – mainly pensions – play a vital role to combating poverty in old age in 
some countries, whilst they only play an ‘assistant’ role in others. Figure 7.2 below is the 
combined result of this data (Figure 4.2) and the country memberships of ideal types (Figure 
6.5). For a clear comparison, this thesis eliminated Mexico, the Slovak Republic and Iceland 
from the original graph. The graph also does not include Portugal and New Zealand, as the 
LIS microdata does not cover them. The blue bar indicates countries that scored highly in 
socialisation; they belong either to the socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type or 
the socialisation reform ideal type. The grey bar indicates countries that scored low in 
socialisation; they belong either to the individualisation reform ideal type or the stable type. 
The result is similar to the result on poverty rates above. There is a moderate overall 
association between the size of the effects of social security transfers and the trend of 
socialisation.  
 
The correlation is relatively clear in the left end and the right half of the graph. It indicates 
that pension reforms to socialise individual’s risks were likely to occur in countries where 
the social security transfers played a minimal role in combating poverty. On the other hand, 
those reforms did not intensively take place in countries where social security transfers 
already played a significant role. The middle part of the graph is a mix of colours, which 
implies that the association between the two factors is rather vague. Some outliers are also 
observed; like Table 7.2 above, the USA did not pursue socialisation in pensions even though 
their social security transfers did not contribute effectively to reducing poverty rates. Poland 
and Italy are also similar cases. Canada is another anomaly; pension reforms in socialisation 
intensively took place in Canada even though their pension system functions relatively well 
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in reducing poverty. These anomalies might indicate the possible influence of other factors 
that shape pension reforms such as the pattern of demographic change and pension politics.         
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Decrease in poverty rates after social security transfers and the distribution 
of countries scoring high in socialisation    
 
 
* Countries represented by blue bars scored high in the set of socialisation.   
Source: Author based on the LIS microdata.   
 
In summary, as we hypothesised at the beginning, higher poverty rates in people aged 65 and 
over in the early 1990s led to more socialisation in pension reforms in the period 1990 - 2015. 
The relationship between the trend and the size of the effects of poverty reduction of social 
security transfers is also clear; socialisation reforms took place in countries where the size 
of the poverty reduction effect of income security systems was relatively small in the early 
1990s. This result implies that old-age poverty plays a role in shaping pension reforms; when 
poverty rates in older people are severe, pension reforms are likely to take place to socialise 
old-age risks. It could be an additional piece that explains pension reform strategies in this 
era, in addition to demographic change and pension institutions; old-age poverty and 
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population ageing interact with pension institutions, exerting influence on pension politics 
which decide the direction of pension reform. As addressed in the previous section, further 
sophisticated empirical evidence would be required to clearly confirm their relationship. 
However, despite its limited capabilities, it is still an interesting finding considering that only 
limited research has paid attention to the aspect of socialisation reforms. In fact, “the term 
pension reform is increasingly used as a synonym for cuts in old age pension” over the last 
two decades (Bonoli et al., 2000: 30). To fill the gap in existing knowledge, the following 
section explores this finding further.      
 
Further analysis 
This thesis shed light on socialisation reforms in pensions in the previous chapter. The 
second fuzzy-set analysis in Chapter Six was based on the three dimensions of the 
socialisation of risks, based on three empirical indicators: coverage, adequacy, and security 
of investment. These three dimensions give us a total of eight ideal types in pension reforms. 
The outcomes of the fuzzy-set ideal type analysis (Figure 6.12) revealed seven ideal types, 
as examples of the adequacy-and-security-focused reform type were not observed. This 
means it is a theoretical combination but does not exist in the observed data. The 26 countries 
were relatively evenly distributed over all the other ideal types. The stable type was revealed 
as the biggest group, with seven membership countries. The coverage-focused and 
adequacy-focused types followed with five membership countries. The coverage-and-
adequacy-focused type has four countries. The all-inclusive and coverage-and-security-
focused type have two countries each. Lastly, the security-focused type has only one.  
 
A dominant trend was not identified from the above outcome, but there are three important 
findings derived from the analysis. First, the outcome of this analysis indicates that the 
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socialisation of old-age risks has continued despite fiscal austerity. Aside from the seven that 
belonged to the stable type, all countries belonged to other reform types that focused on at 
least one of the three aspects of socialisation, coverage, adequacy, and security of investment. 
The majority of OECD countries took reforms to socialise old-age risks at some point over 
the last 25 years. This finding show that the retrenchment of pension systems does not 
provide the whole picture. Secondly, the majority of countries made a strategic choice to 
address urgent concerns rather than comprehensive improvement. There are only two 
countries that reformed pensions in a comprehensive manner (the all-inclusive reform type). 
Instead, a considerable number of countries chose one or two elements to enhance protection 
in old-age. This result might indicate the lack of capacity for comprehensive socialisation in 
most countries for the last 25 years. Seven countries are classified as stable, but it should be 
noted that this does not mean that they did not strengthen old-age protection. It means they 
pursued reforms, but the intensity of reform was not enough to be classified as ‘IN’ the sets 
of socialisation of old-age risks. Thirdly, traditional types of protection received attention 
rather than new types of protection. Traditionally, coverage and benefit adequacy are 
barometers of old-age protection in pensions. On the other hand, security of investment is a 
new type of protection that appeared since circa 1990s. It has been implemented as a 
countermeasure to the risks of prevalent private pensions. The outcome shows, however, that 
security of investment did not receive much attention for the over the last 25 years. There is 
only one country that focused on security of investment. Instead, the number of countries 
that focused on coverage and adequacy (coverage-focused, adequacy-focused, and 
coverage-and-adequacy-focused types) was far greater. This result shows that traditional 
protections were prioritised despite of the growing role of private pensions across countries 
over the last 25 years.  
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In light of the case knowledge from Chapter Five, the result seems to reflect each country’s 
practical necessities in pension systems. Previously, this thesis showed the correlation 
between old-age poverty and socialisation reforms. Countries come under pressure to 
socialise old-age risks when the poverty level among older people is severe. This then 
interacts with pension institutions together with the pattern of demographic change, and this 
in turn affects pension politics. Within this process, countries choose their own strategies to 
compensate for the weaknesses in their pension institutions, which are responsible for old-
age poverty. For example, the coverage of private pensions does not reach 100% in any 
multi-pillar system (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005 13). Thus, multi-pillar countries with high 
old-age poverty might consider measures for expanding coverage as their strategy to combat 
poverty. In this way countries seek effective combinations from various measures for 
coverage, adequacy, and security of investment that complement the weak points in their 
pension system. As each country’s strategy is shaped by the interplay of multiple factors – 
old-age poverty, ageing patterns, and pension institutions, as well as pension politics – the 
result is not necessarily associated with a particular welfare regime or pension typology, or 
even old-age poverty rates.    
 
The case of Japan illustrates this well. Japan belongs to the coverage-focused reform type. 
Japan introduced their mandatory public pensions at an early stage in East Asia (the 
Employees’ Pension in 1940 and the National Pension in 1961) and expanded them as the 
economy flourished. Pension reforms between the 1960s and the 1980s mostly aimed at 
socialising old-age risks. However, this favourable situation changed gradually as Japan 
faced a recession. Furthermore, the pace of population ageing grew faster than in any other 
country in the OECD due to prolonged increases in life expectancy and a decrease in fertility 
rates. The old-age dependency ratio was 13.0% in 1975, a moderate level within the OECD, 
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but had more than doubled by 2000, when it reached 27.6% (OECD, 2015: 159). As a result, 
pension sustainability has become a major concern. Since the mid-1980s, individualisation 
reforms have continued, with blame-avoidance strategies becoming repeatedly used 
( Shinkawa, 2005: 164-174).  
 
In the circumstances, socialisation reforms to improve coverage have appeared. The 
frequency of coverage in Japan reaches 8, far greater than the OECD average, 3.5. First, 
pension coverage was expanded to reflect the change in society. According to Bonoli and 
Shinkawa (2005), Japan belongs to the Bismarkian lite type, consisting of a flat-rate basic 
pension and a moderate earnings-related occupational pension. Despite these pensions being 
mandatory schemes, both had coverage issues. For the basic pension, the legal coverage is 
residents aged 20 to 59 regardless of income. However, the participant rate dropped from 
84.7% in 1990 to 62.8% in 2012 (MHLW, 2015), as some people – mostly those who did not 
have withholding obligations from wages, such as self-employed and mature students – 
increasingly refused to pay contributions. The strict entitlement conditions for benefits and 
the changing labour market were criticised for these reasons. The basic pension system 
neither provided benefits nor returned the contributions that people had made if people did 
not satisfy the qualification criteria within the period. The qualifying period was 25 years 
and there was a growing number of people who were not expected to meet the conditions 
due to the increases in atypical jobs and the frequent in-and-out movements of the labour 
market. In addition, the existing contribution exemption system did not effectively cover 
low-income people. Low-income earners could claim a non-contributory period so that they 
could receive benefits without fully satisfying the 25 years. However, it was criticised for its 
low take-up rate and exposing people to poverty in later life (Kenzoh & Kenzoh, 2004: 114-
122). Regarding the earnings-related occupational pension, its coverage was limited to 
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secure jobs in the private sector. As a result, a growing number of people with irregular jobs 
were excluded from the second pillar pension. Altogether, the mismatch of the pension 
systems within the changing society was highlighted as a serious problem. As a result, in 
response to increasingly flexible labour market, both public pensions extended their 
coverage to part-time workers. Low-income earners, students, and women on maternity 
leave were also exempted from contribution payments, or allowed to delay their payments. 
Most importantly, the basic pension shortened the qualifying period for pension benefits 
from 25 years to only 10 years. This had a substantial impact on the increase in the number 
of people qualified for receiving pension benefits. Secondly, the voluntary private pension 
system was promoted. Japan has eased the conditions to join occupational pensions to 
promote both DB and DC pensions on top of mandatory public pensions.  
 
It is worth noting that other measures of socialisation – adequacy and security of investment 
– were also employed in Japan. Their frequencies were at the average level for the OECD, 4 
and 2 for each. When it comes to benefit adequacy, a general increase for all pensioners was 
not preferred due to the pressure of pension sustainability. Instead, favourable treatments for 
people with low incomes were introduced. For example, the reforms aimed at boosting the 
pension amount by allowing workers of different categories to make up contribution records 
retroactively. Another way of socialising the old-age risks was to improve pension security. 
The basic pension and the earnings-related occupational pension were previously managed 
by a public institution, the Social Insurance Agency (SIA). It was criticised for its 
inefficiency and incompetence due to the scandal of missing pension records in 2007; the 
SIA failed to identify nearly 51 million public pension accounts. In addition to the scandal, 
the falsification of pension records by SIA staff was discovered in 2008. As a result, a non-
public independent agency was established in 2010 that replaced the SIA. Also, pension 
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reforms took place to secure fund management in the 2000s. They especially targeted 
Employee’s Pension Funds (EPFs), the private occupational pension that substitutes benefits 
from the earnings-related part of public pensions and can provide additional benefits. This 
was favoured by large employers, but was raising concerns about persistently poor 
investment returns by the early 2000s. To secure pension funds, a pension reform in 2014 
prohibited the establishment of new EPFs, and encouraged existing EPFs to dissolve and 
convert to other types of pension plans.  
 
In terms of pension politics, these socialisation reforms can be understood as part of a reform 
package that contained retrenchment measures. Häusermann (2012: 116) notes that 
combining different types of policy reforms as a package deal is now a necessary condition 
for retrenchment in continental pension politics. They can be even a combination of reform 
measures that go in opposite directions. Japanese pension reforms confirm this argument. 
Japan continued to face rapid population ageing beyond the expected level, and the 
government repeated retrenchment reforms – cuts in replacement rates, increases to the 
pension age and contribution rates, etc. – in every actuarial revaluation (Uzuhashi, 2011: 97-
99). These repeated retrenchments led to public distrust in the Japanese pension system,  
showing the limitations of blame-avoidance politics (Shinkawa, 2005: 174-176). As a result, 
with the landslide election victory for the Democratic Party of Japan in 2009 for the first 
time in 55 years, the government proposed a structural reform of pension systems. It aimed 
at consolidating the segmented second pillar pensions into a single earnings-related DB 
scheme. It also planned to raise consumption tax from 5% to 10% by 2015 (this was recently 
extended to 2019). It was one of the most fundamental reforms seen in decades. In this 
instance, a variety of socialisation reforms were introduced as a reform package, 
“Comprehensive reform of tax and social security”. This can be seen as a strategy to 
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minimise the negative consequences of retrenchment. In short, practical necessity relating to 
pension institutions and pension politics contributed to the implementation of socialisation 
reforms under the growing sustainability issue in Japan.  
 
As another example, the UK belongs to the all-inclusive reform type. Pension reforms in the 
UK over the last 25 years span across coverage, adequacy, and security of investment. 
However, this is not to say that the UK did not individualise old-age risks in the period. As 
shown in the previous chapter, the UK pursued pension reforms in both directions. This 
section aims at highlighting the socialisation aspect in particular. In terms of socialisation 
the UK is surprising, especially considering that the UK is a model country of the Liberal 
welfare regime. Contrary to the regime’s typical preference for the market, the UK pursued 
socialisation reforms intensively and inclusively. It is also deviated from the general trend 
of OECD countries – taking the strategic choice rather than comprehensive approach.    
 
In order to clearly trace the trajectory of pension reforms in the UK over the last 25 years, it 
is necessary to understand the situation prior to the 1990s. Looking at the demographic 
factors, the old-age dependency ratio in the UK was at a substantially high level from an 
early stage. It reached 25.4% in 1975, which was the fourth highest among the 34 OECD 
countries (OECD, 2015: 159). In line with the increase in the ageing population, pension 
expenditure was projected to rise significantly in the future, despite ungenerous benefits by 
international standards (Pierson, 1994: 58). Under these circumstances, the Thatcher 
premiership in the 1980s proclaimed “the free economy and the strong state” (Gamble, 1994: 
38-45). During the 1980s, the Conservative government tried to contain public expenditure 
by promoting market provision. The rhetoric of individualism, self-reliance, and Victorian 
virtues were dominant in social policy at this time, replacing Beveridgean values (Clarke, 
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1987: 189-190; Digby, 1989: 126-131). According to Pierson (1994: 58-64), this trend was 
reflected in the approach to pensions. First, the Conservative government limited the Basic 
State Pension through the 1980 Social Security Act. This changed the basis for indexing the 
benefits; it had been uprated in line with higher prices or earnings, but was changed to be in 
line with only prices. Secondly, the 1986 Social Security Act lowered the benefit level of 
State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) and promoted private pensions by 
deregulating private providers instead. The government tried to make private pensions the 
dominant form of provision for the whole population, rather than just higher earners (Taylor-
Gooby, 2005: 116). This policy stance was continued by the New Labour government in the 
2000s. After the successive electoral defeats, the Labour party had changed their strategy to 
embrace middle-class voters (Taylor-Gooby, 2005: 126-127). They abandoned the state 
pension centred idea and followed the overall trend of the former government; the state 
pension focused on the poor whilst private pension was encouraged for the rest of the 
population. Consequently, the benefit level of the basic pension declined and SERPS was 
phased out. Many occupational pensions have shifted from a DB to a DC scheme, with 
reduced employers’ contributions (Taylor-Gooby, 2005: 124-135). This was not 
accompanied by an explicit blame-avoidance strategy, according to Taylor-Gooby, due to the 
weak mobilisation of interest groups and the British constitutional system that allows 
significant authority to the government (Taylor-Gooby, 2005: 133).  
 
This is not, however, the whole picture of pension reform in the UK. Pension reforms that 
socialised old-age risks were observed since the 1990s together with individualisation 
reforms.  There may be two explanations. First, the high level of pensioner poverty called 
the public and politicians’ attention to the need to socialise old-age risks. According to the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, pensioner poverty increased significantly during the 1980s. It 
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was about 16% in 1984 and reached 43% in 1989. It then gradually dropped to about 26% 
by 199827 (McGuinness, 2016: 16). Also, as seen in Chapter Four, the UK shows an 80% 
rate of poverty reduction effects of social security transfers in the early 1990s, and the 
poverty rate in older people was the fourth highest in 27 OECD countries. It might be 
difficult to argue that the consistent reform trend that individualised old-age risks since the 
1980s was a decisive factor on high poverty among older people, as multiple factors 
influence the relative poverty rates (Shephard, 2003: 1-4). Nevertheless, pensioner poverty 
clearly gained attention from political parties. For example, the Labour party’s manifesto in 
1997 emphasised the need for adequate pensions as “for today's pensioners Conservative 
policies have created real poverty, growing inequality and widespread insecurity” (Labour 
party, 1997). The Liberal Democrats also promised “a decent standard of living in your 
retirement” (Liberal Democrats, 2010). Secondly, several issues raised concerns about the 
individualisation reforms that had taken place. The pensions mis-selling scandal happened 
in the early 1990s and the pension policy that allowed the private pension industry to sell 
personal pensions to individuals without security measures were examples of these issues 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2005: 124-135). These triggered the need for better regulation to protect 
pension benefits against investment failure in funded pensions. Also, the ‘75p pension rise’ 
in 1999 created anger among pensioners’ about pension benefits. This was because the 
September’s inflation figure was only 1.1% in 1999, and the pension’s uprating had been 
tied with inflation since the 1980 reform. The Liberal Democrats were critical: “ever since 
Mrs Thatcher broke the link between pensions and earnings in 1980, successive Labour and 
Conservative governments have allowed the state pension to decline” (Liberal Democrats, 
                                                          
27 The poverty rate is at 60% of the median income using data compiled from the Family Resources Survey and Family 
Expenditure Survey, whilst the poverty rate in Chapter Four was computed at 50% of median income using the LIS 
microdata.    
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2010).  
 
Consequently, several socialisation reforms have taken place in the UK since the late 1990s. 
The UK introduced a series of regulations for the investment of pension funds, such as 
minimum requirements of solvency on pension funds and annual reporting of assets and 
liabilities in the 1990s. Compensation schemes for occupational pensions as measures to 
safeguard pension funds were also implemented. When it comes to coverage and benefit 
adequacy, the UK moved towards greater protection that targeted low earners in the 2000s. 
A state pension credit was introduced. Also, periods of adoption, paternity leave, and caring 
for family members with disabilities were treated in the same way as normal work in pension 
histories. The pension triple lock in 2011 is also worth noting. By reversing the indexing 
reforms of the 1980 Social Security Act, the state pension rises every year by the highest of 
price inflation, earnings growth or 2.5%. This was promised by the manifesto of Liberal 
Democrats in the 2010 General Election, and was introduced by the coalition government of 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. When considering it was a restoration of the 
uprating rule that was abolished by the Conservative government in the 1980s, it is a 
meaningful shift for socialisation.  
 
When considering the UK’s liberal policy-making tradition, such all-inclusive socialisation 
reforms over the last 25 years might be surprising. Regarding this point, Bonoli and 
Shinkawa (2005: 13-14) explain the political chances to claim credit in the multi-pillar 
system. According to their argument, the second pillar, private pension, attracts policy 
makers for two reasons. For one, the second pillar pension is relatively free from 
sustainability issues compared to the first pillar, the PAYG public pension. Also, it has room 
for expansion as the coverage of private occupational pensions tends to be limited to stable 
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jobs. In this context, policy makers try to expand the scheme for those who are excluded 
from the current system as an electoral strategy. They also employ it as political exchange 
when they pursue retrenchment reforms in the first pillar pension. Bonoli and Shinkawa’s 
argument is partially applicable to the case of the UK. It can be argued that the government 
utilised socialisation reforms as credit claiming, but it was not limited to the second pillar 
pension. In the UK, improving security of investment was for the second pillar, but expanding 
coverage and adequacy were observed in both the first and second pillars. In this way, the 
UK socialised old-age risks since the late 1990s as countermeasures against earlier changes 
that had individualised old-age risks in order to alleviate old-age poverty. This may not mean 
that there has been a fundamental change in policy stance in the UK, but it supports our view 
that the interplay between poverty and pension institutions might delineate pension reforms.   
 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the findings and their implications. First, pension reforms 
between 1990 and 2015 reflect the characteristics of the social investment perspective of the 
time. This can be understood as a diverse configuration of the socialisation and the 
individualisation of risks. The most dominant trend was individualisation reform, whilst the 
least prevalent trend was socialisation reform. Secondly, the trend of pension reforms over 
the last 25 years did not match with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regimes,  Bonoli and 
Shinkawa’s  (2005) pension typologies, or Finch et al. (2017)’s social investment typologies. 
Deterministic path dependence was not observed in pension reforms as reform strategies 
converged regardless of regimes or pension typologies. Also, the path of pension reform was 
not consistent in most of countries for the 25 years. Thirdly, this thesis compared the level 
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of old-age poverty and the trend of pension reforms. Countries with higher poverty rates in 
people aged 65 and over in the early 1990s tend to pursue more socialisation reforms 
between 1990 and 2015. The relationship between the size of the effects of poverty reduction 
of social security transfers and pension reform also showed similar trend. Countries that less 
effectively decreased old-age poverty through social security programmes in the early 1990s 
tend to pursue more socialisation reforms for the last 25 years. These findings imply that the 
level of poverty among older people could be an additional piece that shapes pension-reform 
strategies in addition to demographic change and pension institutions. Lastly, the 
configuration of three types of socialisation measures – coverage, adequacy, and security of 
investment – did not match with welfare regimes, pension typologies, or old-age poverty 
rates. Based on case knowledge, this thesis concluded the pension reform strategy in each 
country reflects a pragmatic mix of reform strategies designed to address the specific old-
age poverty risks that have developed in their system.  
 
Goldberg (2002) predicted that the trend of retrenchment will be maintained in the future as 
welfare states become less popular and less supportive since they are consistently costly. He 
argues that it will force welfare states to be restructured in the direction of poor-law states, 
widening the gap between recipient and provider. This thesis, however, identifies contrasting 
evidence. The trend of individualisation might be continued, but at the same time, the need 
for the socialisation of old-age risks will be highlighted in the future. As this thesis has 
examined, the dominant trend of pension reforms for the last 25 years was strengthening 
individualisation. Furthermore, increased flexible contracts in the labour market will reduce 
protection further, as more people will not be able to satisfy the long contribution record 
criteria. This will severely hit social at-risk groups, as they will fall into ‘outsiders’ in a 
dualised labour market. These changes together will weaken old-age protection resulting in 
321 
 
increases in old-age poverty and inequality. All things taken together, severe poverty among 
older people will impose pressure on socialisation reforms in pension systems, just as it has 
affected pension reforms for the last 25 years. This is in line with Ebbinghaus’ (2012: 202) 
view on the future of pensions; “the retreat of the state from its old-age protection may 
ironically increase the political pressure for its increased role in securing and regulating old-
age income provision”. The socialisation of old-age risks will not be easily forsaken in 
pension systems, despite the continuing prevalence of austerity.     
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Chapter 8 : Conclusion  
 
Balancing sustainability and adequacy in welfare support is one of the most crucial 
challenges faced by most contemporary welfare states. In the stylised periodisation of 
welfare state histories, the eras of the ‘golden age’ and ‘retrenchment’ were succeeded by 
attempts to prevent poverty and unemployment through the expansion of social investment 
measures. The latter is comprised of multiple policies that have different – at times even 
contradictory – aims and effects in securing economic participation and high paid jobs. As 
earlier literature on changing welfare states addresses, social policy at this time often took 
the form of multi-dimensional reform packages (Bonoli & Natali, 2012: 12) and political 
exchange and social pacts are common practices within the introduction of reforms 
(Häusermann, 2012: 116). Due to this complexity, the prevailing terms of ‘welfare expansion’ 
and ‘welfare retrenchment’ are no longer sufficient to reflect welfare dynamics. A new 
approach is required to analyse the changing dynamics of welfare states beyond a unilinear, 
single-dimension conception (Kvist, 2007: 200). Reflecting this, this thesis presents two 
alternative concepts in analysing welfare dynamics in recent decades: the socialisation and 
the individualisation of risks. These concepts reflect how social risks are managed in welfare 
states. Considering that the management of social risks is one of the main functions of 
welfare states, and that social policy is the public management of social risks (Esping-
Andersen, 1999: 36), these concepts are a useful frame that captures the multi-dimensional 
dynamics of welfare states.      
 
Applying this analytical framework, this thesis focused on pension reforms across the OECD 
since the 1990s. This particular period of time was chosen because it is an interesting era for 
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comparative study. It is when the socialisation and individualisation of risks co-existed in 
many policy areas. Despite it not being associated with one unified body of economic 
thought or a particular economic crisis (Hemerijck, 2013: 119), this phase is distinctive from 
the previous eras (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Garland, 2016; Hemerijck, 2013; Jenson, 2012). 
The spread of the social investment perspective across countries was a factor in the 
generation of interesting dynamics (Garland, 2016: 128). This period of time has attracted 
extensive comparative research, but they tend to pay attention to the trend of the 
individualisation of risks to highlight the change from the previous era of ‘embedded 
liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1982). In doing so, the socialisation of risks has received much less 
attention from contemporary researchers. This gap in the existing literature on welfare 
dynamics is particularly noticeable in the area of pensions. Pensions are often considered 
just as a traditional passive income transfer, situated at the end of the spectrum of the social 
investment approach. This is, however, too simplistic a view regarding the pension dynamics 
of the time. Social investment is no substitute for pensions, but they are complementary 
(Hemerijck, 2013: 137). Pension reforms of the time thus reflect multi-dimensional aspects. 
On the one hand, reducing state responsibility should continue to improve the sustainability 
of pension systems in an ageing society. On the other hand, further protection is required 
from the flexible labour market, as pensions are the final safety-net for those not active in 
the labour market. It can be seen as “the emergence of policy objectives unrelated to austerity” 
(Bonoli & Natali, 2012: 12).  
 
In this regard, this thesis analysed pension reforms between 1990 and 2015 to understand 
the trends of pension reform strategies in the OECD. Specifically, this thesis answered four 
research questions. The first asked: how can we categorise the variety of pension reform 
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strategies adopted across the OECD since the 1990s? Summarising the answer to this 
research question is not easy, as it involves several steps. Before commencing, it should be 
noted again that the reason that attention was paid to the ‘categorisation’ of pension reform 
strategies was because it allows researchers systematic comparisons of welfare states, taking 
advantage of analytical and explanatory parsimony (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 88, 92). 
Categorising social phenomena using typologies is thus widely employed in comparative 
research. In this regard, this thesis generated typologies that highlight the variety of pension 
reform strategies across countries.  
 
Answering the first research question followed three steps. We began with sourcing data, as 
very few data sources were suitable for this study. Data was required that presented detailed 
comparative and historical information about pension reforms, and which reflected the 
changes in the socialisation and individualisation of risks over the last 25 years. Existing 
data available in Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles was utilised to construct a 
new dataset. Then, the descriptive data was converted to a continuous form by counting the 
frequencies of reforms. The second step applied the research method, employing FSITA 
within the new dataset. FSITA is a relatively recently developed methodology which has 
received attention from various comparative researchers. It functions as a bridge between 
variable- and case-oriented studies, taking a configurational approach that recognises social 
phenomena as combinations of multiple attributes. FSITA was particularly appropriate for 
this thesis as it is optimised for mid-N cases, and as such was suitable to apply to the OECD 
country cases in this study. Considering these benefits, this thesis employed FSITA as the 
research method. The third step analysed the data using FSITA. This step provided the direct 
answer to the first research question. FSITA provides us ideal types and country 
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memberships of each ideal type. In doing so, this thesis categorised the variety of pension 
reform strategies across 26 OECD countries between 1990 and 2015.  
 
This thesis has two streams of empirical analysis. As the first main analysis, we constructed 
a property space of FSITA based on two concepts, the socialisation and individualisation of 
risks. Using these two dimensions, four ideal types of reform trends were identified. They 
are as follows. First, the socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type refers to countries 
that score highly in both socialisation and individualisation. This means they intensively 
reformed their pension schemes in both directions; further state protection was provided that 
externalised old-age risks from individuals to the state, whilst the responsibility for 
protection was also partly transferred from the state onto individual pensioners, mostly in 
order to improve the sustainability of pensions. Secondly, the socialisation reform ideal type 
refers to countries that score highly on socialisation but low on individualisation. These 
countries aimed at increasing government intervention to absorb old-age risks in pension 
reforms rather than promoting self-responsibility against old-age risks. Thirdly, the 
individualisation reform ideal type refers to countries that score highly on individualisation 
but low on socialisation. Contrary to the socialisation reform type, they facilitated self-
responsibility for old-age risks, and treated social protection for old age as less important 
within their reforms. Lastly, the stable ideal type scores low on both socialisation and 
individualisation, meaning that countries were less active in making pension reforms toward 
either the socialisation or the individualisation of risks.  
 
The first categorisation of pension reform strategies was followed by the second empirical 
analysis, the variety of pension reform strategies for the socialisation of risks. This thesis 
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argued that the socialisation of risks in pension reforms received less attention in earlier 
literature due to the principle academic focus that addressed how welfare states manage to 
improve pension sustainability. In order to fill the gap in the literature, this study categorised 
welfare states based on three elements of the socialisation of risks, coverage, adequacy, and 
security of investment. These three dimensions generated eight ideal types. First, the all-
inclusive reform type refers to countries that scored highly on all three dimensions. These 
countries inclusively employed three types of measures to socialise old-age risks in pension 
reforms. Then there are countries that scored highly on only two dimensions. The coverage-
and-adequacy-focused reform type refers to countries that placed importance on improving 
the coverage and adequacy of pensions, but focused less on the security of investment in 
socialising old-age risks. Similarly, the adequacy-and-security-focused reform type refers to 
countries that employed strategies to improve adequacy and security of investment, but not 
for coverage. The coverage-and-security-focused reform type refers to countries that gave 
priority to coverage and security of investment over adequacy. On the other hand, some 
countries only scored highly on one dimension. The coverage-focused reform type refers to 
countries that exclusively focused on improving pension coverage among their reform 
strategies. The adequacy-focused reform type refers to countries that pursued reforms that 
improved pension adequacy. The security-focused reform type refers to countries that almost 
exclusively focused on security of investment. Lastly, the stable type refers to countries that 
scored low on all three dimensions. These countries did not show a particular emphasis on 
any strategies for the socialisation of risks in pension reforms.  
 
Let us move on to the second research question: what are the trends in pension reforms 
among OECD countries since the 1990s? This thesis answered this question by reflecting on 
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the previous two fuzzy-set ideal type analyses. First, this thesis addressed the trends in the 
overall pension reforms across countries. Previously four ideal types of pension reforms 
were identified using two dimensions; the socialisation and individualisation of risks. The 
results from the FSITA empirically confirmed all four ideal types. They revealed that the 
dominant reform type over the last 25 years is individualisation reform. It has 11 
membership countries making it the biggest group: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Finland, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Such high 
commitment to the individualisation of old-age risks is in line with various earlier studies 
that argued the retreat of old-age protection under austerity (Bonoli, George, & Taylor-
Gooby, 2000; Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005; Ebbinghaus, 2005; 2012; Goldberg, 2002; Scruggs, 
2007). It reflects the prevailing pressure for fiscal austerity. The thesis empirically confirmed 
this trend even in cases like Germany, where the pension system was projected to be 
economically unsustainable at an early stage.  
 
The second most common reform type is the stable type. It has seven membership countries: 
Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the USA. This 
means that more than a quarter of the countries in the study showed a significantly lower 
frequency of reforms, to the extent that they could not be categorised into any of the other 
ideal types. It is a surprising result when the fluctuations of the world economy and dynamic 
changes in societies over the last decades are considered. The reason that these countries did 
not intensively engage in pension reforms might stem from two possibilities; pension 
reforms were not a primary concern, or pension reforms were required but discouraged by 
pension politics. This thesis highlighted the former case using a short case study on the 
Netherlands.  
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Meanwhile, socialisation received less attention in pension reforms over the last 25 years. It 
was less common to undertake intensive reforms in both socialisation and individualisation 
at the same time. The socialisation-individualisation reform type has six membership 
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Japan and the UK. Also, the socialisation 
reform type has only two membership countries: Korea and Ireland. The reason that it was 
the least preferred reform type might be in line with the fiscal pressures of public finance 
and the politics of welfare austerity. Taking into consideration the growing budgetary stress 
in many countries, countries would have had particular reasons to strengthen old-age 
protection. This thesis argued that it might be related to their ‘starting point’; countries that 
did not sufficiently socialise old-age risks in the beginning of the 1990s might have a strong 
motivation to improve pension protection since then, whilst countries that highly socialised 
old-age risks in the beginning of the 1990s might feel less urgency to socialise pension 
systems further in the following fiscal austerity. This thesis shed lights on the case of Korea 
as an example.  
 
As a second empirical analysis, this thesis delineated the trends in socialisation reforms 
across countries. Previously eight ideal types were generated from the three dimensions of 
the socialisation of old-age risks, coverage, adequacy, and security of investment. The results 
from the FSITA confirmed only seven ideal types out of the eight; the adequacy-and-
security-focused type was not empirically observed in this thesis. This means that the 
adequacy-and-security-focused type is a theoretical combination but does not exist in the 
data generated from Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles. However, the 
empirical analysis showed a relatively even distribution of country membership between the 
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other seven ideal types. The stable type formed the biggest group, with seven member 
countries. Meanwhile, the security-focused reform type was the least common, with only 
one member country. The other ideal types had between two and five member countries.     
 
Consequently, this thesis did not find any particular dominant trend in socialisation reforms 
across countries over the last 25 years. Nevertheless, three interesting findings were 
delineated from the empirical results. Firstly, the trend of the socialisation of risks has 
continued in most countries during the period. As addressed above, this thesis revealed that 
the stable type has seven membership countries, forming the biggest group among the eight. 
This means, however, that the other 19 countries strengthened government protection within 
their pension systems, using at least one of the three measures (coverage, adequacy, and 
security of investment). It is an interesting finding as it shows that retrenchment does not 
represent the whole story of the period. The result indicates that socialising old-age risks 
through pension reforms was quite a common practice across countries, despite the 
prevailing pressure for fiscal austerity over the last 25 years. Secondly, the empirical result 
shows that making a strategic choice was much more common rather than pursuing 
comprehensive improvement. For example, the all-inclusive reform type has only two 
membership countries; the UK and Ireland. The remaining countries belong to other reform 
types, which represent the configuration of one or two measures. This result might be 
indicative of limited capacity in the socialisation of old-age risks through pension systems, 
due to fiscal pressure. This pressure might lead the majority of countries to focus on a 
pragmatic mix of reform strategies that target issues specific to each country, rather than 
comprehensive improvement. Lastly, this thesis revealed that the traditional types of 
protection – improving pension coverage and adequacy – were preferred over the new type 
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of protection, security of investment. With the increase in private pensions, the need for 
security of investments in pension funds has gained attention since the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
the empirical result showed that the security-focused type has only one membership country, 
the USA, and the coverage-and-security-focused type has two countries. As addressed 
earlier, the adequacy-and-security-focused type was not observed in this data. This indicates 
that the traditional types of protection are still dominant in the socialisation of old-age risks 
in pension reforms. Regarding the analysis of the trends in the socialisation of risks, this 
thesis provided case commentaries of Korea, Japan, and the UK to support the empirical 
evidence. 
 
The third research question asked how pension reform strategies compare with existing 
welfare and pension typologies. To answer this question, earlier literature on welfare regimes 
and pension typologies was explored. For the former, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism and the related issues were intensively examined. After 
exploring the discourse for the Mediterranean, Antipodes, and East Asian models, this thesis 
reached the conclusion that focusing on the explanatory parsimony rather than accuracy 
would bring greater benefits in analysing the trends in pension reforms. For the latter, we 
critically examined the traditional dichotomy of Beveridgean and Bismarckian pension 
systems, as well as Bonoli’s (2003),  Hinrichs’s (2001) and Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) 
typologies. After examining each typology’s benefits and downsides in comparative study 
on pension reforms, this thesis chose Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) pension typologies in 
comparison with the pension reform strategies of this thesis, because they have better 
explanatory capacity beyond a simple dichotomy, and wider coverage of countries.  
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In this regard, this thesis compared the result of the FSITA of the pension reform strategies 
with  Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regimes, Finch et al.’s (2017) social investment 
typology and Bonoli and Shinkawa’s (2005) pension typologies. First, the result of the 
FSITA on pension reforms did not match with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare regimes. 
Any clear relationship between the reform typologies – socialisation-individualisation 
reform, socialisation reform, individualisation reform, and stable – and the welfare regimes 
– Liberal, Conservative, and Social Democratic –  was not confirmed. Similarly, this thesis 
found no clear relationship between the reform typologies and four social investment models. 
Also, no systematic relationship was discovered between the reform typologies and the 
pension typologies – social insurance, multi-pillar, and Bismarkian lite. These comparisons 
are partial results, as all of three existing typologies did not classify all 26 OECD countries. 
Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999) examined 19 countries, while Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005) 
categorised only 11 countries. Nevertheless, it was clear that the trends in pension reform 
strategies did not match with the regime characteristics or the institutional designs of pension 
systems. Rather, this thesis found general trends in pension reforms regardless of welfare 
models or pension typologies. Individualisation reforms were the most dominant trend and 
socialisation reforms were the least prevalent trend. In other words, the trends in pension 
reforms converged towards individualisation across welfare models and pension typologies 
for the last 25 years.   
 
These results led to the issue of path-development. In this thesis, path-deviance was observed 
in two ways. First, the reform strategies showed the general convergence regardless of 
regimes and pension typologies as addressed above. Also, going back to the first empirical 
analysis on the trends in pension reform strategies, we witnessed clear shifts in most 
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countries from the first period (1990-2003) to the second period (2004-2015). According to 
the FSITA results, only one third of the 26 countries kept to the same strategy throughout 
the whole period from 1990 to 2015. The other two thirds changed their focus in pension 
reform. This thesis revealed that some countries even shifted to the opposite direction, such 
as a shift from the socialisation-individualisation reform type to the stable type. Such 
discontinuity of reform strategies in each country is another form of path-deviance observed 
in this thesis. These results are in line with the ‘opened approach’ of path-dependence 
(Ebbinghaus, 2005; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). According to this approach, path-development 
is not necessarily associated with critical junctures; policies can be gradually and 
incrementally developed without path-breaking. The case commentary on the UK in this 
thesis supports this view; the UK showed path departure (Ebbinghaus, 2005: 17) in pension 
reforms in terms of the shift from the trend of individualisation throughout the 1980s to 
socialisation in the early 1990s. Such path departure does not mean, however, a convergence 
in welfare regimes or pension institutions. This thesis addressed the converging trend in 
pension reform strategies, specifically the convergence in input (legislation) rather than 
output (the effect of legislation) in pensions. In this sense, the results from the FSITA are 
limited to reform trends, and regime specific characteristics or pension institutions can be 
maintained despite the converging trend in pension reforms. 
 
These findings on the trends in pension reforms and comparisons with existing welfare and 
pension typologies lead us to the final research question: how can we explain reform 
pathways found across OECD countries? We explored the underlying mechanism of pension 
reforms in the contextual part of the thesis. Particular attention was paid to Bonoli and 
Shinkawa’s (2005) findings on factors that shape pension reforms. They introduced three 
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pension typologies – social insurance, multi-pillar, and Bismarkian lite – that were employed 
in the previous research question. Using these pension typologies, they examined 11 
countries and found two factors that best explain pension reforms: the pattern of population 
ageing and the institutional design of pension systems (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 3-9). They 
argued that countries have different paces of population ageing depending on region and 
have different issues and opportunities to solve these problems, depending on the pension 
type. As a result, the interplay between population ageing and pension institutions delineate 
political confrontations in pension systems (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 18). They were 
sceptical about other factors shaping pension reforms. They argued that their analysis did 
not find any systematic effect on pension reforms except for these two factors ( Bonoli & 
Shinkawa, 2005: 2).      
 
Their findings, however, did not fully explain the result from FSITA in this thesis. As 
addressed in the previous research question, the institutional design of pension systems did 
not account for the variation in pension reform strategies of OECD countries over the last 
25 years. The regional characteristics in population ageing also did not match with the trend 
in pension reforms. This might be because Bonoli and Shinkawa’s analysis was on pension 
reforms before 2000, targeting only 11 countries. To fill the gap in earlier studies, this thesis 
suggested an additional factor that affected pension reforms over the last 25 years: poverty 
in older people. Considering the status of pensions in contemporary welfare states, reforming 
them is not easy. We expect countries would have had strong incentives and pressures within 
pension politics. Based on the evidence from the LIS microdata in the contextual section, 
this thesis argued that poverty in older people affected pension reforms across countries over 
the last 25 years. It could be an additional piece that fill the gap between existing typologies 
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and the result from FSITA in this thesis, in addition to demographic considerations and the 
institutional design of pension systems. Poverty in older people interacts with pension 
institutions along with demographic changes to generate pressure and incentives within 
pension politics. These factors subsequently determine the direction of pension reforms 
taken by policy makers (Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005: 21). 
 
This thesis consequently hypothesised that higher poverty rates in people aged 65 and over 
in the early 1990s has led to more socialisation in pension reforms in the period 1990 -2015. 
There would be a growing need for socialisation in pensions when the country experienced 
severe poverty rates in older people. Meanwhile, if the poverty rates in older populations 
were not severe, the country would not necessarily focus on socialisation but 
individualisation under the prevailing fiscal pressure. In order to verify this hypothesis, we 
employed the data on poverty rates computed in the contextual analysis in this thesis. The 
poverty rates were calculated as 50% of median income using LIS Microdata for those aged 
65 and over. We combined the data with the result from the FSITA, the trends in reform 
strategies. As a result, this thesis confirmed a loose relationship between ideal types and 
poverty rates. The average poverty rates tend to be higher in countries that belong to the 
socialisation reform ideal type (29.4% on average) and the socialisation-individualisation 
reform ideal type (18.3% on average). Compared to them, those in the stable type (12.2% in 
average) and individualisation reform ideal type (10.9% in average) show relatively lower 
poverty rates among older people. Some exceptions are also observed such as the USA and 
Canada, but the overall relationship was clearly confirmed. The trend was similarly observed 
in the comparison with poverty rates and the size of the effects of social security transfers 
on poverty. Socialisation reforms were more likely to be pursued in countries where social 
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security transfers played a relatively insignificant role in reducing poverty in older people in 
the early 1990s. On the contrary, socialisation reforms were less common in countries that 
had substantive social security transfers in the early 1990s. These results imply the influence 
of old-age poverty in shaping pension reforms. Poverty levels in older populations can be 
considered as an additional piece of jigsaw that clarifies those cases that are not adequately 
explained by welfare regime, social investment, and pension typologies. It should be 
mentioned, however, that the impact of old-age poverty on pension reforms is not fully 
investigated in this thesis. More dedicated empirical study is required to reach the conclusion 
that it is a conclusive factor that shapes pension reforms in addition to demographic changes 
and pension institutions. 
 
By answering these four research questions, this thesis contributes to the existing knowledge 
on pension reform strategies across OECD countries since the 1990s. It paid attention to how 
welfare states manage social risks and identified four ideal types of pension reform strategies 
using FSITA. The result from the FSITA largely confirmed one of the key findings of earlier 
literature on pension reforms of the era; individualisation reforms were the most dominant 
trend over the last 25 years. This thesis, however, also revealed that this did not tell the whole 
story. The socialisation of risks through pension reforms has been continued despite 
prevailing fiscal pressure. Stability in pension reforms was also commonly observed in many 
countries. With these findings from the FSITA, the finding of the influence of poverty in 
older populations on pension reforms demonstrates a new picture in the time of austerity; it 
was not a simple era of retrenchment. Also, it was neither permanent austerity nor a frozen 
landscape. Despite the dominant trend of individualisation, socialisation reforms took place 
when a growing need for social protection was recognised. By demonstrating the co-
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existence of the socialisation and individualisation of risks in pension reforms in the 
challenging period, this thesis contributed to a better understanding of the welfare dynamics 
of the era.    
 
Also, this thesis made methodological contributions by constructing new dataset and 
employing FSITA on pension reform strategies. The dataset generated in this thesis is very 
rare to find elsewhere in terms of its coverage of nations, the period, and the variety of 
contents. In addition, by coding the dataset, this thesis showed how to effectively compare 
the data across countries. Employing FSITA in analysing pension reforms was also a new 
attempt. FSITA has been widely employed in many comparative researches since the 2000s, 
but most of them focused on other programmes such as unemployment benefits and family 
policies or welfare states as a whole. This thesis broadened the scope of the comparative 
research with FSITA by demonstrating the analysis on pension reforms. With the dataset 
introduced in this thesis, it can serve as an example for further comparative studies using 
FSITA.        
 
Nevertheless, this thesis has limitations. It analysed the trends in pension reform strategies 
using frequencies of six categories of raw data. The frequencies are regarded as a proxy for 
the reform intensity of each country. Frequencies, however, may not show a clear association 
between reforms and their significance. As was addressed in the empirical part of this thesis, 
it is possible that countries with a low frequency of reforms actually pursued pension reforms 
that had a significant impact on old-age risks. Therefore, we should be cautious when 
interpreting the result. The fuzzy membership in this thesis provides information of each 
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country’s ‘actions’ in specific directions, but not on the effects of the reforms nor their 
significance. To mitigate this limitation, case commentaries on ideal types were added. For 
example, the case of Germany was explored for the individualisation reform type, the 
Netherlands for the stable type, and Korea for the socialisation reform type in the first 
analysis. Also, Japan was considered as an example of the coverage-focused reform type, 
and the UK for the all-inclusive reform type in the second analysis. In doing so, we 
complemented the limitations of using frequencies as a proxy for reform intensity. They 
allowed us to grasp clearer picture of reforms with the results of fuzzy membership.  
 
Also, the limited coverage of countries and the periods of time are other limitations of this 
thesis. This limitation stems from the secondary data sources employed for the analysis. In 
the main empirical analysis, the dataset was generated based on two international datasets, 
Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles. As Pensions at a Glance only provided 
information on reforms after each country joined the OECD, a few countries were not fully 
covered. Furthermore, Pensions at a Glance 2007 provided some of the data as a big chunk, 
from 1990 to 2003, so this thesis could not break it down further. As a result, this study 
divided the whole data into almost halves – 1990 to 2003 and 2004 to 2015 – and then 
analysed the trends in pension reforms. This was sufficient to capture the big changes in path 
development over the last 25 years, but a more accurate picture could have been captured if 
the data had been divided further. Similarly, the LIS microdata that was used to compute 
poverty has limitations. As the dataset does not have data on incomes in the early 1990s for 
certain countries such as Japan, Korea, and Greece, the study used data from 2006, 2008 and 
1995 for each instead. Also, New Zealand was not covered by the LIS microdata at all. Such 
problems might be inevitable when secondary data is used to analyse trends in pension 
338 
 
reforms strategies, but more accurate results could have been provided if the paucity of data 
could have been overcome.       
 
The limitations in this thesis lead us on to future research. This thesis provided the 
groundwork to understanding pension reform strategies across OECD countries since the 
1990s. It suggested new concepts that reflect the new dynamics of current welfare states as 
well as a new dataset that outlines substantive comparable reform data. Building on the 
findings of this thesis, the research model can be elaborated for analysing pension reforms 
in future studies. First, further case studies would complement the results from the FSITA. 
By expanding the case commentary in this thesis, it would be possible to get better a 
understanding of the characteristics of each ideal type and the underlying mechanisms of 
their dynamics. This would be a particular benefit in understanding the relationship between 
poverty and pension reforms in more depth. This thesis verified the relationship between 
poverty in older populations and socialisation reforms, but its interplay with other factors – 
demographic change and pension institutions – was not comprehensively addressed as it was 
beyond the scope of this study. Verifying these factors could be the next step to complement 
the findings of this thesis. As addressed in this study, the causal relationship between poverty 
and pension systems is difficult to detect in empirical analysis. Therefore, it would require a 
qualitative research programme to fill this gap in knowledge and understand the mechanisms 
of pension reforms. Lastly, it is necessary to highlight the great potential of the dataset 
introduced in this thesis. It provided comparative data that includes highly sophisticated 
information on pension reforms over the last 25 years. The dataset should be updated in line 
with new releases of Pensions at a Glance and ISSA Country Profiles. With the dataset, it 
would be possible to conduct inclusive comparative studies that trace policy changes in 
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pension continuously. In doing so, it would allow researchers to discover new findings in 
pension schemes across countries.   
 
The last 25 years were an interesting period of time for pension dynamics across OECD 
countries. It was far from a favourable situation for pension systems. Pressure for fiscal 
austerity continued in most welfare states and the social investment approach, the dominant 
discourse of the time, seemed to emphasise activation policies instead of passive traditional 
protection. When it comes to pensions, population ageing was an additional burden to the 
system. It might be a natural consequence that the most common issue for pensions was 
fiscal and financial sustainability. Earlier literature tends to focus on the sustainability of 
pension systems, frequently adapted retrenchment measures, and the politics of pension 
retrenchment. The thesis, however, broadened the perspective towards pension dynamics of 
the time. It not only empirically confirmed the dominant trend of individualisation in pension 
reforms, but also revealed the substantive trend of socialisation reforms across countries. 
The socialisation reforms continued in the time of austerity, especially in countries where 
poverty among the older population was severe. These findings provide insights for the 
future of pension systems. Considering continuous austerity measures and increasingly 
flexible labour markets in welfare states, the need for the socialisation of old-age risks will 
not decline. This will continue to facilitate the trend of socialisation reforms in pensions 
unless poverty among older people is successfully alleviated, despite of continuing austerity 
and the social investment approach to social policies across OECD countries. Therefore, the 
co-existing trend of socialisation and individualisation in pension dynamics needs to be 
highlighted further in future studies. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The following table is the dataset the thesis utilised for the empirical analysis. The thesis generated a new dataset in order to trace the trend of 
pension reform strategies between 1990 and 2015 across OECD members. In Chapter Five, we utilised existing data available in Pensions at a 
Glance and ISSA Country Profiles to maximise the benefits of both data sources. Due to limited space, the thesis provides the full version of the 
final data as appendix. Different colours in the table indicate the original sources of the data. For example, blue colour is the data from Pension at 
a glance 2007 (OECD: pp.58-60), brown colour is the data from  Pension at a glance 2009 (OECD: pp.90-94), yellow colour is the data from 
Pension at a glance 2013 (OECD: pp.27-40), green colour is the data from Pension at a glance 2015 (OECD: pp.34-43), and finally, red colour 
indicates the data from ISSA Country Profiles from 1995 to 2014.   
 
       
Country Coverage  
Adequac
y 
Financial and Fiscal 
Sustainability 
Economic 
Efficiency  
Administrative 
Efficiency 
Diversifi-
cation  
Security Other 
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Australia 
Mandatory DC 
scheme 
introduced in 
addition to 
public 
pension. 
Lower 
withdrawal 
rate for 
income test in 
the public 
pension.  
Employees 
allowed 
splitting 
pension plan 
contribution 
with spouse to 
broaden 
accessibility of 
superannuatio
n (2006). 
Lower 
deduction 
from mean-
tested benefit 
entitlement for 
financial 
assets, from 
7.8% of value 
to 3.9%, to 
promote 
voluntary 
saving.                       
Saving 
bonus for 
older 
Australian
s; one-off 
payment 
of AUD 
1,000 to 
people 60 
years of 
age and 
older and 
AUD 
2,000 to 
people 55 
years of 
age and 
older 
(2000). 
One-off 
payment 
of AUD 1 
400 to 
single 
pensioner
s and 
AUD 2 
100 to 
couples 
(Dec. 
2008) as 
part of 
economic
-stimulus 
package. 
Through 
annuity 
calculati
on in DC 
scheme. 
Increase
d 
superan
nuation 
taxes on 
contributi
ons for 
high 
earners 
and 
raised 
threshold 
for tax 
free 
contributi
ons by 
older 
workers. 
Effective 
from 
2013. 
Pension 
contributi
on rate 
increase
d 
gradually 
from 9% 
of basic 
wages to 
Pension age for 
women rising 
from 60 to 65. 
Increase from 55 
to 60 in age to 
access private 
pensions. New 
lump-sum bonus 
for deferring 
public pension.  
Increase in 
pension age from 
65 to 67 in 2017-
23. Abolition of 
age limit (70 
years) for private 
pension 
compulsory 
contribution 
(2013). From July 
2013, retirement 
age for women 
born between 1 
January 1949 and 
30 June 1952 has 
increased to 65 
years. New, more 
generous work 
bonus to Age 
Pension 
recipients 
introduced in July 
2011 that 
replaces the (now 
closed) Pension 
New clearing 
house for firms 
with < 20 workers 
from July 2010; 
measures to cut 
charges for DC 
pensions by 40% 
(December 
2010). New 
“MySuper” – 
simple, cost-
effective DC 
product, which 
commenced in 
July 2013 and will 
cover new default 
contributions as 
of 1 January 
2014. The 
minimum 
obligation 
required by 
employers is set 
to increase to 
12% gradually 
from 2013 to 
2020. New 
“SuperStream” 
reform package 
to improve 
management of 
Superannuation 
schemes and 
consolidation of 
multiple accounts 
Choice of 
pension provider 
in mandatory DC 
scheme. 
Future fund 
established 
to prefund 
benefits of 
public sector 
employees. 
Aim to 
achieve full 
funding by 
2020.  
Introduction of a 
new Pension 
Supplement, which 
combines the GST 
Supplement, 
Pharmaceutical 
Allowance, Utilities 
Allowance and 
Internet rate of 
Telephone 
Allowance and of a 
Senior 
Supplement. 
Enhancements to 
Advance Payment 
for pensioners 
from 1 July 2010 
with an increase in 
the amount of 
pension that can 
be advanced and 
multiple advances 
made each year. 
Carer Supplement 
for Carer Payment 
and Carer 
Allowance 
recipients and an 
increase for Carer 
Allowance 
recipients. 
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Mandator
y DC 
contributi
ons will 
increase 
from 9% 
to 12% 
between 
2013 and 
2020 
(2013 
reform). 
Increase 
in 
targeted 
benefits 
(Age 
Pension) 
of 12% for 
single 
pensioner
s and 3% 
for 
couples 
from 
Septembe
r 2009. 
The 
increase 
in the 
single 
person’s 
rate is 
66.3% of 
a 
couple’s. 
12% in 
2013-20 
(2013 
reform). 
Decreas
e of 50% 
in both 
the 
governm
ent 
maximu
m 
entitleme
nt and 
contributi
on to 
private 
pension 
schemes 
of low-
earners 
employe
es 
(2013). 
The 
assets 
test in 
the Age 
Pension 
is 
rebalanc
ed from 
Jan. 
2017. 
The 
benefit 
Bonus Scheme. 
Phase-out of 
mature  age 
workers tax offset 
– from 1 July 
2012, this offset 
is only available 
to people born 
before 1 July 
1957. 
Superannuation 
changes; 
increased age 
limit for 
contribution and 
the tax deduction 
limit for self-
employed (2002). 
New rules to 
facilitate the 
transition to 
retirement; 
access 
superannuation 
benefits without 
having to retire 
(2005). Restart 
Wage Subsidy 
Program 
commenced 1 
July 2014, 
replacing the 
seniors 
Employment 
Incentive 
Payment and 
from 2011. In 
2014 MySuper 
products replaced 
default 
superannuation 
products for all 
new accounts 
and all existing 
default balances 
will have to be 
transferred into a 
MySuper account 
by 1 July 2017. 
The SuperStream 
project will 
establish 
mandatory, 
uniform e-
commerce 
standards for 
contributions to 
superannuation 
funds and for 
transfers between 
funds 
(“rollovers”). 
Implementation 
will be complete 
by the end of 
2015-16. 
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New 
indexation 
arrangem
ents for 
the base 
pension 
(since 
March 
2010). 
The 
benchmar
k for 
single 
pensioner
s 
increased 
from 25% 
to 27.7% 
of Male 
Total 
Average 
Weekly 
Earnings 
(41.76% 
for retired 
couples). 
Changes 
to the 
income 
test for 
earnings-
related 
benefits 
(Septemb
er 2009). 
Tax 
will 
become 
more 
targeted 
but also 
more 
generou
s. The 
overall 
effect is 
estimate
d create 
savings 
for the 
Treasury
.                
Mature Aged 
Worker Tax 
Offset. 
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bonus of 
up to 
AUD 900 
for eligible 
taxpayers 
in 2009, 
as part of 
Nation 
Building 
Economic 
Stimulus 
Plan. 
Mandator
y DC 
contributi
ons 
increased 
from 9% 
to 9.5% 
from July 
2014. The 
contributi
on rate 
will 
remain at 
9.5% until 
July 2021 
and reach 
12% by 
July 2025. 
General 
concessio
nal 
contributi
ons cap 
indexes to 
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AUS 30 
000 from 
July 2014. 
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Austria 
New option 
for persons 
employed 
to an 
insignificant 
degree to 
insure 
themselves 
under the 
statutory 
pension 
(1998). 
Lower 
minimum 
contribution
s for young 
entreprene
urs. 
Greater 
credits for 
bringing up 
children 
(1998). 
New 
system of 
externally 
funded 
severance 
pay (2002). 
Extension 
of state 
payment of 
pension 
contribution
s for family 
carers to 
Continued 
insurance 
carers at 
favourable 
rates (1998, 
2005). Tax-
efficient old 
age 
provision 
through 
supplement
ary 
insurance 
(1999). 
Better 
protection 
against 
poverty; 
standardize
d minimum 
benefits 
(2007). 
One-off 
lump-sum 
payments to 
lower-
income 
pensioners 
(2010). 
Best 15 years to 
40 years.  
Reduction in 
accrual rate. Less 
generous 
indexation for 
higher pensions. 
Only monthly 
pensions of up to 
EUR 2 000 were 
fully indexed in 
2011. 
Early 
retirement 
age 
increased 
by 1.5 
years. 
Pension 
corridor 
between 62 
and 65. 
Pension 
ages for 
women 
aligned with 
those of 
men. 
Benefit 
reduction 
for early 
retirement 
introduced 
and set to 
increase. 
Tighter 
access to 
early 
retirement. 
Easing 
requirement
s for flexible 
pension to 
make 
people 
remain 
employed 
at least 
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lower-level 
long-term 
care 
benefits 
(from 
January 
2009). Two 
new types 
of benefits 
from DC 
plans 
created 
with a view 
to 
increasing 
pension 
options to 
so as to 
supplement 
the public 
pension 
system 
(2012).  
partially 
(1998). For 
cohorts 
born 1955 
and later 
the early 
retirement 
penalty will 
increase 
from 4.2% 
to 5.1% 
(max. of 
15.3%).  
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Belgiu
m 
Strengtheni
ng 
complemen
tary (the 
second-
pillar) 
pension 
system 
(2002).  
A 
guaranteed 
income for 
elderly 
persons 
introduced 
(2002). 
Increase in 
minimum 
pensions 
additional to 
standard 
indexation. 
Contribution 
condition for early 
retirement at 60 
tightened.   
Pension 
bonus for 
workers 
above age 
62. 
Different 
accounting 
for work 
and credit 
periods. 
Fiscal 
incentive to 
take-up 
private 
pensions 
only at 
standard 
pension 
age. Social 
security 
contribution 
exemptions 
and 
employmen
t allowance 
used to 
increase 
employmen
t (2002). 
Increase in 
earned 
income 
ceilings for 
pensioners 
(2003). 
  Adoption of 
“prudent 
person” rule 
for portfolio 
allocation of 
private 
pensions. 
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Increase in 
pre-pension 
eligibility 
age from 58 
to 60 
between 
2008 and 
2012. 
Abolition of 
social 
security tax 
exemption 
for 
sabbatical 
leave under 
the “time-
credit” 
programme. 
Tighter job-
search 
requirement
s before 
older 
unemploye
d eligible for 
early 
retirement 
benefits. 
Legal 
pension 
age for 
women 
increased 
to 65 in 
January 
2009 
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aligned with 
that for 
men. Since 
January 
2013, age 
limit for 
early (old 
age) 
retirement 
benefit is 
60.5 
(instead of 
60) + 38 
years of 
service. 
These 
requirement
s will 
increase to 
62 + 40 
years in 
2016. 
Discourage
ment of 
employer’s 
use of early 
retirement 
schemes by 
increasing 
the 
contribution 
rate for 
participating 
employers 
(effective 
from April 
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2010). The 
measure 
aims at 
preventing 
employers 
relying too 
early or too 
much on 
this system 
to dismiss 
older 
workers. 
The 
government 
recently 
announced 
a gradual 
increase in 
the 
pensionable 
age to 67 
by 2030, a 
link to life 
expectancy 
thereafter, a 
one-year 
increase in 
the early 
retirement 
age, the 
further 
tightening 
of the 
unemploym
ent exit 
pathway, 
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the abolition 
of lower 
retirement 
ages in 
some 
special 
regimes 
(such as for 
the 
policemen). 
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Canada 
Extension 
of the right 
to partition 
of earnings 
and 
partition of 
pension 
benefits to 
de facto 
spouses 
(1998). 
Pensions 
for same-
sex 
survivors 
(2005). 
Introduction 
of a new 
voluntary 
retirement 
savings 
plan (called 
Pooled 
Registered 
Pension 
Plan) that 
is expected 
to increase 
coverage in 
the federal 
jurisdiction 
(2012), in 
Alberta 
(2013) and 
in 
Governmen
t commits to 
increasing 
benefits for 
low-income 
seniors 
(2005). Law 
to provide 
temporary 
assistance 
to defined 
benefit 
plans 
approved 
(2005).  
Increase of 
the general 
drop-out 
provision for 
the Canada 
Pension 
Plan to 
exclude 
17% (from 
16%) of the 
contributory 
period of 
low 
earnings 
from the 
benefit 
calculation 
in 2014. 
Pre-funding of 
earnings-related 
plan. Increased 
contribution rates 
for Canada 
Pension Plan 
(1996, 1998). The 
administration of 
disability benefits 
has been tightened 
(1998). Québec 
pension plan 
increased 
contribution rates 
(1998). Increase 
(2011) of the 
contribution rate 
for Quebec’s public 
contribution 
second-tier 
programme (the 
Quebec Pension 
Plan) (funded 
equally by 
employers and 
employees) from 
9.9% in 2011 to 
10.8% in 2017. As 
of 2018, an 
automatic 
mechanism will be 
implemented to 
ensure stable plan 
funding. 
Contribution rate 
Québec to 
encourage 
phased 
retirement 
(1997). In 
the public 
contributory 
programme
s 
(Canada/Q
uebec 
Pension 
Plan), 
increase 
accrual rate 
from 0.5% 
per month 
to 0.7% for 
workers 
who delay 
retirement 
up to 5 
years after 
the 
retirement 
age (65), to 
a maximum 
of 36%. For 
early 
pension 
take-up 
(age 60 to 
65), 
pensions 
are reduced 
Greater administrative 
independence for the Quebec 
Pension Plan (2003). Starting in 
2013, a proactive enrolment regime 
for Old Age Security benefits is 
being implemented, which reduces 
the burden on seniors to apply for 
benefits and reduces administrative 
costs. 
The reserve 
fund will be 
invested in 
a diversified 
portfolio 
(1998). 
Relaxation 
of limits on 
foreign 
investments
. 
Introduction 
of new 
voluntary 
retirement 
savings 
plans (the 
Pooled 
Registered 
Pension 
Plans), in 
industries 
and 
territories 
under 
federal 
jurisdiction 
(2012), as 
well as in 
Alberta 
(2013) and 
Saskatchew
an (2013). 
Other 
provinces 
The fund 
will be 
managed 
by a new 
CPP 
Investment 
Board, 
acting at 
arm's 
length 
from 
governme
nt (1998). 
Transfer of 
remaining 
pension 
plan 
assets to 
Investment 
Board in 
progress 
(2005). 
Pension 
Investment 
Board 
pursues 
more 
activist 
role 
(2006). 
The 
Quebec 
governme
nt takes 
over the 
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Saskatche
wan 
(2013). 
Proposal 
(2013) to 
auto-enrol 
(with 
possibility 
to opt-out) 
all 
employees 
of employer 
with five 
employees 
or more in 
Quebec 
into a new 
voluntary 
retirement 
savings 
plan (called 
the 
Voluntary 
Retirement 
Savings 
Plan) 
(2013). A 
new 
voluntary 
retirement 
savings 
plan 
(Pooled 
Registered 
Pension 
Plan, 
for the Quebec 
Pension Plan is 
increasing from 
10.2% in 2013 to 
10.35% in 
2014and 10.5% in 
2015. 
at a rate of 
0.6% per 
month 
instead of 
0.5%. 
People over 
60 are now 
able to 
collect CPP 
benefits 
and work. 
As well, the 
Post-
Retirement 
Benefit was 
introduced 
for 
individuals 
who work 
while 
receiving 
CPP 
benefits. 
Contribution
s are 
mandatory 
for people 
under 65 
and 
optional 
from 65 to 
70. The 
CPP 
requirement 
to stop 
working or 
are 
expected to 
pass similar 
legislation. 
pension 
plans of 
companies 
that go 
bankrupt 
from 
January 
2009 to 
January 
2012, and 
manage 
them for 
five years. 
The 
governme
nt will 
guarantee 
that 
pensions 
will be at 
least equal 
to the 
reduced 
pensions 
that would 
have been 
payable 
upon 
termination 
of the 
pension 
plans. 
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PRPP), 
based on 
auto-
enrolment 
of 
employees 
working for 
an 
employer 
who opted 
in has been 
introduced 
in sectors 
under 
federal 
jurisdictions
. In 2014 
British 
Columbia 
and Nova 
Scotia 
where 
added to 
this group, 
while 
legislation 
was 
adopted in 
Ontario in 
2015. The 
Quebec 
version of 
PRPPs 
was 
adopted in 
Dec. 2013. 
reduce 
income to 
become 
eligible for 
an early 
retirement 
pension 
was 
eliminated. 
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Legislation 
creating the 
Ontario 
Retirement 
Pension 
Plan 
(ORPP) 
was 
adopted in 
April 2015, 
which will 
introduce a 
new 
mandatory 
pension 
scheme for 
Ontario 
employers 
and 
employees 
not 
participatin
g in a DB 
and some 
DC plans 
(starting in 
2017). 
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Chile 
Creation of 
a basic old-
age 
pension 
(2008). 
Last phase 
of 
incorporatin
g 60% of 
the poorest 
elderly 
people into 
the first-
pillar 
solidarity 
pension 
system 
(SPS) 
began in 
July 2011. 
New rules 
for 
employer-
sponsored 
voluntary 
private 
pension 
arrangeme
nts (APVC) 
to 
incentivise 
adhesion 
(2011). 
State to 
provide 
annual 
Severance 
Insurance in 
operation 
(2002). 
Additional 
supplement 
for women 
for every 
child 
conceived 
or adopted 
(2008). 
Healthcare 
contribution 
for low-
income 
pensioners 
abolished 
and 
reduced for 
middle-to-
high income 
retirees 
(2011). 
From 2010, 
new way of 
measuring 
poverty, 
which 
includes 
modified 
definition of 
family and 
per capita 
income and 
use of 
    New Modelo plan won contract to 
manage DC accounts for new 
entrants 2010-12: fees 24% lower 
than existing average; also won 
2012-14 contracts with 30% lower 
fees. Disability and survivors’ 
insurance contracted through 
bidding (effective from 2011). As an 
outcome of the auction in 2014 of 
new members the minimum 
management fees decreased from 
0.477% to 0.47% of an account 
holder’s monthly earnings. Also, the 
fees for providing disability and 
survivor insurance decreased from 
1.49% to 1.15%. 
Permitted 
foreign 
assets 
increased 
from 60% to 
80% of 
portfolios of 
DC plans in 
2010-11. 
Investment 
choice 
between 
five funds 
per 
manager 
made 
easier by 
renaming 
funds “A” to 
“E” in a 
more 
informative 
way: riskier 
to 
conservativ
e. Members 
can choose 
their fund 
allocation 
beforehand 
for their 
remaining 
time in the 
workforce.  
Limit on 
foreign 
investment
s raised 
(1999). 
Introductio
n of 
Second 
Funds" to 
provide 
more 
stable 
investment
s" (2000). 
Minimum 
and 
maximum 
limits for 
foreign 
currency 
hedges 
have been 
establishe
d. 
Women 
and men to 
be charged 
the same 
premium 
for the 
disability 
and 
survivorshi
p insurance 
(SIS). 
Since men 
are 
expected to 
have 
higher risk 
rates, the 
difference 
in 
premiums 
will be 
deposited 
in women’s 
DC 
accounts. 
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subsidy of 
15% of 
total 
contribution
s to 
voluntary 
retirement 
savings 
plans 
(2011). 
Since 
2012-14 
self-
employed 
are 
automatical
ly enrolled 
with the 
option to 
opt out. 
From 2015 
all eligible 
self-
employed 
workers are 
obliged to 
contribute 
to the 
system. 
different 
sources to 
verify 
income. 
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Czech 
Republ
ic 
Supplemen
tary 
(voluntary) 
occupation
al pension 
insurance 
to be 
established 
(2002). 
One year of 
obligatory 
insurance 
prior to 
voluntary 
insurance 
will no 
longer be 
required 
(2003). 
Creation of 
a second 
pillar of 
voluntary 
individual 
accounts, 
effective 
from 2013. 
All pension 
benefits 
were 
increased 
(2001). 
Pension 
increases 
and 
changes in 
benefit 
calculation 
(2003).  
Pensions and 
benefits frozen for 
1998 (1998). 
Credits for pension 
benefits for time 
spent in full time 
further education 
are being reduced 
(2004). The 
pension share 
within total social 
security 
contributions is 
increased from 26 
to 28 per cent of 
the payroll (2004). 
New ceiling on 
pensionable 
earnings at 400% 
of average 
earnings (2010). 
Temporary change 
to indexation rules 
for old age, 
survivor and 
disability pensions 
between 2013 and 
2015 that will lower 
pension increases. 
The voluntary 
individual 
accounts, effective 
from 2013 will be 
closed as of 2016 
due to low take-up. 
Phased 
increase in 
normal 
pension 
age to 63. 
Changes in 
increments 
and 
reductions 
for 
early/late 
retirement. 
Pensioners 
are now 
allowed to 
work during 
the first two 
years of 
retirement 
(2004). 
Gradual 
increase in 
pension 
age to 65 
for men and 
women by 
2030 and 
extension of 
the 
obligatory 
social 
insurance 
period from 
the current 
25 years to 
35 years 
A new independent agency for 
social insurance systems was 
established (2001). An electronic 
format and creation of a new 
updated database (2003).  
Option to 
divert 3% of 
contribution
s to a DC 
plan 
conditional 
on 
individuals 
making an 
extra 2% 
contribution
, subject to 
a reduction 
in public-
pension 
benefits 
from 
January 
2013.  
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(2008). 
Progressive 
increase to 
the 
retirement 
age by two 
months 
each year, 
with no 
prescribed 
endpoint; a 
bridging of 
the gap of 
the 
retirement 
age for men 
and women 
by 2041 
(2011). 
Contribution 
requirement 
for full 
benefit 
increasing 
from 20 to 
35 years by 
2019 
(effective 
from 2010). 
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Denma
rk 
Supplemen
tary 
pensions 
for people 
without 
labour 
market 
attachment 
(1997). 
New 
special 
pension 
savings 
scheme 
(1998). 
Supplemen
tary 
pension 
scheme 
established 
for 
disability 
pension 
recipients 
(2002).  
  Normal pension 
age linked to life 
expectancy. 
Increase 
early 
pension 
age from 60 
to 62 
between 
2019 and 
2022; 
increase 
normal 
pension 
age from 65 
to 67 
between 
2024 and 
2027; link 
both ages 
to life 
expectancy 
thereafter. 
Voluntary 
early 
retirement 
scheme 
(VERP or 
eferlon) 
scaled back 
since 
January 
2012: 
increase in 
eligibility 
age from 60 
to 64 during 
2014-23 
reducing 
Creation of a centralized institution 
(Payment Denmark – Udbetaling 
Danmark), to handle the 
management and payment of 
several social security benefits, thus 
shifting communal responsibilities 
and improving responsiveness 
(2012). 
Liberalisatio
n of Special 
Pension 
investment 
(2005). 
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pay-out 
period from 
five to three 
years; 
during 
2012, 
choice 
between 
early-
retirement 
benefits 
and a tax-
free lump 
sum at 
eligibility 
age of DKK 
143 300. 
Increased 
early 
retirement 
age (2014).  
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Estonia 
Multi-pillar 
pension 
system is 
introduced; 
a voluntary 
supplement
ary pension 
(the 3rd 
pillar) 
(1998). 
Multi-pillar 
pension 
system is 
introduced; 
a 
mandatory 
public 
pension 
funded on 
a PAYG 
basis 
through the 
social tax 
(1st pillar) 
and a 
mandatory 
funded 
earning-
related 
pension 
(2nd pillar) 
(2001, 
2002).   
Increase in 
pension 
benefits 
(2003). 
From 1 
January 
2013, a new 
pension 
supplement 
from public 
pillar is 
available to 
pensioners 
having 
cared for a 
child up to 
age 3. 
Cut in employer 
contributions to DC 
accounts (0% 
contributions in 
2010, 2% in 2011, 
returning to 4% in 
2012). Also, 
employees may 
choose to reduce 
their second-pillar 
contributions 
during this period. 
Cuts to allow an 
equivalent rise in 
contributions to the 
state’s first pillar 
(2009). 
Pension 
age to 
increase 
gradually 
from 63 to 
65 for men, 
from 60.5 to 
65 for 
women 
between 
2017 and 
2026 
(2010). 
Since 2011, pension fund managers 
can no longer charge a unit-issue 
fee. Since 2011 annual 
management fees are also subject 
to a ceiling set in relation to the 
amount of assets under 
management. 
  Stricter 
investment 
limits on 
the 
conservati
ve (least 
risky) of 
three 
funds in 
DC plans; 
members 
able to 
switch 
funds 
three times 
(rather 
than once) 
a year 
from 
August 
2011. 
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Finland 
Coverage 
of 
earnings-
related 
scheme 
extended to 
recipients 
of research 
grants 
(January 
2009). New 
minimum 
pension 
supplement
s earnings-
related 
universal 
pension 
from March 
2011. 
Lowering of 
minimum 
age for 
receipt of 
part-time 
pension 
(from 1 July 
1998 to 31 
December 
2000). 
Flexibility in 
pension 
contribution
s introduced 
for self-
employed 
persons 
(2004). 
Cuts in 
taxes on 
pensions 
worth 
between 
EUR 15 000 
and 30 000 
to bring 
pensioner 
tax into line 
with worker 
tax. 
Indexation 
rule for 
minimum 
pensions 
temporarily 
Changes in 
calculating the 
pensionable wage; 
from the earnings 
for 4 last years to 
10 last years 
(1997). New index 
which reflects 
changes in wages 
to 20 per cent and 
changes in prices 
to 80 per cent 
(1997). An 
employment 
pension as a credit 
for periods of 
unemployment, 
rehabilitation etc. is 
reduced (1998). 
Changes in 
earnings-related 
pension plan for 
self-employed to 
reduce deficit 
covered by tax 
money (1998). 
Changes in 
calculating the 
pensionable wage; 
from the earnings 
for 10 last years to 
lifetime average. 
Life-expectancy 
multiplier (from 
2010). Combined 
The 
mandatory 
employers' 
earnings-
related 
pension 
plan (TEL) 
pension is 
permanentl
y reduced if 
he or she 
takes early 
retirement 
(1996). 
Lower 
accrual 
rates for 
early 
retirement 
pensions 
(1997).  
Stricter 
qualifying 
conditions 
for 
recognizing 
the post-
contingency 
period in 
the 
calculation 
of the early 
retirement 
pensions 
(1997). 
New electronic service allows 
contributors to check data for 
pension purposes (2003). Private 
sector pension acts amalgamated 
(2006).  
Deregulatio
n of the 
statutory 
pension 
scheme 
(2003). 
Temporary 
relaxation 
of solvency 
rules until 
2012 to let 
DB plans 
hold on to 
riskier, 
higher-
return 
assets (first 
time 
January 
2009, 
validity 
extended 
April 2010). 
New rules 
on 
transparen
cy for 
private 
sector 
providers 
have been 
accepted 
by 
Parliament
. The new 
law will 
require 
employees 
able to 
influence 
the 
company’s 
investment 
decisions 
to report 
their stock 
exchange 
holdings 
and 
business 
dealings 
(Jan. 
2015). 
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changed in 
2010 so as 
not to go 
below zero. 
Earnings-
related 
pensions 
linked to 
increases in 
life 
expectancy 
(applies 
from 2010). 
Long term 
unemployed 
born before 
1958 can 
still retire at 
62 with a 
full pension.                 
employer/ 
employee 
contributions to 
earnings-related 
plans (TyEL) due 
to rise annually by 
0.4% between 
2011 and 2014. 
The social partners 
have agreed to 
increase the 
combined 
employer/ 
employee 
contributions to 
earnings-related 
plans (TyEL) by 
0.4% annually 
between 2011 and 
2016.In 2015 the 
pension indexation 
planned for 
(earnings-related 
and KELA) was 
limited to 0.4% 
instead of well over 
1%.  
Increased 
accrual rate 
for people 
working age 
63-67. 
Changed 
adjustments 
for early 
and last 
retirement. 
Increase in 
early 
pension 
age from 63 
to 65 over 
the period 
2011-22 
(proposal). 
The 
individual 
early 
retirement 
pension will 
be 
abolished. 
To 
stimulate 
employmen
t, employer 
contribution
s to the 
universal 
pension 
program 
(KELA) will 
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be 
eliminated 
entirely 
January 1, 
2010 
(2009). 
Possibility 
of putting 
pension on 
hold while 
working 
(max. two 
years) 
extended to 
earnings-
related 
pensions. 
Currently, 
temporary 
legislation 
covering 
2010-13 
(January 
2010 – 
current 
government 
proposal to 
extend this 
period until 
the end of 
2016). To 
stimulate 
employmen
t, employer 
contribution
s to 
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universal 
public plan 
lowered by 
0.8% in 
2009 and 
eliminated 
in 2010. 
The 
legislation 
enabling 
disability 
pensioners 
to have 
work for two 
years 
without 
losing right 
to a 
pension will 
be 
extended 
until the 
end of 
2016. The 
part-time 
pension 
age will 
increase to 
61 for those 
born after 
1953 and 
cuts in 
pension 
accrual will 
be 
implemente
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d. Early 
retirement 
is 
eliminated 
under TyEL 
for workers 
born after 
1951. For 
KELA the 
early 
retirement 
age is 
increasing 
to 63. The 
Unemploym
ent pension 
programme 
is phased 
out in 2014.  
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France 
Targeted 
minimum 
income of 
85% of 
minimum 
wage. 
Retirement 
saving 
funds with 
tax 
advantages 
(1997). 
Abolition of 
the time 
limits for 
buying 
contribution
s (2003). 
Creation of 
an 
additional 
compulsory 
pension 
fund for 
civil 
servants 
(2004). 
Increase in 
insurance 
period for 
those aged 
over 65 
who did not 
have 
enough 
Survivors' 
pensions 
revised 
(1995). Old 
age pension 
calculation 
for migrant 
workers 
(1997). 
Creation of 
a pre-
retirement 
allowance. 
Foreigners 
no longer 
obliged to 
reside in 
France to 
draw 
pensions 
(1998). 
Raise of 
old-age and 
disability 
pensions 
(1999). 
Improveme
nt of 
pension 
rights for 
long 
careers 
(2003). 
Introduction 
of early 
Minimum 
contribution period 
increased. 
Earnings measure 
in public scheme 
from best 10 to 
best 25 years. 
Minimum 
contribution period 
to increase further 
with changes in life 
expectancy. 
Valorisation now 
effectively to prices 
in both plans. 
Indexation of 
public-sector 
pensions with 
prices rather than 
wages. Civil 
servants’ 
contribution rates 
gradually rise from 
7.85 to 10.55% by 
2020 (2010). The 
10% pension 
bonus for having at 
least three children 
will be subject to 
taxes. The 
contribution rate 
will increase by 0.3 
percentage points 
for both employees 
and employers by 
Changes in 
adjustment 
to benefits 
for 
early/late 
retirement 
in public 
and 
occupationa
l pensions. 
General 
reduction in 
employers' 
social 
security 
contribution 
(2003). 
Changes in 
rules for 
pensions 
while 
working 
(2004, 
2005). 
Changes to 
phased 
retirement. 
Pension 
increase for 
continuing 
work after 
age 60. 
Employers 
only able to 
have 
Single application for retirement 
benefits (1997). Supplementary 
retirement institutes to be merged. 
Entitlement to a single pension 
application extended (1998). A new 
benefit to replace the minimum old-
age benefit (2007). Beginning in 
2016 all insured will have an 
electronic account that provides all 
relevant pension related 
information, such as past 
contributions, work history and 
projected pension benefits from 
both public and mandatory 
occupational systems. 
A new 
voluntary 
joint 
savings 
plan (2003).   
Reorganiz
ation of the 
reserve 
funds for 
retirement 
(2002).  
Withdrawal
s from 
Fonds de 
réserve 
pour les 
retraites 
began in 
2011 
instead of 
2020 to 
subsidise 
economic 
recovery. 
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insurance 
period 
(2004). 
New 
individual 
retirement-
saving plan 
(PEIR) 
allowing 
10% of 
earnings up 
to EUR 
24,000 to 
be 
contributed 
with tax 
privileges. 
Cash 
maternity 
benefits 
count as 
earnings 
for pension 
purposes 
(November 
2010). The 
contribution 
period used 
for benefit 
computatio
n will be 
more 
generous 
for 
maternity, 
training, 
retirement 
before age 
60 for those 
with long 
careers. 
Purchasing 
contribution
s for earlier 
periods. 
Changes in 
increased 
insurance 
period for 
child-
rearing 
(2004). 
Survivors' 
pension: 
age 
requirement 
to be 
phased out. 
Extension 
of old-age 
insurance 
period for 
persons 
having 
raised a 
handicappe
d child 
(2005). 
Increase in 
minimum 
pensions 
additional to 
2017, by 0.15% in 
2014 and by 
0.05% a year from 
2015 to 2017. 
From 2014, 
indexation occurs 
in Oct. against Apr. 
previously. 
Pensions below 
EUR 1 200 were 
Frozen between 
April and Oct. 
2014. 
compulsory 
retirement 
at 70 rather 
than 65. 
Increase in 
contribution 
years for 
public-
sector 
workers 
from 37.5 to 
40 by 2012; 
reduction in 
benefits for 
early 
retirement 
of public-
sector 
workers. 
Gradual 
abolition by 
2010 of 
“Delalande” 
tax on firing 
of workers 
over 50. 
Increment 
for working 
age 60-65 
raised from 
3% to 4% 
and 5% 
from age 65 
(from 
2009). 
Minimum 
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unemploym
ent, 
apprentices
hips, 
students 
and part-
time work. 
standard 
indexation. 
Pension 
age stays at 
60 for 
hazardous, 
arduous 
jobs leading 
to 10%+ 
permanent 
disability. 
The age 
requirement 
is dropped if 
the 10%+ 
disabled 
person has 
stayed into 
the arduous 
job for at 
least 17 
years or if 
the 
permanent 
work-
related 
disability is 
20%+. In 
the latter 
case, the 
tenure 
requirement 
does not 
apply 
(November 
2010). 
pension 
age 
(subject to 
contribution 
conditions) 
increasing 
from 60 to 
62 by  2017 
(2012 
amendment
); age for 
full rate 
pension 
increasing 
from 65 to 
67 
(November 
2011); 
employers 
must have 
an action 
plan for 
employing 
workers 
aged 50+ 
by January 
2010. 
Public-
sector 
workers 
contribution 
years for 
full pension 
increased in 
2012. The 
new 
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Restored 
possibility 
for early 
workers to 
retire at 60 
with full 
contributory 
periods 
(2012).        
requirement 
depends on 
the year of 
birth of the 
civil servant 
and 
currently 
varies 
between 40 
and 41.5 
years.  The 
contribution 
period for a 
full pension 
will 
increase by 
one quarter 
every three 
years and 
reach 43 
years in 
2035.  
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Germa
ny 
Greater 
account 
taken of 
periods 
devoted to 
bringing up 
children 
(1999). Tax 
incentives 
and 
governmen
t subsidies 
for 
voluntary 
pension 
(2001). 
Extension 
of social 
security tax 
exemption 
(due to 
expire in 
2008) for 
DC OP 
contribution
s up to 4% 
of earnings. 
Parents of 
children 
born before 
1992 will 
now 
receive 
pension 
credits for 
In 2000 and 
2001, 
pensions 
are 
adjusted in 
line with the 
rate of 
inflation in 
the previous 
year, rather 
than with 
the net 
wage 
developmen
t in that 
year. The 
new method 
of 
adjustment 
is expected 
to increase 
pensions by 
0.7 per cent 
in 2000 and 
1.6 per cent 
in 2001 
(1999). 
Increase 
pensions by 
1.1% in 
2008 (rather 
than 0.46% 
under the 
2005 rules); 
increase of 
Valorisation and 
indexation cut back 
as system 
dependency ratio 
worsens. Pension 
formula includes a 
new demographic 
factor. A disability 
pension will be 
based on the state 
of health of the 
insured person, 
and not on the 
labour market 
situation (1998). 
The replacement 
rate is decreased 
from 70% to 67%. 
Survivor pension is 
reduced (2001). 
Phased abolition of 
favourable tax 
treatment of 
pension income. A 
sustainability factor 
in the pension 
adjustment 
formula. The 
consideration of up 
to three years of 
school or university 
and the exception 
of times spent in 
vocational training 
measures as 
Reduction 
in benefits 
for 
retirement 
before 65.  
Retirement 
pension 
age limit 
raised for 
the severely 
disabled 
(2000). 
Gradual 
increase in 
normal 
pension 
age from 65 
to 67 
between 
2012 and 
2029. 
(However, 
early 
retirement 
age will 
remain at 
63, subject 
to benefit 
reductions.)     
two new federal pension institutions 
are established to strengthen 
efficiency and coordination, and to 
remove the outmoded distinction 
between workers' pension 
insurance and employees' 
insurance (2005). 
A new 
method of 
financing 
complemen
tary 
occupationa
l pension 
plans 
(Pension 
Funds); 
more 
freedom in 
the 
investment 
of plan 
assets 
(2001). 
Relaxation 
of limits on 
foreign 
investments 
of 
Pensionska
ssen. 
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the first two 
years of 
their child’s 
life (July 
2014). 
2.41% in 
2009 (rather 
than 
1.76%). 
Pension-
reduction 
Avoidance 
Law (2006). 
Pension 
increase of 
2.41% in 
2009 (rather 
than 1.76% 
under 2005 
rules). In 
2015 the 
contribution 
rates for 
old-age, 
survivors 
and 
disability 
insurance 
was 
reduced to 
9.35% for 
the 
employer 
and 
employees 
each from 
9.45%. The 
retirement 
age was 
lowered 
from 65 to 
insurance periods 
are abolished 
(2004). Increase of 
pension 
contribution rates 
(2006). Pensions 
were not increased 
in the period 2003-
06.  No increase in 
pension in 2010 (-
2.1%). 
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63 for 
people with 
45 years of 
contributory 
years in 
July 2014. 
From 2016 
this age will 
increase by 
two months 
a year until 
it reaches 
65.     
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Greece 
New 
administrati
ve 
arrangeme
nts aim to 
increase 
compliance 
with and 
coverage of 
public 
schemes. 
Survivor 
pension for 
divorced 
spouses 
(2005).  
No raising 
of age limits 
for full old-
age pension 
(1998). 
Early 
retirement 
facilitated 
for certain 
employees 
(2002). 
One-off 
payment of 
EUR 100-
200 to 
pensioners. 
Right to buy 
contribution 
for persons 
older than 
65 or 
disabled in 
order to 
build up an 
entitlement 
to a 
pension. 
Change to 
old-age 
pension 
formula: 
from the 
last 5 years 
to the best 
5 years 
Restrictions on 
pension payments 
while in gainful 
employment 
(1999). Pension 
benefits on the 
basis of lifetime 
average rather 
than final salary 
(2010). Increase in 
mandatory public 
pensions frozen 
2011-15 – 
extension of two 
years over original 
measure (June 
2011). Pensions 
indexed to CPI 
from 2014 instead 
of changes in civil 
servants’ pensions 
(2010 reform). 
Seasonal bonuses 
for largest 10% of 
pensions stopped 
from 2011 and 
bonuses for lower 
pensioners 
reduced from 
2013. Lump-sum 
retirement 
payments reduced 
by at least 10% for 
civil servants and 
public enterprise 
Pension 
age rising 
from 58 to 
65. 
Additional 
benefits for 
deferred 
retirement 
(2002). 
Equalise 
normal 
pension 
ages for 
men and 
women at 
65; early 
retirement 
from 55 
with at least 
15 years’ 
contribution
s. Mothers 
with 
children 
who are 
minors will 
no longer 
be able to 
retire before 
the age of 
55 (50 at 
present), 
and the 
early 
retirement 
Amalgamation of pension funds for 
self-employed workers. New 
merged pension fund for civil 
servants (1999). Equalized benefits 
of Basic retirement pension and 
National minimum pension among 
different group of people (2002). 
The viability of the system by 
tripartite financing. The 
maintenance of the public 
contributory character of Basic 
Insurance. IKA becomes a Unified 
Fund of Insurance for employees. A 
Unified Fund of Supplementary 
Scheme for employees are set up to 
integrate supplementary funds 
(2003).  Merger of 133 pension 
funds into 13 schemes; centralised 
database of members and 
employers; unique identification 
numbers issued of individuals 
(2008).     Merge of 13 pension 
plans into three (July 2010). 
Implementation of a single unified 
payroll and insurance contribution 
payment method intended to reduce 
evasion and to collect more social 
security contributions (June 2011). 
Mandatory possession of social 
security record (AMKA) from 
January 2009 for all workers. 
The 
modernisati
on and 
maximisatio
n of results 
of the 
financial 
manageme
nt of Social 
Insurance 
Funds. The 
creation of 
mechanism
s of 
supervision 
and 
actuarial 
certification 
for the 
rational 
operation of 
Funds 
(2003).   
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(2005). 
Survivor 
pension is 
now 
payable 
regardless 
of the 
widowed 
person's 
age (2005). 
New 
means-
tested, non-
contributory 
pension of 
EUR 360 
for older 
people 
(2010). New 
flat bonus of 
EUR 800 
replaces 
seasonal 
bonuses for 
pensioners 
receiving 
under EUR 
2 500 per 
month 
(2010). 
Establishme
nt of a 
solidarity 
fund for the 
self-
employed 
employees from 
2011. Increase in 
contribution rates 
(details to be 
announced) for 
social security 
funds (June 2011). 
Average annual 
accrual rate 
reduced from 2 to 
1.2% (2010), 
resulting in less 
generous 
earnings-related 
pensions. Assets 
introduced in 
addition to income 
test for solidarity 
benefits; Reduction 
in monthly 
pensions greater 
than EUR 1 000 by 
5% to 15%, 
depending on 
income (2011). 
Pensions greater 
than EUR 1 400 
per month will be 
taxed by 5-10% 
(from August 
2010). 
 
  
pension will 
come with 
regressive 
tax relief 
from 2009. 
Early 
retirement 
will not be 
granted 
before age 
58 and will 
require 37 
years of 
contribution 
from 2013 
(2008). 
Retirement 
age for 
women 
increased 
from 60 to 
65 between 
2011-13 
(2010 
reform). 
Increase in 
pension 
age from 65 
to 67 for all 
to receive 
full pension 
(November 
2012). 
Contribution 
period 
required for 
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(June 
2011). One-
off, means-
tested, tax-
free benefit 
(solidarity 
benefit) for 
low-income 
pensioners 
offered in 
2009 (but 
then 
abolished in 
2010 as 
austerity 
measure).  
full pension 
from 37 to 
40 years 
from 2015 
and 
actuarial 
reduction of 
6% per year 
of early 
retirement 
(July 2010 
reform). 
Early 
retirement 
age 
increases 
from 53 to 
60 from 
2011. 
Pension 
age linked 
to life 
expectancy 
from 2020. 
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Hungar
y 
Creating 
mandatory 
funded 
private 
pension 
funds as a 
second tier 
to boost 
national 
savings 
(1997).  
New 
voluntary 
retirement 
savings 
account 
with 
governmen
t matching 
contribution
s up to 
HUF 
100,000 a 
year; 
accounts 
also 
exempt 
from capital 
gains tax 
(introduced 
1997) and 
broader 
range of 
investment
s than 
Increase in 
old-age 
benefits in 
Hungary by 
2.6 per cent 
(2001). 13th 
month 
pension 
abolished 
from 1 July 
2009 and 
replaced 
with bonus 
if GDP 
growth is 
3.5% or 
above. 
The role of private 
pensions reduced; 
eliminating the 
obligation for 
employees and 
self-employed 
persons to become 
members of a 
mandatory private 
pension scheme 
and abolishing the 
minimum state 
guarantee under 
mandatory private 
pension schemes 
(2002). 
Contribution rates 
and the income 
basis of the upper 
contribution limit 
are raised (2003).  
Pension 
calculation based 
on gross rather 
than net earnings. 
Through annuity 
calculation in DC 
scheme. DC 
scheme: 
mandatory for new 
entrants, voluntary 
for existing 
workers. 
Contribution for the 
employer pension 
Gradual 
increase in 
pension 
age from 55 
for women 
and 60 for 
men to 62 
for both. 
Accrual 
rates linear 
rather than 
higher for 
earlier 
years. 
Pension 
age 
increasing 
gradually 
from 62 to 
65 between 
2012 and 
2017. 
Proposal to 
reduce and 
eventually 
withdraw 
the early 
retirement 
system for 
law 
enforcemen
t 
professional
s and 
tighter 
  From 2009, 
mandatory 
requirement 
for private 
pension 
funds to 
establish a 
voluntarily 
life-cycle 
portfolio. 
This system 
offers 
members 
the option 
to choose 
between 
three 
different 
portfolios 
(convention
al, balanced 
and 
growth). 
However, 
nationalisati
on of 
pension 
funds 
makes this 
largely 
irrelevant. 
Control of 
Pension 
funds 
returned to 
governme
nt because 
of growing 
fund 
deficits, 
poor 
investment 
returns 
and 
allegations 
of 
corruption 
(1998). 
Diversion 
of 
contribution
s from 
mandatory 
DC plans 
to public 
scheme 
from 
November 
2010 to 
December 
2011. 
Transforma
tion of the 
state 
pension 
from a 
PAYG to a 
funded 
system (by 
January 
2013). 
Closure of 
mandatory 
DC 
schemes in 
December 
2011, 
transfer of 
assets 
(USD 14.6 
billion) to 
governmen
t. 
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current 
plans are 
allowed. 
Workers 
allowed to 
opt out of 
private 
pillar, but 
those who 
do not opt 
into the 
public pillar 
face 
penalties 
(i.e. no 
longer 
entitled to 
state 
pension 
from 1 
January 
2012).   
is increased and 
remain at the same 
level up to 2009 
(2006). Abolish 
13th-month 
payment for 
pensions above 
HUF 80 000 per 
month. Price 
indexation of 
pensions in 
payment instead of 
mixed 
earnings/prices 
(2009). Pensions 
indexed to prices if 
GDP growth is 3% 
or less. In 2010-11, 
indexed to average 
wages and prices. 
Indexed to inflation 
from 2012. 
Taxation of 
pension benefits 
from 2013. 
conditions 
for other 
workers 
(2011). 
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Iceland 
  Increase 
mandatory 
employer 
contribution 
to Ops from 
6% to 8% 
Pensions for senior 
public officials to 
be cut. 
      Requireme
nt to 
reduce 
benefits if 
actuarial 
shortfall of 
10% in 
one year 
or 5% for 
each of 
five years 
to restore 
solvency 
of OP. 
Members 
of voluntary 
pension 
plans were 
allowed to 
withdraw 
money 
from their 
accounts 
after the 
2008 crisis 
(January 
2009). 
Large DB 
pension 
funds (34% 
of total 
assets) 
establish 
Iceland 
Investment 
Fund (IIF) 
to stabilise 
domestic 
economy 
and help 
recovery 
from the 
crisis 
(December 
2009). 
Pension 
fund 
money 
used to 
help 
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stabilize 
the 
economy 
(2010). 
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Ireland 
Introduction 
of widow's 
pension 
(non-
contributory
) (1998). 
Special old 
age 
contributory 
pension for 
self-
employed 
people 
(2000). 
Introduction 
of a 
regulatory 
framework 
for 
Personal 
Retirement 
Savings 
Accounts. 
The 
pension 
entitlement
s of a 
spouse / 
dependants 
Increase in 
pension 
benefit for 
pensioners 
and carers 
(1998). 
Improveme
nts to the 
security and 
quality of 
pension 
entitlements 
under 
occupationa
l pension 
plans. Tax-
deductible 
limits for 
contribution 
is amended 
(2002). New 
pension 
calculation 
formula to 
improve the 
integration 
between 
social 
insurance 
Pre-funding of 
public pensions. 
Tax levy of 0.6% 
on assets in 
private pension 
funds every year 
(2011-14). Pension 
levy on public 
sector wages 
average 7.5% from 
March 2009. Tax 
relief on private-
pension 
contributions for 
high earners 
reduced from 41% 
to 20% between 
2012 and 2014. 
Employer 
contributions no 
longer tax 
deductible. 
Earnings ceiling on 
tax deductible 
contributions 
lowered from EUR 
150 000 to EUR 
115 000 from 
2011. End of 
Reductions 
in civil-
service 
pensions 
for early 
retirement. 
The 
minimum 
pension 
age was 
increased 
to age 65 
and  the 
compulsory 
retirement 
age of 65 
has been 
removed  
(2004). 
Pension 
age 
increasing 
from 65 to 
66 from 
2014; to 67 
from 2021 
and to 68 
from 2028 
(2011 
Launch of e-learning system for 
pension scheme trustees (2010).  
Annuities 
for OPs that 
are wound 
up to be 
provided by 
new (2006).  
Establishm
ent of a 
Pensions 
Ombudsm
an and 
expansion 
of the role 
of the 
Pensions 
Board 
(2002). 
Pensions 
Insolvency 
Payment 
Scheme 
run by the 
governme
nt. 
Pension 
insolvency 
payment 
scheme 
(PIPS) to 
help 
insolvent 
DB plans 
with 
insolvent 
sponsoring 
EUR 24 bn 
National 
Pension 
Reserve 
Fund, 
started in 
2001, 
transferred 
to Ministry 
of Finance, 
largely 
used to 
recapitalize 
banks; 
contribution
s (1.5% of 
GDP) 
suspended 
(December 
2010). 
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are 
improved 
(2002). 
Automatic 
enrolment 
in DC plan 
of young 
employees 
above a 
certain 
income 
threshold. 
Applies 
from 2014 
(March 
2010). 
and public 
service 
pensions so 
as to 
enhance 
the 
aggregate 
retirement 
income of 
lower-paid 
public 
servants 
(2004). New 
affordability 
measures 
to assist 
pensioners, 
persons 
with 
disabilities, 
and carers 
who receive 
the 
Household 
Benefits 
Package. 
The HBP 
will also 
assist with 
water costs. 
The value 
of this 
additional 
benefit will 
be 
approximat
exemption from 
public pension 
contributions with 
earnings of EUR 
18 300 or less. 
Lifetime limit on tax 
privileges reduced 
from EUR 5.4 
million to EUR 2.3 
million (December 
2010). Limitation of 
tax-free lump-sum 
withdrawals from 
pension accounts 
to EUR 200 000 
and taxation of 
withdrawals above 
this ceiling 
(December 2010). 
Exemption from 
contributions to 
public pension 
scheme for people 
earning less than 
EUR 352 per week 
abolished 
(December 2010). 
Lowering of 
employer 
contribution rate 
from 8.5% to 
4.25% between 
July 2011 and 
2013 (2011). 
amendment
s). 
employers 
(2009). 
Re-
establishin
g the 
funding 
standard 
of DB 
plans over 
a three-
year 
period, 
starting 
June 2012, 
to protect 
benefits 
against 
volatility in 
the 
financial 
markets 
(2012). DB 
plans have 
to hold 
additional 
assets, 
from 2016, 
in a risk 
reserve 
intended to 
help 
absorb 
shocks 
and to 
bring 
stability 
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ely EUR 
100 a year 
to each 
recipient, 
beginning in 
2015. A 
temporary 
tax levy of 
0.15% of 
occupationa
l pension 
assets was 
introduced 
in 2014 
replacing 
the 0.6% 
levy that 
was 
introduced 
in 2011.  
(2012). 
Require 
trustees of 
DB plans 
to 
periodicall
y submit 
an 
actuarial 
funding 
reserve 
certificate 
to the 
Pension 
Board 
(2012). A 
new 
benefit 
priority 
was 
establishe
d from 25 
Dec. 2013 
improving 
the priority 
given to 
future 
pensioners 
and 
reducing 
the rights 
of current 
pensioners 
in the 
distribution 
of DB plan 
386 
 
assets in 
case of 
bankruptcy
. DB plans 
have to 
hold 
additional 
assets 
from 2016. 
The 
Standard 
Fund 
Threshold, 
i.e. the 
pension 
fund limit 
eligible for 
tax relief, 
is being 
reduced 
from EUR 
2.3 million 
to EUR 2 
million 
from 
2014.The 
capitalizati
on factor 
used to 
compute 
DB 
pension 
amounts is 
age-
dependent 
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since 
2014. 
388 
 
Israel 
Mandatory 
private DC 
occupation
al plans 
from 
January 
2009 with 
extended 
coverage 
from 
January 
2010.  
Compensati
on of 50% 
of crisis-
related 
losses in 
voluntary 
private 
plans to a 
ceiling of 
potential 
coverage of 
15% of 
over-55s 
(January 
2009). 
Employee 
contribution 
rate up from 
2.5% to 5% 
and 
employer 
rate from 
2.5% to 
10% from 
2013.The 
minimum 
contribution 
rate of 
mandatory 
pension 
savings 
increased 
from 15% to 
17.5% in 
2014. 
      Individuals 
who began 
saving after 
January 
1995 can 
switch 
retirement 
savings 
between life 
insurance 
policies and 
provident 
funds 
without 
paying fines 
or taxes 
(2009). 
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Italy 
Companies
' (with more 
than 50 
employees) 
severance-
pay 
schemes to 
be 
converted 
into 
pension 
plans; 
choice of 
employer 
plan, other 
private 
provider or 
governmen
t-run 
scheme. 
(The last is 
the default 
option.) 
Governmen
t predicts 
around a 
third of 
contribution
s will go to 
new OPs, a 
third to the 
governmen
t scheme 
and a third 
to remain in 
Public 
pension 
contribution 
rates 
increased 
for the self-
employed in 
the NDC, 
which will 
involve 
higher 
benefits 
(2011).  
Qualification years 
for long service 
pension increased 
from 37 to 40 
years. Link to life 
expectancy 
through notional 
annuity calculation. 
From DB to 
notional accounts. 
Less generous 
indexation of 
higher pensions. 
Reduction in 
transformation 
coefficient used to 
convert NDC 
balances into 
pensions from 
2008 to reflect 
changes in life 
expectancy. Cuts 
in pensions range 
from 6.4% for new 
retirees aged 57 to 
8.5% for 65-year-
old retirees. 
Postponing pay-
outs from 
retirement funds 
for public-sector 
employees by up 
to 2 years (2011).  
More rapid 
transition to NDC 
Adjustment 
to early-
retirement 
benefits 
through 
notional 
annuity 
calculation. 
Contribution
s used to 
increase 
employmen
t incentives 
for older 
workers; 
contribution
s are 
exempt if 
they fulfilled 
conditions 
(2001). 
Disadvanta
ge for early 
retirement 
(Seniority 
pension). 
Tax-free 
bonus for 
those 
eligible for a 
seniority 
pension, 
but who 
defer 
retirement 
Merger of three agencies managing 
public pensions (INPDAD and 
EMPALS accounts transferred to 
INPS by 31 March 2012). 
New 
pension 
fund 
investment 
regulations 
have been 
introduced 
in 2014. 
The new 
rules aim to 
create more 
prudent 
manageme
nt of 
investments 
and more 
diversified 
portfolios. 
Limits on 
companies
’ ability to 
take short 
or 
medium-
term loans 
from 
severance-
pay plans. 
New 
pension 
fund 
investment 
regulations 
have been 
introduced 
in 2014. 
The new 
rules aim 
to create 
more 
prudent 
managem
ent of 
investment
s and 
more 
diversified 
portfolios. 
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severance-
pay 
schemes. 
system from 2012. 
Introduction in 
2012 of a new 
early retirement 
scheme with tight 
access 
requirements in 
replacement of the 
seniority pension. 
For the period 
2014-16 a new 
progressive 
indexation rule 
based on the “cost-
of-life” index has 
been introduced. 
Pensions higher 
than a certain 
threshold are not 
indexed but given 
a fixed amount. 
(2004). 
Increase full 
pension 
age from 57 
to 58 in 
2008 and 
60 from 
2011; 
increase in 
contribution 
years for 
full pension 
from 35 to 
36 years. 
(However, 
this delays 
earlier laws 
to reach 
age 60 from 
2008). 
Pension 
age 
increase for 
women 
from age 60 
to 66, to 
match that 
of men by 
2018; 
pension 
age for both 
sexes due 
to increase 
in line with 
life 
expectancy 
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after that 
time. 
Pension 
age for 
women in 
the public 
sector 
increased 
from 61 to 
65 in 2012 
(2011). 
Acceleratin
g the 
scheduled 
gradual 
increase in 
the 
retirement 
age for 
women in 
private 
sector 
(2011). 
New policy 
gradually 
increases 
the 
retirement 
age for both 
men and 
women 
from age 65 
to 67 by 
2026 
(2012). 
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Japan 
Students 
and low 
incomers 
are able to 
be exempt 
from 
contribution 
payment or 
delay their 
payment 
(2000). 
Division of 
pensions 
on divorce 
(2004). For 
corporate 
pensions, 
employees 
can 
contribute 
directly to 
employer 
provided 
DC plans 
without 
having to 
go through 
their 
employers 
(effective 
from 
January 
2012). 
Extension 
of coverage 
Elimination 
of five-year 
limitation on 
retrospectiv
e pension 
claims. 
Provide 
low-income, 
old age 
pensioners 
with welfare 
benefits 
(2012, 
effective 
from 
October 
2015). 
Possibility 
for different 
categories 
of workers 
to make up 
gaps in 
contribution 
records of 
2-10 years 
by paying 
between 
October 
2012 and 
September 
2015. 
Provide 
low-income, 
old age 
Pensionable 
earnings extended 
to include 
bonuses. Benefits 
adjusted to reflect 
expected change 
in dependency 
ratio. Accrual rate 
reduced. Changes 
in indexation from 
wage to price. 
Government's 
financial subsidy to 
the national 
pension system 
from currently one-
third to one-half of 
total costs by the 
fiscal year 2009. 
Workers aged 
between 65 and 69 
years have to pay 
contributions. 
Those who earn 
more than a fixed 
amount have to 
accept a reduction 
in their pension 
benefits (2000). 
Increases in 
contributions to the 
National Pension 
and the 
Employees' 
Pension Insurance 
Employers 
are 
exempted 
from the 
payment of 
contribution
s for 
employees 
who are on 
child care 
leave 
(2000). 
Compulsory 
retirement 
age that 
employers 
can apply to 
private-
sector 
workers 
increased 
60-65 in the 
period 
2006-13. 
Problem of 50 million pension 
records unmatched with individuals: 
Social Insurance Agency to be 
replaced with a new regulatory body 
(Japan Pension Service) from 2010. 
Unify employees’ pension systems: 
inclusion of public servants and 
private school employees in the 
employees’ pension (2012, effective 
from October 2015).  Public 
servants and private school 
employee’s pension systems are 
being unified into the employees’ 
pension from Oct. 2015. 
Introduction 
of two new 
types of 
occupationa
l DB plans, 
the fund-
type and 
the 
contract-
type 
defined 
benefit 
plan. 
Introduction 
of 
occupationa
l and 
personal 
DC 
plans(2002)
.  
Independe
nt agency 
for pension 
fund to be 
establishe
d (2005). 
The bill to 
terminate 
employees
’ pension 
funds 
(EPFs) 
came into 
effect in 
April 2014. 
Financially 
unsound 
EPFs are 
being 
contracted 
out or 
dissolved 
within five 
years. No 
new EPFs 
can be set 
up. EPFs 
with assets 
above the 
minimum 
reserve 
can 
continue 
subject to 
annual 
 
393 
 
of voluntary 
DC plans to 
workers 
aged 60 
and above 
(from 
January 
2012). 
Shorten the 
period 
needed to 
be eligible 
for the 
national 
pension 
from 25 to 
10 years 
(2012, 
effective 
from 
October 
2015). 
Extend 
employees’ 
pension 
insurance 
to more 
part-time 
workers 
(2012, 
effective 
from 
October 
2016). 
Extend the 
basic 
pensioners 
with welfare 
benefits 
from Apr. 
2017. The 
ad hoc 
nominal 
freeze of 
pension 
benefits is 
being 
abolished 
by 2015. 
(2004). The 
exceptional level of 
the amount of 
pension (2.5%) will 
be abolished from 
October 2013 to 
April 2015 (2012 
policy measure). 
Permanently fixing 
the national 
government’s 
burden regarding 
the basic pension 
at 50% by 
increasing the 
consumption tax 
rate (2012, 
effective from April 
2014). new wage 
and price 
indexation (called 
"macroeconomic 
indexation”) is 
being introduced 
from Apr. 2015. 
asset tests 
beginning 
in 2019. 
Financially 
sound 
EPFs are 
also 
encourage
d to switch 
to other 
types of 
pension 
plans. 
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pension for 
surviving 
family to 
motherless 
families 
(2012, 
effective 
from April 
2014). The 
qualifying 
period for 
the national 
pension will 
be 
shortened 
from 25 to 
10 years 
from Apr. 
2017. 
Women on 
maternity 
leave are 
exempt 
from 
pension 
contribution
s since Apr. 
2014.  
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Korea 
Extension 
of 
compulsory 
coverage of 
pension 
scheme 
(1995). Age 
of 
compulsory 
coverage is 
increased 
to cover 
persons 
between 
age 18 and 
26 who 
have 
income and 
are not 
workplace 
based 
insured 
persons 
(2002). 
Enhanced 
protection 
of small 
company 
workers, 
daily, 
irregular 
and part-
time 
workers 
(2004). 
New firms 
Self-
employed 
persons to 
contribute 
more to the 
National 
Pension 
Scheme 
(2000). The 
basis for the 
calculation 
of the basic 
pension 
amount is 
changed 
from the 
average 
monthly 
income in 
the previous 
year to 
those in the 
last 3 years 
(2002).  
Doubling in 
value of 
basic 
pension 
from 5% to 
10% of 
average 
earnings.  
Increased 
contribution 
(2004). Pension 
reform for 
government 
employees to 
reduce retirement 
pension payments 
and increase the 
financial stability of 
the fund because 
of the growing 
deficit (2006). 
Gradual cut in 
target RR of public 
scheme from 60% 
to 40% from 2028.              
Pension 
age rising 
from 60 to 
65. The 
upper age 
limit to be 
insured is 
abolished 
(2002). 
“Wage-
peak” 
system: 
government 
subsidies 
pay of over 
53s who 
stay in jobs 
while taking 
a pay cut. 
Encouragin
g longer 
careers 
through 
earlier 
labour 
market 
entry 
(shorter 
military 
service, 
periods in 
education). 
Set up of an integrated, electronic 
information system for collection of 
social security contributions and 
monitoring (2010). 
Investment 
options of 
National 
Pension 
Fund 
diversified 
(2002). 
National 
Pension 
Fund to be 
managed 
independe
ntly from 
Governme
nt (2008).  
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required to 
set up DB 
or DC Ops 
rather than 
severance-
pay 
schemes; 
existing 
employers 
must ballot 
employees 
on whether 
to maintain 
severance 
pay or 
switch to 
Ops 
(2005). 
Extension 
of coverage 
from 60% 
to 70% of 
over 65s. 
Introduction 
of Basic 
Old Age 
Pension for 
needy 
seniors 
(2008). 
Extend 
mandatory 
occupation
al / 
severance-
pay plans 
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to firms 
with 5 or 
less 
workers 
from 
December 
2010. New 
basic 
pension 
introduced 
in July 
2014. 
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Luxem
bourg 
Introduction 
of a 
voluntary 
insurance 
for persons 
without 
enough 
income. 
The 
method of 
calculating 
the number 
of hours 
qualifying 
for a 
pension is 
improved, 
benefiting 
those who 
work part-
time 
(2000). 
Minimal 
monthly 
contribution 
for 
voluntary 
insurance 
drop from 
EUR 300 to 
EUR 100 
(2012-13). 
The rules 
applying to 
the 
treatment of 
"baby 
years" 
(crediting 
child care) 
are relaxed. 
Allowing 
people to 
pay "mop-
up" 
contribution
s 
retroactively
. Arrears 
interest is 
payable on 
social cash 
benefits 
which are 
provided 
late (2000). 
Increase in 
the bonus, 
minimum 
pension. 
Abolition of 
reductions 
to survivor's 
pensions 
when the 
amount is 
less than 
that of 
Gradually reduced 
benefits for a 
transitional 
scheme in the 
public sector. 
Calculating 
pension from final 
salary to the 
lifetime average 
(2000). Pension 
adjustments 
reduced to 50% 
(2012). The 
combined 
contribution rate 
(employee, state 
and employer) will 
be gradually 
increased from 
24% to 30% of 
covered wage by 
2052 (2012). 
Contribution 
requirement 
for a full 
pension 
increases 
from 40 to 
43 years by 
2052 
(2013). 
Reduced 
rates of 
increase 
are adopted 
to 
encourage 
people to 
work 
longer. To 
obtain a 
pension at 
current 
levels, 
insured 
persons will 
have to 
work for 
approximat
ely three 
years more 
(2012). 
Adjustments for greater 
convergence with public schemes 
with private schemes (2000).  
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minimum 
pension. 
"Baby 
years" are 
extended 
(2003). The 
basic 
pension is 
increasing 
slightly on 
average by 
about 
0.44% per 
year since 
October 
2012 on top 
of wage 
growth. 
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Mexico 
Mandatory 
supplement
ary system 
(Retirement 
Savings) is 
opened to 
self-
employed, 
federal 
workers 
and public 
servants. 
Additional 
tax-
favoured 
mechanism 
for 
voluntary 
long-term 
savings 
(2003). 
Extension 
in coverage 
of the 
private 
scheme to 
the self-
employed 
(2005). In 
March 
2013, a 
new non-
contributory 
pension 
established 
for 
Income tax 
exemption 
for 
pensioners 
with income 
up to 25 
minimum 
wages. 
DC scheme for 
public-sector 
workers (like the 
scheme for private 
sector); new 
employees must 
join; workers under 
46 can choose DC 
option or remain 
with DB plan. (7% 
of employees work 
in the public 
sector). 
  National organization which regulate 
Retirement Savings is authorized to 
reject proposed increases in the 
commissions charged by Fund 
Administration industry (2003). 
Charges restricted to those on 
account balances; switching to low-
cost providers encouraged. 
(Charges are currently double the 
average in Latin America). Simpler 
and more transparent system for 
Retirement Pensions System 
(2007). Re-organisation of pension 
funds (SIEFOREs) within the 
system of individual accounts 
(2013). 
Greater 
investment 
flexibility 
and 
potential for 
asset 
diversificati
on (2003). 
Greater 
competition 
in the 
Retirement 
Savings 
Fund 
Administrati
on industry 
(2005).  
Extension 
of 
investment 
choice in 
DC plan 
from two to 
five 
portfolios 
per 
manager, 
with up to 
30% equity 
share. Two 
new 
retirement 
fund 
administrat
ors. 
Pension 
  Structural 
reform: 
Social 
Security 
Funding 
reforms 
(1999).  
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Mexicans 
older than 
65 years 
and with no 
other 
pension.  
Fund 
Administrat
ors are able 
to offer new 
diversified 
portfolio 
(2005). 
New Fund 
Administrat
ors for low 
income 
group 
(2006). 
New rules 
were 
implemente
d in 2011 
that allowed 
retirement 
account 
holders 
more fund 
choices and 
promoted 
competition 
among 
manageme
nt 
companies 
(2012). 
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Netherl
ands 
  Until 2013, 
it was 
possible to 
get a full tax 
allowance 
for pension 
contribution
s (accruing 
at 2.25%). 
Shift from final to 
average lifetime 
salary in many 
occupational plans. 
Reductions in 
survivors' 
pensions; lower 
benefits and 
stricter eligibility 
requirements 
(1996). New 
regulations of the 
Dutch civil servant 
pension fund 
(2006). Tax 
exemption will only 
be granted for 
accrual rates up to 
2.15% and 1.75% 
annually from 2014 
and 2015. 
Waiver of 
minimum 
contribution 
payments 
made by 
the 
employer 
(1997). Tax 
advantages 
for early-
retirement 
Ops 
abolished. 
Increase in 
normal 
pension 
age from 65 
to 67 in 24 
monthly 
steps 
(proposal). 
In 2014 the 
retirement 
age for 
occupationa
l pensions 
was 
increased 
from 65 to 
67. Early 
retirement 
for 
physically 
demanding 
occupations 
conditions 
Civil servants to be gradually 
brought under the general system 
for employee benefits (2001).  
  Stronger 
governanc
e of OPs; 
clear 
statement 
of OP 
indexation 
policies; 
solvency 
buffer 
against 
future 
liabilities 
for OPs; 
market 
valuation 
of OPs’ 
assets. 
Recovery 
period for 
underfund
ed DB 
plans 
temporarily 
increased 
from three 
to five 
years 
(February 
2009). 
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are being 
phased out. 
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New 
Zealan
d 
KiwiSaver: 
DC scheme 
with 
automatic 
enrolment; 
Governmen
t match of 
contribution
s up to 
NZD 1 040; 
one-off 
payment of 
NZD 1 000 
when 
account 
opened. 
KiwiSaver: 
elimination 
of mortgage 
diversion for 
new 
applicants 
(2009). 
Default 
contribution 
rate for 
KiwiSaver 
cut from 4% 
to 2% of 
wages in 
2009, but 
increased to 
3% from 
April 2013. 
From April 
2013, 
minimum 
required 
contribution 
for 
employees 
and 
employers 
will rise 
from 2% to 
3% of 
earnings 
(2011).  
Pre-funding of 
public pension. 
From July 2011, 
50% reduction in 
tax credit for 
KiwiSaver 
members, up to a 
ceiling of NZD 521. 
Tax credits for 
employer 
contributing to 
KiwiSaver 
accounts 
eliminated in 2009. 
In April 2012, both 
employee and 
employer 
contributions no 
longer tax free. 
The government 
lowers his financial 
obligation to 
KiwiSaver plans 
(2011). The kick-
start 
government 
subsidy for each 
new KiwiSaver 
account was 
eliminated in May 
2015. Abolishing 
the subsidy is 
estimated to save 
the government 
NZD 125 million a 
Pension 
age 
increased 
from 60 to 
65.                                        
    KiwiSaver 
default 
providers 
will 
maintain a 
conservati
ve 
investment 
strategy 
with 15%-
25% of 
allocation 
in growth 
assets. 
KiwiSavers 
providers 
will be 
required to 
post 
information 
on their 
websites 
regarding 
performan
ce, fees, 
returns, 
portfolio 
and key 
staff 
information 
on 
quarterly 
basis. 
Default 
providers 
will have to 
Suspensio
n of 
contribution
s to public 
reserve 
fund (New 
Zealand 
Superannu
ation Fund) 
in 2009, 
projected 
to resume 
payments 
in 2016-17 
(three 
years 
earlier than 
originally 
planned). 
Retirement 
Commissio
n 
Recommen
ded 
(December 
2010): i) 
pension 
age to 
increase 
from 65 to 
67 by 2023 
with new 
means-
tested 
benefit at 
age 65-66; 
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year over the next 
four years. 
offer 
financial 
education 
and 
impartial 
financial 
advice to 
account 
holders. 
ii) shift from 
wage 
indexation 
to 50:50 
wages and 
prices; and 
iii) concern 
over cost of 
KiwiSaver 
tax 
incentives, 
about 40% 
of 
contribution
s so far. 
Treasury 
review 
Recommen
ds 
(October 
2009): i) 
pension 
age to 
increase 
from 65 to 
69; or ii) 
shift from 
wage to 
price 
indexation; 
or iii) 
means-
testing 
basic 
pension. 
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Norway 
Introduction 
of new 
mandatory 
occupation
al pension; 
minimum 
employer 
contribution 
of 2% to 
DC plan 
from 2006 
unless 
superior 
arrangeme
nts already 
in place, 
extending 
overage to 
25% of 
workforce 
(2006). 
New 
income-
tested 
pension to 
replace the 
current flat-
rate 
contributory 
public 
pension. 
New 
pension is 
guaranteed 
to be at 
least as 
high as the 
minimum 
pension 
payable 
under 
current law.  
Mandatory 
employer DC 
contributions. Pre-
funding of public 
pension. Notional 
accounts scheme 
from January 
2011: fully for 
cohort 1963+ and 
partly for cohorts 
1954-62; pensions 
linked to life 
expectancy, based 
on full-career 
earnings not 20 
best years (2011). 
Indexation of 
pensions in 
payment to wages 
– 0.75% rather 
than wages.  
Flexible 
retirement 
age 62-75 
with 
adjustments 
of benefit to 
be effective 
age of 
retirement 
(2011). 
Individuals 
can 
combine 
work and 
pension 
receipt and 
no 
necessary 
to defer 
pension. 
New 
requirement
s for 
occupationa
l pension 
plans offer 
flexible 
withdrawal 
of full or 
partial 
retirement 
pension 
benefits 
from 62 
years of 
age, 
  New rules 
for 
occupationa
l pension 
plans allow 
employers 
greater 
flexibility in 
designing 
pension 
plans 
(2014). 
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independen
t of actual 
employmen
t. The 
present 
value of 
total 
retirement 
pension 
benefits is 
independen
t of 
withdrawal. 
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Poland 
Voluntary 
individual 
retirement 
accounts 
are allowed 
to workers 
as a 
supplement 
to the first 
and second 
pillar 
(2004). 
New third-
pillar, 
voluntary 
savings 
vehicle 
(IKZE) 
introduced 
in 2012, to 
complemen
t current 
voluntary 
retirement 
accounts 
(IKEs). 
Mandatory 
contribution
s to the 
privately 
managed 
DC scheme 
(OFE) were 
turned 
optional: 
One-time 
payments 
for 
pensioners 
receiving 
benefits not 
exceeding 
the amount 
of a 
minimum 
pension in 
2005 and 
2006 
(2005). 
From best 
consecutive 10 in 
final 20 years to 
lifetime average. 
DC scheme 
mandatory for new 
entrants and 
workers under 30. 
Abolition of basic 
pension. From DB 
to notional 
accounts. Change 
in indexation from 
the yearly basis to 
each third year 
(2004). From May 
2011, a portion of 
employee 
contributions from 
second-pillar 
individual 
accounts, 
managed by open 
pension funds, 
were diverted to 
newly created first-
pillar subaccounts, 
managed by 
Poland’s social 
insurance 
institution (ZUS). 
As a result, the 
contribution rate 
for DC accounts 
was lowered from 
Withdrawal 
of early 
retirement 
for certain 
groups of 
workers. 
New rules 
for 
occupations 
retiring 
early, 
cutting 
eligible 
numbers 
from 1.3 
million to 
0.25 million. 
Time limits 
on new 
rules. 
Retirement 
ages of 60 
(women) 
and 65 
(men) 
gradually 
increase to 
67 for both 
from 2013 
until 2020 
(men) and 
2040 
(women). 
Early 
retirement 
Tighter limits on charges for DC 
plans. On Feb. 2014, 51.5% of the 
net assets of privately managed 
pension funds were transferred to 
the Social Insurance Institution. 
Moreover, the assets of those who 
chose to stay in OFEs will be 
gradually transferred to the public 
system ten years prior to the 
retirement age. Assets so far 
accumulated by those who decided 
to move to the public pension 
scheme will also be transferred on 
the same basis.                      
Choice of 
investment 
portfolios 
between 
three 
options. 
Fewer 
investment 
restrictions 
on DC 
accounts, 
including 
permitted 
equity 
share rise 
from 40% to 
62% from 
2020 
(2011). 
That 
threshold 
will 
gradually 
decrease to 
15% in 
2017. 
OFEs are 
prohibited 
to invest in 
Polish 
treasury 
bonds or in 
debt 
instrument
s 
guarantee
d by the 
Treasury. 
In 2014, 
pension 
funds have 
to hold a 
minimum 
threshold 
of 75% of 
their 
assets in 
equities.  
  
409 
 
workers 
can opt-in 
to allocate 
2.92% of 
their gross 
wages to 
OFEs while 
the default 
option is to 
contribute 
to the 
public NDC 
scheme. 
New tax 
incentives 
for IKZE (a 
type of 
voluntary 
personal 
plan) – 
Exempt-
Exempt- 
Tax 
scheme, 
with 
special, 
10% flat tax 
rate (i.e. 
lower than 
standard 
income 
tax). 
7.3% to 2.3%; but 
will gradually 
increase to 3.5% 
between 2013 and 
2017. The residual 
5% (declining to 
3.8%) goes to the 
new subaccounts, 
indexed according 
to the average of 
the previous five 
years’ nominal 
GDP growth. The 
diversion has been 
considered 
necessary to lower 
Poland’s budgetary 
deficit. Generally 
pensions are 
indexed by factor 
which is a 
combination of 
inflation and 20% 
of wage growth. 
This indexation 
principle was 
applied in 2015 
without setting it as 
a rule for next 
years. However, in 
2015 the increase 
of individual 
pension could not 
be lower than PLN 
36.  
(at 62 for 
women and 
65 for men) 
possible 
with 
pension 
reduced by 
50% 
(2012). 
Several 
early 
retirement 
schemes 
were 
abolished at 
beginning 
of 2009.  
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Portug
al 
New 
centrally 
managed, 
voluntary 
DC plan, 
with 
contribution
s of 2% or 
4% for 
under 50s 
and 6% for 
over 50s. 
Solidarity 
Supplemen
t (non-
contributory 
means-
tested 
benefit) for 
the elderly 
(2006). 
Workers in 
banking 
sector 
recruited 
after March 
2009 
automatical
ly covered 
by the 
public 
pension 
system.  
Changes in 
protection 
for self-
employed 
(1997). 
Contribution 
base of the 
self-
employed 
revised 
(2006).  
From best 10 out 
of last 15 years to 
lifetime average 
earnings. Life-
expectancy 
adjustment to 
benefits. Less 
generous 
indexation of 
higher pensions. 
Cut pension 
benefits with life-
expectancy 
increases from 
2008; accelerated 
shift to lifetime 
earnings measure. 
Indexation of 
pensions in 
payment to mix of 
prices and GDP 
growth rather than 
changes in 
minimum wage. 
Public pensions 
frozen in 2011. 
Increase in 
contribution rate 
from 11% to 18% 
for private sector 
but employer 
contribution will be 
reduced in 
exchange (2013). 
The aim is to lower 
Pensionabl
e age for 
women 
aligned with 
that for men 
at 65. 
Introduction 
of 
increments 
for late 
retirement 
and 
reductions 
for early 
retirement. 
Applying 
better 
pension 
rates for 
those with 
21 years or 
more of 
contribution
s (2002). 
Lower 
social 
security 
contribution 
rate for 
workers 
aged 65+, 
as a means 
to 
encourage 
extension of 
Convergence of civil servants 
pension systems toward the general 
social security scheme (2006).  
New rules 
for the 
Social 
Security 
Reserve 
Fund 
(FEFSS) 
that 
ensures 
some 
investment 
flexibility 
(2009). 
New rules 
for the 
Social 
Security 
Reserve 
Fund 
(FEFSS) 
that 
ensures 
liabilities 
are 
appropriat
ely hedged 
(2009). 
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labour cost. 
Introduction of a 
special contribution 
levy on pensions of 
more than EUR 1 
500 per month 
(2010-12). 
Eliminating the 
13th and 14th 
month payments to 
pensioners with 
incomes of more 
than EUR 1 100 
per month. Those 
with over EUR 100 
000 in bank 
accounts not 
eligible for income 
support allowance 
(2013); other 
tighter conditions 
to be introduced 
for renewal of 
benefits. In 2015 
the pension-
income threshold 
for the CES 
(extraordinary 
solidarity 
surcharge) was 
transformed into a 
sustainability 
contribution rate 
between 2% and 
40%, depending 
on income. 
working life 
(September 
2009). In 
2012, 
suspension 
of early 
retirement 
for 
employees 
covered by 
public 
scheme 
until 2014. 
Employers 
who provide 
indefinite 
contracts 
will pay 
lower 
contribution
s (2010). 
The 
determinati
on of the 
sustainabilit
y factor, 
which links 
the level of 
pensions to 
increasing 
life 
expectancy, 
was 
changed. It 
will be 
computed 
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as the ratio 
between life 
expectancy 
in 2000 and 
life 
expectancy 
in the year 
prior to 
retirement. 
The 
sustainabilit
y factor will 
be used to 
increase 
the 
retirement 
age rather 
than to 
reduce 
retirement 
pension 
and applies 
only to 
people 
claiming 
old-age 
pensions 
before the 
normal 
retirement 
age. The 
retirement 
age was 
increased 
from 65 to 
66 in 2014. 
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Long-term 
unemploye
d can retire 
at 57. 
Retirement 
age will be 
linked to life 
expectancy. 
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Slovak 
Republ
ic 
Introduction 
of 
mandatory 
2nd pillar 
(old age 
pension 
savings) 
(2004). 
Introduction 
of voluntary 
3rd pillar 
(supplemen
tary 
pension 
saving) 
(2006). In 
2015 the 
DC scheme 
was made 
voluntary 
and 
individuals 
now have 
the 
possibility 
to opt into 
the public 
earnings-
related 
scheme for 
the fourth 
time since 
its 
introduction 
in 2005. 
Increases in 
pensions for 
people for 
whom the 
pension is 
their only 
income 
(1998). 
Increase 
and 
adjustment 
of pension 
benefits 
(2003). 
From best 5 in final 
10 years to lifetime 
average earnings. 
Through annuity 
calculation in DC 
scheme. From DB 
to points system. 
DC scheme made 
optional for new 
entrants in 
employment but 
compulsory again 
from April 2012. 
Principal 
guarantee in 
investment 
performance which 
is introduced in 
2009 will be 
restricted to the 
least risky (bond) 
fund from April 
2012. 
Contributions to 
2nd pillar individual 
account reduced 
and reallocated to 
1st pillar (2012). 
From 2013 to 2017 
pension benefits 
will be increased 
by fixed amounts 
and thereafter 
valorisation will 
Increase in 
pension 
ages to 62 
for men and 
women. 
  Introduction 
of three 
funds types 
– 
conservativ
e, mixed 
and growth 
– 
supplement
ed by a new 
equity-index 
fund from 
April 2012.  
Tighter 
limits on 
charges 
for DC 
plans. Cut 
fees as a 
percentag
e of assets 
and link 
them to 
investment 
returns 
from July 
2009. 
Principal 
guarantee 
on 
investment 
performan
ce 
introduced 
(2009). 
Reduction 
in ceiling 
on foreign 
mutual 
fund 
investment 
from 50% 
to 25% in 
2009. 
Workers 
could 
switch 
contribution 
back from 
DC 
accounts to 
public 
scheme 
(2008, 
2009, 
2012).  
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follow consumer 
prices. 
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Sloveni
a 
New non-
contributory 
pension 
(state 
pension) 
for people 
who are not 
entitled to 
other 
pensions 
(2000). 
Credits for 
child care, 
military 
service, 
and 
mandatory 
covered 
work 
(2013).  
Pension 
support for 
pensioners 
whose 
family 
incomes are 
not 
sufficient for 
subsistence 
(2001).  
Calculation basis 
modified from 
salary levels in 
recent years to the 
average salary 
(1996). Changes to 
pension 
adjustment; 
pensions are only 
adjusted when the 
growth in average 
salaries exceeds 
1.5 per cent 
(1998). Calculation 
basis is changed 
from the best 10 
years to best 18 
years (2000). 
Changes in 
indexation of 
pensions (2000-
2003).  Pensions 
frozen in 2011(and 
2012 if inflation 
less than 2%) 
(September 2010). 
Calculation basis is 
increased to 24 
years (2013).   
Disadvanta
ge for early 
retirement . 
Pension 
age for 
women is 
increased 
and the 
minimum 
insurance 
condition 
for women 
is tightened 
(2000). 
Retirement 
age for 
women is 
increased 
to 65 to be 
the same 
as for men 
(2013).  
  Supplement
ary 
(voluntary) 
occupationa
l pension 
insurance 
can be set 
up by 
employers, 
insurance 
companies, 
banks and 
other 
financial 
institutions 
(2000).    
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Spain 
Recognisin
g 
unmarried 
couples as 
eligible for 
survivors' 
pensions 
(2008).  
The right to 
early 
retirement 
is extended 
to workers 
aged 61 on 
the 
condition 
that they 
have 
contributed 
for at least 
30 full 
years. The 
pension 
reduction 
for early 
retirement 
rages from 
6 percent to 
8 percent 
depending 
contributed 
years. A 
special 
agreement 
may also be 
made in 
certain 
circumstanc
es to 
provide 
social 
security 
coverage 
The minimum 
contribution period 
for a full pension 
was increased 
from 12.5 years to 
15 years. The 
number of years of 
contributions are 
taken into account 
when calculating 
disability benefits 
(2008). The 
minimum 
contribution period 
for a full pension 
was increased 
from 15 years to 
25 years until 2022 
(2013). Adjustment 
of relevant 
parameters of the 
pension system to 
change in life 
expectancy every 
five years from 
2019 instead of 
2027 [2011 reform; 
the anticipation of 
the linking moment 
is contained in a 
reform proposal 
currently under 
discussion 
(September 
2013)]. The 
Persons 
may 
continue 
working at a 
reduced 
rate while 
receiving a 
partial 
retirement 
pension. 
The amount 
of the 
retirement 
pension for 
persons 
working 
beyond age 
65 is 
increased 2 
percent for 
each full 
year of 
contribution
s (2002). 
The 
pension 
rate is 
increased 
by 3 
percent for 
persons 
with 40 
years of 
contribution
s who 
In 2014 the General Social Security 
Treasury was enabled to bill 
employers directly instead of having 
employers’ calculating employers 
and employee’s contributions as 
was the case previously. 
Weakening 
the 
influence of 
members of 
occupationa
l pension on 
the plan 
manageme
nt (2002).   
  A new 
public 
agency the 
Independe
nt Authority 
for Fiscal 
Responsibil
ity was 
created in 
November 
2013. The 
agency will 
give its 
opinion of 
proposed 
annual 
adjustment
s of 
benefits 
and 
changes in 
the 
sustainabili
ty factor. 
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among laid-
off workers 
over 55 
(2002). 
Retirement 
age is 
reduced for 
persons 
with 
disability 
(2004). 
Changes to 
the survivor 
pensions 
(2005). 
Increase in 
minimum 
pensions of 
6.4%. 
Increase in 
survivors’ 
benefits 
from 
January 
2012 for 
retirees and 
the over 
65s with no 
public 
pension 
entitlement 
of their own 
from 52% to 
60% of 
deceased’s 
pensionable 
sustainability factor 
is only applied 
once when the 
initial benefit is 
calculated (Dec. 
2014). Pension 
benefits will be 
adjusted 
according, among 
others, to the ratio 
of contributions to 
expenses with a 
maximum and 
minimum 
adjustment from 
2014. 
working 
beyond age 
65. The 
contribution
s for early 
retirement 
are stricter 
by 
increasing 
the 
minimum 
early 
retirement 
age to 61 
and the 
minimum 
contribution 
period to 30 
years. The 
minimum 
retirement 
age for 
those 
working in 
dangerous 
conditions 
is 52, but 
new 
coefficients 
are applied 
to 
determine 
the 
contribution 
rates 
(2008). 
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earnings 
(subject to 
income 
limits). 
Normal 
pension 
age to 
increase 
from 65 to 
67 between 
2013 and 
2027 but 
full benefit 
available at 
age 65 with 
38.5 years 
of 
contribution
s (2011 
reform, 
effective 
from 2013); 
sustainabilit
y 
adjustment 
to be 
anticipated 
to 2019 
instead of 
2027 
(reform 
proposal of 
September 
2013); early 
pension 
age 
increasing 
from 61 to 
63 (but 61 
in times of 
420 
 
economic 
crisis); 
contribution
s for full 
benefit 
increasing 
from 35 to 
37 years; 
contribution 
for early 
retirement 
increasing 
from 30 to 
33 years. 
Amendment 
in April 
2011 allows 
partial 
retirement: 
workers 
close to 
retirement 
age work 
part time 
and receive 
a 
proportional
ly reduced 
pension. 
However, 
social 
security 
contribution
s must be 
paid based 
on a full-
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time 
position. 
Incentives 
for work 
after 
retirement 
age: 
pension 
increase of 
2-4% for 
each year 
of deferred 
pension 
(2011).  
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Swede
n 
  Cut taxes 
on over 65s 
with 
incomes up 
to SEK 363 
000 from 
2009, 
affecting 
90% of 
pensioners. 
It increased 
in 2010 and 
2011. The 
basic 
pension 
income tax 
deduction 
for people 
over 65 was 
increased in 
2014. 
New pension 
(1998); best 15 
years to lifetime 
average (public, 
earnings-related 
scheme); link to life 
expectancy 
through calculation 
of notional annuity 
and annuity in DC 
schemes; 
additional 
sustainability 
adjustment in 
notional accounts; 
DC scheme 
mandatory for  
nearly all workers; 
occupational plans 
switch from DB to 
DC. From DB to 
notional accounts. 
Abolition of 
income-tax 
concessions for 
pensioners. DB OP 
scheme for white-
collar workers in 
private sector 
converted to a DC 
scheme. Change 
to the balancing 
mechanism 
underlying the 
NDC scheme: from 
The right to 
work up to 
the age of 
67 years 
established 
(2001). 
Occupation
al pensions 
regulations 
to be 
modernized 
(2005). Cut 
employers’ 
social 
security 
contribution
s by 1% 
from 2009.    
Earned 
Income Tax 
Credit 
enhanced 
in 2009 and 
2010, as 
part of the 
2007 reform 
to 
encourage 
labour 
supply 
among 
workers. 
The EITC is 
higher for 
workers 
Merger of bodies managing public 
and mandatory DC plans. Swedish 
Pension Agency took over work of 
two separate agencies managing 
national pensions in January 2010. 
New fund managed by AP7 
available from 2010, representing 
low-cost government alternatives to 
private-sector investment options. 
   AP7 
replaced 
its 
premium 
choice and 
default 
funds with 
low-cost 
equity and 
fixed 
income 
funds 
(2010). 
Review of 
investment 
rules and 
governanc
e of buffer 
funds in 
2012. 
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2009, calculation 
of balance based 
on average value 
of the buffer fund 
at the end of the 
last three years 
rather than the last 
year. This implies 
cuts in the pension 
of 3% in 2010 
instead of 4.5%. 
Tax deductions for 
private personal 
plans are being 
phase-out and 
abolished by 2016. 
 
             
over 65. 
Simplificatio
n of the 
formula of 
the EITC for 
older 
workers 
from 2009. 
In 2011, 
maximum 
credit for 
under 65s 
of SEK 21 
249, 
compared 
with SEK 
30 000 for 
over 65s. 
Employee’s 
social 
security 
contribution
s are lower 
for over 
65s. Earned 
Income Tax 
Credit 
(EITC) was 
enhanced 
in 2014. 
The EITC is 
higher for 
workers 
over 65. 
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Switzer
land 
Widower's 
pension for 
married 
men who 
have one 
or more 
children 
under 18 
years of 
age (1995). 
Mandatory 
occupation
al pension 
provision 
for 
unemploye
d people 
(1997). 
Lower 
earnings 
threshold to 
cover more 
low-paid 
and part-
time 
workers. 
Widowers 
are entitled 
to the same 
benefits as 
widows. 
Surviving 
cohabiting 
partners 
are able to 
Annual 
supplement
s for 
educational 
responsibilit
ies are 
applicable 
to the 
calculation 
of the single 
person's 
pension for 
divorced 
women 
(1995). A 
flexible 
retirement 
system 
based on 
transitional 
pensions for 
certain 
categories 
of persons, 
and 
particularly 
for the 
unemployed 
who are no 
longer 
entitled to 
benefit and 
who have 
reached a 
Reduction in 
required interest 
rate and annuity 
rate in mandatory 
occupational plans. 
Reduction in 
minimum interest 
rate for mandatory 
OPs from 2.75% to 
2% for 2009. 
(However, this had 
earlier increased 
from 2.5% in 2007 
to 2.75% in 2008.) 
Reduction in 
annuity rate for 
mandatory Ops 
from 7.2% to 6.8-
7.15%, depending 
on age and sex. 
Abolition of the 
widow's pension 
for widows without 
children. Pensions 
are indexed when 
price rises exceed 
a specific 
threshold. The old 
age contribution 
rates, which used 
to vary according 
to gender have 
been standardised. 
Abolition of the 
minimum benefits 
Pension 
age for 
women 
increased 
from 62 to 
64. (Men’s 
pension 
age 
remains at 
65.) 
Bringing the 
minimum 
retirement 
age into 
conformity 
with the 
increase in 
life 
expectancy. 
Harmonizati
on at 65 
years of 
retirement 
age for 
women and 
men as 
from 2009 
(2005). 
Greater 
flexibility is 
provided for 
deferring 
labour 
market exit 
since 
  Pension 
institutions 
are able to 
propose a 
maximum 
of 3 
pension 
plans to 
each group 
of insured 
persons. 
Newly-
formed 
insurance 
institutions 
are able to 
commence 
their 
activities 
under 
optimum 
conditions 
(2005).  
Ceilings on 
real-estate 
investments 
and 
mortgage 
loans 
reduced 
(2009). 
Creation of 
an 
Ombudsm
an for 
occupation
al 
pensions 
(1997). 
New 
regulations 
on 
financing 
the 
guarantee 
fund to 
extend 
insolvency 
cover 
(1999). 
Joint 
managem
ent in 
group 
pension 
provisions 
and in the 
training of 
scheme 
enrolee 
representa
tives is 
enhanced. 
Accounting 
rules are 
standardiz
Pensioners 
are able to 
take a 
quarter of 
their 
retirement 
benefits in 
the form of 
a lump sum 
(2004). 
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receive 
benefits 
(2004).   
specific age 
(2005).  
paid to insured 
persons of modest 
means (2005). The 
Minimum interest 
rate further cut to 
1.5% from 2012. In 
2012, maximum 
contribution for 
insured persons 
who are not 
gainfully employed 
increased to CHF 
19 350 (50 times 
the minimum 
contribution).  
insured 
persons 
may carry 
on paying 
contribution
s to the 
pension 
fund until 
70.   
ed. 
Insurers 
must keep 
separate 
accounts 
for the 
group 
pension 
schemes 
they 
administer. 
Insurers 
must give 
the group 
scheme 
the facts 
and figures 
it needs to 
inform its 
enrolees. 
Terminatio
n of 
contracts 
between 
insurers 
and 
pension 
schemes 
are 
governed 
by 
provisions 
which take 
better 
account of 
enrolee’s 
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interests 
and their 
accumulat
ed pension 
assets. 
The 
conversion 
rate is 
drop to 
ensure 
that 
pensions 
can be 
adequately 
funded. 
The 
minimum 
rate of 
interest on 
enrolees’ 
retirement 
assets is 
revised 
every 
other year, 
on the 
basis of 
actual 
yields 
(2004).  
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Turkey 
  Increase in 
benefits for 
Bag-kur 
pensioners 
(2004). 
From 
January 
2013, the 
government 
matches 
25% of 
individual 
contribution
s up to a 
gross 
monthly 
salary of 
TRY 978. 
Participants 
will have 
access to 
government 
contribution
s through a 
gradual 
vesting 
system – 
15% after 
the first 
three years, 
35% after 
six years, 
60% after 
ten years 
and 100% 
at 
Reduced accrual 
rate. Change to 
indexation of 
benefit increases 
to the urban 
consumer price 
index during the 
previous twelve 
months (2002).     
Increase in 
contributing 
years for 
women to 
receive 
Bag-Kur 
pension 
from 20 
years to 25 
years 
(2001). 
Pension 
age to 
increase 
from 60 to 
65 for men 
and from 58 
to 65 for 
women by 
2048 
(2006). 
Increases in 
the 
qualifying 
period for 
entitlement 
to the 
pension 
from 7,000 
to 7,200 
days 
(2008). 
Governmen
t tax 
deduction 
on wage to 
Introduction of E-declaration service 
(2005).  
A new 
system of 
voluntary 
individual 
pension 
savings 
plans 
(2001). Use 
of 
derivatives 
by pension 
funds for 
investment 
purposes 
permitted 
for the first 
time in 
2010.  
  Postponem
ent of 
default 
interest on 
unpaid 
contribution
s for some 
categories 
of insured 
due to the 
earthquake
s of 1999 
(2002).  
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retirement 
at the age 
of 56. Tax 
levied on 
exit is 
applied to 
net returns 
as opposed 
to 
accumulate
d value as 
previously. 
private 
pensions 
was 
abolished, 
with the aim 
of 
encouragin
g domestic 
savings 
(2012). 
429 
 
United 
Kingdo
m 
Employers 
required to 
provide 
access to 
DC 
(“stakehold
er”) 
pension.  
Extension 
of means-
tested 
supplement
s. Equal 
access to 
pension 
schemes 
for men 
and women 
(1996). 
New 
pension 
and benefit 
rights for 
same sex 
couples. 
Periods of 
adoption 
and 
paternity 
leave are 
treated in 
the same 
way as 
those of 
normal 
Increased 
progressivit
y of 
earnings-
related 
pension. 
Increase in 
basic 
pension. 
People who 
are 
unmarried 
at the time 
they 
purchase a 
pension 
annuity no 
longer have 
to take out 
a pension 
that 
provides for 
survivor 
benefits 
(2002). 
State 
pension 
credit is 
introduced 
(2003). 
Vesting 
rights to 
those who 
leave OPs 
early 
Employee 
contribution of 4%, 
employer of 3% 
and government of 
1% phased in. 
Contribution rates 
increase of 1% to 
2% for both 
employer and 
employee in 2012-
16. A 1% 
contribution-related 
tax credit 
introduced. In 
October 2017, the 
employer will pay 
3% and the 
employee will pay 
4% (Pensions Act 
2011). Indexation 
of private-sector 
OPs is changed 
from the retail price 
index to the 
consumer price 
index (2011).  
Employers 
who take on 
someone 
who has 
been 
unemploye
d for two 
years are 
able to take 
'contribution
al holiday'. 
The main 
rate of 
employers' 
NICs is cut. 
The rate for 
self-
employed is 
cut (1996). 
Increment 
for late 
retirement 
raised from 
7.4% to 
10.4% a 
year; 
increment 
now 
payable as 
a one-off 
bonus. The 
maximum 
time limit of 
5 years to 
defer State 
A new department for Work and 
Pensions created. New tele-claim 
service for pensioners (2001). 
Measures to simplify the regulatory 
framework: pension schemes are no 
longer required to produce actuarial 
certificates every three years; 
provision for the commutation of 
equivalent pension benefits prior to 
normal pension age providing that 
certain conditions are met (2002). 
Legislation regarding tax and 
contracting-out is simplified (2003). 
The rules on limited price indexation 
have been changed to make the 
regulation simpler (2004).Central 
clearing house for new national 
pension savings scheme; aim to 
have costs of 0.5% of balance 
initially, falling to 0.3%. New 
Pensions Regulator established in 
2005, combing previous agencies. 
A reduction 
in the 
amount of 
information 
that must 
be provided 
by an 
employer 
electing to 
contract-out 
or vary the 
contracting-
out 
certificate 
(2002). 
New NEST 
scheme 
planned in 
2010 and 
implemente
d in 2012.  
Contracted
-out 
occupation
al pension 
schemes 
need to 
meet a 
benchmark 
by 
providing a 
pension 
broadly 
equivalent 
to, or 
better than 
the 
statutory 
standard. 
New 
compensat
ion 
scheme for 
occupation
al 
pensions 
as 
measures 
to 
safeguard 
pension 
funds 
(1996). 
Minimum 
funding 
requireme
S2P 
replaces 
SERPS 
(2002).Acc
eleration of 
change of 
state 
second 
pension 
from an 
earnings-
related to a 
flat-rate 
scheme, 
with initial 
benefits 
indexed to 
average 
earnings. 
In January 
2013, the 
Departmen
t for Work 
and 
Pensions 
published a 
draft bill 
introducing 
a flat-rate 
single-tier 
pension 
(STP) to 
replace the 
existing 
multi-tier 
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work for the 
purpose of 
employmen
t-related 
pension 
schemes 
(2004). 
Reduction 
in number 
of years 
required for 
full basic 
pension to 
30. Large 
employers 
(120 000 
plus 
employees) 
must 
automatical
ly enrol 
workers in 
company 
scheme or 
state-run 
National 
Employme
nt Savings 
Trust 
(NEST) 
from 
October 
2012; 
medium-
sized 
(2004). 
Basic 
pension to 
be indexed 
to average 
earnings 
from 2012; 
increases 
2004-08 in 
line with 
earnings. 
Improved 
credits for 
carers. 
One-off 
payment of 
GBP 60 to 
pensioners 
(January 
2009). 
Increase 
basic State 
Pension by 
higher of 
CPI, 
earnings 
growth or 
2.5% from 
April 2011 
(triple lock 
guarantee). 
Contribution
s will be 
increased 
from total of 
pension is 
removed 
(2006). 
Equalise 
pension 
ages at 65 
by 2018. 
Bring 
forward 
pension 
age to 66 
by 2020 
and 
increase 
from 66 to 
67 by 2026 
(October 
2010 and 
amendment
s in January 
2011 and 
2012 that 
accelerated 
the pace of 
reform). 
Removal of 
the default 
retirement 
age (DRA) 
of 65 to 
provide 
workers 
greater 
opportunitie
s to remain 
nt for 
salary-
related 
pension 
scheme 
(1997). 
Measures 
to 
safeguard 
the rights 
of 
members 
of Ops: 
introductio
n of a 
Pensions 
Protection 
Fund; full 
buy out 
policy for a 
solvent 
company 
who winds 
up its 
pension 
scheme; 
revision of 
the priority 
order 
which 
applies on 
wind-up; 
introductio
n of a new 
system of 
State 
Pension 
system. 
The STP 
will be 
implemente
d in April 
2016. The 
reform is 
expected to 
particularly 
benefit 
people who 
were 
expecting a 
low amount 
of Addition 
Pension 
due to their 
work 
history. It 
will 
represent a 
significant 
simplificatio
n of the 
state 
system and 
be a clear 
foundation 
for 
retirement 
saving. The 
governmen
t has also 
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employers 
(50 plus) 
from June 
2013, and 
small 
employers 
(fewer than 
50) from 
May 2015. 
The 
National 
Employme
nt Savings 
Trust 
(NEST) is 
being 
extended to 
small 
employers 
from 
January 
2016.  
2% of 
earnings in 
2012 to 5% 
in 2016 and 
8% in 2017. 
Taxes on 
withdrawals 
from 
pension 
accounts 
were 
lowered and 
tax-free 
amounts 
were 
increased in 
2015. 
in the 
labour 
market 
afterwards. 
From 
October 
2011, 
employers 
cannot 
compel 
employees 
to retire 
using DRA. 
Bring 
forward 
pension 
age to 66 
by 2026 
and to 67 
by 2028. 
Gradually 
increasing 
the private 
pension 
savings age 
from 55 to 
57 in 2028. 
Private 
pension will 
be available 
for 
withdrawal 
from 10 
years 
before the 
normal 
private 
pension 
regulation 
with a 
Pensions 
Regulator; 
requireme
nt that 
employers 
consult 
before 
making 
changes to 
pension 
schemes 
(2003). 
Premiums 
paid by 
plans, 
related to 
measures 
of risk, 
double the 
originally 
predicted 
level. 
Tightening 
of recovery 
rules for 
plans in 
deficit. 
Extension 
of 
Financial 
Assistance 
Scheme 
legislated 
to 
accelerate 
increase in 
State 
Pension 
age and 
introduced 
a regular 
review 
process to 
set Spa 
based on 
the 
principle 
that a fixed 
proportion 
of adult life 
should be 
spent in 
retirement. 
Increase 
contribution 
rates of 
public 
sector 
workers 
and amend 
the DB 
plan for 
Members 
of the 
Parliament 
(2010). 
From 2016, 
a new state 
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pension 
age. 
for 
insolvent 
OPs, 
covering 
140 000 
extra 
workers. 
Pension 
Protection 
Fund, to 
insure DB 
plans, 
establishe
d in 
2004.The 
Pensions 
Regulator 
to assist in 
protecting 
members' 
benefits 
(2004). 
New 
funding 
requireme
nts for DB 
schemes: 
preparing 
a 
statement 
of funding 
principles; 
obtaining 
regular 
actuarial 
valuations 
pension 
(single-tier 
pension, 
STP) will 
replace at 
a higher 
level both 
the basic 
pension 
and the 
minimum 
income 
guarantee 
(Pension 
Credit). 
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and 
reports; 
putting in 
place a 
recovery 
plan 
addressing 
any 
funding 
shortfall; 
and 
keeping 
scheme 
members 
informed 
about their 
scheme's 
funding 
position 
(2005). 
Pension 
education 
initiatives. 
Financial 
assistance 
when 
pension 
schemes 
wind up 
(2006). 
Pension 
quality 
mark 
"award for 
DC 
employer 
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schemes" 
(2009).  
NEST 
scheme 
will create 
economies 
of scale 
compared 
to current 
DC plans. 
Pension 
providers 
and trust-
based 
managers 
must offer 
DC 
members 
free and 
impartial 
face-to-
face 
advice. 
Small DC 
plans are 
automatica
lly 
transferred 
to the new 
pension 
plan when 
workers 
change 
jobs. The 
governme
nt’s 
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authority to 
introduced 
minimum 
governanc
e 
standards, 
fees, etc. 
have been 
strengthen
ed to 
mitigate 
excessive 
charges 
and to 
increase 
standards.   
New rules 
for defined 
contributio
n pension 
withdrawal
s were 
legislated 
in May 
2014 and 
will enable 
large 
lump-sum 
withdrawal
s. 
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United 
States 
Employers 
permitted 
to enrol 
employees 
automatical
ly in 
pension 
plans.  
Increases in 
the 
threshold 
for 
coverage of 
domestic 
employees' 
earnings. 
(1995). 
Occupation
al pension 
reform: 
increase in 
contribution 
and benefits 
limits 
(2001). 
One-off 
payment of 
USD 250 to 
all public 
pension 
recipients 
(May 2009). 
Automatic 
adjustment 
of pensions 
to inflation 
(COLA) 
suspended 
in 2010 to 
avoid 
lowering 
benefits. 
However, 
benefit 
In December 2011, 
“Bowles-Simpson” 
plan for improving 
solvency of the 
Social Security 
system: increase in 
the Social Security 
payroll tax and 
reductions in 
benefits, especially 
for upper-income 
workers while 
raising them for 
low earners.  
Increase in 
full pension 
age from 65 
to 67. 
Changes in 
adjustment 
for 
early/late 
retirement. 
Abolition of  
the Social 
Security 
earnings 
test for 
retirement 
benefits. 
Allowing the 
retired 
worker to 
earn a 
delayed 
retirement 
credit even 
though 
he/she is 
already on 
the benefit 
rolls (2000).  
Social security administration 
becomes an independent agency 
(1995).  
Allowing 
people to 
put more 
money into 
their IRA 
and 401 (k) 
personal 
retirement 
savings 
accounts 
(2006).  
Online 
retirement 
planner 
(2000). 
Requireme
nt to 
companies 
to give 
employees 
more 
information 
about the 
performan
ce of their 
individual 
accounts. 
Forcing 
companies 
that under-
fund their 
pension 
plans to 
pay higher 
premiums 
to the 
Pension 
Benefit 
Guaranty 
Corporatio
n. 
Preventing 
companies 
with under-
funded 
plans from 
promising 
Special 
provision 
for the 
struggling 
airline 
industry by 
giving 
those 
companies 
who are in 
bankruptcy 
proceeding
s and have 
frozen their 
pension 
plans an 
extra 10 
years to 
meet the 
new 
funding 
obligations, 
while those 
still with 
active 
defined 
benefit 
plans will 
get 10 
years in 
total to 
comply 
with the 
rules 
(2006). 
Payroll tax 
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increase 
was frozen 
in 2011. 
extra 
benefits to 
workers 
without 
paying for 
these up 
front 
(2006). 
rates for 
OASDI cut 
during 
2011 and 
2012 as a 
stimulus 
measure.  
 
 
* OECD (2007) Pensions at a glance, p58-60. "Reforms to national retirement income systems since 1990 (to 2003) in OECD countries” 
* OECD (2009) Pensions at a glance, p90-94. "Pension reforms: 2004-
09" 
* OECD (2013) Pensions at a glance, p27-40. "Pension reforms: 2009-
13" 
* OECD (2015) Pensions at a glance, p34-43. "Pension reforms: September 2013-September 2015" 
* ISSA Country profiles (1995-2014) 
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Appendix 2  
 
With regards the analysis on the socialisation and individualisation of risks between 1990 
and 2015, this thesis used 5.97 as the lower cut-off point instead of 5.09, the original lower 
cut-off point in the process of calibration of sets of socialisation of risks (see Chapter 6.2). 
It was because this thesis found two countries, Austria and Germany, are the heterogeneous 
cases in membership. They were originally classified as ‘IN’ in the socialisation of risks, but 
they should belong more to ‘OUT’ than ‘IN’ in the set when considering their traits of 
socialisation reforms. This thesis thus decided to slightly adjust the cut-off points to assign 
them to ‘OUT’ in the set. This decision stems from the case knowledge presented in Chapter 
Four and Five, and the fact that Austria and Germany were already located on the boundary 
of ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ in the original process; only a slight difference existed between their 
original fuzzy scores (0.53) and the cross-over point (0.5).  
 
The following appendix aims at assessing the significance of this decision. Here we provide 
the original fuzzy-set scores and fuzzy-membership scores, and the original result of set 
memberships. It means the following tables and figures are the results based on the mean ± 
one, the original cut-off points without any adjustment. In fact, the only difference between 
this appendix and the Chapter Six is the lower cut-off point in the calibration of the 
socialisation of risks. Here, we employed 5.09 whilst the Chapter Six employed 5.97 as an 
adjusted lower cut-off point. Other anchors – upper cut-off point for the socialisation of risks 
and upper and lower cut-off points for the individualisation of risks – were not changed. 
After presenting the original results of FSITA on the socialisation and individualisation of 
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risks, this appendix also provides the subsequent findings based on the original results: the 
association between welfare regimes and pension typologies, poverty rates among older 
people, and the decrease in poverty rates after social security transfers. By doing so, we 
illustrate that employing the original lower cut-off point would have not make significant 
difference to the major findings in Chapter Seven, which are derived from the outcome of 
FSITA based on the adjusted cut-off point. 
 
Firstly, the following Table 1 shows the frequency and fuzzy-set scores of the socialisation-
individualisation of risks. In comparison of Table 6.2 in Chapter Six, a difference appears 
only in the fuzzy-score in socialisation. In the original calibration shown in Table 1, 15 
countries scored higher than in the calibration with the adjusted lower cut-off point shown 
in Table 6.2. However, the difference is minor. The original fuzzy-set score is only 0.01 to 
0.07 higher overall.   
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Table 1: Frequency and fuzzy-set score of the socialisation-individualisation of risks, 
total period, based on the original cut-off points   
1990 - 2015 
  Frequency Fuzzy-set score 
  Socialisation Individualisation Socialisation Individualisation 
Australia 16 18 1.00 0.86 
Austria 11 10 0.53 0.00 
Belgium 3 15 0.00 0.51 
Canada 14 17 0.81 0.74 
Czech Republic 5 15 0.00 0.51 
Denmark 3 6 0.00 0.00 
Finland 9 26 0.35 1.00 
France 24 28 1.00 1.00 
Germany 11 16 0.53 0.62 
Greece 15 25 0.90 1.00 
Hungary 7 15 0.17 0.51 
Ireland 21 14 1.00 0.39 
Italy 4 21 0.00 1.00 
Japan 14 15 0.81 0.51 
Korea 12 8 0.63 0.00 
Luxembourg 9 6 0.35 0.00 
Netherlands 3 10 0.00 0.00 
New Zealand 9 7 0.35 0.00 
Norway 2 10 0.00 0.00 
Poland 7 16 0.17 0.62 
Portugal 6 21 0.08 1.00 
Spain 7 16 0.17 0.62 
Sweden 5 15 0.00 0.51 
Switzerland 10 16 0.44 0.62 
United Kingdom 40 15 1.00 0.51 
United States 9 7 0.35 0.00 
    
Source: Author.  
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The slight differences in fuzzy-scores in Table 1 result in the differences in fuzzy 
membership scores of the socialisation-individualisation of risks. Compared with the result 
of Table 6.3 in Chapter Six, the following Table 2 shows a few changes in fuzzy membership 
scores. Again, the fuzzy membership scores are changed in 15 out of 26 countries. However, 
the difference is minor, and the change did not affect the country membership except two 
countries, Austria and Germany. Except these two countries, the country membership which 
is greyed out remained the same in all other countries. For example, Canada scored 0.19 in 
each individualisation reform ideal type and stable type in Table 2. They are both 0.21 in 
Table 6.4, but Canada’s fuzzy-membership is anyway socialisation-individualisation reform 
ideal type, as Canada scores the highest in it, 0.74 in both tables. Austria and Germany are 
the different cases. When it comes to Austria, the original score in socialisation reform ideal 
type is 0.53, the highest score among four types in Table 2. Also, the second highest score 
is 0.47 in stable type. These scores are changed in Table 6.4. The highest score in Table 6.4 
is 0.51 in stable type, and the second highest score is 0.49 in socialisation reform ideal type. 
In Germany, the original score in socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type is 0.53, 
the highest score among four types in Table 2. It is followed by 0.47 in individualisation 
reform ideal type. They are changed to 0.49 and 0.51 in each ideal type in Table 6.4.  
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Table 2: Fuzzy membership scores of the socialisation-individualisation of risks, total 
period, based on the original cut-off points   
 
Socialisation-
individualisation 
reform 
Socialisation 
reform 
Individualisation 
reform 
Stable 
(S*I) (S*~I) (~S*I) (~S*~I) 
Australia 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Austria 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.47 
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.49 
Canada 0.74 0.26 0.19 0.19 
Czech 
Republic 
0.00 0.00 0.51 0.49 
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Finland 0.35 0.00 0.65 0.00 
France 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Germany 0.53 0.38 0.47 0.38 
Greece 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.00 
Hungary 0.17 0.17 0.51 0.49 
Ireland 0.39 0.61 0.00 0.00 
Italy 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Japan 0.51 0.49 0.19 0.19 
Korea 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.37 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.65 
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
New Zealand 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.65 
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Poland 0.17 0.17 0.62 0.38 
Portugal 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.00 
Spain 0.17 0.17 0.62 0.38 
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.49 
Switzerland 0.44 0.38 0.56 0.38 
United 
Kingdom 
0.51 0.49 0.00 0.00 
United States 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.65 
 
Source: Author.  
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Consequently, the country memberships of the socialisation-individualisation fuzzy-set 
ideal types are changed in two countries: Austria and Germany. With the original fuzzy 
membership scores, Austria belongs to socialisation reform ideal type and Germany belongs 
to socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type as shown in Figure 1 below. They belong 
to different ideal types in Figure 6.5 in Chapter Six due to the adjusted cut-off point. In 
Figure 6.5, Austria is classified to stable type and Germany is located in individualisation 
reform ideal type. 
 
Figure 1: Country memberships of the socialisation-individualisation fuzzy-set ideal 
types, total period, based on the original cut-off points   
 
Source: Author. 
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The impacts of changes in fuzzy memberships on the subsequent findings in Chapter Seven 
are presented below. Firstly, Table 3 shows the association between country memberships 
and Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes, Finch et al.’s social investment typology and 
Bonoli and Shinkawa’s pension typology based on the original cut-off point. The comparing 
result based on the adjusted cut-off point is presented in Table 7.1 in Chapter Seven. In 
Chapter Seven, this thesis demonstrated no systematic relationship between the country 
memberships and welfare regimes. We could not find any dominant reform trend in any 
welfare regime type and social investment typology. Similarly, the country memberships 
and pension typologies did not match. Based on these results, this thesis argued the trend of 
pension reforms cannot be explained by welfare models or by a pension’s institutional 
designs. It seems the argument in Chapter Seven is not significantly affected by the 
adjustment of cut-off point. As seen Table 3 below, the mismatch between the country 
memberships and welfare models is still clear. Germany is relocated from individualisation 
reform ideal type to socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type, and Austria is 
relocated stable type to socialisation reform ideal type compared with Table 7.1, but we 
cannot confirm any systematic relationship from this result; there is no dominant reform type 
in any welfare regime type and social investment models. When it comes to pension typology, 
the impact is even smaller as Austria is not originally covered by Bonoli and Shinkawa 
(2005)’s pension typologies. As a result, again, any systematic relationship cannot be 
confirmed between reform type and pension typology.  
 
Table 3: Country memberships and welfare regimes (1990–2015), based on the original 
cut-off points   
Socialisation and 
individualisation reform typology 
Welfare regime 
(Esping-Andersen, 
Social 
investment 
Pension 
typology 
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  1999) typology  
(Finch et al., 
2017) 
(Bonoli and 
Shinkawa, 
2005)  
Socialisation- 
individualisation 
France Conservative Type 4 Social 
insurance 
Greece - Type 2 - 
Australia Liberal Type 1 - 
Canada Liberal Type 1 Bismarckian 
lite 
Germany Conservative Type 2 Social 
insurance 
Japan  Conservative Type 2 Bismarckian 
lite  
UK Liberal Type 3 Multipillar 
Socialisation  Ireland Liberal Type 3 - 
Korea Conservative Type 1 Social 
insurance 
Austria Conservative Type 4 - 
Individualisation Italy Conservative Type 2 Social 
insurance 
Portugal - Type 2 - 
Finland Social Democratic Type 4 - 
Poland - - - 
Spain Conservative Type 2 - 
Switzerland - Type 1 Multi-pillar 
Belgium Conservative Type 4 - 
Czech Republic - - - 
Hungary - - - 
Sweden Social Democratic Type 4 Multi-pillar 
Stable  Denmark Social Democratic Type 4 - 
Netherland Liberal Type 3 - 
Norway  Social Democratic Type 3 - 
Luxembourg - - - 
New Zealand Liberal Type 3 - 
USA Liberal Type 1  Bismarckian 
lite 
 
* The classification of welfare regimes is mainly based on Esping-Andersen (1999: 74-94). As Esping-
Andersen did not clearly reveal every country membership of each regime, this thesis only addresses countries 
that he named as examples in describing the characteristics of three regimes. The classification of Korea and 
Japan followed Nam (2002) and Shinkawa (2001)’s view (see Chapter Three).  
* The classification of social investment typologies is from Finch et al. (2017). 
* The classification of pension typologies is from Bonoli and Shinkawa (2005:6).  
Source: Author.  
  
 
446 
 
Chapter Seven also presented the association between country memberships and poverty 
rates in older population. Table 7.2 in Chapter Seven showed the old-age poverty rates in 
each country in the early 1990s and the average of old-age poverty rates in membership 
countries of each reform ideal type. Based on the table, this thesis argued a loose relationship 
between ideal types and poverty rates. The average poverty rates are the highest in countries 
that belong to the socialisation reform ideal type. Then it is followed by the socialisation-
individualisation reform ideal type. Compared to these two types, the countries that belong 
to stable type and individualisation reform ideal type had relatively moderate old-age 
poverty. This trend is similarly observed when we employed the original cut-off point in 
calibration. As seen Table 4 below, Germany is originally classified to socialisation-
individualisation reform ideal type instead of individualisation reform ideal type, and 
Austria is classified to socialisation reform ideal type instead stable type. In Table 4, the 
average of old-age poverty rates is highest in the socialisation reform ideal type (25.5%), 
and then in the socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type (17.2%). It is followed by 
the stable type (12.3%) and the individualisation reform ideal type (11%). Compared to 
Table 7.2, the average of poverty rates in the socialisation reform ideal type and the 
socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type decreased more than 1 percentage point, 
but the loose relationship between ideal type and poverty rates is still clearly confirmed.     
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Table 4: Country memberships and poverty rates (1990–2015), based on the original 
cut-off points   
    Old-age poverty 
rates  
(early 1990s) 
Average of old-age  
poverty rates  
(early 1990s) 
Socialisation  Korea 41.4 25.5 
Ireland 17.3 
Austria  11.9 
Socialisation- 
individualisation 
Greece 27.3 17.2 
Australia 24.2 
UK 24.1 
France 14.7 
Japan  13.6 
Germany 10.4 
Canada 5.8 
Stable  USA  21.5 12.3 
Norway 14 
Luxembourg 11.8 
Denmark 11 
Netherland 3.2 
New Zealand - 
Individualisation Italy 15.7 11 
Finland 14.1 
Hungary 13.6 
Belgium 12.1 
Spain 12 
Poland 10.9 
Switzerland  8.4 
Sweden 6.4 
Czech Republic 5.7 
Portugal - 
 
* Relative poverty rates at 50% of the median income threshold, aged 65 and over. 
* Poverty rates in Korea and Japan are based on figures from the mid- 2000s.    
* Portugal and New Zealand are not covered in the LIS Microdata.  
Source: Author based on the LIS Microdata.   
 
Lastly, Chapter Seven demonstrated the size of the effects of social security transfers on 
poverty. In Figure 7.2 in Chapter Seven, blue bars indicate countries that belong either to the 
socialisation reform ideal type or the socialisation-individualisation reform ideal type. On 
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the other hand, the grey bars in the figure indicate countries that belong either to the 
individualisation reform ideal type or the stable type. From the result, this thesis confirmed 
a moderate association between the size of the effects of social security transfers and the 
trend of socialisation. The Figure 2 below is illustrated in the same way but analysed based 
on the original cut-off points in calibration. Like Figure 7.2, we can find a moderate 
association between the size of the effects of social security transfers and the trend of 
socialisation; blue bars are concentrated in the left half of the graph whilst grey bars are 
located more in the right half of the graph. However, it is worth noting that the association 
is relatively less clear compared to Figure 7.2. There are more outliers in Figure 2 due to 
Germany and Austria. They are blue bars but located in the right side of the graph. Germany 
is especially a clear anomaly with Canada, as they devoted to socialisation reforms despite 
their income security systems already decreased poverty rates more than 90%. As addressed 
in Chapter Seven, the anomalies observed here might indicate the possible influence of other 
factors that shape pension reforms.             
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Figure 2: Decrease in poverty rates after social security transfers and the distribution 
of countries scoring high in socialisation, based on the original cut-off points     
 
 
* Countries represented by blue bars scored high in the set of socialisation.   
Source: Author based on the LIS microdata.   
 
In this Appendix 2, we demonstrated the outcome of FISTA on socialisation-
individualisation between 1990 and 2015 with the original lower cut-off point in the set of 
socialisation of risks. Compared to the outcome based on the adjusted cut-off point in 
Chapter Six, two country’s fuzzy-memberships are different: Germany and Austria. Except 
these two countries, all other country memberships remained the same. It resulted in different 
outcomes in the comparison of welfare regime and pension typology, poverty rates, and the 
size of the effects of social security transfers on poverty. However, they are not big enough 
to have any significant impact on overall findings in Chapter Seven. Firstly, the trend of 
pension reforms cannot be explained by Esping-Andersen’s regime theory or by Bonoli and 
Shinkawa’s pension typology. Secondly, a loose relationship between reform types and 
poverty rates is observed. Thirdly, a moderate overall association between the size of the 
effects of social security transfers and the trend of socialisation is also observed. Regarding 
the third point, it is worth noticing that more outliers appeared – as Germany and Austria are 
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the additional anomalies – when we employed the original cut-off point in calibration. It 
implies the finding would have been less clear if we stick to the original cut-off point instead 
of the adjusted one. We would have spared more time for the outliers before drawing the 
conclusion. However, the core part of the finding did not change when we considered the 
traits of socialisation reforms in Germany and Austria, which are already explored in Chapter 
Six.   
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